(Y)

(Although in practice, and on Forums, what metaphysics usually does is result in interminable and irresolvable debate.)

Ah, but does such debate "strengthen and maintain" spirit?

Any talk of 'a system' disquiets me. I hear a univocalist calling. How are my plural understandings going to harmonise? :)

It can. I have learned a lot from these forums. I learn what I can get away with, but I also learn from criticism and have had to modify my ideas. One profound thing I'm learning is that how some principles I regard as obvious are interpreted completely differently by others. But there are also those who think they understand metaphysics, who, from my inexpert opinion, really don't. It's like the thousands of people who line up for talent shows who think they can sing or play piano. :-d

Gabriel Marcel — Mitchell

Sounds like a French philosophy quote to me. Marcel probably needs bouts of metaphysical disquiet to de-paralyze his superior spirit.

>:O

I've been reading a really interesting essay by Marcel, following a reference to him on the Forum - Gabriel Marcel and the Existence of God:

Marcel has been concerned with the question of how we know God from the time of his earliest writings. At the beginning of his Metaphysical Journal, he expresses Kantian thoughts which, with some modification, persist throughout his later works. At this point he is concerned to show that since God does not exist in space-time, he cannot be known as an object of the world is known. Consequently, he makes the typical existentialist statement that God “ is” but does not “ exist.” “ God does not exist,” he asserts; “ He is infinitely above existence.”
...
Marcel argued ...that one cannot validly think of God as an existing object independent of ourselves, because this mode of thought would place him within the ambit of the world. When we think God as an object, we fail to distinguish him from the world or from ourselves. An objective God reflects a Kantian conception of existence as limited only to space-time relations. Marcel expresses this in the following terms: When we suppose we are positing (in existence or still only objectively) the absolute independence of God, we are really on the contrary only binding up God with immediate consciousness.

(Y)

Asserts the distinction between 'reality' and 'existence' that I have been going on about ever since joining forums.

The problem, then, is how are we to think and talk about God? I am reminded of the early Wittgentstein's

That whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must be silent.

Boy, Christians would not like that.

The problem with what Marcel writes in the above quoted passage is twofold:

• He does not give a coherent account of the difference between existence and being. I have never heard a coherent account of this difference, which is probably because to say that anything is is logically equivalent to saying that it exists (in whatever sense of 'existence' we might be using).

• If we want to say that God is real as opposed to merely imaginary then his reality, or being, or existence or whatever must be thought as being independent of human consciousness.

These considerations lead inexorably to Wittgenstein's "whereof..." unless we adopt an immanent, 'process' account of God. For this see Whitehead's groundbreaking Process and Reality.

He does not give a coherent account of the difference between existence and being. I have never heard a coherent account of this difference, which is probably because to say that anything is is logically equivalent to saying that it exists (in whatever sense of 'existence' we might be using). — Janus

Well, that is why I make the point of the nature of the difference between numbers and objects.

Objects - the paradigmatic chairs and apples of philosophical debates - demonstrably exist. They come into existence, they are composed of parts, and they cease to exist. In other words, they're temporal and compound.

Whereas, numbers are not like that. Numbers don't come into, or go out of, existence, and prime numbers are not composed of parts. But they're nevertheless real - if I ask you for 5 apples, and you give me 4 or 6 apples, then you've got it wrong. And there's something you're wrong about.

So, I make the argument that numbers are real, but not existent in the same sense that phenomena are existent. They're real in an intelligible sense, i.e. real to an intelligence capable of counting. But they're not phenomenal.

Obviously, in the case of the nature of 'the supreme being', then it's another matter altogether and I'm not trying to compare God to numbers. However, I think in the Augustinian tradition of metaphysics it is understood that there are different degrees or levels of reality, of which the above is one example. That comes out in the passage I frequently cite on Augustine and intelligible objects.

@Mitchell - the above passage is related to Feser's 'Augustinian argument for God', although I don't really like Feser's analysis of it.

The problem, then, is how are we to think and talk about God? I am reminded of the early Wittgentstein's
That whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must be silent.
Boy, Christians would not like that. — Mitchell

Wittgenstein's approach was also apophatic, and apophatisism has its place, but sometimes too much can be left unsaid! Have a look at this page on apophaticism for an explanation.

