It is practically axiomatic that the philosophers in the Aristotelean-Thomist tradition are Catholic. Other prominent advocates include Jacques Maritain (who was a great thinker in my view) and Etienne Gilson (more of a generalist). So conservatism is implied by that (although there is a stream of Catholic social philosophy that is more politically liberal, i.e. commited to social equity and charity, although they still tend to social conservatism.)

I have perused quite a few of Feser's blog posts, and naturally agree with his criticisms of materialism, such as those in The Last Superstition. I thought his analysis of the reaction to Thomas Nagel's Mind and Cosmos was excellent, although I don't share his Catholic convictions.

So I wouldn't agree necessarily that Aristotelean-Thomistic philosophy is the greatest amongs the 'traditionalist' schools. I suspect that there are major elements of Platonistic philosophical insight which are far better represented by the Orthodox philosophers and theologians. But the point about that school is, it is about the last remaining outpost of the perennial tradition that is still alive in Western culture. It is kind of like the last bastion against the raging tide of scientific materialism. So I have to be sympathetic to it on the grounds that 'the enemy of the enemy is my friend'.

But the point about that school is, it is about the last remaining outpost of the perennial tradition that is still alive in Western culture. — Wayfarer

What do you consider to be the "perennial" tradition?

although I don't share his Catholic convictions. — Wayfarer

May I ask why you do not? This would make you, at minimum, opposed to his theology.

The 'perennial philosophy' is an expression, coined by Liebniz, referring to the idea that there is a core mystical and philosophical vision of which the various religious and philosophical traditions are specific expressions. There is a similar idea in Hindu thought, namely, that of 'sanatana dharma' which likewise sees all the various Indian traditions, even the heterodox movements like Jaina and Buddhism, as expressions of an underlying perennial wisdom. Alduous Huxley published a book called The Perennial Philosophy about this idea. It is also characteristic of some exponents of comparative religion such as Huston Smith who wrote very popular books on world religions.

I majored in comparative religion and read a lot of that kind of literature, and I think it is demonstrably true that there is a core of ideas, expressions of which can be found in every culture and historical period. It was very much one of the themes that animated Rennaisance humanism, but you also find it in New England transcendentalism (Emerson and Thoroeau) and in theosophy.

What is and what isn't an aspect of such a philosophy (although many will deny there is such a thing!) will obviously be a difficult question, but I think the major currents of Platonist and Aristotelean philosophy would be counted among them. They are formal schools of philosophical spirituality, incorporating ideas from the grand tradition of philosophy, although they are often not read that way in the secular west. (That is where Pierre Hadot's work has been especially significant.)

As to why I'm not Catholic - I am now much more simpatico to it than I would have been when younger, because I can interpret the liturgy and the symbolic meanings it embodies. But I couldn't accept the dogma and take on the whole institutional side of the faith. But there are many Catholic intellectuals, writers and spiritual teachers that I admire - including Feser, for the reasons given above, but I am more interested in the contemplative and mystical aspects of the tradition. (There's actually a minor sub-cultural movement of Zen Catholicism that I feel a lot of affinity for.)

I also ask this because I'm not religious in any way, and am skeptical of a deity, and kinda want to see some other perspectives and fight the cognitive dissonance for self-improvement sake. — darthbarracuda

I have found that there are those who have a religious sensibility and those who lack one. It's more to do with character, in other words, than with the arguments at hand that decides one's orientation toward religion and its claims. For me, I am caught somewhere between the two, in that I cannot rationally commit myself at present to belief in various dogmas and yet also deeply yearn for a mystical glance at the ineffable, the path to which is inherently religious in some way. I can see myself perhaps formally converting to Catholicism one day or remaining a skeptic. Either choice would be anticipated given my perspective on things now. In your case, you might not have the religious sensibility and so don't know this tension. If so, I would envy you in some respects, but it also means that the project of someone like Aquinas might seem ridiculous or uninteresting.

I was contemplating buying one of his books on Thomistic metaphysics — darthbarracuda

Why not read or reread Aristotle and Thomas for yourself? I always buy primary literature rather than secondary literature when it comes to philosophy, except for biographies. I also plan on purchasing physical copies for myself, but if cost at the moment is an issue for you, as it is for me (which is frustratingly why I have a huge backlog of all kinds of books), then you could peruse this site, which has virtually everything Thomas ever wrote translated into English: http://dhspriory.org/thomas/.

