As I read through much of what's said in this thread, I find that one of the problems, if not much of the problem has to do with how knowledge is acquired (an obvious observation). I have also been a student of Wittgenstein as some of you know, and I have great respect for Wittgenstein's ideas. In fact, his last work (On Certainty) tells us much about what it means to have knowledge, and if anything, it tells how expansive the use of the word know is. I have very rarely ever disagreed with Wittgenstein, because much of what I wrote on Wittgenstein was an exegesis. Although I did develop my own theory of epistemology based on his ideas.

My disagreement with Wittgenstein is that even he didn't fully appreciate the impact of his work, i.e., Wittgenstein's ideas, I believe, go much further than he even he thought. Although he did not downplay the importance of the mystical, he did not believe that we could have knowledge of the mystical, and this also carried over into his ethical discussions. He limits language, in terms of what we can know, to the world, and this is where I believe Wittgenstein went astray. The mystical is displayed by a showing, not a knowing according to Wittgenstein. This idea remains a part of his thinking from his early philosophy to his later philosophy. His later philosophy is much more accurate and practical than his earlier philosophy, but it still limits our knowing to how we use these words within the world, and within the culture developed around these words. The reasons for this have to do with the Austrian culture he came out of, and also the philosophical culture that molded some of his thinking.

My own view is that our knowledge is quite more expansive than Wittgenstein realized, and it's much more expansive than many materialists acknowledge. I definitely do not think that science has the corner on what it means to have knowledge. Some of you put a much higher premium on scientific thinking, and there are good reasons for this, but I think it is a mistaken notion that limits what we can know. One example comes to mind, and that is the experience of the self, my knowledge of myself, which surely is stronger in many ways than any scientific knowledge (any experimentation). In fact, our self awareness in some ways is bedrock to all that follows, including science.

It would be helpful if you were to say why you think that.

Simply the fact that it exists, along with the commentarial tradition that grew up around it over the centuries. You can be agnostic (as I am) but still not assume that it's all simply historical delusion and myth. Many people put it all in the same category as computer games or fantasy novels; that is one of the manifestations of the cultural nihilism that we're discussing elsewhere. (And a lot of people are unknowingly nihilist.) — Wayfarer

I agree with you in terms of the tradition, and that there are many facts that present themselves as part of that tradition, but, and I assume since you're an agnostic, that you also find the evidence to support a God lacking. This is my point. In many ways, I'm closer to your point of view, and I agree with some of your comments about the materialistic point of view.

I think that the cross-cultural similarities in reports of mystical experiences give us prima facie (and only prima facie) evidence of a dimension of reality that transcends the world of our senses. Let me recommend an examination of that claim: The Evidential Force of Religious Experience

I assume since you're an agnostic, that you also find the evidence to support a God lacking. — Sam26

I am agnostic, but not atheist. So I know I don't know that God exists; but the way I see it, for those who believe in God, the Universe is evidence. The requirement for evidence is a misunderstanding of the question.

There was a useful book published in 2009 by religious studies scholar, Karen Armstrong, called The Case for God. In it, she argues that the distinctively modern, Western attitude to God developed as one of the consequences of the Christian tendency to believe that natural laws ‘showed God’s handiwork’ - which is very much what early modern scientists and philosophers believed. But this had the consequence of 'naturalising' the Divine, which does it a disservice. It is that which made God a pseudo-scientific hypothesis, Paley's watchmaker, the divine engineer, tinkering on the edges with beetle wings and bacterium flagella.

But Armstrong reminds us of the apophatic tradition, the 'way of negation', which is behind the 'Cloud of Unknowing', and many of the Zen-sounding aspects of Christian mysticism ¹. That is in line with my approach. God is not a super-manufacturing design engineer.

