Hi

Constitutive rules can be written as "X counts as Y"

So "a diagonal move of any length counts as a move for a bishop in chess".

"Here is a hand" can be read as constitutive in that it is setting out what counts as a hand.

How would "the human being consists of body and soul" be written as a constitutive rule?

"A human being counts as a body and a soul" or "A body and a soul counts as a human being"?

DO they work? Perhaps. — Banno

Interesting reply. So a constitutive rule is a proposition which takes a certain form. You would read 'here is a hand' as 'this counts as a hand'. Well, what is meant by 'hand' in this phrase? If all that is meant by 'hand' is this (where I am pointing to my hand), then the proposition reads 'this counts as this', which is just an uninteresting tautology. It might be right that that proposition is exempt from any request for evidence because it is already self-evident, but what is the significance of this seeming triviality?

Alternatively, is "this counts as a hand" just an ostensive definition of "hand"? If so, I agree that it is exempt from a request for evidence. But what I don't see, is how this solves the regress problem (I assume this is what it is meant to do, since that was the problem mentioned in the OP. Forgive my not having read the entire thread). Or rather, I don't see how it can solve that problem in a way that is different to what Descartes did - and I assume it is meant to be different. If we are trying to put an end to the regress of justification by saying "this counts as a hand", won't a sceptic simply say "what is the justification for believing that there is anything there at all? Why do you think there is a this?". A Cartesian will say that he is immediately acquainted with this; that it is given to him in consciousness in such a way that he cannot be mistaken that there is a this before him. We could then add 'this counts as a hand' as an ostensive definition, but this is clearly parasitic on the Cartesian answer, and inherits all of the problems of that answer. Perhaps I am putting Cartesian words in a mouth that doesn't want them, but how else can we answer "Why do you think there is a this?"?

Best
PA

Really? Not over here. For Alice, maybe. — Banno

This statement expresses the attitude called "certitude". And such an attitude doesn't justify any claim of certainty. "Certainty" requires justification. Otherwise "it is certain" is nothing more than "I am certain of it", and that's just the manifestation of one's attitude.

So until you actually address the argument which I've produced, such statements are merely meaningless personal opinions, with no bearing in relation to what is known as "certainty".

But what I don't see, is how this solves the regress problem (I assume this is what it is meant to do, since that was the problem mentioned in the OP. — PossibleAaran

Yes, I think that's exactly the issue which Sam26 brings up, the infinite regress of justification. One proposition justifies another, which justifies another, so on and so forth. Hinge-props are proposed as a means to put an end to this infinite regress, by being beyond reasonable doubt without needing to be justified. This is supposed to ground certainty.

My argument is that because hinge-props are outside "the game" of epistemology, and are therefore not subject to justification, they are actually the most dubious.

I think all of this is no more than an attempt of filling in the gaps between the variables of that which exists as a state of mind. I do n`t agree with much of it, and neither do I think most of it makes real world sense, or is of any use for anything. It is as near to a deep meaningful conversation about nothing as one can likely get. Even on important topics everybody seems to head off on their own personal flight of fancy, it`s crazy here, it has nothing to do with the search for that which actually is, for the whole approach is totally wrong headed. Actual answers are not the fascination, the correct answer would not even be noticed here..

Certitude and certainty are not arched enemies, and it`s only an attitude should "Alice" (symbolic Alice) not really be "Alice" (so in the real world) It only requires to be believed that she is for no attitude to be shown to exist. Attitude is not always reliable on its own in terms of whether a person can be taken as concise, their joking aside.

Yes, I think that's exactly the issue which Sam26 brings up, the infinite regress of justification. One proposition justifies another, which justifies another, so on and so forth. Hinge-props are proposed as a means to put an end to this infinite regress, by being beyond reasonable doubt without needing to be justified. This is supposed to ground certainty.

My argument is that because hinge-props are outside "the game" of epistemology, and are therefore not subject to justification, they are actually the most dubious. — Metaphysician Undercover

Thanks for the clarification. It depends what is meant by saying "this counts as a hand". As I said, if it is an ostensive definition of "hand" then I don't find it problematic at all. One can simply stipulate that by "hand", one means, this. Is such an ostensive definition a dubious proposition? In one sense I don't think a definition can be dubious. If I choose, for my purposes, to use the word 'hand' as a name for this, what is there to doubt? One might ask, 'why call this a hand and not some other name?', but this is a semantic, and not a substantive, question. The simple answer is 'I've decided on this name. You can use another name if you like. It doesn't really matter'.