Alternatively, if you are looking for some good commentary, then you might check out Garrigou-Lagrange. I became interested in him because of his spiritual writings, but he was a prolific commentator on Aquinas as well. He's very readable from what little I've read of him so far and would likely address how Aquinas belongs to the perennial tradition.

Aquinas had his Five Ways that make Thomism famous, but is that all that's really different from him and Aristotle other than his efforts to fit Aristotelianism into Catholicism - theology? — darthbarracuda

Two things. One, there are people like Anthony Kenny who are not formally Catholic and yet are strongly influenced by Aquinas, such that they would call themselves Thomists, "analytic Thomists" to be exact, which you alluded to. Second, I think Aquinas does actually significantly depart from Aristotle's metaphysics in various ways, so he's not as unoriginal as he might initially seem, if that's what you're worried about. But even if he were, I find the synthesis of Aristotle with Christianity an interesting feat in and of itself, one worthy of one's attention. I am still drawn to Plato/Augustine more than I am to Aristotle/Aquinas, but they're both very important streams of thought.

Thank you, I hadn't heard of Kenny, although apparently Feser responds to his critiques. I'll have to read the original documents some time though.

Any recommendations for alternative theologies, such as Augustine?

You mean recommendations about Augustine? In his case, I would recommend simply reading the man himself. He's honestly one of best prose writers to have lived.

It's too bad he didn't use his intellect to pursue more "pagan" philosophies.

Like I said, the Church was playing its cards.

Who, Augustine? How so?

I might be wrong but I think Schop1 meant that Augustine (and Aquinas) limited themselves somewhat by adhering to Christianity. Whereas people like Plotinus didn't have to do that and in fact criticized the religions of their day.

I'm not sure if that is sarcastic which, if so, is kind of funny. But what I meant is he could have put his theological tendencies energies into Neoplatonism proper or traditional Greco-Roman schools of though but instead he became the mouthpiece of what would become orthodox Christian thinking which became an oppressive system as it became one of the only allowable points of view. Being heavily involved in what is considered right interpretation of Christian metaphysics/ethics and what is heretic- he along with other Church Fathers was a main architect of the demise of diverse thinking, heterodoxy, and the relative free thought of the upper classes enjoyed in Greco Riman times. The Christian point of view being the "only" point of view carried over into the Middle Ages with scant alternative. Granted, contingencies of Germanic tribal culture, the collapse of the Roman economy, and the general decline of knowledge didn't help- the archetype of only viewing philosophy in service of bolstering Christian belief was established.

They were free to think within the confines of Scripture. Like Whitehead said: Christianity is a religion looking for a metaphysics (...while Buddhism is a metaphysics looking for a religion).

They were free to think within the confines of Scripture. Like Whitehead said: Christianity is a religion looking for a metaphysics (...while Buddhism is a metaphysics looking for a religion). — darthbarracuda

Astute summary.

I'm not sure if that is sarcastic which, if so, is kind of funny. — schopenhauer1

I don't know what you mean. I wasn't trying to be sarcastic. I just didn't know who you were referring to with your post.

But what I meant is he could have put his theological tendencies energies into Neoplatonism proper or traditional Greco-Roman schools of though but instead he became the mouthpiece of what would become orthodox Christian thinking which became an oppressive system as it became one of the only allowable points of view. — schopenhauer1

You appear to be talking about Augustine. I would say that your criticism is quite unfounded. He did identify with pagan philosophies as a young man. He was a Neoplatonist and a Manichean before becoming a Christian, and if you want to know why he became the latter, you can read the Confessions. Secondly, I don't think anyone could honestly accuse Augustine of not having fully acquainted himself with Neoplatonism and other Greco-Roman schools of thought. He was probably the most learned and often sympathetic authority on these schools you could find in the entire Roman world at the time. Finally, trying to pin on Augustine all the alleged oppression perpetrated by Christianity is nothing more than a fallacious attempt to impute guilt by association.

