It's interesting to me, and I keep puzzling over it, how we completely
disagree, you and I, and yet utterly agree, at the same time. That's philosophy :) Thanks for carrying on such debates!

'Natural Selection' is likewise imbued with the attributes of agency — Wayfarer

On this, I agree; but I would like you to answer the further question: does this imply the presence of an agent?

I think not. I think that our language developed an approach to action based around our own agency, and finds itself unable to easily present the undirected agency of evolution.

I’m not arguing for ‘a grand desinger’, a super-agent. The mere fact of intentional action, of agents who act for purposes, is what is not accounted for in a lot of current philosophy of biology. My feeling is, that we believe this is something that is understood when actually it’s not.

@McDoodle - not really clear on what it is we are not agreeing on.

Try this quotation for size: ‘I’ll tell you if I’m an atheist, if you tell me what it is I’m supposed not to believe in’ ~ Chomsky.

I just can't see how being mind-dependent in the sense you are pointing to, the sense that the Pythagorean Theorem must be formulated and understood in order to be known, could be anything but unarguably obvious.

On this, I agree; but I would like you to answer the further question: does this imply the presence of an agent? — Banno

Let me see if I understand your claim. We observe that living things act with purpose, but this does not provide us with what we need to conclude that living things act with purpose. Commonly called "the problem of induction".

Bergson on the poverty of what he calls finalism: "But radical finalism is quite as unacceptable, and for the same reason. The doctrine of teleology, in its extreme form, as we find it in Leibniz for example, implies that things and beings merely realize a program previously arranged. But if there is nothing unforeseen, no invention or creation in the universe, time is useless again. As in the mechanistic hypothesis, here again it is supposed that all is given. Finalism thus understood is only inverted mechanism." (CE, p. 45).

And on the poverty of vitalism: "There lies the stumbling-block of the vitalistic theories. We shall not reproach them, as is ordinarily done, with replying to the question by the question itself: the "vital principle" may indeed not explain much, but it is at least a sort of label affixed to our ignorance, so as to remind us of this occasionally while mechanism invites us to ignore that ignorance" (CE, p. 48).

And again on how "It would be futile to try to assign to life an end, in the human sense of the word. To speak of an end is to think of a preexisting model which has only to be realized. It is to suppose, therefore, that all is given, and that the future can be read in the present. It is to believe that life, in its movement and in its entirety, goes to work like our intellect, which is only a motionless and fragmentary view of life, and which naturally takes its stand outside of time". (CE, p. 58).

On why Plato sucks: "Plato was the first to set up the theory that to know the real consists in finding its Idea, that is to say, in forcing it into a pre-existing frame already at our disposal as if we implicitly possessed universal knowledge. But this belief is natural to the human intellect, always engaged as it is in determining under what former heading it shall catalogue any new object; and it may be said that, in a certain sense, we are all born Platonists. Nowhere is the inadequacy of this method so obvious as in theories of life." (CE, pps. 55-56).

The whole book is just so good.

Nothing in the article about "a human could observe another person's time slowing relative to his own."

As you said, it is incoherent. — Rich

I didn't say recognition of time slowing was incoherent. I said experiencing another's phenomenal state was.

Let me see if I understand your claim. We observe that living things act with purpose, but this does not provide us with what we need to conclude that living things act with purpose. Commonly called "the problem of induction". — Metaphysician Undercover

There needn't be intentionality (which seems to be how "agency" is being used here) where there is teleological behavior. A plant grows upward toward the sun for the pupose of survival, but entirely without intent. The evolutionary pull of survival, posited as no different than any other law of nature, offers the causative, non-teleological explanation for its behavior just as gravity explains why the rock falls to earth when dropped.

The evolutionary pull of survival — Hanover

And the theory for this phenomenon? Why does dead matter long to survive? For what purpose? With what intent? Why does dead matter create forums to discuss non-existent intent? Why does dead matter enjoy Big Macs and sugar and conversing with other dead matter about themselves? What is the theory? It just happens - and keeps happening forever? It's that the theory? A Miracle?

