The more interesting and pressing question is whether the phantasmagoria of experience exhausts the category of the real. In other words, the more important question is not what objects are, but why they are. If this question has no answer, nihilism results. If this question has an answer, but we can't know it, skepticism results. If this question has an answer, and we can know it, then something like theism results. — Thorongil

One of 2017's philosophy books I've been reading is Defragmenting Modernity, Paul Tyson:

We live in a strangely fragmented lifeworld. On the one hand, abstract constructions of our own imagination—such as money, “mere” facts, and mathematical models—are treated by us as important objective facts. On the other hand, our understanding of the concrete realities of meaning and value in which our daily lives are actually embedded—love, significance, purpose, wonder—are treated as arbitrary and optional subjective beliefs. This is because, to us, only quantitative and instrumentally useful things are considered to be accessible to the domain of knowledge. Our lifeworld is designed to dis-integrate knowledge from belief, facts from meanings, immanence from transcendence, quality from quantity, and “mere” reality from the mystery of being. This book explores two questions: why should we, and how can we, reintegrate being, knowing, and believing?

I think you would find it congenial.

Too subtle? >:O

You wrote "logical axioms"; the point is that axioms are not logical, in the sense that they can be logically demonstrated, but are the intuitions, assumptions or beliefs which constitute the premises of logical (deductively valid) arguments.

Thanks, I'll take a look.

The aspect of existentialism that I think is positive, is the emphasis on 'self-creating' and not living out of a rule-book. But the sense of generating 'out of oneself' a sense of meaning or purpose - I am dubious about that. What I have learned/am learning from my study of spiritual traditions and meditation, is the importance of having a sense of relatedness. I think it is one aspect of what is called in Buddhism bodhicitta and that it's the same quality as the Christian 'agápē'. I don't associate it with formal religion, but it is a spiritual quality, and I think it's lacking in existentialism generally. (Although there are some spiritually-inclined existentialists.) — Wayfarer

Well my understanding of the debate is pretty limited, but I think it was a major point of difference between Sartre and Levinas. They are both students of Heidegger in one way or another but Levinas goes in a different spiritual direction in the existential affirmation. As you can tell I'm pretty impressed by him, when I have more space in my reading schedule (i'm in college again at the mo) I'm going to get back to 'Otherwise than being'.

I still fail to see what point you're trying to advance here. When I spoke of logical axioms, or principles of logic, I wasn't referring to premises in an argument. I mentioned the principle of sufficient reason. That would be one such axiom. The law of non-contradiction would be another. All arguments depend on these axioms, about which one cannot deny without assuming them.

In other words, "If A then B" is the if-then proposition. So, if "If A then B" is true, then the if-then proposition is true.

(...even if A, or B, or both, are false.)

...and is therefore an if-then fact.

A mathematical theorem is an if-then proposition whose "if " premise includes, but needn't be limited to, some mathematical axioms. When it's been shown that that theorem's conclusion follows from its premise, then that theorem is said to be true,

No one says that the axioms must be proven to be true, in order for the theorem to be accepted as true.

I've begun checking sources on the Internet, and I haven;t yet found one that supports Janus's unusual definition of "true"

Michael Ossipoff

I have all along being taking about premises which may, but need not be, taken as axiomatic such as for example that there must be a first cause. I have not been talking about general logical principles such as the LNC or the PSR, which may or may not be ineliminable, but the question of whose dispensability would certainly be more controversial than the premise that, to return to the example, there must be a first cause.

All deductive arguments are based on premises which cannot themselves be deductively derived.

I'm not too familiar with Heidegger, but what you attribute to him here accords well with my position. Leibniz lurks in the background of my thoughts on the question you're responding to, as I've come to sense that his version of the principle of sufficient reason might be superior to Schopenhauer's, and Leibniz's version, of course, leads pretty straight forwardly to theism. — Thorongil

Definitely read Heidegger, but I also recommend Levinas. Both are critical of historical philosophy. Heidegger critiques what he sees to be a diminution of Being to beings, especially in light of the modern technological-industrial revolution. I think he even identifies Scholastic "metaphysics" christened as a science in itself as the beginning of the decline of philosophy proper. Levinas critiques what he sees to be an "egology" behind most metaphysical systems, where everything Other is attempted to be assimilated into one grand totality that the mind can understand. There are things we encounter without understanding, and the dominant tradition has been to either ignore or reduce away these things. Though he points out certain times in which philosophers have recognized the Other, such as Descartes' attempt to use our knowledge of infinity as an argument for God. Anyway.