However, I think what many people understand by the word 'God' is somewhat similar to Jupiter; after all, the names 'Jupiter' and 'Jehovah' sound somewhat alike, even though etymologically they're completely unrelated. The name 'Jupiter' is derived from the Indo-european 'dyaus-pitar', meaning, 'sky-father' also known as Zeus, Indra, and various other names, denoting the first among Gods. Now that, you can imagine as an engineer.

I think that due to the way religious ideas developed, the 'one God' of the Christian tradition became identified as one of 'the Gods', but then re-conceptualised as 'the most powerful' or 'only real' amongst the pantheon of ancient Gods which were displaced. This is why atheists will often remark that they believe in 'one God less' than do believers, as if Christians have clung to a remnant ancient deity, not realising that this is really no different in kind to Zeus or Indra or Baal. Which is a fair depiction under the circumstances, but a misunderstanding all the same.

I think there is a deep epistemological problem in all of this, which is identifying 'God' with Gods generally, or even with 'a' God. But religions have to operate on many levels; they have to clothe themselves in tropes and metaphors that are meaningful to their audience. So the 'Father' of the New Testament, is not actually 'a God' - but it was natural, in the ancient world, replete with pantheons and Gods, for God to be depicted this way, as everyone believed in the Gods. (It's also the case that as religion did have to provide a meaningful cosmology for the populace, then it depicted in terms that most people will grasp -whereas now the tropes of Christianity are barely intelligible in post-industrial culture.)

But as is known to students of comparative religion and mythology, the 'god of the mystics' is a very elusive figure. This has been brought out by the negative theology of Paul Tillich when he says that to claim that 'God exists' is to deny Him. The term 'existence' refers to what is finite and fallen and cut of from its true being - 'ex-ist' means 'to be apart'; to be 'this' as distinct from 'that'. Within this finite realm issues of conflict between, for example, autonomy and heteronomy abound (there are also conflicts between the formal/emotional and static/dynamic). Resolution of these conflicts lies in the essential realm (the Ground of Meaning/the Ground of Being) which humans are cut off from yet also dependent upon. In existence man is that finite being who is aware both of his belonging to, and separation from, the infinite'. Therefore existence is estrangement (the meaning behind the idea of the world being 'fallen'.)

"Although this looks like Tillich was an atheist such misunderstanding only arises due to a literalistic understanding of his use of the word "existence". What Tillich is seeking to elucidate is an understanding of the 'God beyond God'. We have already seen above that the Ground of Being (God) must be other than the finite realm (which is a mixture of being and non-being); and that God cannot be a being; God must be beyond the finite or phenomenal domain. Anything brought from essence into existence is always going to be corrupted by ambiguity and its own finitude (i.e. 'fallen'). Thus statements about God must always be symbolic; this is reflected in the understanding of classical theology that all positive statements about deity are 'analogies' and not actual descriptions). Although we may claim to know God (the Infinite) we cannot. The moment God is brought from essence into existence God is corrupted by finitude and our limited understanding (and henceforth becomes merely an idol, a sign). In this realm we can never fully grasp (or even speak about) who or what God is ²."

So a lot of what is said about God really amounts to a straw man argument; 'straw god argument', you could say. But those who generally advance such arguments have no real interest in understanding what it is they're not understanding, as it's all in a sealed box which they have no desire to re-open.

Metaphysics doesn't serve any purpose. — Wayfarer

So, like a ladder, once metaphysics has served its purpose it can be discarded. — Wayfarer

I read what you wrote and I'm quite confused about what you're trying to say. One the one hand you say metaphysics doesn't serve any purpose, and on the other you talk of metaphysics having served a purpose :s

As regards 'feeling differently' - I feel as though I did undergo a genuine Platonist epiphany a long time ago. Epiphanies are very elusive, they generally come and go in an instant. You could compare them to being out at night, and there's a lightning flash, and it reveals something amazing - just for long enough to see that it's there, and something about its nature - and then it falls dark again, but you still have a memory of what you saw.

In my case, it was the insight into the non-material reality of number. My very first post on philosophy forum was about this very idea. But when you try to explain it, you get funny looks.