But, as I said in my last post, even if acceptable, this is largely useless, since the sceptic will want to know why you believe that there is a this to be called 'hand' at all, which means the regress hasn't been halted.

Best,
PA

In "On Certainty" Wittgenstein sets out to determine what is meant by "certainty", in the sense of "it is certain that ...". He provides a preliminary definition of "certainty", as the possibility of mistake has been logically excluded. The attitude of certitude (I am certain that...), as expressed by Banno, does not qualify as meeting the criteria of this definition, due to the fallibility of the human mind.

won't a sceptic simply say "what is the justification for believing that there is anything there at all? — PossibleAaran

What possible criterion is there for judging whether something is really "there" or not other than that we can all see it?

LOL. That would be why Moore on an LSD trip, shrieking here is one flipper, now here is another, is simply failing to share in a language game with his audience. It wouldn’t be a failure of a perceptual experience game. — apokrisis

It's only a partial failure, which any erudite audience would recognize as such. Mistaking a hand for a flipper is not so bad; I could think of much worse perceptual failures or visual agnosias ("wife for hat").

Thanks for the clarification. It depends what is meant by saying "this counts as a hand". As I said, if it is an ostensive definition of "hand" then I don't find it problematic at all. One can simply stipulate that by "hand", one means, this. Is such an ostensive definition a dubious proposition? In one sense I don't think a definition can be dubious. If I choose, for my purposes, to use the word 'hand' as a name for this, what is there to doubt? One might ask, 'why call this a hand and not some other name?', but this is a semantic, and not a substantive, question. The simple answer is 'I've decided on this name. You can use another name if you like. It doesn't really matter'. — PossibleAaran

I think I agree with this pretty much. I went through this earlier in the thread, and didn't get too much agreement because the other participants in the thread did not think that Moore's proposition "this is a hand" was meant as a demonstration. If it is meant as an ostensive definition, then it justifies the further statement "I have two hands". As an ostensive definition, it does not need to be justified, it is a proposition in the sense of a proposal, which the audience can either accept or reject. The point being that he could have said "this is a foot", or something else, and the audience is in a position to either agree or disagree.

There are many reasons (of doubt) for the audience to reject such a proposal as "this is a hand". Principally, the boundaries of exactly what is and is not part of the hand, are not defined. Moore would hold up an entire arm, saying "this is a hand", not indicating whether things like the wrist and the fingers are part of the hand or not. So even ostensive definitions need to be justified, clarified by further descriptions.

This is where I see the foundation of justification, rather than in hinge-propositions, or ostensive demonstrations, I see descriptions as fundamental. So rather than naming things such as "this is a P", and "that is a Q", I see descriptions of what is a P, and what is a Q, as the basis for justification. Fundamental descriptions are where we find self-evident truths.

Principally, the boundaries of exactly what is and is not part of the hand, are not defined. — Metaphysician Undercover

Pedantry is not philosophy.

It's only a partial failure, which any erudite audience would recognize as such. Mistaking a hand for a flipper is not so bad; I could think of much worse perceptual failures or visual agnosias ("wife for hat"). — Janus

So what does that say? If failure can be partial - and indeed would always be partial under your view, as what would total look like? - then success would also only be partial.

Or in other words, belief and doubt are relative, never absolute. They are opposed limits on certainty.

Which is what I pragmatically argue. As also does Wittgenstein in making certainty the result of a system - events in contexts, acts of measurement within background theories.

It is only Banno who wants facts to be facts regardless of any system of measurement.

LOL. Pedantry, (adhering to strictly defined terms), for the purpose of logical proceeding, is one of the fundamental principles of scientific understanding. And that, is also philosophy. Disciplined description is another fundamental principle of scientific understanding which itself requires adherence to strictly defined terms.

So what does that say? If failure can be partial - and indeed would always be partial under your view, as what would total look like - then success would also only be partial.

Or in other words, belief and doubt are relative, never absolute. They are opposed limits on certainty. — apokrisis

No argument from me on that! I would agree that there is no absolute certainty (on analysis the very idea is revealed to be meaningless, I would say), but only relative certainty within given contexts that it makes no sense to question. :)

Also, logically, there must be correct perception in order for failure to be possible, just as there must be beliefs in order that doubt be possible.

There is adhering to strict definitions, and then there is pointless pedantry.