Being heavily involved in what is considered right interpretation of Christian metaphysics/ethics and what is heretic- he along with other Church Fathers was a main architect of the demise of diverse thinking, heterodoxy, and the relative free thought of the upper classes enjoyed in Greco Riman times. — schopenhauer1

I don't know, the demise of diverse thinking could have been due to the weakness and corruption of the later Western Roman emperors, the barbarian invasions, the cultural deterioration of Rome, and so on.

The Christian point of view being the "only" point of view carried over into the Middle Ages with scant alternative. — schopenhauer1

And? Most of the Roman world had converted to Christianity by the time it evaporated in the West, so I don't know what you expect.

Granted, contingencies of Germanic tribal culture, the collapse of the Roman economy, and the general decline of knowledge didn't help- the archetype of only viewing philosophy in service of bolstering Christian belief was established. — schopenhauer1

I'm glad you clarified here, but I don't like your insinuation in the last part. I find most of the medieval philosophers to be genuine searchers after truth, not cynical opportunists making due under an oppressive church. The oppression thesis is simply too patronizing to these often profound thinkers. And remember that the seeds of the scientific, political, and philosophical revolutions of the early modern era were laid during the medieval period by these thinkers.

I ask this because A-T philosophy is "apparently" having a bit of a revival in analytic circles. — darthbarracuda

I heard that too. I'm a lowly grad student but at levels far above me in academe there's a lot of talk of powers, capacities and dispositions.

Nancy Cartwright is one who's moved more to an Aristotelian position (insofar as I even understand these labels). Personally I like her philosophy of science work.

I would take a synoptic approach to Aristotle and Aquinas. The volume of their works is enormous and daunting. Although I do agree with @Thorongil that Augustine himself is a truly great writer and philosopher. ( The major problem I see with his theology is his intepretation of the original sin, especially as later intepreted by Calvin. It is one of the reasons why overall I think Orthodox theology is superior. But, read this. This single passage has been a major inspiration for me.)

I think the reason that Aristotle is under consideration again is because we're 'fishing for a metaphysic'. A coherent school of thought is needed, which actually provides for some depth and a proper philosophical lexicon and provision for such ideas as formal and final causes, teleology, and so on, all of which Aristoteleanism does.

Actually I think one name that ought to be mentioned in respect of Aristoteleanism, is Loyd Gerson, I have hardly scratched the surface of his books, but from what I understand they're well worth the effort of reading.

However going back to the beginning, it's difficult to see how exactly A-T metaphysics is different from plain ol' Aristotelian metaphysics. — darthbarracuda

For what it's worth darth, here's my opinion, and some things which you should consider.

Neo-Platonist and Aristotelian metaphysics are very distinct platforms. Plato had exposed the problems with Pythagorean idealism and cosmology, so the Neo-Platonists took a separate path from Aristotle in resolving these issues. The Neo-Platonists developed a stronger idealism with independent Forms, Such as the One, which are active in the creation of the sensible world which we know. Aristotle developed a type of materialism with active, eternal circular motions, as unmoved movers.

Neo-Platonism was accepted into Christian theology, mostly through the influence of St. Augustine, as the independent, immaterial Forms, were consistent with God and the angels. Aristotelian metaphysics was not brought into Christianity in this early time, and remained in the hands of the Arabs. In later times, with increasing exposure to the Arab world, through the crusades etc., Christian theologians became familiar with Aristotelian philosophy.

I believe it is important to recognize that Aquinas approached Aristotelian metaphysics from a firm Neo-Platonist foundation. Therefore his work was to interpret Aristotle in a way so as to establish consistency with Neo-Platonist principles. This involved selective referencing, and generally shaping the material to conform. I think that if an inverse situation had occurred, if one were to approach Neo-Platonic metaphysics from a stringent Aristotelian platform, such a consistency could not have been established. .

I believe it is important to recognize that Aquinas approached Aristotelian metaphysics from a firm Neo-Platonist foundation. Therefore his work was to interpret Aristotle in a way so as to establish consistency with Neo-Platonist principles. This involved selective referencing, and generally shaping the material to conform. I think that if an inverse situation had occurred, if one were to approach Neo-Platonic metaphysics from a stringent Aristotelian platform, such a consistency could not have been established. . — Metaphysician Undercover

So, like I was saying, Aquinas rather "bastardized" Aristotelianism. That's not to say that what he did was remarkable, but he certainly had an agenda to fulfill, it would seem.