This is Henri Bergson:



“Fortunately, some are born with spiritual immune systems that sooner or later give rejection to the illusory worldview grafted upon them from birth through social conditioning.[/b] They begin sensing that something is amiss, and start looking for answers. Inner knowledge and anomalous outer experiences show them a side of reality others are oblivious to, and so begins their journey of awakening. Each step of the journey is made by following the heart instead of following the crowd and by choosing knowledge over the veils of ignorance

“But, then, I cannot escape the objection that there is no state of mind, however simple, which does not change every moment, since there is no consciousness without memory, and no continuation of a state without the addition, to the present feeling, of the memory of past moments. It is this which constitutes duration. Inner duration is the continuous life of a memory which prolongs the past into the present, the present either containing within it in a distinct form the ceaselessly growing image of the past, or, more profoundly, showing by its continual change of quality the heavier and still heavier load we drag behind us as we grow older. Without this survival of the past into the present there would be no duration, but only instantaneity.”

To think intuitively is to think in duration. Intelligence starts ordinarily from the immobile, and reconstructs movement as best it can with immobilities in juxtaposition. Intuition starts from movement, posits it, or rather perceives it as reality itself, and sees in immobility only an abstract moment, a snapshot taken by our mind, of a mobility. Intelligence ordinarily concerns itself with things, meaning by that, with the static, and makes of change an accident which is supposedly superadded. For intuition the essential is change: as for the thing, as intelligence understands it, it is a cutting which has been made out of the becoming and set up by our mind as a substitute for the whole. Thought ordinarily pictures to itself the new as a new arrangement of pre-existing elements; nothing is ever lost of it, nothing is ever created. Intuition, bound up to a duration which is growth, perceives in it an uninterrupted continuity of unforeseeable novelty; it sees,it knows that the mind draws from itself more than it has, that spirituality consists in just that, and that reality, impregnated with spirit, is creation.”

“Creation signifies, above all, emotion, and that not in literature or art alone. We all know the concentration and effort implied in scientific discovery.

Banno first said "The point of evolution is its lack of purpose". Now the subject has switched to "intent", and "agency", rather than "purpose". I suppose the question is whether "purpose" implies "intent".

You suggest that it does not, that a plant's growth has purpose, but no intent. I find that difficult to accept, as I see no other meaning to "purpose", except as an object to be attained. The object to be attained is what the thing intends. We could however, assume that "intent" refers to a special type of purpose, a type of purpose specific to conscious agents, so that "intent" implies "purpose", but "purpose" does not imply "intent".

But then we still have to account for all the rest of the "purpose" which we observe in the biological realm, "purpose" which is not properly intentional. How is it that plants act as if survival is an object to be attained? Why do they grow? So we cannot remove "purpose" from evolution, as Banno suggested. And the problem, with teleology, as Aristotle demonstrated, is that when we ask "that for the sake of which" (why?) in this way, we can always ask that again of the answer. Either we get an infinite regress or we hit the ultimate end. One might argue that "survival" is the ultimate end, but the reality of death, reproduction, evolution, and the endeavours of the conscious mind, make it highly unlikely that survival is the ultimate end of the biological organism.

But, then, I cannot escape the objection that there is no state of mind, however simple, which does not change every moment, since there is no consciousness without memory, and no continuation of a state without the addition, to the present feeling, of the memory of past moments. It is this which constitutes duration. Inner duration is the continuous life of a memory which prolongs the past into the present, the present either containing within it in a distinct form the ceaselessly growing image of the past, or, more profoundly, showing by its continual change of quality the heavier and still heavier load we drag behind us as we grow older. Without this survival of the past into the present there would be no duration, but only instantaneity. — Bergson

It is interesting that Bergson does not give us an approach to the existence of the future here. He relates present to past, and speaks as if things come into existence, at the present, in the act of creation. But we all know that it is nonsense to speak about something coming from nothing. The eternalist determinist, would have all the things which come into existence at the present, (are created), already existing somehow in the future, prior to being observed at the present, as time passes. But the free willist allows that things which are created as time passes, actually "come into existence" from possibility, in some very real way.

