According to everything you've put forth here Banno, Jack's belief is not meaningful to him.

Don't you find that problematic?

We are led astray by the picture of a belief as a thing in a mind. A belief is rather post hoc, inferred as a folk explanation of the behavioural results of brain activity. So I can agree with your causal chain leading from perceptions to brain to behaviour; but not to belief. The belief is a different language game - dare I use that term - running in parallel with and about the same thing, the act; but instead of being in physical terms, it is in intentional terms. — Banno

Our notion of belief comes after our realization that we have them...

That's a much better way to look at it.

I would say that you have this exactly backwards. Behaviours reflect belief. — creativesoul

I don't understand why you would say this, especially since in what you quoted I said, "...they [beliefs] can be reflections of our actions. I've been saying this all through this thread. :-$

Maybe I misunderstood you Sam. It probably wasn't worth mentioning...

To me, saying that behaviours reflect belief is not the same thing as saying beliefs are reflections of actions(behaviours)...

I think we ought begin to set out - as precisely as possible - what the contents of belief are. Pre-linguistic and linguistic alike. We've been skirting around it the entire thread...

Not I. They are an agent and a statement.

Jack doesn't have statements.

Besides that, we can have both, agent and statement and not a belief statement...

He can be the subject of a statement.

So what.

Jack has belief.
Jack has no statements.
Statements are not necessary for belief.

If we can have both, an agent and a statement and do not have belief, then the criterion is found lacking...

That's what.

Cheers Banno...

Gotta run!

You too Sam!

(Y)

You mean like jack believes Paris is the capital of France?
Just a belief statement that happens to be false.

That wouldn't be Jack's belief. Cannot be. Jack has no statements. That would be your report(or someone's report) of Jack's belief. It would be wrong in the only way that matters... the content.

Of course it is Jack's belief. If not Jack's then whose? That he can't say it doesn't imply that it is not his. He can't say "that's my tooth" either. It's his tooth, nonetheless.

While I like the idea of looking for agreement, I can't agree with this. Since the meaning of a word is its use, knowing-that reduces to knowing-how. Language is, after all, a human action. — Banno

We have some agreement on justification, but there's a way of using "know" which indicates that it is believed that the thing known is necessarily true. Those who claim knowledge as justified true belief would assert this. That is what I referred to earlier as "a certainty", in the sense of "it is certain that...". We use "know" in the sense of knowing-that to indicate that the thing known is true. I do not think that knowing-how can account for this type of certainty, as "knowing-how" is only supported by that confidence which I referred to, the attitude of certitude.

So this is the issue. If knowing-that reduces to knowing-how, then that certainty (in the sense of it is certain that...) which is commonly associated with the use of "know" in the sense of knowing-that, cannot be supported. This is to say that "knowledge" as justified true belief cannot be supported, because "true" cannot be verified by knowing-how. This is the certainty which is associated with truth. "It is certain that..." means "it is true that...". Now we have no support for the assumption that what one knows is the truth, because what one knows is how to do something, and any determination of truth would be relative to the method or technique, unless there was some specific justified way of determining "the truth". If this is the case, then I argue that there is nothing which is indubitable.

So really, we agree on everything accept the logical consequences of what we agree on. I agree that knowing-that reduces to knowing-how. But I apprehend as a logical consequence of this, that JTB cannot be supported because the certainty required for truth cannot be provided by knowing-how. So I argue that if we ask of a proposition, is it true, there is no proposition which is beyond doubt.

But a good post, Meta - you have perhaps hit on a basic disagreement. — Banno

Thanks Banno, coming from you, that means a lot.

We have some agreement on justification, but there's a way of using "know" which indicates that it is believed that the thing known is necessarily true. Those who claim knowledge as justified true belief would assert this. That is what I referred to earlier as "a certainty", in the sense of "it is certain that...". We use "know" in the sense of knowing-that to indicate that the thing known is true. I do not think that knowing-how can account for this type of certainty, as "knowing-how" is only supported by that confidence which I referred to, the attitude of certitude. — Metaphysician Undercover

Woe. Suddenly we are miles apart.

