No' that's not what I said, nor implied. I was talking about considering statements. In the consideration of statements it is incumbent on me to decide whether or not I ought to doubt the statement. If I were playing chess, I would be considering which moves to make, not considering statements, so the example is not relevant. Though there would still be doubt involved as to which move I ought to make, there would be no doubt in my mind concerning the rules. Any such doubt would have been dealt with when I first encountered, and learned the rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is what you implied. Before making your move, you have to sit and ponder whether you are presently in such circumstances as to doubt that bishops move diagonally.

It does you no good to say "But I am already playing chess" because then you must ponder if you are indeed playing chess.

And then there is the doubt surrounding whether you correctly remember the rules of chess...

And so on.

If you complaint is that this situation is absurd, then I agree; but it is indeed the consequence of your approach. If every statement can be doubted, you cannot play chess.

You seem to be refusing my distinction between "may be doubted", and "ought to be doubted". — Metaphysician Undercover

That makes no nevermind here. If every statement may be doubted, then every justification may be doubted. You have no grounds for certainty.

Does knowing the bowl is empty require being able to think about one's own belief? — creativesoul

Where are we going here? What was the question?

Does Jack know his bowl is empty?
— creativesoul

Does it make sense to say Jack thought he knew the bowl was empty?
— Banno

No. That would be to say that Jack thought about his own belief. That requires written language. Jack has no such thing.

Does knowing the bowl is empty require being able to think about one's own belief? — creativesoul

Where are we going here? What was the question? — Banno

I answered yours and asked my own. Is there a problem?

Only my own memory. What was the point of our discussion?

Maybe this will help...

We agreed that Jack thought his bowl was empty. We agreed that Jack believed his bowl was empty. I then asked if Jack knew his bowl was empty.

You answered with a question. I answered that question and asked another, hoping you would respond in kind. You did not.

The point of our discussion? Making sense of Jack's belief. Making sense of your questions. Making sense of your failure to answer mine...

Does Jack need to think he knew the bowl was empty, or need to be able to think he knew the bowl was empty in order to be able to know the bowl is empty?

Not the same old, same old... my 'friend'.

;)

Ah... I was making the point that 'justification" is ambiguous, I think.

So, does Jack have a justified true belief? The bowl is indeed empty. He believes it to be empty.

What is his justification?

Your turn to answer Banno. That question already is answered above... in kind. I'll add more below. Please, do return the favor.

I agree that 'justification' seems to have different meanings between participating users, namely you and Sam(I think) on the one side and I on the other. That is of no consequence though, at least not all by itself. We ought see them through.

Do return the favor...

I've learned a lot from you Banno.

(Y)

Your chess game comparison is not a good analogy. We are discussing knowledge here, and knowledge is a changing, evolving, progressive object. Contrary to the game of chess, it is fundamental and essential to knowledge that the rules change. This means that doubting the rules is a very important aspect of knowledge. It is evidenced by things such as the Copernican revolution, and Einstein's revolution. Einstein for instance doubted the idea that "time" is absolute, and replaced it with the notion that "time" is relative. That's an obvious instance of doubting a "hinge-proposition".

If every statement may be doubted, then every justification may be doubted. You have no grounds for certainty. — Banno

That is exactly what the inquiry concerns here, what are the grounds for certainty? According to what I've argued it is impossible that hinge-propositions give us the grounds for certainty because these are just ancient relics, phrases from days gone by, when knowledge was far less developed; phrases like "the sun rises in the morning", which really don't give us any cause to be certain about the way things actually are.

This is why I turn instead toward "certitude" as the grounds for certainty. Certitude is an attitude of confidence which instills the feeling of being certain. Certitude, as the grounds for certainty, is often rejected for being subjective (of the subject), because many have the attitude that certainty must be objective (of the object, i.e. "it is certain that..."), but it really doesn't make sense to say that anything other than a subject is certain.