You appear to be talking about Augustine. I would say that your criticism is quite unfounded. He did identify with pagan philosophies as a young man. He was a Neoplatonist and a Manichean before becoming a Christian, and if you want to know why he became the latter, you can read the Confessions. Secondly, I don't think anyone could honestly accuse Augustine of not having fully acquainted himself with Neoplatonism and other Greco-Roman schools of thought. He was probably the most learned and often sympathetic authority on these schools you could find in the entire Roman world at the time. Finally, trying to pin on Augustine all the alleged oppression perpetrated by Christianity is nothing more than a fallacious attempt to impute guilt by association. — Thorongil

Yes, Augustine and his guilt..I never claimed he did not know or initially participate in other views of thought. In fact, I acknowledge that, and hence why it is a tragedy that he chose, at the end, a narrow focus on Christianity and then participated on apologetics and trying to define an orthodox Christianity as against other sects which were deemed wayward and possibly dangerous. His interpretations would by and large would become orthodoxy during the Middle Ages (though his more interesting Neoplatonic spin would be challenged later on).

As far as pinning on him the oppression perpetrated by Christianity- he was not the sole bearer but certainly a mover and a shaker in the field. Cyril, Irenaeus, Clement, Origen, Jerome, Athenasius, and the like started this kind of philosophy-in-employment-of-orthodoxy; later debates over doctrine were ongoing throughout the Middle Ages in a sort of echo chamber. So he indirectly (in a link with other apologists) influenced the idea that philosophy is only in employment of Christian theology and as far as I know, explicitly supported coercion during a time of Christian consolidation and power. Every once in a while new writings came through and provoked new ways of thinking of old problems (i.e. Aristotle in the 1100s), it was always in the confines of a) Christian-theological speculation and b) what the authorities of the time deemed was orthodoxy or heretical.

I don't know, the demise of diverse thinking could have been due to the weakness and corruption of the later Western Roman emperors, the barbarian invasions, the cultural deterioration of Rome, and so on. — Thorongil

I acknowledged this as you acknowledged.

And? Most of the Roman world had converted to Christianity by the time it evaporated in the West, so I don't know what you expect. — Thorongil

With the alignment of the Church being fused with the State in 380 CE (under Theodosius), persecution and coercion were the norm. Augustine, tacitly and then explicitly agreed with these policies. By the 500s, the last pagan schools of Classical philosophy was closed down (purposefully). Church Fathers- master theologians and apologists influenced the Councils and Edicts that would be pronounced via the Church infrastructure which eventually become consolidated under the Pope. This institution would become the de facto third rail of power in Europe. Germanic/Slavic/Celtic kings would convert (and often force convert) their respective tribesman (especially the warriors which would then filter down), and thus be given the pomp and legitimacy that a (for that time) international institution could bestow (with ancient ties to the Roman Empire).

I'm glad you clarified here, but I don't like your insinuation in the last part. I find most of the medieval philosophers to be genuine searchers after truth, not cynical opportunists making due under an oppressive church. The oppression thesis is simply too patronizing to these often profound thinkers. And remember that the seeds of the scientific, political, and philosophical revolutions of the early modern era were laid during the medieval period by these thinkers. — Thorongil

The educated class- those who would eventually become monks/priests/bishops/clergy did several things that made Medieval philosophy sclerotic:
1) Christian texts would be the only texts that mattered most for copying and recopying in monasteries and libraries. Pagan philosophical texts were secondary if at all being deemed as inferior. It would not be until the libraries from the Muslim world were making their way into Europe via Spain and Sicily that there was a slow movement towards studying things outside of the confines of theology. Even then, Aristotle's inaccurate version of cosmology and movement would be used to justify Church theology- making empirico-mathematical science especially hard to overthrow in the Renaissance.

2) Philosophy could not be free-form but only used in its employment of theology. Thus, the educated class, instead of following the dialectic to wherever it led, were instead following it wherever it led as long as it had the tinge of Christian belief.

3) The various inquisitions (the major ones being in the 14-1600s), crusades, and especially via Papal edict and Church Councils, were enforced via courts and kings who made alliances and thus indeed did keep a tight grip of Church order in this time period. It became an established and enmeshed part of politics in a period when there was little other avenues for inter-regional politics.

