If the limits of language are the limits of our world, then language also limits our beliefs? — frank

Well, if any belief can be parsed in the form B(a,p) where p is a proposition, then yes, our beliefs are all of them statable. All that is being said here is that any belief can be stated.

The word "limit" seems to put folk off - perhaps it should be "The extent of our world is the extent of our language".

But even that is not quite right. Perhaps "The extent of our world is the extent of what we can do with words".

Which is just to say that our world and our words are knitted together.

what is the believer? — frank

I would treat this question in the same way as any requests for definitions - as a discussion of how we use the words involved; this is as opposed to a search for an "essence" of believer that allows us to decide what things are believers and what are not.

So I'm not so sure there is a believer, if that is conceived of as a "self'. The self is perhaps constructed out of our interactions with the world. A post-hoc excuse for saying you are the same as the Frank I spoke to last year.

In assessing the nature of belief we're attempting to pull ourselves free of our time and place to occupy a vantage point on who and what we are. — frank

The notion of a view from nowhere.

What about the view from anywhere? Can't there be propositions that are true regardless of where you stand?

A belief may be pre-linguistic in your sense, or in W's appeal to forms of life, but also linguistic in the sense that it can be stated (later). — jamalrob

Yep. A belief must be statable, if not stated.

And I'm not talking about instincts. — Sam26

That's the question: is it legitimate to cal something a belief if it is caused - if there is no choice involved?

That's the question: is it legitimate to cal something a belief if it is caused - if there is no choice involved? — Banno

While it's true that some beliefs are a matter of choice, it's also true that some beliefs have nothing to do with choice. For example, let's suppose that I walk into a room and observe certain objects in the room, do I make a choice to believe there are pens, paper, clothing, pillows, etc, or do I just believe it without a choice being made at all. In fact, this may support the idea that the belief is causally formed quite apart from any decision. My sensory observations about what's in the room have become part of what I believe, quite apart from a choice to believe.

What about the view from anywhere? Can't there be propositions that are true regardless of where you stand? — Banno

Should be simple enough to demonstrate. Just give us an example.

I like that. Damn, I should have come up with that myself.

Seeing the pens, papers and so on justifies the belief.

In much the same way as "Here is a hand" justifies belief in hands.

Banno the belief is not justified, nor is there a choice involved. I don't make some kind of justification for these kinds of beliefs, that's Wittgenstein's point. Moore justifies "here is a hand" through a proof, an argument (look at my last posts in A Wittgenstein Commentary where I quote Moore), but Wittgenstein refutes this idea. There would be a justification involved if you asked me how I know that there are pens, paper, clothing, etc. in the room, and I replied with, "I saw them." Note that now this is taking place within language, which is where justification takes place. Justification is linguistic.

Think about it this way: You walk in the room and see the objects, as a result of seeing the objects you have the belief, there is no choice, and there is no justification needed. Do you justify the belief to yourself? No. The only time a justification would be needed is if a discourse takes place between you and someone else, i.e., you are asked, "How do you know...?" Also note that this e.g. is different (in terms of justification) from Moore's e.g., in that everyone sees Moore's hand, Moore holds up his hand to the audience and says, "Here is a hand." "Here is a hand" is bedrock, there is no need to justify this belief to the audience. Wittgenstein's point is that these statements are bedrock, they are the hinge on which justification occurs. The epistemological door wouldn't swing without these beliefs.

There is also something that is the same in my e.g. and Moore's example. Everyone in the room with Moore is having the same sensory experience that you have when you walk into the room (my e.g.) and see the objects I mentioned in my e.g. Where Moore goes wrong is that he is using a justification where no justification is needed, just as in my room e.g. Do all the people in the room need a justification that that is a hand? No. Do you need a justification when walking into a room that has x, y, and z objects? No.

You need a justification where a doubt might arise. So if I'm not in the room, where either e.g. is taking place, I might ask, "How do you know?" This is perfectly legitimate, and it's within your epistemic rights to ask "How do you know?" Then, of course you can give your justification, "I saw..." The justification is a sensory justification, which is one of the ways we justify some of our beliefs. Thus it would be a piece of knowledge.

