I'm not sure we are really disagreeing so much as it being a matter of emphasis. — Janus
Consciousness is fundamental to all knowing. — Janus
Or in Peircean terms, it is the interpretant that is the most fundamental element of the sign relation. — Janus
No. Not unless here you are prepared to re-define consciousness - with all its embedded dualistic substance metaphysics - as the modelling relation itself. It is the modelling relation that is "fundamental" to all knowing. — apokrisis
Where does he argue for that? — apokrisis
But consciousness, if defined as the modeling relation itself is foundational and so could also be considered to be, in that sense, substantial. — Janus
But consciousness, if defined as the modeling relation itself is foundational and so could also be considered to be, in that sense, substantial. — Janus
I'm not saying Peirce argues for that (although it might be what he is alluding to with his notion of matter as "effete mind"). — Janus
If we count the modeling relation itself as being consciousness, then it would be in a restricted sense ( as individual consciousness) that the interpretant would be considered to represent consciousness. Taken that way then it would not be right to say the interpretant is fundamental. On the other hand if we think there is a God...then the sign relation would be like the holy trinity, where the interpretant is the father, the object is the son, and the sign is the holy spirit. — Janus
And so it begins.
Talk of places in the mind must be metaphorical - the mind does not have places.
What is it to have a place in the mind? — Banno
And there cannot be the belief that the sky is blue without "blue". — Metaphysician Undercover
If someone sees the blue sky that does not entail that they see that the sky is blue; — Janus
the latter would involve association with other experiences involving blue objects. — Janus
But even seeing that the sky is blue in this associative sense cannot sensibly be said to lead to conviction that something is the case; because the conception of something being the case requires the abstractive ability to consider that it might not have been the case, and it is most plausible that such reasoning is possible only with symbolic language. — Janus
In any case conviction or belief is redundant when we see. If we see the blue sky it is redundant to say that we believe the sky is blue unless we are speculating about whether we might be deceived, that it might be an illusion or a dream, and so on. In the presence of such questions it might be appropriate to say we believe. — Janus
And this kind of belief is different than the kind of expectation your dog, pre-linguistic child or pet troglodyte child might experience when s/he hears the sound of your car arriving in the driveway. Do you seriously believe that she considers the possibility that her expectation might be mistaken? — Janus
"It is important to remember that the constraint on belief imposed by experience is a negative one. The world affects our beliefs not by our finding out positive things about it, but rather, by providing recalcitrant or surprising things which upset an expectation produced by a belief. The role which the world plays is not one of providing something for our beliefs to correspond to, but rather, one of letting us know when we have a belief that conflicts with it."
Yes, in fact I was in the process of editing that post to add that maybe it would be better not to say that animals and pre-linguistic humans believe but that they associate and expect. — Janus
For example I am absolutely certain that I see a blue sky; belief simply doesn't enter into it. — Janus
This seems just like word play over definitions. — apokrisis
What can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.
...
The word is not the thing. The concept is not the thing. The belief requires neither. Why would it? — Sapientia
Yes a word is a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
That's my evidence, the word itself, as a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
By denying that the word is the thing, you are simply denying the evidence. — Metaphysician Undercover
But the evidence is clear, words are all around us. They clearly exist and are clear evidence. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, there is no such thing as what a word refers to, without the word. There is no such thing as what "sky" refers to, or what "blue" refers to without those words. In order for there to be a thing which is referred to by "sky", there must be the word "sky". Your ridiculous argument is like insisting that there is something which Bob is doing when there is no Bob. — Metaphysician Undercover
That doesn't address what I said. I said that the word is not the thing. I didn't say that a word is not a thing. — Sapientia
I refuse to be drawn into a debate over something so silly. — Sapientia
I've already explained your misunderstanding. I refuse to do so repeatedly until it finally sinks in, if it ever does. Please pay close attention to what I'm about to say, because it's the second time that I've said it: we are not in the thought experiment, and my use of terms such as "blue" and "sky" is for sake of convenience only. There are no words in the thought experiment, as there's no language in the thought experiment. I am of course using language, but I am not in the thought experiment. There is a blue sky in the thought experiment. — Sapientia
I don't see a refutation. — Metaphysician Undercover
But if anyone were stupid enough to fail to realise that, then one could simply point out that words are composed of letters and colours are not. Or do you deny that as well? — Sapientia
Where's your thought experiment? — Metaphysician Undercover
To be convinced of something does not require the abstractive ability to consider that it might not have been the case, and this can be effectively argued by bringing up plausible counterexamples, including beliefs which naturally arise as a result of seeing the blue sky, feeling the cold weather, drinking from a river, being stung by a bee, and many, many more. — Sapientia
I don't think it is plausible that a percipient could form such an abstract concept in the absence of linguistic capacity. In any case how could we ever know that they were able to formulate abstract concepts in the absence of symbolic language? — Janus
These two statements are self-contradictory. In the first you claim that it is not plausible that something could form an abstract concept in the absence of linguistic capacity, then you state that we would know whether they had or not anyway. — Pseudonym
No, that wouldn't be better, since they - pre-linguistic humans, at least - do believe. (Unless you're talking about Belief 2.0). And they believe as a result of associations and expectations, much like us. It's in our nature.
What would be better is if you broadened your notion of belief, and untied it from the strings that you've attached, so that it better matches the reality. — Sapientia
They see that it's the sky, and not, e.g. an elephant. — Sapientia
You're not really saying anything here. What you term "beliefs", and cite as "plausible counterexamples" would, in my view, be better termed 'believings' or 'expectations', to distinguish them from beliefs proper, which are linguistically formed (or at least formable) propositions. — Janus
Really all we are arguing over is which would be the better, clearer terminology. — Janus
The way I see it, to be convinced that something is the case just is to hold a conviction, and naturally entails that you are convinced that the negation of the "something" is not the case, and even, in extremis, could not be the case. — Janus
An animal or pre-linguistic human would probably be, for example, surprised if one day the sky was red in the middle of the day, because habit would have caused them to expect it to be either blue with or without more or less clouds, or grey and overcast with or without more or less rain. But they would quickly accept it and move on. How do you think a linguistically cultivated human would react? — Janus
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