I acknowledge that, and hence why it is a tragedy that he chose, at the end, a narrow focus on Christianity — schopenhauer1

But why narrow? You are assuming in advance that Christianity is untrue, so that if someone like Augustine formally turns away from Neoplatonism and toward it, he is ipso facto making the wrong decision.

So he indirectly (in a link with other apologists) influenced the idea that philosophy is only in employment of Christian theology — schopenhauer1

Yes, because he and others like him thought Christianity was true. A lemonade stand is likely to sell lemonade.

Church being fused with the State in 380 CE (under Theodosius), persecution and coercion were the norm — schopenhauer1

And prior to then, people converted to Christianity freely and in the teeth of brutal Roman persecution. Enough of them did so to constitute a majority of the population, which then carried over into the Middle Ages. Naturally, Christian rulers then persecuted others into conversion, but this was not the primary means of how the Roman world became Christian to begin with.

1) Christian texts would be the only texts that mattered most for copying and recopying in monasteries and libraries. — schopenhauer1

Right, because they thought these texts contained the truth.

Thus, the educated class, instead of following the dialectic to wherever it led, were instead following it wherever it led as long as it had the tinge of Christian belief. — schopenhauer1

Here again you're simply parroting Russell's patronizing treatment of these philosophers. Has it ever occurred to you that perhaps, in following where the argument leads, they thought it lead to Christianity?

3) The various inquisitions (the major ones being in the 14-1600s), crusades, and especially via Papal edict and Church Councils, were enforced via courts and kings who made alliances and thus indeed did keep a tight grip of Church order in this time period. — schopenhauer1

Correct. The Church had quite a bit of power, but it also encouraged philosophy, learning, etc. Like all large institutions it has a mixed history.

But why narrow? You are assuming in advance that Christianity is untrue, so that if someone like Augustine formally turns away from Neoplatonism and toward it, he is ipso facto making the wrong decision. — Thorongil

Being a belief-system that focuses on proper belief, taking on the Christian system strait-jacketed his thought to then only view things in the prism of the core doctrines/beliefs of this belief system. The irony is, that a culture of "right" and "wrong" belief became dominant because of apologetics and polemics that he helped create and thus, others under Christendom were compelled to have these beliefs as well. Thus future people who were under the much more forceful watch of Christendom could not enjoy the relative freedom to explore other systems of ideas the way he was able to do in the relative diversity of ideas in late Antiquity. Granted there was the cult of the Emperor which was tacitly put in place to establish dominance (and was in great part the reason for the Jewish Revolt of 70 CE). Granted there were isolated incidents before Rome, where Greeks were overzealous to Hellenize (again involving Jews in ancient Judea who resisted the more Hellenistic faction and revolt against Antiochus IV's Zeus-worshipping policies of c. 160 BCE). However, for the most part, right doctrine or right religious beliefs or right philosophical leanings were not a part of the Greco-Roman power structure. Certainly brute force, slavery, and intimidation was a part of it and the sheer desire for land and economic gain, but the desire to completely limit people's beliefs to one belief-system was not usually on their agenda.

Yes, because he and others like him thought Christianity was true. A lemonade stand is likely to sell lemonade. — Thorongil

Thus his (core) beliefs became everyone's beliefs with limited options and variety. This was very different than the diversity of Greco-Roman times.

And prior to then, people converted to Christianity freely and in the teeth of brutal Roman persecution. Enough of them did so to constitute a majority of the population, which then carried over into the Middle Ages. Naturally, Christian rulers then persecuted others into conversion, but this was not the primary means of how the Roman world became Christian to begin with. — Thorongil

Perhaps not to begin with and I guess I have no problem if people choose to strait-jacket themselves into a belief system. It is when that one belief system becomes the dominant power in a region and systematically creates a climate and structure that disallows other points of view. It edged out all othe philosophies- ones that could have survived the barbarian invasions. This indeed happened as stated earlier, when Theodosius came to power. It morphed into the Pope/ Bishops become power players after the downfall of the Western Roman Empire. No doubt, you can argue that Christianity "saved" some of the pagan ideas through monasteries and libraries, but at the cost of suppressing diversity and creating the Medieval system of concordia (making philosophy in accordance with Christian belief).