I've found Marcel to be a humble and decent man who encourages others to be patient with themselves while also encouraging them to continually work on becoming the ideal self they aspire to be.

What do you think of the following claim?

“Metaphysical disquiet.—It seems to me that a metaphysical system is nothing if not the act by which a disquiet is defined and succeeds partially—as well as mysteriously—if not abolishing, at least in transposing or transmitting, itself into an expression of self that, so far from paralyzing the superior life of the spirit, on the contrary, strengthens and maintains.”
Gabriel Marcel, Metaphysical Journal — Mitchell

Rhetoric: language designed to have a persuasive or impressive effect, but which is often regarded as lacking in sincerity or meaningful content.

Are you implying that the passage quoted is "lacking in sincerity or meaningful content"?

Yes, in a sense. I don't know whether it was said in sincerity or not, and that doesn't really matter. But I do know that as a French existentialist philosopher of the 20th century, you're expected to talk in a particular way, in a particular style. You might find it brimming with meaningful content, but then, likewise, any piece of art can induce that reaction in someone.

Compare the quoted passage with Dewey:

"We only think when we are confronted with a problem"

(Although in practice, and on Forums, what metaphysics usually does is result in interminable and irresolvable debate.)[/quote]

You will always have endless debates on these subjects, so what matters, at least for me, is, am I satisfied with what I've discovered. The tendency is for people to think that because one cannot resolve these problems with others, that that means they are not resolvable. Even if you (Wayfarer) had all the answers on these subjects, you would still have just as many disagreements.

He does not give a coherent account of the difference between existence and being. I have never heard a coherent account of this difference, which is probably because to say that anything is is logically equivalent to saying that it exists (in whatever sense of 'existence' we might be using). — Janus

There is a coherent difference to be made between existence and being which can be made from understanding the history of these terms. "Being" goes way back to very ancient times. In the Eleatic school, of Parmenides, where it gets opposed to "not-being" as a logical principle. But at the same time, the Greek philosophers of nature, like Thales and Heraclitus, observing a world of change, adopted "becoming" as a first principle.

Plato noticed a fundamental inconsistency between these two ways of looking at reality, 1)what is, is, and what is not is not; 2) All is becoming. Aristotle demonstrated that the two are inherently incompatible, and sophists could abuse this incompatibility to produce logical arguments with absurd conclusions. But Plato introduced "the good", as the means by which all things become intelligible. And Aristotle posited "substance" as consisting of both matter (becoming) and form (what is and is not).

"Existence" is a term which was developed in Latin, in later philosophies. In its development it was conceived so as to include both 1) and 2), under that name, "existence". In Christian religion it is compatible with Plato's "good", as what is given by God, and it is also compatible with Aristotle's "substance". "Existence" included both 1) and 2).

So I think that in its early development the category of "existing" was produced as a wider category which could include both the categories of "being/not-being" and "becoming". Both of these categories, which are inherently inconsistent, are allowed to be real under the category of existing, which is therefore the more general category. The scholastics though, then produced a dichotomy between existence and essence, and in this way they re-introduce the incompatibility. "Essence", is now the category of what is, and what is not (1), while "existence" is relegated to the material realm of becoming (2).

If we are to compare the modern concept of existence, to the concepts of antiquity, we see that in modern times existence generally refers to material existence, and this would be associated with the ancient "becoming". The ancient concept of being/not being, what is and is not, based in the logical principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle, is associated with essence.

Well, that is why I make the point of the nature of the difference between numbers and objects.

Objects ...demonstrably exist. They come into existence, they are composed of parts, and they cease to exist..

Whereas, numbers are not like that. Numbers don't come into, or go out of, existence...

So, I make the argument that numbers are real, but not existent in the same sense that phenomena are existent. — Wayfarer

There is no denying that numbers have a different kind of existence than spatio-temporal objects. But there are many things apart from number that don't "come into existence". If the world is material then matter doesn't come into existence any more than number does. Nor do form or process. So, what you have written sheds no light on a purported difference between being and existence, as far as I can tell.