I concur. But recall that the pre-modern philosophers you speak of made a distinction between knowing what and knowing that something is. We cannot know God's essence but we can know that he exists, they would say. — Thorongil

Yeah, I agree. Though it's sort of difficult for me to wrap my head around the notion that we can know that something exists without knowing hardly anything (if anything) about that which is said to exist. Seems to me that we need at least some basic understanding of what it is we are talking about if we are to say that something "exists".

But this could also be a modern influence to equivocate God's existence with the existence of ordinary objects. I'm not sure what exactly it means when we say God exists if we are not talking about something in space-time with definite qualities, but this is just what Heidegger means when he says the question of Being is not a question of beings, and seems to also be what Levinas tries to get at when he says the Other is beyond the totality. The encounter before understanding. The mind cannot grasp God, because God is beyond the totality.

I'm not sure I agree here. Another Scholastic distinction is between the preambles of the faith and the articles of the faith. The existence of God was thought to be a preamble of the faith, and so capable of rational demonstration. The articles of faith, however, do require faith, for they are revealed truths, that is, truths that do not contradict reason but cannot be arrived at by reason, such as the Trinity. — Thorongil

I was not aware of this distinction, thanks. I thought it was that demonstrations only led the path to God for non-believers and did not establish his existence as some kind of indubitable fact, only as possible and perhaps even likely. I thought Aquinas did not think reason alone could establish that the universe did not extend temporally ad infinitum, for example, and that it's creation by a necessary being was a metaphysically coherent notion that was nevertheless taken on by faith.

DB, I got to say, you are ‘most improved poster’, compared to what you were writing two years ago. (Y)

I mentioned the principle of sufficient reason. That would be one such axiom. The law of non-contradiction would be another. — Thorongil

The LNC cannot be denied without affirming it, but I'm not sure you can say the same about the PSR. There are many who have (coherently) denied the PSR, at least in its applicability beyond our language.

However, even the LNC can be denied in a way. Nobody can deny that our phenomenal experience obeys it or at the very least that we need it in order to communicate. But it can be denied that the LNC applies to reality. For example, someone can appeal to quantum mechanics and say that science reveals that, contrary to what our phenomenal experience at the macro-scale tells us, at the quantum scale reality does not behave according to the LNC. Our language and conceptual thought is simply inadequate in describing this kind of reality.

The LNC cannot be denied without affirming it — Agustino

How so?

Thank you, Wayfarer.

Well, then we've been talking past each other, alas.

Definitely read Heidegger, but I also recommend Levinas. — darthbarracuda

I actually tried reading Being and Time many years ago and found it utterly impenetrable. My thought recently has been that some of his shorter essays might be more approachable. I have a Basic Works of Heidegger on my list as well as the Safranski biography, so I do hope to have at least a baseline knowledge of him. I know nothing about Levinas, but he's another continental figure, so I'm a little wary of him, too. If I get into a PhD program, I'll be focusing on Schopenhauer, so my planned reading list won't be tackled for some time.

I will say that there is a continental philosopher I have liked, from what little I've read of him thus far, namely, Peter Sloterdijk. He has a knowledge of Schopenhauer and his prose is actually pretty readable, at least in comparison with other continental philosophers. He takes aim at scientism and the New Atheists.

Though it's sort of difficult for me to wrap my head around the notion that we can know that something exists without knowing hardly anything (if anything) about that which is said to exist. — darthbarracuda

It seems to be how physicists currently treat dark matter, for example. And it seems to me that I can know that I exist without knowing what I am. With God, I think the Scholastics would say that we can make true statements about what God is (e.g. God is being-itself) without fully understanding what they mean.

I thought it was that demonstrations only led the path to God for non-believers and did not establish his existence as some kind of indubitable fact, only as possible and perhaps even likely. — darthbarracuda

Well, they are presented as deductive, not inductive, arguments, so if the conclusion follows from the premises and the premises are true, then they would be indubitable in the way, 1) all men are mortal, 2) Socrates is a man, 3) Therefore, Socrates is mortal is indubitable.