I cannot say what would have happened if monasteries and other Christian institutions did not exist as preservers. You may have an indirect argument that religious suppression came with it philosophical preservation. However, this was more of a consequence, and not the goal as far as I see it. Perhaps Roman academics could have found other ways to preserve ideas and writings. There were schools of thought, like the Classical Academy in Athens that were shutdown so, there could be no room for competition of this academic sort at least.

Here again you're simply parroting Russell's patronizing treatment of these philosophers. Has it ever occurred to you that perhaps, in following where the argument leads, they thought it lead to Christianity? — Thorongil

That's interesting because when Christiandem stopped being the power structure and lost its grip on academic institutions, other points of view started to make its way to the fore.

Correct. The Church had quite a bit of power, but it also encouraged philosophy, learning, etc. Like all large institutions it has a mixed history. — Thorongil

Granted, as stated before philosophy was somewhat permissible in the scope of the parameters set down by Church Fathers and theologians. There was some allowance of debate, I'll grant that. Even this became political if one group came to power that did not like the other's point of view. Certainly, one had to show fealty to a belief-system first before ought else was speculated upon or debated.

taking on the Christian system strait-jacketed his thought to then only view things in the prism of the core doctrines/beliefs of this belief system — schopenhauer1

If he voluntarily found the Christian system true, then he was not "strait-jacketed" into anything. Or would you rather him view things through the prism of doctrines and beliefs he thought to be false?

freedom to explore other systems of ideas the way he was able to do in the relative diversity of ideas in late Antiquity. — schopenhauer1

Fully agreed. Nonetheless, I would be hesitant to praise diversity for its own sake. In modern cultures that do so, there is always a diversity of the false and the bad, which makes the truth harder to find and pursue. Could it also be that "enforcing" a certain set of beliefs produces a healthier, more harmonious, and culturally richer society? Does it really impede the truly critical and original thinkers out there that much? I am reminded of the long history of the method of esoteric writing and a particular line about Meister Eckhart from Schopenhauer:

"[W]e shall find that Sakyamuni and Meister Eckhart teach the same thing; only that the former dared to express his ideas plainly and positively, whereas Eckhart is obliged to clothe them in the garment of the Christian myth, and to adapt his expressions thereto."

If the same ideas are getting across, what harm is being done that the mode is not the same? Only the intellectually deaf will fail to understand the meaning being conveyed, which is just as well. Moreover, why cannot one mode be more generally beneficial than another?

I guess I have no problem if people choose to strait-jacket themselves into a belief system — schopenhauer1

What is this supposed to imply? That one not ever commit oneself to what one finds to be true? That one must remain skeptical, even in the face of evidence to the contrary? Critical thinking doesn't, or needn't, cease when one commits oneself to a philosophical or religious system.

It is when that one belief system becomes the dominant power in a region and systematically creates a climate and structure that disallows other points of view. — schopenhauer1

Well, it depends on the belief system. Christian Europe was far less destructive in this regard than the Muslim Middle East and North Africa, if only for the simple reason that the former produced all those things you seem to be indirectly praising, namely, freedom of speech and religion, democracy, modern science and philosophy, etc - whereas the latter actively fought against them.

"Thorongil;15506"]If he voluntarily found the Christian system true, then he was not "strait-jacketed" into anything. Or would you rather him view things through the prism of doctrines and beliefs he thought to be false? —

If a change in language matters here, I am willing to say he "took to the teachings and beliefs of a brand of Christianity as he saw it and thus philosophized about the world in those terms" rather than "strait-jacketing" his views to one system which puts a negative spin on it. I only want emphasize that the difference with religious belief and any old philosophical belief is the expectation that one can only view other philosophies in relation to a core belief system rather than one amongst many.

Fully agreed. Nonetheless, I would be hesitant to praise diversity for its own sake. In modern cultures that do so, there is always a diversity of the false and the bad, which makes the truth harder to find and pursue. Could it also be that "enforcing" a certain set of beliefs produces a healthier, more harmonious, and culturally richer society? — Thorongil

Plato might agree with this as per The Republic. I don't think so though. A society is healthier with a diversity of beliefs without one dominating the other. It depends on what goals you want to promote though. If there is some sort of prosperity or benefit that ensues from sameness in beliefs, does this outweigh the possibility for general freedom to entertain any belief?

