So, just what, apart from linguistic ability, are those mysterious "intellectual capacities"? Explain how someone could be said to believe something is the case, if they are not capable of conceptualizing. We already know that we are able to do it if we are able to conceptualize (which obviously requires language use), so how are you going to argue that we would be able to do it in the absence of the ability to use language? — Janus
I already made the distinction between believing as a basic disposition to act, which is what some sufficiently intelligent animals (and thus presumably pre-linguistic humans) seem to be capable of doing, and holding beliefs in the sense of 'believing that'. — Janus
On the other hand if you want to reject any distinction between pre-linguistic believing and linguistically mediated believing that (which some of comments would seem to indicate); then you need to give cogent reasons for the rejection of what seems to be perfectly valid distinction. — Janus
How could there be a colour that we know of as blue, without the word "blue"? Remove the word "blue" and we wouldn't know of that colour as blue. The person without language might recognize the colour of the sky, and compare that to objects of a similar colour, but this is completely different from believing that the sky is blue. — Metaphysician Undercover
I'll respond if you provide some actual arguments or address any of the points I've raised. — Janus
We know that it is possible to be convinced that something is the case if you are a language-user; and it is very clear how language enables that. — Janus
No, it's not at all clear that it's language which enables the possibility of being convinced that something is the case. That's a controversial claim. Why do you think that it's a subject of debate within philosophy? I grant that there is a correlation, but, as you should know, correlation does not imply causation. — Sapientia
We already know that we are able to do it if we are able to conceptualize — Janus
Once again, I am going to draw attention to the fallaciousness of basing your argument on your consideration that we are able to believe if we are able to conceptualise. Cum hoc ergo propter hoc. — Sapientia
(which obviously requires language use) — Janus
No, I don't take it as a given that conceptualisation requires language use, rather than that language is a tool necessary to express concepts. You can't beg the question or put the cart before the horse. — Sapientia
I put it to you that advanced functionality, not language, determines the possibility of being convinced that something is the case. — Sapientia
Belief is being convinced that something is the case. If someone sees that the sky is blue, then that's convincing enough for most people, I think it's safe to say. I don't see how taking language out of the equation would change that, as it seems you'd have to maintain.
Consider that it's not language which convinces; it's seeing the blue sky. Were primitive peoples not convinced upon seeing the blue sky that there is a sky, and it is the colour that we know of as blue? There were humans before language developed, correct? We didn't begin with language; that came later. These early humans must surely have looked up at the blue sky and noticed its colour in contrast to the colours of its surroundings, yes? So why then would they not believe what they've seen? You must answer that question. — Sapientia
The "something more" after the seeing is whatever intellectual faculties are involved in becoming convinced that something is the case. Does that require language? No, I don't think so. Not in every conceivable case. If Henry, the pre-linguistic human, sees the blue sky, and he can distinguish its colour from others, such that it is identifiable as being of that particular colour, and not of any different colour, such as red, and if he has the intellectual capacity to connect the dots, then why would he not have the belief that the sky is blue, whether he's aware of it or not? Where is language in all of that? I think that it's absent, and therefore unnecessary. — Sapientia
Nor is [belief] necessarily composed of concepts. That's simply not characteristic of belief as a whole, or in essence. It's also, and I would argue, more fundamentally, about raw experience, like for example, a splash of water on your face. I don't need to understand "splash" or "water" or "face" to believe that water splashed my face. Can't you see how absurd that philosophical thinking is? How far removed from reality it is? The nitty gritty world of lived experience is not a world full of abstractions. — Sapientia
believing as a basic disposition to act, — Janus
I have confirmed to you once already that I was talking about 'believing that', which is blindingly obvious, given that the example I have used time and again is the example of believing that the sky is blue. So you can do away with your talk of belief as a basic disposition to act, whatever that means. — Sapientia
No, it's not at all clear that it's language which enables the possibility of being convinced that something is the case. — Sapientia
the point at issue seems to be whether such believings are propositional — Janus
Well propositional just means that a belief can be asserted in a way that makes it true or false. — apokrisis
Under these definitions: do I have to understand the proposition "God exists," to be an agnostic? Or differently put, is not understanding the proposition "God exists," sufficient to make me an agnostic? Is the difference between not understanding a proposition, and understanding a proposition but believing it to be undecided (or undecidable) relevant? — Dawnstorm
I don't think anyone was arguing that animals do not believe in the sense of expecting and being disposed to act; the point at issue seems to be whether such non-linguistic believings are propositional in the sense that linguistically formulated beliefs are, and, in consequence of that, whether or not they should be considered equivalent to linguistically formulated beliefs. — Janus
I'm not going to waste more time than necessary, so I'll address just one point at a time. It is obvious that language enables holding beliefs since there is no other way to express or formulate a belief to ourselves and others, and since in the absence being able to express or formulate a belief such as the example in question "I believe the sky is blue", there would be no way to know or show that I held any non-linguistic belief equivalent to "I believe the sky is blue". The onus is on you to show how, in the absence of language, it could be shown that anyone held any such belief or kind of belief. — Janus
The presence of belief in the sense of "disposition to act" can be shown by the presence of the relevant actions. If you want to claim the kinds of beliefs shown by the presence of actions should be understood to be of a propositional kind like those which are expressed linguistically then you need to give an argument as to why they should be thought to be so. — Janus
Propositional' I would say means formulated as 'I believe that'; this way a belief is given a definite form. — Janus
think that you've missed the point. I wasn't arguing that there could there be a colour that we know of as blue, without the word "blue". I was arguing that the pre-linguistic human would be able to see and distinguish the colour which I am now referring to as "blue". We are not in the thought experiment. I am not in the thought experiment. I am only referring to the colour as "blue" so that you know what I'm talking about. — Sapientia
very complex information is communicated acoustically, including emotive state, physical characteristics, intention,and perhaps reference to abstract concepts."
How could appropriate defensive behaviour possibly be taken if the the animal doing the communication does not 'believe' the predator does have the properties it's describing and the listeners do actually 'believe' that too?
Since these beliefs are vocalised, they fall on the same side of the sharp distinction you're trying to make. — Pseudonym
Belief is being convinced that something is the case. If someone sees that the sky is blue, then that's convincing enough for most people, I think it's safe to say. I don't see how taking language out of the equation would change that, as it seems you'd have to maintain. — Sapientia
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