Now, in that phrase above, I would not say of the 'intelligible things' that they 'clearly exist', but that they are real. They're real in a noetic or intelligible manner, but in a different mode to the reality of phenomenal objects. Whereas hardly anyone seems to get that there could be any other level or domain of being, than the phenomenal domain. You know the expression 'out there somewhere'? That is usually said of anything we might be considering the reality of - that it's 'out there somewhere', which denotes that it's real or that it exists. And for most of us, 'what exists' and 'what is real' are the same. We have an instinctive world-picture in which we picture ourselves as intelligent subjects in the world described by the natural sciences; and because it's instinctive, we're for the large part unaware of it; it's simply reality to us, it is 'what everyone thinks'. So seeing through that, or realising that it is literally just an attitude or mental construction - that does change you. Realising that 'what exists' - the phenomenal domain known to science - is only one slice or aspect or domain of reality, is indeed 'a realisation'. It's not simply understanding a verbal description. There's another Platonistic term, namely, metanoia, which nowadays is (unfortunately) translated as 'conversion', but it means something more profound than that. It's like a noetic transformation, a different way of understanding the nature of existence. And, sure, that does completely change how you 'feel' about life. — Wayfarer

It seems to me that metaphysics is useful only to prove that your conception is possible. Metaphysics can prove possibility, never actuality. You'll never convince anyone of your metaphysical position by recounting metaphysics to them. Nobody gains any sort of insight through the reading or study of metaphysics, except insight into how reason, concepts, etc. work. In other words, you learn that metaphysics is useless, or only useful after the fact.

You speak of contemplation with an entirely different sense to the Christian or Medieval sense of contemplation. In Christianity, contemplation refers to the activity that you know as meditation in Buddhism. Meditation, in Christianity, refers to the activity that you call contemplation - thinking about things more deeply. So there is prayer, which is opening yourself up and asking for inner strength, etc. there is meditation, which is pondering over the wisdom of Scripture, the life of Christ, etc. etc. and there is contemplation (both active and passive), which is sitting silently and watching.

So all the metaphysics in the world are completely useless, since metaphysics doesn't give you any insights. Spiritual practice, ie prayer, meditation, contemplation does. The spiritual practices change how you feel about the world - not metaphysics. You can study metaphysics all day long and you won't get anywhere in terms of changing how you feel about the world.

One the one hand you say metaphysics doesn't serve any purpose, and on the other you talk of metaphysics having served a purpose :s — Agustino

Touché :-d

Touché :-d — Wayfarer

Why are you upset? I can't follow what it is you're trying to say.

Do you disagree with this?

So all the metaphysics in the world are completely useless, since metaphysics doesn't give you any insights. Spiritual practice, ie prayer, meditation, contemplation does. The spiritual practices change how you feel about the world - not metaphysics. — Agustino

Wow, I guess we're much further apart than I realized. To me Tillich's thinking is a muddled mess. However, to be fair, I've not studied him in depth, so I have very generalized view of his thinking. The language Tillich and other existentialists use, especially when it comes to epistemology is just not well thought out.

So you don't care what the other person says they believe — Agustino

Exactly. Belief is useless and unimportant. I'm only interested in knowledge. You make my point for me.

No, it is literarily impossible to doubt when you have nothing to doubt. Doubting and disbelieving is a learned process that becomes possible only after you've already learned to believe and have come to believe a thousand and one things. — Agustino

This is simply nonsense.
1) You say some shit
2) I doubt that shit, based on knowledge. Faith based belief has nothing to do with it.

Like I told you before you are using poorly developed ideas, where the same words come in for different meanings. Faith is not the same as trust. And belief is not knowledge. If you are incapable of making distinctions you are just making a fool of yourself by switching from one meaning to another.

Exactly. Belief is useless and unimportant. I'm only interested in knowledge. You make my point for me. — charleton

Then you can't have a discussion, so you're really wasting your time here.

