You hint at the issue you've raised in past... Jack cannot tell us what he's thinking...

So... how do we know what Jack believes?

I mean, that's what it boils down to...

Care to explain this charge of misplaced concreteness; hypostatization; reification; or conflation of abstract entities with physical ones?

I know what the fallacy is. I want to know how you've arrived at mistakenly believing that I've committed it. Especially seeing how you've never asked me my ontological viewpoint regarding what counts as "real"...

:-|

For those who are inclined to value apokrisis' participation here...

S/he has charged me with not answering simple questions. S/he is mistaken about that. S/he has claimed that over the five or so years that s/he and I have been debating on these forums that s/he still cannot understand what theory I'm attempting to put forth. Unfortunately, for whatever reason apo cannot take the steps necessary for understanding another... setting aside one's own preconceptions, granting another's terms simply for the sake of being able to understand the argument, and listening...

I work from the notion of thinking about one's own thought and belief. This is not difficult to grasp. If I tell you here and now that I believe that methodological naturalism is philosophy, then that is a belief statement about and/or of my own mental ongoings. Because methodological naturalism is the name for a method of philosophical approach which values 'natural' explanations and de-values supernatural ones, being able to believe that that is the best approach requires a rudimentary understanding of what it entails. That, in turn, clearly requires language use. So... in such a case, Banno's cat Jack cannot possibly believe that methodological naturalism is philosophy, for it requires thinking about one's own thought and belief, which in turn requires complex language replete with the ability to isolate and further consider one's own mental ongoings, and Jack has no such language, thus no such ability.

So... We think about our own thought and belief. That requires language. Thinking about thought and belief first requires that we form and/or hold thought and belief. Thus, we form and hold thought and belief prior to language.

That's basic common sense.

In closing, I'd only suggest that the reader steer clear of the likes of Charles Sanders Peirce. It seems that being able to understand and follow his line of thinking requires that which cannot be understood after doing so...

X-)

Thinking about Peirce's position seems to have rendered one utterly unable to understand what "thinking about thought and belief" is... the irony.

Aside from the strictest of jargons... all things talked about can be interpreted in a plurality of ways... So, making a big deal about something like that is fucking petty...

What are you doing here apo?

Yes, I'm concerned with mental ongoings as well. The position I'm taking is that we need to distinguish what type of mental ongings constitute belief, from those which are something other than belief. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do we though?

Wouldn't it be much wiser to establish what all mental ongoings are existentially dependent upon? Wouldn't it serve our interests here more if we were to 'look' at every example imaginable, from imagining to dreaming to doubting to...

All of them. What do they all have in common in terms of their elemental constituency?

It seems that it is the human ability to think symbolically that allows for "holding beliefs"; where holding a belief is conceived of as being in an unchanging state of assent towards an absolutely fixed content. — Janus

That's one way to frame it. There's more than one framework.

That's why I said earlier that I think holding a belief could only consist in reciting one's belief as a stable formula while maintaining an unchanging attitude of of assent to it, or something along those lines. It seems that even in the human case the idea of holding a belief is an abstract idealization.

Of course. You're maintaining consistency in your terminological usage. Coherency is a good thing even if it is not concrete.

;)

Reciting one's belief requires thinking about what one already believes and then using language to report upon it.

If people are conceived of as being able to hold beliefs in this kind of static sense, it would seem that they routinely do it without 'thinking about thinking', though, and that is why I said it has nothing to do, necessarily, with metacognition. Holding a belief, if the idea is sensible at all, would seem to be possible simply by virtue of the ability to think symbolically, but not otherwise.

Oddly enough, I almost agree with this. Almost. You've mentioned the nuanced bits in between rudimentary thought and belief formation and thinking about one's own thought and belief. These haven't been properly taken account of.

Which is where Banno and Sam go astray in trying to treat the truth-makers as some uninterpreted ground of experience. — apokrisis

Again, this is not an accurate account. I am convinced by Davidson's account, from On the very idea... That is, I reject the dualism between scheme and world.

Everything is always interpreted. So it makes no sense to talk about interpretation.

Banno is imagining that if he got out a ruler - a measurement in terms of some transcendent co-ordinate system - he could tell you how high a mountain "really was". Well he can tell you the results of a measurement act in terms of some world transcending viewpoint. But already he is imagining a measurement act in an ideal Platonia where mountains aren't eroding or still growing, or where he never makes an error as he lays his ruler end over end several thousand times, while trying to keep count. — apokrisis

It is much easier for Apo to critique my view if he makes it up as he goes along.