So if we take the free willist ontology, then when things are created at the present, as time passes, they come into existence from the real existence of possibility. "Possibility" here substitutes for "nothing", because it is irrational to believe that something could come from nothing. The ontology is radically different from the eternalist determinist ontology which assumes that what will be, already is, in some substantial way, because "possibility" negates the reality of this substantial future, assuming rather a "nothing" in relation to substantial existence. This is difficult for people to grasp, that substantial existence comes from nothing (mere possibility), at the moment of the present.

This leaves us with the question of where do the creations really come from. If the past consists of what is determined, in the sense of having real substantial existence, and the future consists of possibilities for creativity at the present, then the decisions as to what exactly is created at the present, from the possibilities which are proper to the future, must come from somewhere else. What exactly is a "decision"?

This leaves us with the question of where do the creations really come from. If the past consists of what is determined, in the sense of having real substantial existence, and the future consists of possibilities for creativity at the present, then the decisions as to what exactly is created at the present, from the possibilities which are proper to the future, must come from somewhere else. What exactly is a "decision"? — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no terse response to your questions (I prefer terse and to the point), so I am struggling to understand the precise concept that you are attempting to grasp. This quote from Bergson is not meant to be satisfy your question but possibly to steer it in a Bergsonian direction.

"Spirit borrows from matter the perceptions on which it feeds and restores them to matter in the form of movements which it has stamped with its own freedom."

Admittedly, poetic but actually very much to the point.

A decision, can be considered a choice to move in a specific manner of action. Bergson was fundamentally suggesting that duration is the unfolding of action by the Élan vital/consciousness/mind.

You suggest that it does not, that a plant's growth has purpose, but no intent. I find that difficult to accept, as I see no other meaning to "purpose", except as an object to be attained. The object to be attained is what the thing intends. We could however, assume that "intent" refers to a special type of purpose, a type of purpose specific to conscious agents, so that "intent" implies "purpose", but "purpose" does not imply "intent". — Metaphysician Undercover

It's purpose is survival, which is the purpose of all living things, and is the basis for evolution theories. As with plants, it's clear they grow up toward the sun in order to survive, but no plant decided or intended to grow upward. It's simply that if they had not, they would not have survived and those of similar genetic code would not have seen a next generation.

I think the same is true of birds and of higher biological organisms. It's clear that a causal explanation is not entirely complete when describing bird behavior, as in, just telling me the physical and chemical causes of wing flapping will not explain to me why the bird is going south for the winter. I do need to know why the bird is going south in order to understand bird behavior, but that answer boils down to survival of the species. It goes south to eat, to reproduce, and to raise its young, without which it won't survive.

When it comes to people, though, it's not entirely clear why we do the things we do, and it's not clear we as a species are advancing our survivability, but maybe we are doing the best we can in our environment. Afterall, human populations are at the highest ever.

It's purpose is survival, which is the purpose of all living things, and is the basis for evolution theories. — Hanover

I'll repeat what I said. It is highly doubtful that survival is the purpose of living things:

One might argue that "survival" is the ultimate end, but the reality of death, reproduction, evolution, and the endeavours of the conscious mind, make it highly unlikely that survival is the ultimate end of the biological organism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here's the point Hanover. Look at what "survive" means. It means little more than to subsist, to remain in existence, and this is what the most simple life forms are best at doing. To subsist, to survive, is the most fundamental, basic capacity of a living organism.

Now move to evolution, and see what it has given to living organisms. Plants grow, which is much more than surviving. Animal have the capacity to move themselves, which gives them something more than growth. Animals also sense, and have a power of creativity. Human beings have intellection, which gives them an even higher power of creativity, and understanding.

So it seems highly unlikely that the purpose of all these higher levels of activity, which living organisms engage in, is survival, which the most basic, primitive organisms already have.