There's that word necessarily. I use the possible worlds interpretation to make sense of modal logic; if I recall correctly, you use it entirely differently, in a way that I could not make any sense of. SO I will just try to work around that for a bit.

Let's look at some other examples of know-how. The ubiquitous example is knowing how to ride a bike.

Notice that knowing how to ride a bike presupposes a bike? Sans the vehicle, the notion of riding a bike is nonsense.

Sound familiar? It's the same issue as the certainty of hinge propositions. Knowing how presupposes the stuff of our everyday world. Knowing how to use language is no different.

Now you seem to think there is a problem here for JTB. Please understand that from my reading, OC shows that it is illegitimate to say that we know hinge propositions. That's because they do not admit to justification, and hence are not subject to the JTB definition, and hence not examples of knowledge. No potential to be wrong, no knowledge.

So not only is certainty central to knowing how, it is central to knowing that.

That wouldn't be Jack's belief. Cannot be. Jack has no statements. That would be your report(or someone's report) of Jack's belief. It would be wrong in the only way that matters... the content. — creativesoul

Of course it is Jack's belief. If not Jack's then whose? That he can't say it doesn't imply that it is not his. He can't say "that's my tooth" either. It's his tooth, nonetheless. — Banno

He cannot believe "that's my tooth" anymore than he can believe Paris is the capital of France.

That Jack cannot state his belief does not mean that it is not his. We agree there.

It's the content that needs to make sense here Banno. Jack's belief does not consist of statements. He has none. His belief cannot consist of statements. Nor can it be the case that Jack's belief is some attitude or other towards a statement.

One can know how to say that without knowing that...

:-}

It's the content that needs to make sense here Banno. Jack's belief does not consist of statements. He has none. His belief cannot consist of statements. Nor can it be the case that Jack's belief is some attitude or other towards a statement. — creativesoul

It really doesn't. Jack's belief is the compliment of his actions and his desires. You're just indulging in reification.

No. I'm not. Gratuitous assertions won't do here Banno. I've already addressed that charge when it came from Janus.

Try this... open your eyes a bit wider...

How would you know if you were wrong in your claims about Jack's belief? What would have to be the case in order for you to be wrong in your report of another's belief?

I'm not saying the word or concept belief doesn't get it's meaning from public behavior, of course it does.

When I sit on a chair, am I not showing that I believe a chair is there to sit on? No one has to state the belief to know that the person showing the belief, has the belief. You can state it, or I can state it, but that doesn't mean there is no belief prior to the statement. It's often seen in our public actions even before it's stated.

Are you saying that a concept cannot refer to something prior to it's linguistic creation? When I read what others are saying it seems they're implying this, as though beliefs can't exist apart from the concept belief, or the linguistic use of the term belief. — Sam26

If you accept that the concept belief takes its meaning from public behaviours, then what of your "private beliefs"? If you are merely saying that there is some internal aspect to belief, as there is e.g. an internal aspect to pain, then I agree - although I'm not sure what pre-linguistic man's internal aspect of a belief could be without language. But also, as I've said before, I think it confuses matters to use the word private here, given its Wittgensteinian usage, i.e. where something cannot be made public or can be known only by a single individual. If you accept that the word belief gets its meaning, and that beliefs can be expressed, via external, public behaviours, then it confuses matters to refer to beliefs as private, especially when the discussion is also about Wittgenstein.

Notice that knowing how to ride a bike presupposes a bike? Sans the vehicle, the notion of riding a bike is nonsense. — Banno

The presupposition of "a bike", is just that, a presupposition. The presupposition cannot grant truth to that which is presupposed.

That you know how to ride a bike means that there is an activity which we call "ride a bike", and you are judged as knowing how to do it. You are judged to be correctly doing what is called "ride a bike" . The use of the word "bike" to refer to what you are engaged with, doesn't necessitate logically, that there is a bike there. Your fallacious "necessity" is hidden in your presupposition.