However, reality doesn't seem to be the same sort of thing with regard to epistemology. When I attempt to make good sense of this parallel between the rules of chess and reality, I can only surmise the following... — creativesoul

Hi creativesoul! It's been a while, I missed you. It appears like we may be on the same side of the coin (so far) this time around.

Justification, then.

The justified true belief notion comes from Theaetetus, of course. Two things are well worth understanding about that dialogue.

The first is that Plato does not use the idea of justification. Towards the conclusion, he starts, but does not finish, a conversation about the relation between objects and words, and the analysis of complex statements into their components. SEP translates the result as "True Judgement with an Account". Judgement is in many ways a better word than belief here, since it brings in the volition of the believer. This is perhaps were I differ from @Sam26, who I think has a notion of beliefs being caused.

But it is the account that concerns us here. Jack cannot give an account, and hence he cannot know that his bowl is empty.

The second is that Theaetetus ends inconclusively. The argument itself is described by Socrates as a long painful labour giving birth to wind. Socrates does not pretend to give a final account of knowledge. Nor, I think, should we. As we analyse and cajole our words into order we lose some of their flexibility. There is a sense in which Jack demonstrates his belief that the bowl is empty by herding me into the laundry. He is sharing his knowledge, perhaps in the only way available to him, even giving an account of the situation.

And so I, too, have brought forth nothing but wind.

Contrary to the game of chess, it is fundamental and essential to knowledge that the rules change. This means that doubting the rules is a very important aspect of knowledge. It is evidenced by things such as the Copernican revolution, and Einstein's revolution. Einstein for instance doubted the idea that "time" is absolute, and replaced it with the notion that "time" is relative. That's an obvious instance of doubting a "hinge-proposition". — Metaphysician Undercover

Such revolutions might be interesting and grab our attention, but they do so because they are extraordinary. Should you base your understanding of knowledge on the extremes rather than the mundane?

The very point of knowing things is that we can take them as read, take them as shared, and use them to move on. Doubting what we know must remain an unusual occurrence. lest we turn into a bunch of navel-gazing esoteric philosophers - and no body wants that...

Further, the account you gave of the development of relativity is incorrect in a certain vital way. The hinge proposition was not that time is absolute, but that the laws of physics must be the same for all observers. Relativity follows from Einstein applying this hinge proposition to the previous observations of the speed of light, and making the whole consistent.

And the Copernican revolution came from the hinge proposition that the simples explanation of the orbits of the planets was to be preferred.

But just to be sure, you do understand that a hinge proposition is taken as certain in order to start the language game in which it is involved? They do not apply universally or absolutely?

The problem with this is that we perceive objects as particular things, and we are sometimes wrong in our perceptions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you saying that the hands you perceive every day doing all the kinds of things that hands do; preparing food, washing the dishes, swinging a hammer, typing on the key board, and so on, might not be hands at all but actually might be something else? Are you saying that they might be, for example, oranges, dogs, cars, feet, tennis racquets, pumpkins, snakes, rivers, boiled eggs, pin cushions...?

This is why I turn instead toward "certitude" as the grounds for certainty. Certitude is an attitude of confidence which instills the feeling of being certain. Certitude, as the grounds for certainty, is often rejected for being subjective (of the subject), because many have the attitude that certainty must be objective (of the object, i.e. "it is certain that..."), but it really doesn't make sense to say that anything other than a subject is certain. — Metaphysician Undercover

You can call it "Fred" for all I care. What counts is that in order to get on with life we take some things as given.

But if there can be no coherent skepticism about our hands existence, then to say that we know that they exist is incoherent as well. If Moore gives perceptual evidence for the existence of hands, then he accepts skepticism as coherent. — Πετροκότσυφας

Well said. Belief can't be belief without the possibility of doubt. Why would he treat waving his hands about as a demonstration of anything unless it was not just a factual assertion but a counterfactual one.