I thought Aquinas did not think reason alone could establish that the universe did not extend temporally ad infinitum, for example, and that it's creation by a necessary being was a metaphysically coherent notion that was nevertheless taken on by faith. — darthbarracuda

It is true he thought that it could not be demonstrated either way that the world had a temporal beginning, unlike Bonaventure, for example, but this doesn't affect the doctrine of creation. Here is what Boethius says on the subject:

'God is eternal; in this judgment all rational beings agree. Let us, then, consider what eternity is. For this word carries with it a revelation alike of the Divine nature and of the Divine knowledge. Now, eternity is the possession of endless life whole and perfect at a single moment. What this is becomes more clear and manifest from a comparison with things temporal. For whatever lives in time is a present proceeding from the past to the future, and there is nothing set in time which can embrace the whole space of its life together. To-morrow's state it grasps not yet, while it has already lost yesterday's; nay, even in the life of to-day ye live no longer than one brief transitory moment. Whatever, therefore, is subject to the condition of time, although, as Aristotle deemed of the world, it never have either beginning or end, and its life be stretched to the whole extent of time's infinity, it yet is not such as rightly to be thought eternal. For it does not include and embrace the whole space of infinite life at once, but has no present hold on things to come, not yet accomplished. Accordingly, that which includes and possesses the whole fulness of unending life at once, from which nothing future is absent, from which nothing past has escaped, this is rightly called eternal; this must of necessity be ever present to itself in full self-possession, and hold the infinity of movable time in an abiding present. Wherefore they deem not rightly who imagine that on Plato's principles the created world is made co-eternal with the Creator, because they are told that he believed the world to have had no beginning in time, and to be destined never to come to an end. For it is one thing for existence to be endlessly prolonged, which was what Plato ascribed to the world, another for the whole of an endless life to be embraced in the present, which is manifestly a property peculiar to the Divine mind. Nor need God appear earlier in mere duration of time to created things, but only prior in the unique simplicity of His nature. For the infinite progression of things in time copies this immediate existence in the present of the changeless life, and when it cannot succeed in equalling it, declines from movelessness into motion, and falls away from the simplicity of a perpetual present to the infinite duration of the future and the past; and since it cannot possess the whole fulness of its life together, for the very reason that in a manner it never ceases to be, it seems, up to a certain point, to rival that which it cannot complete and express by attaching itself indifferently to any present moment of time, however swift and brief; and since this bears some resemblance to that ever-abiding present, it bestows on everything to which it is assigned the semblance of existence. But since it cannot abide, it hurries along the infinite path of time, and the result has been that it continues by ceaseless movement the life the completeness of which it could not embrace while it stood still. So, if we are minded to give things their right names, we shall follow Plato in saying that God indeed is eternal, but the world everlasting.

Well, then we've been talking past each other, alas. — Thorongil

Here is the original exchange:

The existence of God was thought to be a preamble of the faith, and so capable of rational demonstration. — Thorongil


The problem with this is that there are no "rational demonstrations" which are capable of demonstrating the axiomatic assumptions upon which they are founded. — Janus

So, the point was that valid logical arguments are such that conclusions are inherent in premises. If the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true if an argument is to be counted as valid. So, following that, if any logical argument which purports to prove the existence of God must already assume it, then no deductive proof of the existence of God is possible.

God's existence must always be assumed as axiomatic in any such argument; that is it must be assumed to be given by experience, intuition, feeling or faith. It cannot be derived by pure reason. In fact this was exactly what Kant's project was all about; refuting the idea behind scholastic metaphysics, an idea that is still lurking in the metaphysics of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, that the existence of God could be demonstrated by pure (i.e. disinterested) reason.

if any logical argument which purports to prove the existence of God must already assume it — Janus

They don't, though. That's what the arguments are attempting to establish, that God exists.

If the existence of God is the conclusion then God's existence must be, explicitly or implicitly, contained in the premises; otherwise the argument cannot be valid.

Right, that's how arguments work.