I am still open to having this discussion with you. I find it fascinating that someone as thoughtful and erudite as you might think that one could not tell how high Everest is.

If you wish to continue that discussion, I will start a thread; or if you prefer, contact me using the message system.

The animal mind is embedded in the flow of the moment. It is responding directly to the here and now in terms of some adaptive system of conception and exploration. There is just no mechanism to transcend that flow. So an animal doesn't "hold beliefs" in that it could objectify a thought and wonder whether it is actually true or not. It just expresses a belief in interpreting the world a certain way. And the "truth" is then discovered in terms of the pragmatic consequences. The animal prospers or suffers. — apokrisis

The here and now is always gone and past, by the time you say it's here and now. And when we reflect on the past, how would one really know whether it's the truth or not? It appears to me, like defining truth "in the terms of pragmatic consequences" is just an escape from real truth. It's like saying that we can't know real truth, because as soon as anything happens it's in the past, and we can't be absolutety certain about what we've sensed, and our memories, so let's just define truth in terms of pragmatic consequences.

So the measurables - the truthmakers - are not grounded in "the world", or even "our direct experience of the world". The truthmakers are grounded in our conception of how the world should look in terms of some set of signs, some set of measurements, that usefully converts a running temporal reality into the kind of timeless representation of reality that our theories of the world can deal with. — apokrisis

All this is very questionable to me. First, why would you say that measurables are truthmakers? Wouldn't it be more precise to say that the act of measuring is the truthmaker? And so we would produce our signs such that they will best enable us to make our measurements. Then truth must be related to how we produce our signs, not to how we apply them.

So... how do we know what Jack believes?

I mean, that's what it boils down to... — creativesoul

If Jack cannot tell you what he believes, then what would lead you to think that Jack believes anything? You refer to Jack's behaviour, and claim that Jack displays signs of belief. But is this really true? What are the real signs of belief? The real signs of belief are statements of belief. But you seem to look for actions in Jack which would be consistent with specific statements of belief, and claim that because these statements are consistent with these behaviours which Jack demonstrates, then Jack must have these stated beliefs. But is it so simple? We know that a person demonstrating behaviour which is consistent with a specific belief, does not necessitate the conclusion that the person holds that belief. So why make such a faulty conclusion with respect to other animals?

If we restrict "belief" to what is stated, we avoid the problem of trying to determine what one believes through the analysis of one's other actions. A belief is what is represented by a statement. This allows us to focus strictly on the statement. Only if there is reason to think that the individual is not sincere in the statement, do we need to turn to other actions to prove that the statement is not a real belief.. In this sincerity is where we find the elements of truth.

So... We think about our own thought and belief. That requires language. Thinking about thought and belief first requires that we form and/or hold thought and belief. Thus, we form and hold thought and belief prior to language. — creativesoul

So to think doesn’t require language, but to think about thinking does require language?

Doesn’t really work, does it. If thinking is thinking, it either does or doesn’t require language. So the usual equivocation at work here.

Same old tune, Banno.

If you want to say something, I outlined a position just a couple of posts back. Have a go at that.

If Jack cannot tell you what he believes, then what would lead you to think that Jack believes anything? — Metaphysician Undercover

Wouldn't it be much wiser to establish what all mental ongoings are existentially dependent upon? Wouldn't it serve our interests here more if we were to 'look' at every example imaginable, from imagining to dreaming to doubting to...

All of them. What do they all have in common in terms of their elemental constituency? — creativesoul

;)

It's like saying that we can't know real truth, because as soon as anything happens it's in the past, and we can't be absolutety certain about what we've sensed, and our memories, so let's just define truth in terms of pragmatic consequences. — Metaphysician Undercover

What waffle. The proof that we understood the past is the degree to which we can use it to predict our future.

So... We think about our own thought and belief. That requires language. Thinking about thought and belief first requires that we form and/or hold thought and belief. Thus, we form and hold thought and belief prior to language.
— creativesoul

So to think doesn’t require language, but to think about thinking does require language?

Doesn’t really work, does it. If thinking is thinking, it either does or doesn’t require language. So the usual equivocation at work here. — apokrisis

As before...

In closing, I'd only suggest that the reader steer clear of the likes of Charles Sanders Peirce. It seems that being able to understand and follow his line of thinking requires that which cannot be understood after doing so. — creativesoul

Thanks for confirming that you can’t answer a direct question to save your life.