A little background on Bergson:

"Bergson inclined to convert to Catholicism, writing in his will on 7 February 1937: My thinking has always brought me nearer to Catholicism, in which I saw the perfect complement to Judaism.[30] Though wishing to convert to Catholicism, as stated in his will, he did not convert in view of the travails inflicted on the Jewish people by the rise of Nazism and anti-Semitism in Europe in the 1930s; he did not want to appear to want to leave the persecuted. On 3 January 1941 Bergson died in occupied Paris from bronchitis.[31] A Roman Catholic priest said prayers at his funeral per his request. Bergson is buried in the Cimetière de Garches, Hauts-de-Seine".

Bergson chose, and it had nothing to do with survival, instead had everything to do with his Spirit.

↪Banno I’m not arguing for ‘a grand desinger’, a super-agent. The mere fact of intentional action, of agents who act for purposes, is what is not accounted for in a lot of current philosophy of biology. My feeling is, that we believe this is something that is understood when actually it’s not. — Wayfarer

Then perhaps you are making a good point.

We observe that living things act with purpose, but this does not provide us with what we need to conclude that living things act with purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

Rather, we observe that living things act with purpose, but this does not provide us with what we need to conclude that evolution acts with purpose.

While watching this video on quantum entanglement and gravity I came across this comment which I have taken the liberty to highlight key points. Basically, time as a moment of a clock in space was assumed by Relativity and never proven, which Einstein himself attested to. You can ignore the video. I am including it to reference the comment.

https://youtu.be/bKjgNznlkcI

Comment by:

Matthew Marsden
(Auth “A Brief History of Timelessness) 

To unify any two theories (e.g. Relativity and Quantum), one should be very clear that each and all of the phenomena suggested by both theories Is reasonably confirmed.

Otherwise, if one or other theory is believed to prove something that it in fact does not, and this not noticed, then one may be endlessly trying to fit two pieces of a puzzle together, thinking the problem is very hard, because one is not realising that one piece may actually be bogus.

In this talk, Professor Dowker refers to, and incorporates into her explanation, Relativity, and space-“time”. Suggesting that she accepts that “time” is a phenomena that exists, and is merged with space, and that this is proven to a reasonable extent by Relativity. And thus is trying to work out how to merge space-time with the quantum arena.

However, if we actually check for ourselves, and look at the seminal paper on Relativity, ( translated ) “The electrodynamics of moving bodies”, we find that concerning the theory of time it actually says...
A.Einstein, (Section § 1. Definition of Simultaneity) quote...

“If we wish to describe the motion of a material point, we give the values of its co-ordinates as functions of the time. Now we must bear carefully in mind that a mathematical description of this kind has no physical meaning unless we are quite clear as to what we understand by “time.” “

And...

“If, for instance, I say, “That train arrives here at 7 o'clock,” I mean something like this: “The pointing of the small hand of my watch to 7 and the arrival of the train are simultaneous events.” “


Here, to avoid accepting, and attempting to explain and incorporate phenomena which may in fact not be proven be Relativity, I think it is important that professor Dowker considers the following.

Where apparently describing a thing called “time”, “The electrodynamics of moving bodies”, says we describe “the motion of a material point” , “as functions of the “time” “.

However the paper clearly only actually describes the comparing the motion of a material point ( a train) , with the motion of another material point “a motorised pointer on a numbered dial”.

In other words, from the outset Special Relativity does not actually show the existence of a past, a future or a thing called time, that must exist and pass for things to be able to exist and move, but instead Relativity only assumes that a thing called time exists, and that a rotating hand in some way proves or indicates this.

(i.e. just saying "time is that which clocks measure, is nonsense, no matter who says it, unless one can scientifically prove, rather than just assume, there is a "past" and or "future", and an extra thing called time that must exist, extra to the energy in a spring or battery that IS clearly measured by such a motor).

SR does show us that for easily understood reasons that

“all moving oscillators are oscillating more slowly than expected”,

And this fact is of course essentially incorporated in GPS satellite oscillators etc.
But logically, and scientifically, just observing the rotating tip of a motorised hand and “calling” that motion “time”, is in no way at all scientific proof, as per the scientific method, that there IS a past, or a future, or a thing called time that exists and passes between a past and future.

