Oh, sorry for the misunderstanding. I was trying to be sure of what you were saying so I took dictionary definitions. I suppose you have an idiosyncratic understanding of these words?

One can often understand another's writing by virtue of looking at the context... the use. A nuanced understanding doesn't tend to follow common uses of key terms. I've defined those on a number of occasions, and you and I have been conversing literally for almost a decade. You can go back and look at anything I've written during that time. Consistent terminological usage is not a problem, and my usage isn't contradictory to common usage either. It's just quite a bit more detailed...

So...

If all belief consists of statements/propositions, then Jack has no belief for he has no statements/propositions.

If Jack has belief, then not all belief consists of statements/propositions, for Jack has no statements/propositions. — creativesoul

I say that it is clear that Jack has belief. Therefore, it is not the case that all belief content is propositional. — creativesoul

Exactly, couldn't have said it better myself. Very precise, and very clear.

It does not follow from the fact that Jack cannot argue for his own belief that he has none. It does follow from the fact that Jack cannot justify his own belief that he does not have the means for doing so. It does follow from the fact that Jack has belief and no language that not all belief is existentially dependent upon language. It does follow from the fact that Jack has belief and no language that not all belief content is propositional/statements... — creativesoul

Again, I like it Creative, very direct and to the point.

If you accept that the concept belief takes its meaning from public behaviours, then what of your "private beliefs"? If you are merely saying that there is some internal aspect to belief, as there is e.g. an internal aspect to pain, then I agree - although I'm not sure what pre-linguistic man's internal aspect of a belief could be without language. But also, as I've said before, I think it confuses matters to use the word private here, given its Wittgensteinian usage, i.e. where something cannot be made public or can be known only by a single individual. If you accept that the word belief gets its meaning, and that beliefs can be expressed, via external, public behaviours, then it confuses matters to refer to beliefs as private, especially when the discussion is also about Wittgenstein. — Luke

Yes, that's all I mean by private, that there is an "internal aspect" to belief. But then you ask, "...I'm not sure what pre-linguistic man's "internal aspect" of a belief could be without language[?]" - It would be just that, a private belief, if kept private, or become public in two ways - first, by expressing the belief publicly via an action apart from language, or two, expressing the belief via language, which are both public.

I do except the fact that beliefs get their meaning in a public way, i.e., the concept belief is a public happening. It doesn't confuse things if you understand that there is an internal aspect to a belief that is a necessary condition for belief (here I'm separating the internal from the external). However, language itself, is not a necessary condition for belief, although it's necessary for the linguistic application, or the expression of a belief, which are public.

I don't think I confused the issue of what I meant by private beliefs, but I can see how others confused the issue. The problem as I pointed out to Banno, was that the concept belief doesn't get it's meaning from the private mental happening. I explained how this idea a couple of times, and how it differed from what Wittgenstein was saying. Now, could I have worded it more accurately, probably, I would have to go back and look at what was written.

I think clarity start's happening as people use their words to explain the idea.

The problem as I pointed out to Banno, was that the concept belief doesn't get it's meaning from the private mental happening. — Sam26

Judging by the discussion in this thread, there is no such thing as "the concept belief". Doubt is clearly warranted.

So "Jack has a red ball" must be false because Jack cannot see red?

So "Jack has a red ball" must be false because Jack cannot see red? — Banno

I don't follow your logic. Jack has a red ball is not a belief that Jack would have (if Jack is a dog). If I say, "Jack has a red ball," that would be my belief expressed in language.

"Jack has a belief"cannot be true if beliefs are our descriptions of Jack's behaviour, since our descriptions are not Jack's descriptions.

"Jack has a red ball" cannot be true if "red" is our descriptions of Jack's ball, since our descriptions are not Jack's descriptions.

The best argument against my view - implicit in some things that have been said here, but one that ought be set out in detail - is that my account leaves us with far too may potential beliefs.

So Jack went to the bowl because he was hungry and he believed the bowl might contain food: act explained by desire and belief.

Or Jack went to the bowl because he wanted to view some art and believed that there was an excellent fish motif on his bowl.

Or Jack went to the bowl because he believes that the great god Zarg requires him to sniff the bowl at least five times per day.

"Jack has a belief"cannot be true if beliefs are our descriptions of Jack's behaviour, since our descriptions are not Jack's descriptions.

"Jack has a red ball" cannot be true if "red" is our descriptions of Jack's ball, since our descriptions are not Jack's descriptions. — Banno

This doesn't follow from what I've been arguing Banno.

"Jack has a belief" cannot be true if all beliefs are descriptions of behaviour, because Jack has no descriptions of behaviour.