Same old tune, Banno. — apokrisis

Indeed. So you don't know any other songs?

We just go straight to the pissing competition, yet again. It's just sad, Apo. You could do so much better.

Again, if you want a discussion, say something interesting. There’s a post what I wrote not a page back, yet you just want reruns of your dullest one liners. Show you can actually engage with other people in an actual conversation for once.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/2768/mount-everest-is-8848-meters-high-/p1

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/145789

[reMany of my thoughts on epistemology come from Wittgenstein's last work called On Certainty. They were developed from my understanding of On Certainty, in particular Wittgenstein's bedrock propositions. However, I don't want to give the impression that what I'm putting forth in this thread is necessarily what Wittgenstein was communicating in On Certainty. I developed my own theory based on some of his thinking, and how I interpreted some of his thinking. So much of my own thinking on this subject is going beyond what's presented in On Certainty. It's my expansion of some of the ideas in On Certainty, for better or worse.

First, it seems that there are beliefs that arise apart from language, and a belief, whether linguistic or not, is simply a state-of-mind. These mind states are clearly seen in our actions. This is not to say that all actions by living organisms reflect beliefs, but simply to say that all beliefs are reflections of mind states, which in turn are shown by the things we do.

Second, not only are there beliefs that arise non-linguistically, but our thoughts are also not dependent upon linguistics. This it seems, has to be case if one is to make sense of the development of linguistics. For if there are no beliefs and no thoughts prior to the formation of linguistics (language), what would be the springboard of language? How does one get from a mind of no thoughts and no beliefs, to a mind that is able to express one's thoughts linguistically? It also seems to be the case that language is simply a tool to communicate our thoughts to one another, which also seems to lend support for the idea that thinking is prior to language.

Third, the basis for beliefs in prelinguistic man is causal in nature, not based on reasoning, reasoning is a linguistic endeavor, at least as how it is defined here. How are beliefs causally formed? It seems to be the case that beliefs arise causally within the mind based on the interactions between our sensory experiences and the world around us. The interaction between our sensory experiences and the world do not necessitate the belief, but are simply sufficient to cause the belief. One acts upon the information given through sensory impressions, which in turn has a causal relationship with the belief.

Fourth, these three previous ideas form what is bedrock to all of epistemology. For epistemology arises out of language, it is a way of expressing what we know, or what we believe we know by using ply="Sam26;d2612"]

One may be certain but still be entirely mistaken. One can be certain that which is actually is, but not should a notion for that which is exist only as a perception, such as the case with certainty.

Only primitive instinctive beliefs can arise apart from language. Beliefs are concepts, and beyond language only emotion based concepts have a construct, but having said this even wonderment is an emotion.

Beliefs are not, so to speak, a state of mind, it is only the object of one`s belief which can be reasonably said.to be the state of mind.

Beliefs may not necessarily convert to actions for the first priority for the vast majority of us is to conform.

The springboard to communication was wonderment, and I consider a state of wonderment to be one of emotion, the emotion which is wonderment. In my view many emotional states go unrecognized.

Language both communicates our thoughts and possesses them, beyond our emotions this is. Do n`t underestimate how far reaching may be emotions though.

Beliefs do n`t form casually in the mind, they either develop as consequence to experience, one`s own or others, or are planted there, by others..

Whether there is this interaction with one`s belief, refer back, would depend upon whether that belief is held as an active belief or a non active one.

How would you argue, should you be so asked, that your reasoning has taken you on a journey? .In my view it is only representative of the average surface perception for non philosophers. It is the way at first visit the vast majority of us would already think, and in effect you are going out of your way in trying to convince of arguments for not thinking..

Which is where Banno and Sam go astray in trying to treat the truth-makers as some uninterpreted ground of experience. — apokrisis

This interpretation is just wrong. It shows that you haven't read the posts carefully.

Likewise Sam is imagining that the brain has "states". At some instant in time, you can take that instantaneous snapshot view which gives you a timeless representation of how the brain was, in a way that will forever after be recorded as such. — apokrisis

This just isn't the case, where did I ever define brain states in such a way? This is simply your interpretation of what I said, not what I actually said. As I said in another post, the term brain states is simply a term used to refer to whatever is happening in the brain prior to a particular action. I don't think there is any way one can point to activity X (some one-to-one correspondence) in the brain that is associated with a state, which is then correlated with a belief. There is a multitude of overlapping activity (frequencies and chemical reactions) that take place in the brain. I'm using the term brain states in a very generalized way to point to mental activity. I'm sure that most of you agree that there is mental activity taking place that is associated with our actions. I'm also saying that these actions show our beliefs, regardless of the existence of language.

