I would say not, i.e., these beliefs can't be wrong in the epistemological sense. — Sam26
I agree that animal behaviour might be explained without mentioning belief.
I made the point that belief implies a choice; it involves believing one thing rather than some other. Instinct does not involve choice. — Banno
So if I understand Janus, the correct grammar would be that if one knows, one is certain; when one doubts, one no longer knows nor is justified in believing. — Banno
Will mere implication do? I think not, since any true proposition is implied by any other proposition, true or false.
Why call them "beliefs" then, when the word 'belief' is usually understood to have a propositional sense, when beliefs are generally truth apt, and thus right or wrong? It seems all the more odd in that you have stated a few times that you don't like Wittgenstein's term "hinge proposition" for this very reason.
Why not call these "hinge propositions" or "bedrock beliefs" 'hinge understandings' or 'bedrock understandings'. I anticipate you might say that understandings can be wrong too; but I think generally it is more the case that they are adequate or inadequate, rather than right or wrong. The understanding that I have hands seems to be eminently useful and not at all inadequate. — Janus
Also I would not characterize them as understandings, for me at least, this does not capture Wittgenstein's intent. — Sam26
They are beliefs, they can be prelinguistic, which are shown in a form of life, viz., one's actions. — Sam26
These beliefs do reflect our subjective certainty about the world though, but this certainty is not epistemological certainty. — Sam26
A belief is a relation between an individual and a proposition. — Banno
It only follows that there are no pre-linguistic and/or non-linguistic belief unless propositions existed prior to language. That alone is more than enough ground to warrant our dismissing the above belief statement, because there most certainly are such things. — creativesoul
When I enter the room and see the pens and papers I know there are pens and papers. Once I start thinking in terms of belief, then doubt enters. — Janus
Are there any other criteria that can be used to establish whether something is or is not a belief, beyond whether or not calling it a belief is consistent and coherent with common usage of the term 'belief'? — Janus
It only follows that there are no pre-linguistic and/or non-linguistic belief unless propositions existed prior to language. That alone is more than enough ground to warrant our dismissing the above belief statement, because there most certainly are such things. — creativesoul
That depends on how we organise the semantic field, though. — Dawnstorm
A belief is a relation between an individual and a proposition.
Are there any other criteria that can be used to establish whether something is or is not a belief, beyond whether or not calling it a belief is consistent and coherent with common usage of the term 'belief'? — Janus
The problem here is that I have some idea what "agents" and "mental correlations" could be as considered in a linguistic context, but outside that context I have no idea. — Janus
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.