There is a further point however that seems to be confusing, viz., that there are two kinds of bedrock beliefs. First, there are those that take place within language, as in Moore's statements. Second, there are bedrock beliefs, which I'm identifying, and which Wittgenstein alludes to in On Certainty, that occur quite apart from language. These bedrock beliefs are the ones I've given when talking about pre-linguistic man, but also note that they do occur in my e.g. above, viz., if Banno walks into a room and sees x,y, and z objects, then you have these beliefs; and although Banno can state the belief (something pre-linguistic man cannot do), they are not stated until they are stated. They are not stated in your mind, you have them quite apart from any statement, a statement is not required in order to have these beliefs. If you want to share the belief, or justify the belief, you can, but that's not a necessary ingredient to having the belief. This is why pre-linguistic man can also have the belief quite apart from language. He could walk into the room and see the same objects you see, and as a result have the same beliefs you have. The only difference is that he cannot share the belief, he doesn't have the linguistic ability, the same is true of an animal.

I hope this last post clarifies some of the problems.

I'm sympathetic with the overall view you've sketched.

A corollary of this is that belief does not stand in opposition to falsehood, but to doubt. Truth goes with falsehood, belief with doubt. And at the extreme end of belief we find certainty. In certainty, doubt is inadmissible. — Banno

I prefer to say that belief and knowledge are compatible with doubt, though it seems a psychological "state" or "feeling" of certainty is not compatible with a psychological "state" or "feeling" of doubt.

Belief does not entail certainty. Knowledge does not entail certainty.

So, that John is hungry, and that John believes eating a sandwich will remove his hunger, we have a sufficient causal explanation for why John ate the sandwich. — Banno

I agree that the explanation is satisfying in a wide range of cases, but strictly speaking I wouldn't call it sufficient.

Consider the infinite range of counterexamples including the following. John is hungry, believes eating a sandwich will remove this hunger, but:
---prefers fish and chips....
---wants to lose weight....
---has been blindfolded and tied to a chair....

I doubt we could ever give a description of an agent's states along these lines, in anything like traditional folk-psychological terms, that would be sufficient to predict the agent's subsequent action in all cases. There's just too much to specify in concrete cases. One may never fill in the gap papered over with a phrase like "all else equal...."

We might say more modestly: In appropriate circumstances and all else equal, an agent who is hungry and believes eating a sandwich will remove this hunger, is likely disposed to eat a sandwich; though there may be countervailing dispositions at work in the same agent on the same occasion.

And here we have an indication of the propositional content of a belief; of the content of the 'p' in B(a,p). The content here has the form "doing X will produce result Y". — Banno

Some but not all beliefs seem well-suited to this form. Though many more beliefs have practical implications. In ordinary circumstances and all else equal, if S believes p then S is disposed to actions (a1, a2, ..., an).

In fact, we tend to ascribe beliefs to other agents -- including nonhuman animals -- given observation that they perform or are disposed to perform some of a relevant range of actions.

Which raises the question of whether all beliefs can be parsed in the form of an action production a result; does "I believe in God" parse to "I believe that praying for rain will produce rain", or some conjunction of such beliefs? — Banno

Of course there is a wide variety of ways to "believe in God", and I expect there's no single set of actions correlated in the relevant way with all such beliefs.

Nevertheless, some ways of believing in God will dispose the believer to perform or affirm a conjunction of actions or beliefs-about-action of the sort you've indicated.

Seeing the pens, papers and so on justifies the belief.

In much the same way as "Here is a hand" justifies belief in hands. — Banno

The problem I have with this way of looking at it is that I think the notion of belief is completely inappropriate in these kinds of cases.

When I enter the room and see the pens and papers I know there are pens and papers. Once I start thinking in terms of belief, then doubt enters. If, on the basis of critical doubt, I come to believe that I can no longer justify taking my seeing of pens and papers as knowing of pens and papers, then it follows that I can no longer justify any belief at all.