Now you seem to think there is a problem here for JTB. Please understand that from my reading, OC shows that it is illegitimate to say that we know hinge propositions. That's because they do not admit to justification, and hence are not subject to the JTB definition, and hence not examples of knowledge. No potential to be wrong, no knowledge. — Banno

Right, the hinge propositions support a knowing-how. I would call this knowing how to use words. The know-how is judged according to the conventional use of words. However, the proper use of words does not guarantee "truth" in any meaningful sense of "truth". As in your example of the bike, truth is "presupposed" by conventional usage. If it is conventional to call the thing a bike, then it is true that it is a bike.

Because hinge propositions are not subject to JTB, the knowledge they support is not JTB knowledge. It is lacking in an essential aspect, real truth. Hinge propositions support 'truth by convention".

If all belief consists of statements/propositions, then Jack has no belief for he has no statements/propositions.

If Jack has belief, then not all belief consists of statements/propositions, for Jack has no statements/propositions.

That's something to consider here folks...

I say that it is clear that Jack has belief. Therefore, it is not the case that all belief content is propositional.

The reason that that(belief content is propositional) has been held for so long is as a result of the justification aspect of JTB, which would have been much more aptly named JTP. When one argues for his/her own belief such as is necessary in order to justify one's belief to another, they are reporting upon their own thought and belief. That is to say that they are involved in a metacognitive process. They are thinking about their own thought and belief. When doing this, it is done so via language use... belief statements/propositions. Language is required in order for an agent to become aware that it has thought and belief. Written language to be more specific...

It does not follow from the fact that Jack cannot argue for his own belief that he has none. It does follow from the fact that Jack cannot justify his own belief that he does not have the means for doing so. It does follow from the fact that Jack has belief and no language that not all belief is existentially dependent upon language. It does follow from the fact that Jack has belief and no language that not all belief content is propositional/statements...

All predication is correlation.
All correlation is thought and belief.
Not all correlation is predication.

That's how it works.

There are many an agent in this world without complex written language that form and/or 'hold' thought and belief. They do so by virtue of drawing correlations between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or themselves(their own 'state of mind', be it hunger, fear, reproductive drive, or some such).

Jack draws correlations between his own behaviour and getting fed. He attributes causality. Thus, he expects to get fed again after behaving the same way enough times and getting fed afterwards. He believes acting a certain way results in getting fed.

Think Pavlov's dog and the bell...

My one cat has drawn correlations between the sound of certain kinds of plastic rustling and her own getting fed(treats). She has also drawn correlations between the sound of cat food hitting her bowl and getting fed. She has also drawn correlations between certain vocalizations she has and getting fed. She also has drawn correlations between certain vocalizations and other cats around my house that are feral and mean...

Her behaviour puts all of this on display. She has certain expectations as a result of these rudimentary thoughts and beliefs, and she makes them known. She doesn't think in statements. She thinks in meaningful correlations...

As do we all.

Over and out. You guys/gals have fun, I've a bunch of much more practically important engineering to do.

X-)

A belief is a firm opinion, a conviction. To expect is to regard as likely a future occurrence. A correlation is a mutual relation or dependency of two things.

If I understand you correctly, you say that the cat with its mind, recognizes a relation between two things. Because of this it considers a future occurrence to be likely. This you consider is a firm opinion, a conviction, belief.

How does "doubt" relate to this scheme? When the cat considers as likely, the future occurrence, does it still respect the possibility that the occurrence may not happen? When a person has a belief, a firm opinion or conviction, does that person still accept the possibility that it may be false?

A belief is a firm opinion, a conviction. To expect is to regard as likely a future occurrence. A correlation is a mutual relation or dependency of two things.

If I understand you correctly... — Metaphysician Undercover

You don't.

Conviction is belief based. Expectation does not require any understanding of likelihood/probability. Correlations are drawn by agents. Belief consists entirely of mental correlations...