Much of what I said is getting distorted. These are just a couple of distortions, but there are many, and I don't have time to address each and every one. The problem seems to be that people aren't reading all the posts I've written, or they're reading it quickly and simply responding with their take, and that's fine, but unfortunately it's not accurate.

In particular, does it follow from the use of this shorthand that there must be a brain state that corresponds to Banno's belief that tomatoes are good; and further that this brain sate is distinct from and yet somehow responsible for all of those behaviours?

Or does that belief amount to nothing more than the collection of tomato-related behaviours? Including that internal soliloquy that just came up with this post... — Banno

I never meant for the term brain states to be defined in a very precise manner (not that you're necessarily doing this). It's simply a term that refers to mental activity that precedes our actions, and I don't think that when philosophers and others use the term, that they had in mind some one-to-one correspondence between one's belief and a particular brain state. And as you know from other posts of mine, I tend to be careful about giving some precise definition to a particular word, especially a word like brain states. I think that words like brain states, reality, knowing, etc., refer to a wide range of uses, and don't lend themselves to very precise definitions, like the word game that Wittgenstein discusses in the PI.

So if we think of brain states as generalized brain activity that precedes one's actions, and by extension one's beliefs, then we get a picture that these actions/beliefs don't arise in a vacuum. I think you would agree with this. So when you say, "...there must be a brain state that corresponds [with] Banno's belief that tomatoes are good;" I say, yes and no, which means, it depends on what you mean by corresponds with. If you mean some one-to-one correspondence, then no, I don't think that. If you mean that there is brain activity happening prior to your actions/beliefs then yes, but there is no brain state X that one can point to that says, ahhh, Banno believes Y.

Another point about brain states, is that I'm simply pointing out that prior to the rise of language, beliefs are reflections of what's happening in the brain. The evidence is in one's behavior, and the evidence is in what we know about our own private experiences. Actions in themselves don't necessarily tell us anything about these private experiences, because even computers can be programmed to perform certain actions. Moreover, we know that computers don't have the kind of private experiences (generalized brain activity or states) that humans do. So the point, again, is that there is something private happening when we form beliefs, some brain activity (brain states as I referred to them earlier) that precede or coincide with actions, and/or coincide with statements or propositions.

I do think that brain states, as I'm using the term, are responsible for our actions or behaviors, but I'm not prepared to say all actions or behaviors. I just don't know enough about the brain to make such a claim.

There is another important point to make about actions reflecting beliefs, it may be that even if actions reflect beliefs, we may not necessarily know which belief it reflects. So, in your case Banno, you exhibit certain behaviors/actions related to tomatoes, and these behaviors/actions reflect certain beliefs. For example, your action of going to the supermarket and buying tomatoes, reflects the belief that you'll find tomatoes there. However, by simply seeing one's actions that doesn't necessarily mean I can point to a specific belief, only that they reflect beliefs in general. This we know based on our own actions of going to the supermarket. And I don't need to express a belief to know that I have a belief.

Wouldn't it be much wiser to establish what all mental ongoings are existentially dependent upon? Wouldn't it serve our interests here more if we were to 'look' at every example imaginable, from imagining to dreaming to doubting to...

All of them. What do they all have in common in terms of their elemental constituency? — creativesoul

The subject is epistemology. So our goal ought to be to limit the object of inquiry to that which is relevant to the subject. If we were discussing metaphysics or ontology here, we would be looking to broaden the object, as you suggest, to consider what all thinking has in common, and consider what all activity has in common, but since this is epistemology, we want to limit our field of observation, to focus directly on what we call "knowing".

There is a classical division made by some epistemologists, which separates knowing-that, from knowing-how. We do not deny that animals without language know how to do many things, but epistemologist make this division in order to focus specifically on knowing-that, as the type of knowing which is important to epistemology. Even though it is a well-argued point, that knowing-that is just a special type of knowing-how, making this classification allows the epistemologist to limit the field of inquiry and focus on a more specialized object.

Is it your argument, that the epistemologist ought not give value or respect to this division, and broaden the field of inquiry to include all instances of knowing?