I'd said:

That remains true even if there aren't any Slitheytoves or Jaberwockeys — Michael Ossipoff

Janus replied:

No, it remains valid, not true. You need to brush up on your terminology. I suggest you take a course in elementary logic. — Janus

Actually, a check of various university sources shows that, as implication is conventionally defined, it's unanimous that A => B is true unless A is true and B is false.

By that definition, if it could be shown , for some A and B, that the truth of A would always mean that B is true, then A => B can never not be true.

Perhaps an elementary course in logic would be helpful for Janus.

Michael Ossipoff

(Y)

Great contributions to this discussion, especially concerning the relevance of Heidegger's thinking to the subject.

I actually tried reading Being and Time many years ago and found it utterly impenetrable. My thought recently has been that some of his shorter essays might be more approachable. I have a Basic Works of Heidegger on my list as well as the Safranski biography, so I do hope to have at least a baseline knowledge of him. — Thorongil

I'd suggest tracking down a copy of his Introduction to Metaphysics. Much more readable than Being and Time and it's largely an extended reflection on the issue you raised here.

There are quite a few political and cultural asides thrown in throughout the work that you may find off-putting (or maybe not if you're not a big fan of modernity) and, if I recall correctly, the book is based off a series of lectures that were delivered in 1935, which was shortly after Heidegger had become disillusioned with the Nazi movement.

Anyhow that's the backdrop and IMO it's no exaggeration to say that he felt that the only hope of saving the West from nihilism involved bringing back the question of Being.

bringing back the question of Being. — Erik

As history repeats today.

Thank you, Erik.

I actually tried reading Being and Time many years ago and found it utterly impenetrable. My thought recently has been that some of his shorter essays might be more approachable. I have a Basic Works of Heidegger on my list as well as the Safranski biography, so I do hope to have at least a baseline knowledge of him. I know nothing about Levinas, but he's another continental figure, so I'm a little wary of him, too. If I get into a PhD program, I'll be focusing on Schopenhauer, so my planned reading list won't be tackled for some time. — Thorongil

If you thought Being and Time was impenetrable then I don't know what you'll think of Levinas, haha. Well, that's not entirely true, some of Levinas' texts are easier and digestible. Time and the Other as well as Otherwise Than Being are tough, but some of his shorter works are easier.

Two of my favorite texts by Heidegger are, The Question Concerning Technology and The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, the latter being where he mentions Scholasticism as the decline of philosophizing proper.

Then for Levinas, shorter texts are Useless Suffering, and On Escape. A longer text, but one of my favorites, is Time and the Other.

It seems to be how physicists currently treat dark matter, for example. And it seems to me that I can know that I exist without knowing what I am. With God, I think the Scholastics would say that we can make true statements about what God is (e.g. God is being-itself) without fully understanding what they mean. — Thorongil

It is interesting you bring up the point about knowing that I am without knowing who or what I am. But I have to wonder, how is it that I know that I am without knowing any essence of myself? What is knowledge without essence?

Just based on my own thinking on things, I have to agree with something along the lines of the Schopenhauerian Will. I know I exist, because I am striving. I suffer. This is the primal apodicticity - I suffer, therefore I am.

Another angle to approach this by would be to go a Thomistic / Wittgensteinian route and argue that not everything can be articulated with words. That we may understand without being able to communicate means that at least some knowledge is esoteric and cannot be communicated to a population with an increasingly narrow attention span.

Well, they are presented as deductive, not inductive, arguments, so if the conclusion follows from the premises and the premises are true, then they would be indubitable in the way, 1) all men are mortal, 2) Socrates is a man, 3) Therefore, Socrates is mortal is indubitable. — Thorongil

Sure, but I would say that the premises of these arguments are inductive. That change happens is an empirical observation, for instance. That things depend on each other for their mode of existence is not an a priori deduction. That there may seem to be some kind of design to the world is certainly an empirical observation. Theological arguments like this start from everyday, common experiences and abstract from there.

The point I suppose I was trying to make was that it is not only implausible (in my opinion), but also not preferable, to hold the existence of God as "just another fact", alongside the truth of evolutionary theory, or the orbital trajectory of Saturn. God should not be an entity to be "studied". If we were to "prove" that God exists beyond any reason of doubt, would we need any faith? Would there be any difference between science and religion?