That would follow what I've argued.

"Jack has a red ball" cannot be true if all cases of having a red ball are descriptions because Jack has no descriptions.

That would follow what I've argued.

I warn against conflating the necessary and sufficient conditions for having a red ball with a description of having a red ball. That's what's going on with your account.

Indeed, how could we be wrong about Jack's belief if we first hold that it consists entirely of our statements about his behaviour?

Quite simply, we would be dead wrong in every case if we first held that the content of Jack's belief was propositional/statements... each and every claim would be equally wrong. Jack has belief. He has no statement. Jack's belief does not consist of statements.

Our report of Jack's belief does.

Logical possibility alone doesn't warrant belief.

X-)

Thanks Sam. I've been telling you that we're not that far apart... well, on this matter at least.

;)

It's all about the content of belief.

I warn against conflating the necessary and sufficient conditions for having a red ball with a description of having a red ball. That's what's going on with your account. — creativesoul

Yeah. Except that a belief is a description.

SO what more is there to the content of a belief than subject and statement?

Yeah. Except that a belief is a description. — Banno

Then Jack has no belief, and your position is self-contradictory. It also cannot admit of belief prior to language, for descriptions are existentially dependent upon language.

You're just following the same old epistemological mistake Banno. JTP is more apt.

SO what more is there to the content of a belief than subject and statement? — Banno

It's not more... it's less AND more.

That's what getting to the root of things goes. It provides the simplest adequate explanation for the widest scope of application.

Correlations Banno... that's what all thought, belief, propositions, and statements consist entirely of.

Witt didn't quite figure it out either... but he was well on his way.

He would and most notably did argue against the notion of intention as well. Just so ya know. You invoked it earlier.

He never balked at belief.

Oh... and if shifting your weight to your back foot is a defensive posture, there's no need my friend. I'm not attacking you. I'm focusing upon the content of your writing...

and if shifting your weight to your back foot is a defensive posture, — creativesoul

Just an admission that your argument at that stage carried some weight. I went into how, here.

"Wittgenstein didn't figure it out either," that's really funny, not that he wasn't wrong about some things, but that you would say such a thing. I don't know that I would have the audacity to say such a thing. His mind and philosophy, generally, was just on a different level altogether in terms of genius.

We can evaluate beliefs not only in terms of whether a person has a belief or not but also, if he has a belief, how sincerely he holds it. E.g. I believe my wife loves me and me alone - but I continually check her phone for texts from lovers. It's not a sincerely held belief. It's not actually a belief at all. In this case the behaviour is crucial to the evaluation not just of sincerity but of the existence of the belief. My saying 'I believe my wife loves only me' is not enough for the statement to qualify as a belief, even if I believe that I believe it. So I submit.

...what do you do with beliefs that are simply shown and not stated? We know that a belief can be stated given a linguistic context, but not all beliefs originate in linguistic contexts, i.e., they can simply be reflections of our actions, again like Wittgenstein's examples. — creativesoul

Now that I re-read my statement, it's a mistake to say that beliefs are reflections of actions, so you are correct in that actions are reflections of a belief. So I did reverse this, and this is what Wittgenstein pointed out, i.e., I see a particular kind of action, and that action reflects a belief or beliefs. I'll have to re-read my posts because I'm sure there are other errors that I made in my expressions. This though is a kind of typo more than anything else, but I also didn't realize what I'd done when I re-read what I typed.

That's an interesting point Cuthbert. In some sense we can also fool ourselves about our beliefs, i.e., I can say that I love my wife, but my actions may indicate otherwise. This is also another example where an action shows the belief. Is it that it's not a sincerely held belief, or is it just not a belief at all, i.e., I can say that I sincerely believe it, but my actions say otherwise?

Another interesting point about lying, i.e., when I tell the judge that I didn't murder my wife (when in fact I did murder my wife), I'm expressing a belief, but the judge, prosecutor, and jury have to judge based on my actions whether it's a belief truly held by me, viz., that I'm not lying. Thus the evidence of the act reflects the true belief held by the guilty party. So lies can be determined based simply on the actions of the person, and thus what's true, in terms of the belief truly held by the guilty party, is seen in the evidence, which reflect the correct belief.

↪creativesoul "Wittgenstein didn't figure it out either," that's really funny, not that he wasn't wrong about some things, but that you would say such a thing. I don't know that I would have the audacity to say such a thing. His mind and philosophy, generally, was just on a different level altogether in terms of genius. — Sam26

The content of belief...

He didn't figure it out. His use of "hinge proposition" shows that. I've been called arrogant more times than I care to count. You'll have that.