Belief and doubt go together. We can't talk about the presence of the one in the absence of the other.

So to say a cat believes X is to say a cat could doubt X at the same intellectual level. Pre-linguistically, there is no problem with that kind of belief matched with that kind of doubt. Cats can learn to be sceptical of their owner's actions just as much as trust them.

But then language is another level of belief~doubt semiosis. And formal logic yet another.

The real complaint boils down to a crossing of levels. At a pre-linguistic or biological level, we don't doubt those are our hands that wave about in front of our eyes exactly as we will and expect. There just isn't a chance of counterfactuality on that score - unless Moore was surprised to discover he was waving flippers or blocks of cheese.

So to claim intellectual doubt about the existence of your hands is to claim a higher-order counterfactuality about something which at its "proper level" just isn't lending itself to such counterfactuality.

I just said Moore's hands might be flippers or blocks of cheese. He might be dreaming or hallucinating. So linguistically, counterfactuals come thick and fast.

But pragmatically, we can recognise a basic illegitimacy of this kind of semiotic level crossing. We are importing the counterfactuality of a higher order where the counterfactuality is just not there at the level being thus challenged.

So the Wittgenstein-flavoured pragmatism is right for the wrong reasons. Or reasons that are poorly articulated.

The "theory of truth" issue is that all belief is secured against its own counterfactuality - but properly speaking, by counterfactuality of the appropriate order or semiotic level.

What the tortoise said to Achilles.

What do you each make of this?

Some beliefs are caused, but not all.

Cheers. I suspect I would call such things certainties because of the absence of the possibility of doubt.

So it seems that the content of such a creature's belief is not linguistic, nor could it be.
— creativesoul

That a prelinguistic belief is stateable is not that the prelinguistic believer can state it, When you say the cat believes X you are stating her prelinguistic belief for her. — Janus

I've never said otherwise. However, it must be the case that the content of a non-linguistic or pre-linguistic creature's belief is not propositional. Unless it is the case that propositions are not existentially contingent upon language; if one can think in propositions despite having no language. I see no reason to believe that.

However, reality doesn't seem to be the same sort of thing with regard to epistemology. When I attempt to make good sense of this parallel between the rules of chess and reality, I can only surmise the following...
— creativesoul

Hi creativesoul! It's been a while, I missed you. It appears like we may be on the same side of the coin (so far) this time around. — Metaphysician Undercover

Aww. Thanks Meta. That's a nice thing to say.

I'm not so sure that we are in agreement. I mean, I am currently unpacking Banno's notion of justification to see exactly what he holds is necessary for a belief to be justified. If I remember correctly, you and I had a very similar discussion about 3 years ago. Unless you've changed your position, I suspect that your view regarding what it takes for a belief to be justified includes justification in the sense of offering one's grounds for said belief to another. If that is still the case, then you're actually in agreement with Banno and Sam(I think) and not I.

;)

It's interesting how many different ways all of you have interpreted what I've said. Half of what's attributed to me is not what said at all. I thought my writing was very clear, but I guess not clear enough.

Aw Sam...

Have I misattributed meaning to your words?

It's nothing new, it happens all the time. That's just the way it is.

No Sam. That's unacceptable to me. Totally. I have no desire to argue, per se, with you. To quite the contrary, I'm wanting to understand you... build a bridge of mutual understanding... shared meaning. That cannot include the misattribution thereof.

I haven't actually addressed your words yet, I don't think. Did you see my earlier reply, where I asked if my understanding of Witt was aligned with your own, or words to that affect?

The only way I can understand you is by correcting any misunderstandings. I need your help in order to successfully do that.

You've lost me on this one; you seem to be conflating knowledge with belief. I know that my hands exist because I can see them.

@Sam26,

For my part, I'm happy to agree that there are some propositions that are certain within a given situation; you call these hinge propositions, I would call them bedrock statements, but I don;t think the difference significant.