And secondly, there is no knowledge without belief.

This is simply nonsense.
1) You say some shit
2) I doubt that shit, based on knowledge. Faith based belief has nothing to do with it. — charleton

What you call knowledge are merely things you have faith in.

And belief is not knowledge. — charleton

Sure, that doesn't mean that knowledge doesn't involve belief though.

Belief is a thing taken to be true regardless of evidence, information or reason.
This, although, can be confused with "knowledge" is not the same thing at all.
Why don't you stop and think for a second. I know you are not completely stupid.
Take the two definitions above as two ends of a spectrum.
You know damn well that some people accept and believe things without a reasonable warrant. But on the other end of the spectrum there is such a thing as rigorous method that leads to near certain knowledge.
If you use belief without any discrimination, in the way you do, and also pretend that faith is the same as trust, then you are never going to make yourself clear.
On the contrary all you are doing is offering muddled thinking.

Belief is a thing taken to be true regardless of evidence, information or reason. — charleton

No, that's not the traditional definition of belief. Have a look in the closest dictionary please. Here's one:

Belief = conviction of the truth of some statement or the reality of some being or phenomenon especially when based on examination of evidence

This, although, can be confused with "knowledge" is not the same thing at all.
Why don't you stop and think for a second. I know you are not completely stupid.
Take the two definitions above as two ends of a spectrum. — charleton

If you are familiar with philosophic tradition, you would know that many philosophers have defined knowledge as justified true belief. So I don't see how I'm being dumb. You're just pretending I should accept what you say as if it is the most evident thing in the world. Clearly it's not, and that's not just for me, but for many people.

You know damn well that some people accept and believe things without a reasonable warrant. But on the other end of the spectrum there is such a thing as rigorous method that leads to near certain knowledge. — charleton

So one can believe in the absence of evidence, or one can believe based on evidence right?

Your use of these terms is has no utility. Since you want to use the "rational" definition of "belief" to self justify your silly religious Faith.
This makes you risible.
You are missing the point utterly.

So one can believe in the absence of evidence, or one can believe based on evidence right? — Agustino

No. I am suggesting that if you are indiscriminate in your use of the word, you end up saying NOTHING.
That is why I personally hold that knowledge and belief has to be sundered in order that it is possible to make any sense.
With Knowledge I do not employ Faith. I use previsional trust that my information is correct, until I discover contrary information.
With Belief, as the extreme can you simply employ empty faith and believe what suits your whim.
If you cannot see that there is a difference then you are not saying anything of any value.

No. — charleton

What other alternatives are there? So if believing in the absence of evidence, and believing based on evidence do not exhaust all possibilities, what other possibilities are there?

With Knowledge I do not employ Faith. I use previsional trust that my information is correct, until I discover contrary information. — charleton

Right, so you believe something based on reasons - evidence is an empty word. Reasons are just other things you believe. Ultimately we have to reach something that you believe for its own sake, because it is self-evident to you. Those are things you take as properly basic, that you believe on faith.

I can have the same discussion about logic, and hence reason, being antithetical to believe too if you want. I can also have a discussion about the realms of morality and natural science too if you want.

For example "I believe that we are all equal", does not mean that I know we are equal, or that we are equal. This is a moral value that I hold as an aspiration. A aspiration that we deserve to all be treated equally before the law.
The clumsy use of the term "belief" here above is not tantamount to knowledge in any sense.
Am I getting through?

For example "I believe that we are all equal", does not mean that I know we are equal, or that we are equal. This is a moral value that I hold as an aspiration. A aspiration that we deserve to all be treated equally before the law.
The clumsy use of the term "belief" here above is not tantamount to knowledge in any sense.
Am I getting through? — charleton

I never said belief is equal to knowledge. I asked you some specific questions, can you please focus and answer my questions, and not talk about things that I haven't yet asked you about?