In my mind, the fact is that theological arguments will never reach the level of sophistication and universal acceptance as the more ordinary scientific theories. And that may just be well. Part of the seduction of religious belief is the mystery behind it, and the breathtaking risk associated with believing in something that is not the product of reason (but is not contradictory to reason, of course). As soon as we think these arguments are perfect, I think that might be the end of religion. God would become ordinary. I don't think I want to actively pursue God like this.

So, in valid arguments that conclude that God exists, his existence is assumed in the premises. This is common to all logical arguments; they simply cannot demonstrate the existence of anything because if the existence of anything is a conclusion then the assumption of that existence is an undemonstrated premise. Your saying that logical arguments could demonstrate the existence of God was the erroneous point I initially took issue with, but you seem to be very slow to see that for some reason.

in valid arguments that conclude that God exists, his existence is assumed in the premises — Janus

No, not assumed. Contained.

What you are doing is arguing against deductive arguments per se, every syllogism. Of course, some philosophers have regarded the syllogism as question begging, like J.S. Mill, but I don't agree with them. Are you aware of the position you have taken here or you do not realize that your objection is actually an objection to syllogistic reasoning as a whole? I don't think there's much use arguing with someone who would reject that, so this may be my last post to you.

Two of my favorite texts by Heidegger are, The Question Concerning Technology and The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, the latter being where he mentions Scholasticism as the decline of philosophizing proper. — darthbarracuda

I'll see if the compilation I mentioned includes them.

Then for Levinas, shorter texts are Useless Suffering, and On Escape. A longer text, but one of my favorites, is Time and the Other. — darthbarracuda

I think I've read Useless Suffering before. Sounds very familiar.

Just based on my own thinking on things, I have to agree with something along the lines of the Schopenhauerian Will. I know I exist, because I am striving. I suffer. This is the primal apodicticity - I suffer, therefore I am. — darthbarracuda

Yes, but even with Schopenhauer, the subject of willing is identical with the subject of knowing.

Another angle to approach this by would be to go a Thomistic / Wittgensteinian route and argue that not everything can be articulated with words. — darthbarracuda

Or that not everything can be articulated fully accurately with words: the via analogia.

That change happens is an empirical observation, for instance. That things depend on each other for their mode of existence is not an a priori deduction. — darthbarracuda

This sounds Humean. I don't think the Scholastic or Kantian would agree.

If we were to "prove" that God exists beyond any reason of doubt, would we need any faith? Would there be any difference between science and religion? — darthbarracuda

If you had such proof, then you wouldn't need faith to believe only in the proposition that God exists. That's just bare theism. You would need faith to be a Christian in addition to a theist. That's what the distinction between the preambles of the faith and the articles of faith amounts to. The Scholastics thought Plato, Aristotle, and others, for example, who never heard of Christ, believed in God. See Acts 17:22-23 as well. God's existence doesn't or need not require faith. Believing in something like the Resurrection, however, does (even if, as some think, the Resurrection can be shown not to be unreasonable).

In my mind, the fact is that theological arguments will never reach the level of sophistication and universal acceptance as the more ordinary scientific theories. — darthbarracuda

It's the reverse, in my mind. But notice you've shifted from the specific claim about arguments for the existence of God to the much more general and vague "theological arguments."

Syllogistic reasoning is just the form of valid reasoning. The content of any syllogistic reasoning cannot be proven. What is the distinction between assumed and contained?

Take for example the argument from first causes:

1.Everything that exists/begins to exist has a cause of its existence
2.The universe exists/began to exist
3.The universe has a cause of its existence ( from 1. & 2.)
4.The cause of the existence of the universe cannot itself have a cause
5. God is the only being that does not have a cause
C. Therefore God is the cause of the universe

Now, look at the assumptions which are not demonstrated by the argument but are inherent in the argument:

1. Nothing exists/ begins without a cause
2. The universe had a beginning
4. That the cause of the universe cannot itself have a cause is actually not really a further assumption but a logical entailment of the argument that must obtain in order to avoid the infinite regress which the first two premises already assume to be impossible.
5, That God is the sole uncaused being. One could argue that this is matter of definition, but it has not been shown that there could not be multiple uncaused beings, or that even if there is only one uncaused being, that that being must be God as he is conceived according to Christian theology.