There are many reasons (of doubt) for the audience to reject such a proposal as "this is a hand". Principally, the boundaries of exactly what is and is not part of the hand, are not defined. Moore would hold up an entire arm, saying "this is a hand", not indicating whether things like the wrist and the fingers are part of the hand or not. So even ostensive definitions need to be justified, clarified by further descriptions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yep. Words can only function as constraints on interpretance. They are irreducibly open ended and thus uncertain. Nothing could be defined exactly, as reality is a continuous whole and words are attempts to name its discrete parts.

So the language game when it comes to ostensive definition has a second aspect. We must learn the communal practice when it comes to the point where we cease to sweat the detail. There will always be fine grain differences that could be used as the seed of doubt. But language use involves knowing when a difference ceases to make a difference.

A hand may include a bit of wrist or not. Where one leaves off and the other begins is vague. Or in other words, it is not a big enough contradiction to get fussed over. To speak, to be certain of what another is saying, we only need to agree on the gist. And that involves both understanding the general ostensive reference and sharing a close enough degree of unconcern about the differences that don’t make a difference.

So pragmatically, there is always doubt as words want to break the thing in itself into a collection of signs, a collection of named parts. But part of the game is then learning when differences don’t matter.

When we point at a part of the world, there is this double pointing. We are saying x is that thing, and also not all those other things. We are thus in fact pointing at our idea of the thing, not the actual thing - as there is no “actual thing” in a continuous world.

What do we make of someone who doubts that this is a hand? They have not understood the game.

There is a way of understanding "This is a hand" that is not explained in yet more propositions - "this is this". Understanding is shown by behaving in a way that agrees that this is a hand. The sceptic has not understood how to use the word "hand".

There is a way of understanding "This is a hand" that is not explained in yet more propositions - "this is this". Understanding is shown by behaving in a way that agrees that this is a hand. The sceptic has not understood how to use the word "hand". — Banno

Yep. What is ostensively demonstrated is is a customary and pragmatic degree of unconcern. Folks, this is where the doubting stops ... so far as this language game about "reality" goes. This is what looks like a "grounding fact" in the world we are collectively imagining.

So a pragmatic approach to truth accepts that there is this kind of semiotic game, this triadic modelling relation, which is itself basic. It stands against Cartesian dualism and Kantian representationalism by speaking to the Peircean triadicism of a sign relation.

Facts are always facts in terms of some language game, some pragmatic modelling relation. They are the acceptable acts of measurement for some game, not some semiosis-independent truth.

In practice, the line between belief and doubt, similarity and difference, generality and particularity, is always fuzzy. Language over-claims when it comes to the supposed atomism, the supposed counterfactual definiteness, of the world it attempts to describe. But pragmatically, it works. And it works because it is always open-ended and imprecise.

That is why language is inherently creative as well as usefully definite. Every interpretation has suppressed freedoms. Talk about a hand can include or exclude flippers or phalanges, depending on the intentional context. So the leash on meaning can be loosened or tightened. If facts were just facts and not states of interpretation bounded by a notion of differences that don't make a difference, then language use would be as uncreative as a computer programme. It would not be the fluid instrument of thought that it is.

Folks, this is where the doubting stops ... so far as this language game about "reality" goes. — apokrisis

Yes. The next step is of course that it is always a language game. It makes no sense to talk about it being just language and not abut the world-in-itself; they are the very same.

So of course, truth-telling games are grounded in a principle of indifference. A ground is found not by reaching the bedrock of "undoubtable hinge propositions" but by actively agreeing that further facts don't make an essential difference.

This is what is key. There is no solid ground. But we can construct a ground based on the agreement that there is a generality - a constraint that defines similarity - and then also a limit on the capacity for the particulars or individual differences to make a difference.

This is why truth-telling is considered "a system". The true facts are sandwiched between our pragmatic notions of essence and indifference. They are what arise via this pincer movement. To refer to "a hand" is to bound a state of conception in terms the idea of a hand's essence - whatever it is that makes hands similar - and the idea of what then doesn't matter, or is inessential, to that ideal. Between those two complementary bounds, we find our particular interpretant of the sign.

It makes no sense to talk about it being just language and not abut the world-in-itself; they are the very same. — Banno

Why does it make no sense exactly? You keep making the assertion. But the argument is missing.

Pragmatically it might be no use - especially in everyday settings where there is nothing philosophical at stake.

But epistemology is a philosophical language game. It talks of stuff like truth, certainty, belief and doubt. It gets silly to pretend that there is nothing being spoken of in terms of that culturally-foundational inquiry.

@apokrisis

It makes no sense to talk about it being just language and not abut the world-in-itself; they are the very same. — Banno

Since meaning is use, sense is found by using a language. A language that was not about the world could not have a use. Consider propositional logic. Like an engine with the clutch in, it would grind away without engaging.