Does it really impede the truly critical and original thinkers out there that much? I am reminded of the long history of the method of esoteric writing and a particular line about Meister Eckhart from Schopenhauer:

Yes it does. They were still tied to a core belief system with no possibility of disclaiming it. I am sympathetic to some Medieval ideas as they are often acutely aware of suffering and the disatisfaction of the physical world. There are definitely overlaps with Eastern/Schopenhauerean ideas here. However, this does not mean that I'd rather everyone drink from the "sweet bliss of Enlightened thinking" by forcing feality to it. Imagine if it was Schopenhauer's beliefs instead of Christianity. Instead of being freely enjoyed, his ideas would become a sort tool for thought-police. "Once you have shown your fealty to ideas about the Will's existence, how it is the flip side of Representation, and accept that we are all suffering through our constant deprivation, you may be free to entertain any notion you want!" Again, there was a time before this in Western history where one did not have to vow fealty to a system of thought. After this time period, it would return again.

What is this supposed to imply? That one not ever commit oneself to what one finds to be true? That one must remain skeptical, even in the face of evidence to the contrary? Critical thinking doesn't, or needn't, cease when one commits oneself to a philosophical or religious system. — Thorongil

Again, I am willing to change my terminology. If people are willing to take on a belief system of their own accord, I am fine with this. Critical thinking does not cease, but if there is a climate and power structure that does not allow for one to even exit this belief system, this completely destroys the basis for truly critical thinking.

Well, it depends on the belief system. Christian Europe was far less destructive in this regard than the Muslim Middle East and North Africa, if only for the simple reason that the former produced all those things you seem to be indirectly praising, namely, freedom of speech and religion, democracy, modern science and philosophy, etc - whereas the latter actively fought against them. — Thorongil

No doubt, Muslims did the same thing. Muslims had the advantage that many of the former Byzantine writings and teachers ended up under their control which gave them access to Aristotle, mathematics, medicine, astronomy, and science that was largely cut off from Europe until about the 1100s. The Muslim Golden Age ran from about 700-1200 CE.

However, I still have the same complaint that their philosophical achievements had to be in employment of religion. Unfortunately for this region, free-thought took a reversal when the two-fold factors of Genghis Khan's destruction of the Baghdad library in 1258 and (primarily) the spread and institutional enforcement of conservative beliefs of philosophers like al-Ghazali. It would be interesting if this somehow went the other way.

I'm not too sure about Christiandem being the driver of democracy. Under the system of a unified Church, it was quite hierarchical. Democracy came about in Europe through both an evolutionary means and a deliberate philosophizing in the Enlightenment era. Republics like the ones in Italy and then the Netherlands, were ones based on mercantile-elite rule. England's parliamentarian system gradually evolved from an assemblage of nobles advising and limiting the king to a larger institution where a House of Commons became dominant by the 1600s. More systematic approaches to democracy and freedom were often due to the Renaissance/Enlightenment practice of people trying to abandon Medieval traditions and looking back to a time of more freedom of thought (and not bound to Christian doctrine) such as the Greco-Roman period. It took outside philosophers like Spinoza and Hobbes to get points of view out that were skeptical and critical of religion.

I largely agree with your assessment that due to Christianity's early ability to separate itself from political power and be a third rail rather than a direct ruler, allowed for there to be a less strict stranglehold over differing points of view. It also helped that Europe was not unified under one regime as the Muslim world was. The Church's power was at the whims of local monarchs and aristocracy. Thus Luther, subsequent Protestants, and later a-religious thinkers could be somewhat insulated from persecution. However, one should not overlook the Church's concerted effort to keep its grip (trials of Galileo and Bruno, Protestant persecution, the Inquisition, Crusades, trials and persecution of the Cathars, numerous individual trials on heresy, etc.).

So, like I was saying, Aquinas rather "bastardized" Aristotelianism. That's not to say that what he did was remarkable, but he certainly had an agenda to fulfill, it would seem. — darthbarracuda

Why would you call this bastardizing, when I said that what he did was create consistency between Neo-Platonist and Aristotelian metaphysics? Isn't this how knowledge advances, we build on what those who have gone before us have produced. Anytime two different people are working to conceptualize the same thing, work has to be done to create coherency between the two.