Under the aegis of JTB, you may indeed have knowledge, but you can never know that you have knowledge, or even know whether you are justified in believing that you have knowledge. This is very problematic; it is like disappearing up your own arse. No wonder they call it analytic philosophy! :rofl:

Really, we do not have to justify any beliefs at all; all we have to do is accept and understand our knowing of the world, and realize that the extension of that knowing into 'knowing-that' is ineluctably fallabilistic.

I'm sympathetic with the overall view you've sketched. — Cabbage Farmer

Cheers.

Belief does not entail certainty. Knowledge does not entail certainty. — Cabbage Farmer

Yes - I agree. Certainty, however, entails belief. Knowledge - well, in the end, that's one of the results of belief; and if one accepts JBT, knowledge entails belief.

What might be interesting to discuss is whether certainty entails knowledge. If Moore's "here is a hand" does not present a justification for believing in an external reality, but instead shows a certainty in an external reality, then belief in an external reality is certain and yet not known.

Odd.

I doubt we could ever give a description of an agent's states along these lines... that would be sufficient to predict the agent's subsequent action in all cases. — Cabbage Farmer

Indeed! Further evidence, perhaps, that using belief to explain an act has a post-hoc character. John ate a sandwich. That he was hungry and believed eating the sandwich would cure his hunger is sufficient to explain why he ate the sandwich, but not to predict that he will act in the same way next time.

Nevertheless, some ways of believing in God will dispose the believer to perform or affirm a conjunction of actions or beliefs-about-action of the sort you've indicated. — Cabbage Farmer

Make it a conjunction of disjunctions. Someone who believes in god is disposed to (go to church on Sunday and say their prayers at night) or (go to a mosque on Friday and give money to charity) or...

The question then is can any belief be reduced to such a conjunction of actions?

Belief does not entail certainty. Knowledge does not entail certainty. — Cabbage Farmer

And what is certainty? Is it logical: deductive certainty or psychological:feeling certain; or is there some other kind of certainty?

If you know how to do something is it a coherent question to ask yourself whether you are certain that you know how to do it? Or is it an appropriate question to ask yourself whether you believe that you know how to do it? Or that you know that you know how to do it?

Are these all not just conceptual elaborations upon that which is obvious, rendering that which was obvious to be no longer obvious, or even uncontroversially believable?

For me, having a belief about believing is motived directly from social interaction, — Dawnstorm

So an animal could have beliefs, but not beliefs about beliefs.

This lines up with Wittgenstein's remark that a dog can believe his master is coming home, but not that his master is coming home next Wednesday.

This lines up with Wittgenstein's remark that a dog can believe his master is coming home, but not that his master is coming home next Wednesday. — Banno

Better to simply say the dog expects to see his master. It's less subject to confusion that way.

Justification is linguistic. — Sam26

If so, then we have a web of beliefs. A justification must, after all, be held to be true.

Better to simply say the dog expects to see his master. It's less subject to confusion that way. — Janus

And is it better to say Janus expects to see his paycheque? :grin:

When I enter the room and see the pens and papers I know there are pens and papers. — Janus

Does he, @Sam26?

Or is Janus certain, but since lacking in justification, not knowledgeable?

So much of this is about the limits and gradients between belief, knowledge, certainty, justification, expectation...

Is expecting to see the paycheck the same as believing the proposition: 'I will receive my paycheck', or is it the same as 'I will most likely receive my paycheck'?

It could be equated with either or neither. I don't believe the dog can think in terms of 'will' or 'will most likely', so no equation is possible in her case.

Or is Janus certain, but since lacking in justification, not knowledgeable? — Banno

I would say that Janus simply knows, and certainty does not come into it: but that once doubt enters, he can no longer be certain that he knows, or that he is even justified in believing. It's all context dependent in other words.