If epistemology is no more than an engine spinning away without making contact with the world, then why bother.

Since meaning is use, sense is found by using a language. A language that was not about the world could not have a use. Consider propositional logic. Like an engine with the clutch in, it would grind away without engaging.

If epistemology is no more than an engine spinning away without making contact with the world, then why bother. — Banno

Again, your response founders on a failure to recognise that language games must create their speakers along with their worlds. So they are always about more than just the world. And also less about the world in that the "speaking self" is defined in terms of a grounding indifference to "the world".

This is the central cognitive trick that your Kantian representationalism just overlooks time and again.

It is telling that you even use a mechanical metaphor to make your point. You just take the driver for granted. There is a driver wanting to mesh with the world in some way. And so all your attention goes to the linguistic device used to make that connection. A clutch that switches a connection off and on.

This is naive realism. You take the fact of the self and the world for granted where really they are emergent from the linguistic mechanism - the epistemic cut - themselves.

As I say, speakers define themselves in terms of the aspects of the world they can afford to deem themselves indifferent towards. I am me - an autonomous being able to do my own thing - to the degree that I don't need to care about the physical details of the world. To the degree that the world fails to act as a constraint on my intentions.

So Wittgenstein was trying to articulate this ecological or embodied or pragmatic understanding of epistemology. The world is what it is. But the world for us is the world defined in terms of the limit of what we need to care about. And it is that very capacity for a practical indifference that is the making of "us". It is the definition of selfhood as interpretance. We arise along with the umwelt we construct. Our understanding of the world is really our understanding of a world with "us" in it.

So as I say, it is both less and more than your naive realism supposes. There is less of the actual thing in itself. But there is more of this us.

I sense your frustration at being pushed towards this critical realisation. But for too long you have simply wanted some simple theory of truth to come out right.

Epistemology's central problem is how to understand the relation between a thinker and a world. You want to just dismiss the problem as something not in need of an explanation. Which is naive. Pragmatism by contrast solves the riddle left by Descartes and Kant by showing how both self and world are co-constructions. Each arises as a reflection of the other. So it is the relation which creates the "reality".

Now again, you will howl - look around. There is a mind-independent reality exactly as physicalism asserts! I kick this stone, I wave this hand, I measure this mountain, I name this bump in the landscape the sacred rock, Uluru.

But that is a realism which leaves the mind undefined and unexplained. How can you claim this "mind-independence" if your epistemology has stepped all around the issue of what is a mind?

And it is a realism that relies on the objectivity of scientific method, when our best theory of scientific method is ... Peirce's pragmatism.

So at every turn, you are finding you run into the same answer.

Sure, commonsense says we are just a mind, and there just is a world. But this is the commonsense of the naive realist. And here we are talking about the foundations of epistemology. You can't just wish all the problems away.

your response founders on a failure to recognise that language games must create their speakers along with their worlds. So they are always about more than just the world. — apokrisis

You think this a problem because you split the speaker from the world. I don't.

You think this a problem because you split the speaker from the world. I don't. — Banno

But you do. You are a representationalist in saying there is "a world". It's right there in your language.

A trivial split, as opposed to your world-shattering epistemic cut.

A trivial split, as opposed to your world-shattering epistemic cut. — Banno

Hmm. What is it that you don't get about the the cut which is the separation that founds the connection? :)

A Peircean epistemology explains how a self is formed via a capacity to be indifferent to the world. As yet, you have made zero counter-argument. You just make these gurgling drowning noises.

You set up a dualism at the base of your doctrine. If I don't accept your doctrine, I do not need to accept your basic dualism.

You set up a dualism at the base of your doctrine. If I don't accept your doctrine, I do not need to accept your basic dualism. — Banno

It's a dichotomy. So it is anti-dualistic in being fundamentally triadic.

And I presented an argument. So you are just finding excuses to avoid making a counter-argument.

It is you who have claimed a dogmatism in doctrinal fashion. You are telling me you don't need to change your position as no argument is going to change it. You believe what you want to believe.

Seems really philosophical. Or religious. ;)

The argument you presented was unconvincing. Just too obtuse to be helpful.

We are not obligated to refute every single argument that comes along. While a few things in what you have said are interesting, quite a few other things leave me cold. There include the blurring of belief and truth and the weird obsession with trinities.

We are not obligated to refute every single argument that comes along. — Banno

So after a series of evasive one-liner deflections, the confession of the lack of any reasonable counter.

After the prolonged gurgling, the slow disappearance beneath the waves.