Suppose that you and I both had the idea of putting a rocket on mars. You took a look at my plan, and put the most applicable parts together with your plan, leaving behind the parts where I was mistaken, to come up with a plan better than your original plan. Why would you call this bastardizing my plan?

Of course he had an agenda to fulfill, don't we all? Or do you think we all ought to be lost souls, going whichever way the wind blows? I've tried that, going whichever way the wind blows, and you cannot subsist, because it tears you apart.

I am willing to say he "took to the teachings and beliefs of a brand of Christianity as he saw it and thus philosophized about the world in those terms" rather than "strait-jacketing" — schopenhauer1

That's much better.

I only want emphasize that the difference with religious belief and any old philosophical belief is the expectation that one can only view other philosophies in relation to a core belief system rather than one amongst many. — schopenhauer1

This is too vague.

A society is healthier with a diversity of beliefs without one dominating the other. — schopenhauer1

But this is impossible, There will always be some beliefs that dominate others, such as the belief that society is healthier with a diversity of beliefs without one dominating the other.

If there is some sort of prosperity or benefit that ensues from sameness in beliefs, does this outweigh the possibility for general freedom to entertain any belief? — schopenhauer1

That was basically what I was asking. I don't have an answer to it, but it's a good question I think.

Again, there was a time before this in Western history where one did not have to vow fealty to a system of thought. After this time period, it would return again. — schopenhauer1

And I'm not trying to dispute this.

one should not overlook the Church's concerted effort to keep its grip (trials of Galileo and Bruno, Protestant persecution, the Inquisition, Crusades, numerous individual trials on heresy, etc.). — schopenhauer1

This and what you say before it is all granted, but I feel like adding some qualification here. Heresy was a state crime at the time. The inquisitors would hand over those accused to the state and the state would then determine the punishment; and the vast majority of those accused of heresy were not killed or tortured. Second, Galileo and Bruno did have demonstrably heretical and heterodox views, so it would make even less sense for the Church not to investigate them, considering they identified as Catholic. Lastly, the crusades were originally conceived as a defense of Christendom from Muslim invasion, not bloodthirsty imperialist and colonialist expeditions.

This is too vague. — Thorongil

Once a person "takes to heart" a fundamentalist religious doctrine, it becomes incumbent upon that person to also follow the restrictions of the thought that is part of this doctrine. If TRUTH is instilled through some divine revelation and/or divine interpretation, and one believes this to be true, then anything that is contradictory to this truth can never be even in the realm of consideration. As stated earlier, it really does not become an issue until it is coerced.

But this is impossible, There will always be some beliefs that dominate others, such as the belief that society is healthier with a diversity of beliefs without one dominating the other. — Thorongil

It is a very weak dominance and allows for the widest number of views to be taken. The tyranny of wanting to keep a society with a diversity of thought, just doesn't seem very stifling.

That was basically what I was asking. I don't have an answer to it, but it's a good question I think. — Thorongil

Yes, it is a good question.

This and what you say before it is all granted, but I feel like adding some qualification here. Heresy was a state crime at the time. The inquisitors would hand over those accused to the state and the state would then determine the punishment; and the vast majority of those accused of heresy were not killed or tortured. Second, Galileo and Bruno did have demonstrably heretical and heterodox views, so it would make even less sense for the Church not to investigate them, considering they identified as Catholic. Lastly, the crusades were originally conceived as a defense of Christendom from Muslim invasion, not bloodthirsty imperialist and colonialist expeditions. — Thorongil

By the time of Christendom's reign in the Dark Ages, lower classes of Germanic/Slavic/Celtic tribes followed their kings' shift to the religion, or were forced converted by losing in battle or not following his lead. The ability to allow for local syncretism often helped transition native pagan beliefs to Christian doctrine. Trials as far as I know it, was amplified and institutionalized when the Church was more established around the high/late Middle Ages.

The tyranny of wanting to keep a society with a diversity of thought, just doesn't seem very stifling. — schopenhauer1

You must distinguish between "wanting" to have a diversity of thought and "allowing" for a diversity of thought. I'm all for the latter, but not the former.

You must distinguish between "wanting" to have a diversity of thought and "allowing" for a diversity of thought. I'm all for the latter, but not the former. — Thorongil

Yes, allowing may be a good word there. Providing for a climate where diverse points of view are protected from government censorship would be getting more at the sense of it I think.