The temptation is to think it's a piece of knowledge, but it's not. In fact, it's the same mistake that Moore makes, and that Wittgenstein criticizes. One does have a subjective certainty about these bedrock beliefs though, and Wittgenstein points this out. However, one's subjective certainty is not knowledge, but it's a very powerful intuition that causes us to react with certainty, which makes us want to claim it's knowledge.

There are at least two kinds of certainty going on in Wittgenstein's notes, a subjective certainty reflected in the way we emphasize or gesticulate; and there is the certainty that is used as a synonym for knowledge. We tend to confuse these two uses of the word certainty. The confusions lies in equating our feelings about pens, pillows, clothes, with having knowledge. Knowledge is JTB, so does one justify to oneself that one is seeing pens, pillows, etc? Of course not, it's a basic belief that is part of the background information, like the chess board and chess pieces are the background to the game of chess.

Another problem with trying to explain this, is that some of you have a strange view of what knowledge is. I'm sticking with the definition of knowledge as justified true belief. It's a good working definition that I find invaluable. I find no good reasons to give up this definition.

Reminds me of the 80s song by Edie Bricknell and the New Bohemians:

I'm not aware of too many things
I know what I know if you know what I mean
Philosophy is a talk on cereal box religion
Is a smile on a dog
I'm not aware of too many things
I know what I know if you know what I mean
Choke me in the shallow water before I get too deep
What I am is what I am are you what you are or what?
I'm not aware of too many things I know what I know if you know what I mean
Philosophy is a walk on slippery rocks religion
Is a light in the fog
I'm not aware of too many things I know what I know if you know what I mean
Choke me in the shallow water before I get too deep
What I am is what I am are you what you are or what

Not that I agree with all of the sentiments expressed in the song. :yikes:

it's a basic belief that is part of the background information, — Sam26

No it's a basic understanding or knowledge. To call it a belief suggests that it could somehow be wrong; and of course it *can*, but only in an elaborated, artificial 'faux' sense. It could only be 'wrong' if the whole way that we understand the world were somehow wrong, for example, but then one could ask: 'what *more real and true* context could it be wrong in relation to, and how could we know it was wrong in relation to that purportedly "more real and true" context?.

Is it really worth considering such *possibilities*, or just a waste of time and effort; not to mention knowledge and understanding?

Even in the Theaetetus, JTB is rejected.

But one can't know something without also believing it; nor can one know something that is not true.

Long ago. I added this diagram to the epistemology page on Wiki:



It's survived quite a few updates, so it must say something useful.

To call it a belief suggests that it could somehow be wrong — Janus

I would say not, i.e., these beliefs can't be wrong in the epistemological sense. In what sense could Moore be wrong about having hands, especially in the context of the statement? If one makes a genuine knowledge claim, doubt plays a role against such knowledge claims. Otherwise we could infer the truth of a knowledge claim simply by making the statement. But with Moore's propositions, note that it doesn't make sense to doubt the statement "Here is a hand." This lack of sensible doubt tells us something about that particular belief, viz., that it has a special role in our belief system, outside, apart, and quite separate from our epistemological language-games.

The problem with this is that one is confusing the definition of knowledge as JTB, with a claim to knowledge that may or may not be true. They are two different things.

I would say that Janus simply knows, and certainty does not come into it: but that once doubt enters, he can no longer be certain that he knows, or that he is even justified in believing. It's all context dependent in other words. — Janus

So if I understand Janus, the correct grammar would be that if one knows, one is certain; when one doubts, one no longer knows nor is justified in believing.

And If I have@Sam26 correct, we can be certain but since this entails there being no doubt, and hence no need for a justification, we do not know what it is we are certain of.

And If I have@Sam26 correct, we can be certain but since this entails there being no doubt, and hence no need for a justification, we do not know what it is we are certain of. — Banno

That's not quite what I'm saying Banno. :wink:

OK, so in order to know some proposition, it must be true, believed and justified.

TO be justified is to be implied by or consistent with the other propositions one believes.

Moore showing his hand does not count as a justification because it is not a proposition.

So we do not know that Moore has a hand.

IS that OK?