You appear to hold that beliefs are a pattern or some such in one's mind. I can go half way and say that they are a pattern in someone's behaviour, but only in so far as they are public. (I would keep beliefs as simply statements that explain an act by setting out a relationship between the actor and another statement: Banno baked cake because he believed that Sam was coming for tea. This connection with action is paramount).

I agree that there can be non-linguistic thoughts. I'm intrigued by your suggestion (if I have you right...) that such thoughts are somehow part of a causal chain such that some sensory input or other brings it about such-and-such a belief. I could quite happily accept a causal chain from some sensory input to some act, because the chain would be replete with neutrons and muscles and proteins and things that we can find by doing an autopsy. No autopsy will find a belief. (I wonder if this is @apokrisis' point, when he talks in such a constipated way about "importing the counterfactuality of a higher order where the counterfactuality is just not there at the level being thus challenged").

So I can't quite agree that there are bedrock statements that one is somehow caused to believe.

I rather see bedrock statements as those that must be taken as true in order for the conversation to take place.

For reasons I gave elsewhere I'm not perturbed by the Gettier problems. SO I admit not having paid much attention to your post on that issue.

Otherwise, I've not read anything I disagree with in your posts.

The justified true belief notion comes from Theaetetus, of course. Two things are well worth understanding about that dialogue.

The first is that Plato does not use the idea of justification. Towards the conclusion, he starts, but does not finish, a conversation about the relation between objects and words, and the analysis of complex statements into their components. SEP translates the result as "True Judgement with an Account". Judgement is in many ways a better word than belief here, since it brings in the volition of the believer. This is perhaps were I differ from Sam26, who I think has a notion of beliefs being caused. — Banno

Hm...

Plato. I have a collection of his work. Volition is problematic. Quite, on my view. However, I want to keep going in the right direction here, so rather than wearing my typical analytic critical with no apologies 'hat' and arguing the volitional aspect, I want to grant the notions you're putting forth as the first step in seeing them through to their conclusions. That's what I suggested earlier, and I think it's a path well worth pursuing. And... as you say, it is the account that concerns us here...

That's the longest reply I've seen you write in quite some time. ;) I appreciate it. Let's make something of this.

But, it is the account that concerns us here. Jack cannot give an account, and hence he cannot know that his bowl is empty.

The second is that Theaetetus ends inconclusively. The argument itself is described by Socrates as a long painful labour giving birth to wind. Socrates does not pretend to give a final account of knowledge. Nor, I think, should we. As we analyse and cajole our words into order we lose some of their flexibility. There is a sense in which Jack demonstrates his belief that the bowl is empty by herding me into the laundry. He is sharing his knowledge, perhaps in the only way available to him, even giving an account of the situation.

And so I, too, have brought forth nothing but wind. — Banno

So indeed...

If the criterion for JTB includes that the believer offer an account, then knowledge requires language. The difficulty we have with Jack, I'm fairly certain that you'll agree here, is knowing what his belief is. I mean, all we have to go on is his behaviour. There is no more evidence to suggest that he believes his bowl is empty than some alternative belief, such as he believes that you will feed him, or another equally plausible possibility. Furthermore, without Jack telling us in no uncertain terms(pardon the pun) it's hard for us to say that Jack is telling us anything at all. So, the requirement of a believer offering an account of it's own belief is quite problematic here. Seems that that criterion does not admit of pre-linguistic or non-linguistic belief... cannot if coherency(lack of self-contradiction) matters.

If you're talking to me, I think it's just a bit more nuanced than that.

That's the longest reply I've seen you write in quite some time. ;) — creativesoul

Procrastination is a powerful motivator.

If the criterion for JTB includes that the believer offer an account... — creativesoul

"If...", as the Spartans replied to the Macedonians.

Yes, I agree that in such circumstances Jack knows very little. But I don't see that this is problematic; all that is happening is that one sense of know differs from another.