And, more importantly, just observing that a moving oscillator is oscillating more slowly than expected, is not scientific proof as per the scientific method, that one’s “guess” that a thing or place called the “past”, and or the “ future” and a thing called “time” must exist. Logically, it is only confirmation bias that would make us assume this.

In other words, while it is agreed with the professor, that a rapidly moving twin will be “changing more slowly” that a stationary twin, without specific proof it cannot actually be logically and scientifically accepted that this is because of, or proves the existence of a thing called “time”, or that the moving twin is changing more slowly becasue a thing called time is dilated in its passage between a "past and "future", and is thus affecting the twin.

(imo, the importance and consequences of seeing how SR may in fact in no way prove the existence of a 4th dimension, and realizing tha many professionals assume, without actually checking, that it does , cannot be over estimated. I.e it may lead to the conclusion that matter just exists, moves changes and interacts "now", or "timelessly" so to speak, effectively disolving and solving the so called "problem of time", and all eliminating all discussion of temporal paradoxes etc)

And, despite the fact that many people cite Relativity as apparently proving that extra to space, matter and motion, a thing called time exists, unless they can actually show where Relativity from the outset proves, rather than just assumes, the existence of a thing called “time”, and where the paper proves there may be a thing or place called “past” and or “future”, rather than just assuming these “things” are obvious, and for some reason exempt from needing proof as per the scientific method, the concept of “time”, and the existence of 4 dimensional space-“time”, should not be considered scientific fact.

Therefore , if the professor is trying to unify quantum mechanics, with the concept of space”time”, but the time component she has just accepted as proven, but cannot actually cite the proof of, then this “time” component may be a falsehood that does not exist, and need not be included in the unification.

i.e imo, probably wrongly assuming a thing called “time” does exist, and must be incorporated as in space time, will make professors Dowkers problem seem harder to solve than it may actually be.

Then perhaps you are making a good point. — Banno

Wonderful! I’ll frame that for the Trophy Room. X-)

On a more serious note - it’s not far removed from the main point of Thomas Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos.

Rather, we observe that living things act with purpose, but this does not provide us with what we need to conclude that evolution acts with purpose. — Banno

Evolution is not an acting thing, so to suggest that it acts with purpose would be a category mistake in the first place. Evolution is not an agent in any way, rather it is a description that we have, of a process carried out by life on earth. Life is the agent.

The thing which "evolution" refers to, is the result of the actions of living beings. So if living actions are purposeful, then we cannot divorce evolution from purpose unless we propose that some living actions, the ones that result in evolution, are not purposeful. This would be ridiculous though, because it would mean that reproductive acts are not purposeful acts, when they clearly are. Therefore we cannot separate evolution from purpose.

So I will ask you the same question as I asked @Wayfarer:

Does the presence of a purpose imply the presence of an agent?

Great post.

Thanks foo. As I search the Internet, I find many people with strong misgivings with the concept that oscillations in space determine the nature of hour lives. From what I've seen, quantum scientists are definitely moving in a different direction that will almost certainly supplant Relativity. Ultimately, Relativity becomes superfluous and all notions of space-time will be replaced by quantum information entanglement which fits perfectly within a Bergsonian view of Mind and Matter. The only thing that remains is for science to quit pretending there is no Mind involved with science.

Does the presence of a purpose imply the presence of an agent? — Banno

I think that would depend on how you define "agent". I believe that anything which is active, an active cause, is an agent.

In the case of a human being, we say that the person acts with intent (has a purpose in mind), and is an agent. In the case of other living beings, I would say that each one of them is an agent as well, as they each act with purpose. However, the agency associated with "purpose" need not be within the object which acts with a purpose. For instance, each component in my computer has a purpose, so it is not necessary for a thing to be animate in order for it to act for a purpose. But in this case, the object was created with intention, such that the parts are directed toward their purpose by the intent of the creator. The agent who acts to give each of the parts its purpose, is the one who builds the object. I do not see how anything could act with purpose without some sort of agency.

So... there is an agent?

Always. Without an agent there is no activity.

SO what is the agent?

What do you mean? What is the soul?