The individual must understand the meaning of the proposition in order to correctly be said to believe that proposition.
The individual thinks the proposition is true. — Banno
I think you must do better than just tell me what you can imagine. Some folk say they can conceive of a round square. — Banno
...an individual could not understand the statement, "The sky is blue", or any translation of it, yet nevertheless believe that the sky is blue... — Sapientia
Yet it's conceivable to me that an individual could not understand the statement, "The sky is blue", or any translation of it, yet nevertheless believe that the sky is blue. — Sapientia
That's the contradiction. Any test you did to see if the individual believed the sky was blue would by that very fact be teaching them a translation of "the sky is blue". — Banno
How could you believe the sky is blue if you had no concept of blue or of the sky? — Janus
Sure, without such concepts, meaning without any language, you could see the blue sky, but that is not the same as believing the sky is blue. — Janus
that would affirm what was the case prior to the learning of the translation. — Sapientia
How? What you will have done is to teach a new game - picking a colour swatch or whatever. Notice that in the very act of teaching the individual to pick a colour swatch you would use multiple examples, and not just of blue. You are teaching a language game.
And that's the point. Belief is a language game. It requires language. — Banno
...how on earth will teaching him the meaning somehow demonstrate that he already knew the meaning which you've just taught him? — Sapientia
Odd; you seem now to be adamantly agreeing with me.
You have taught him to participate in a language game. In order to play, our friend must learn to differentiate blue form other colours; that is, he learns what "blue" is. In so doing he may well form a belief about the sky being blue. — Banno
But the one leads to the other, which is all that matters. You see, then you believe. — Sapientia
Seeing the blue sky is not believing the sky is blue. — Janus
Actually, there is a sense in which a pre-linguistic percipient could be said not to even see the blue sky since s/he has no concept of blue or sky. — Janus
Of course from our linguistically conditioned point of view she sees the blue sky. — Janus
But believing that the sky is blue is, whatever the case might be regarding the mere seeing of the blue sky, a further reflective step that is not possible without language. — Janus
Pretty cool things, these beliefs that do nothing. — Banno
SO, on your account, water believes it is cold, and hence decides to freeze. — Banno
will?
Seriously? — Banno
We start with an individual with no understanding of the statement, "The sky is blue", or any translation of it, yes? He's a lone, primitive, hunter-gatherer type, shall we say? — Sapientia
Did you not read what I just said? I haven't claimed otherwise. I am not claiming equivalence. I am claiming entailment. — Sapientia
The right thing to do, I feel, is to set the record straight, not embrace such twaddle. — Sapientia
No, she sees the blue sky regardless. Is there the sky? Yes. Is it blue? Yes. Does she see it? Yes. That's what is required, and as a matter of fact; not these additional false requirements that you're positing about language or concepts or points of view or whatnot. — Sapientia
You have yet to demonstrate that to me. Asserting it won't do. — Sapientia
So you are claiming that seeing the blue sky entails believing that the sky is blue? I think you're just playing with words, or perhaps with yourself, here; you can define terms to suit your own argument, for sure; and continue to ignore more cogent definitions if that's what turns you on. — Janus
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that ants can see the colour blue; if seeing entails believing, does that mean that ants believe the sky is blue?
If seeing and believing are not equivalent, then is the seeing one cognitive state and the believing another, in your view? — Janus
If seeing and believing are not equivalent, then is the seeing one cognitive state and the believing another, in your view? — Janus
So, seeing the sky is blue is not equivalent to believing the sky is blue; and yet nothing more is required? — Janus
And how would I go about demonstrating that to you, seemingly so mired in your own simplistic commonsensical prejudices, that you would not accept the premises of any account I might offer? You can always say "No, no no!", to anything I say; so why should I continue to waste my time if I detect no real desire to learn in the interlocutor? — Janus
No; because he does not know what "blue" is. — Banno
To be clear, ants don't believe shit. They differ drastically from humans, and to such an extent that the comparison is clearly an inappropriate one. — Sapientia
They're obviously different. One is the visual process, the other the state of becoming convinced that something is the case. — Sapientia
Required for what? In the context of what you quoted, I was referring to what was required for it to be the case that she is seeing the blue sky, not what was required for belief. — Sapientia
The consideration has been of believing in the context of pre-linguistic beings. — Janus
Ants see, just as humans do; and we can coherently say that they see the blue sky in the restricted context of our own way of talking about ants. If you claim pre-linguistic humans can believe the sky is blue, then what about chimps, or dogs, or tigers? Where, and on the basis of what, pre-linguistically speaking, would you draw the line? — Janus
And being convinced that something is the case does not require language? — Janus
We know that it is possible to be convinced that something is the case if you are a language-user; and it is very clear how language enables that. So, what argument do you have to support your contention that it is possible in the absence of language ability? Give an account of how it is possible absent language. Just to make my position clear, I don't deny that some 'higher animals' can, and pre-linguistic humans could, believe; but believing in that basic sense of 'disposition to act' is not the same as the propositional 'believing that something is the case' or, in other words, 'holding a belief'. — Janus
You said that seeing entails holding beliefs, but that they are not the same cognitive state. So, something more than merely seeing must be required to get from one cognitive state to the other. What is it? You don't get something for nothing. If you claim that nothing more is required for holding beleifs than for seeing then it follows that "what was required for it to be the case that she is seeing the blue sky" would be exactly the same as "what was required for belief. — Janus
The "something more" after the seeing is whatever intellectual faculties are involved in becoming convinced that something is the case. — Sapientia
Nor is it necessarily composed of concepts. That's simply not characteristic of belief as a whole, or in essence. — Sapientia
Consider that it's not language which convinces; it's seeing the blue sky. Were primitive peoples not convinced upon seeing the blue sky that there is a sky, and it is the colour that we know of as blue? There were humans before language developed, correct? We didn't begin with language; that came later. These early humans must surely have looked up at the blue sky and noticed its colour in contrast to the colours of its surroundings, yes? So why then would they not believe what they've seen? You must answer that question. — Sapientia
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