It's simply a term that refers to mental activity that precedes our actions, and I don't think that when philosophers and others use the term, that they had in mind some one-to-one correspondence between one's belief and a particular brain state. — Sam26

The separation between one's actions, and the mental activity which precedes one's actions, may not really be called for. One's brain activity is a part of one's actions. To position the mental activity, or brain activity as prior in time to one's actions, seems to express some form of prejudice which hasn't been justified. In reality, one's brain activity, and the rest of one's actions, all coincide in time. So even if you think about what you are going to say, prior to saying it, you are still thinking about it as you are speaking, and readjusting what you are saying, as you are speaking. The situation is such that one's brain activity is extremely complex, and far reaching, constantly extending far toward things past and future, near and far, such that the activity is involved with much more than just one's actions which may be observed as outward expressions.

So if we think of brain states as generalized brain activity that precedes one's actions, and by extension one's beliefs, then we get a picture that these actions/beliefs don't arise in a vacuum. I think you would agree with this. So when you say, "...there must be a brain state that corresponds [with] Banno's belief that tomatoes are good;" I say, yes and no, which means, it depends on what you mean by corresponds with. If you mean some one-to-one correspondence, then no, I don't think that. If you mean that there is brain activity happening prior to your actions/beliefs then yes, but there is no brain state X that one can point to that says, ahhh, Banno believes Y. — Sam26

Belief becomes a very difficult subject to understand under the terms of brain activity. One could demonstrate brain activity which corresponds with, or more precisely, coincides with, Banno stating "tomatoes are good", but this brain activity would not correspond with Banno's belief that tomatoes are good.

The belief itself, must be classed as some sort of memory. The brain activity, which is the act of recollection, and Banno making the statement, "tomatoes are good", is completely different from whatever activity it is which supports that memory in a state of belief, which is more properly the referent of Banno's "belief" that tomatoes are good

Sure, actions reflect beliefs, and no need to prove it for you are a philosopher, not a scientist. Remember though, we possess thousands of beliefs all interconnected, such it is unlikely that one particular belief would fire very often in total isolation. Particular beliefs are not necessarily singular either, one may partly believe something on some levels, scarcely believe that same something on other levels, and at the same time wholly believe it on yet another level again, and not every one of those separate areas of believing may be firing, or indeed firing at the same strength.at any one time, additionally, with every variance in psychoenvironmental background when reflecting upon ones belief there would necessarily be a shift here.. What appears on the surface in terms of the response is far less straight forward than this.

I never meant for the term brain states to be defined in a very precise manner (not that you're necessarily doing this). It's simply a term that refers to mental activity that precedes our actions, and I don't think that when philosophers and others use the term, that they had in mind some one-to-one correspondence between one's belief and a particular brain state. — Sam26

Sorry but I’m more familiar with the language games of neuroscientists than your private language. So “brain states” is a phrase expressing a commitment to a particular physicalist ontology - one where a particular state of conscious experience would be uniquely specified by a particular state of neural affairs.

If you had said “brain activity” or “neural goings on”, then the hand waving generality would have been clear. But you chose the words you chose.

Furthermore, a hand waving notion of “whatever activity was the case to stand as a belief” simply says that however a belief was caused, then that was how it was caused. You have not grounded anything really, just said effects must have a cause. A “state” can be presumed, whatever the heck a state is.

And unless you said something further to make it clear, the very framing of this - as a correlation between a state of physical activity and a state of mind - is dangerously representational. It sounds like you are committing to a general ontology that treats the mind as some kind of passive display rather than a meaningful semiotic interaction with a world.

Sorry but I’m more familiar with the language games of neuroscientists than your private language. — apokrisis

Well, it's not my private language, many philosophers have talked about brain states or states-of-mind in reference to beliefs. What a particular neuroscientist means by brains states may be quite different based on their particular theory. So I chose the words I chose based on the language some philosophers have used.

You can say "whatever the heck a state is" in reference to my talk about states, but one could also say the same things about "brain activity" or "neural goings on." You act as though those phrases are somehow more accurate, and not as vague. Much of this is vague because much of it is not understood precisely. Besides it wasn't meant to refer to something very precise.

OK then. I am familiar with what that would mean to both neuroscientists and in philosophy of mind. My comment stands. Talk of the brain having states is quite a strong commitment to a particular ontology compared to some vaguer phrasing such as talk about activity.

The distinction might be critical for distinguishing between an identity theorist and a functionalist, for example.

You're taking this too far into neuroscience, which is fine, but my reference to brain states doesn't rely on a scientific understanding for it to make sense. All that's needed, is to understand that there is brain activity that precedes or coincides with our actions, and that some actions are expressions of beliefs, quite apart from statements or propositions.