I failed to make a distinction between knowledge and unjustified belief. Can you explain how? — Agustino

Can you also explain what justifies belief? (and please don't tell me evidence, explain what evidence consists of). — Agustino

Does prima facie evidence differ from 'evidence at first glance' or apparent evidence? The question is, whether on further examination and analysis, it constitutes substantive evidence, it seems to me. Substantive evidence is evidence that can be intersubjectively corroborated; and I think on that score it fails to qualify.

An individual's religious experience may constitute evidence for them, but the status as 'evidence' there consists in the ability to convince; to change one's feelings; it is not a matter of rational argument or empirical evidence. But don't mistake me to be saying that I don't think individuals should allow themselves to be convinced by such experiential "evidence"; on the contrary I think individuals should be very open to that; it is very human to lay yourself open to experience of all kinds, and to decide for yourself what it is that you value and how you value it. Individuals may be socially constructed to a certain degree, but they are by no means owned by society.

Does prima facie evidence differ from 'evidence at first glance' or apparent evidence? — Janus

I would concur it's not called evidence which should be readily available to be examined formally.
Rather it's just facts that you accept or deny based on your own subjective judgement. Say, you can still deny a rose is red if you were color blind.

Something like that I guess.

We don't need science to tell us that we want to survive, and more, we want to live and even more still, that we want to flourish. — Janus

Well said. Do we know all our wanted or all we would and should want? And for what?

Thanks. I would say that self-knowledge consists in knowing which wants lead to dissipation and which to flourishing. Since we are social beings, desires that lead to pleasant and mutually fruitful engagement with others should be cultivated, and desires which lead to unpleasant engagement with others or alienation from others should be neglected and if necessary weeded out.

We cannot know all our wants; there will always be the unconscious; but I would say the worthwhile aim is to, as much as possible, bring all that is subconscious into consciousness .

which wants lead to dissipation and which to flourishing — Janus

perfect!

Since we are social beings — Janus

appears obvious but if allowed just a bit of skepticism, one could ask "what if from deep down we are not?"
Anyway we can't deny that but I am still proposing the most important "what" you can ever perceive is your own self, more than any relationships or connections to the surroundings. Having said that I am aware there is yet a satisfactory definition of "self".

it doesn't work — Janus

can you educate me why not for Kan'ts imperative? I love Kant by the way and would be interested in any points unmatched.

So, why single out religious faith for our criticism? — TheMadFool

I believe you have been satisfied with the reasons given so far. I read the most apparent answer is because thinkers consider it as "that whereof we cannot speak".

If I am asked, I'd say plainly people don't want to talk about it because it sounds naive in the face, or sort of. Plainly we are very limited and we don't know our limits, just vaguely that we are. If you agree with Plato's Allegory of the Cave, this is exactly what I mean.

Kant wants to formulate universal moral imperatives. In other words he wants to reduce morality to a set of rules, all of which may be rationally justified by just one maxim:

Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.

He wants to eliminate the affective, imaginative and intuitive dimensions from moral thought and action.

This may seem to work in the abstract; but the problem is that in concrete situations the rigidity of the imperative may create situations which conflict with our moral feelings and intuitions.

The classic example of this kind of conflict is: Say you have some Jewish children whose parents have been killed by the Nazis hidden in your attic. The Gestapo knock on your door and ask you if have any Jews in your house. According to Kant lying is always wrong; therefore you must tell them about the children.

Kant wants to formulate universal moral imperatives. In other words he wants to reduce morality to a set of rules, all of which may be rationally justified by just one maxim:

Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law. — Janus

Given these two statements is seems to me that you have it completely backwards.

As if you act towards your universal wishes you are imposing your moral code towards the objective from the subject, not the other way round.

Consider the statement that all Mongols are universally supreme and the all Indians are universally inferior. That it ought to be a universal maxim that all Mongols should crush their enemies and hear the lamentation of their women.
This is great if you are Ghengis Khan, not so good if you are Ghandi.

I can't see any relevance at all in your response. Perhaps you could explain your point more clearly.