.

Obviously, in the case of the nature of 'the supreme being', then it's another matter altogether and I'm not trying to compare God to numbers. However, I think in the Augustinian tradition of metaphysics it is understood that there are different degrees or levels of reality, of which the above is one example. — Wayfarer

I'm still not clear as to whether you actually believe in the existence of God; it seems that you have said many times that you are agnostic. In any case, I am not arguing that things are not real in different ways. Love is real in a different way than a chair, and beauty is real in a different way than food. There are countless different kinds of real things, complexes, processes and qualities.

To return to the example, I believe number is inherent in nature; its existence is a kind of subsistence. If existence began at the Big Bang, then it would seem to be entirely incoherent to say that number subsisted or was real in any sense prior to that.

From what you have written here I take it that you think 'existence' is a broader conception that includes both 'being' and 'becoming', and that the modern conception of existence allows only for material existence (which is becoming) and not being. I don't think of 'being' as a univocal term, but as both noun and verb. It includes becoming. Anything that exists materially, changes continuously, however minutely, it always becoming.

On the other hand materiality itself is ever-present; and in that sense does not change. Beings both remain themselves, and are continually changing. This is even the case with number; fiveness remains ever the same, and yet its instantiations are constantly changing. If "time is the moving image of eternity" as Plato avers, then all things are both changeless and eternal and ever-changing and temporal; eternality and temporality constitute the two Janus-faces of reality; and this would apply even to the greatest entity, God.

Anything that exists materially, changes continuously, however minutely, it always becoming. — Janus

What Aristotle demonstrated is that "continuous change" is incompatible with the logical principles of what is and what is not, being and not being.

So for instance, if X changes and becomes Y, then if we posit a 'becoming" or change, between x and Y, we need to allow that this condition between X and Y is describable. If we allow that this condition of becoming is describable as A, then we have X becomes A and A becomes Y. Then we need to posit a describable condition between X and A, and A and Y. This would continue infinitely and we'd never get an adequate description of the becoming which occurs between two describable states. The point is that there is a fundamental incompatibility between "what is" (being) which is a describable state, and "change", or becoming, which is an activity.

Between two contiguous determinate states of being of any entity there is a seamless transition which does not consist in a determinate state of being (it does not because if it did this would lead to infinite regress).

There is either nothing at all between two determinate states of being of any entity or else there are other determinate states of being. But if there are other determinate states of being between two determinate states of being of any entity then those two states of being are not contiguous; which would deflate our explanations.

A "seamless transition" cannot consist of determinate entities, but must that mean it is "nothing at all"?

Whatever the case may be the change from one determinate state to another is a becoming, so becoming is either nothing at all (or in other words it is merely formal) or it is 'something' real (a seamless transition) which does not consist of determinate entities.

What Aristotle demonstrated is that "continuous change" is incompatible with the logical principles of what is and what is not, being and not being. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where does Aristotle do this?

Between two contiguous determinate states of being of any entity there is a seamless transition which does not consist in a determinate state of being (it does not because if it did this would lead to infinite regress). — Janus

The problem with this perspective is that the two determinate states cannot be contiguous, because change occurs between one and the other, and change takes time. So if they are contiguous then there is nothing between the two states, and no such thing as change

There is either nothing at all between two determinate states of being of any entity or else there are other determinate states of being. If there are other determinate states of being between two determinate states of being of any entity then those two states of being are not contiguous.

A "seamless transition" cannot consist of determinate entities, but must that mean it is "nothing at all"?

Whatever the case may be the change from one determinate state to another is a becoming, so becoming is either nothing at all (or in other words it is merely formal) or it is 'something' real (a seamless transition) which does not consist of determinate entities. — Janus

OK, so let's say that the change from state X to state Y is either nothing at all, or a seamless transition. I think we can assume that it is not nothing at all, change is something real. So what's a "seamless transition"? We can't saying that X ceases to be, and then Y begins being, because that implies a point of nothing, so this would not be seamless. On the other hand, X cannot overlap Y temporally or this would be contradiction.

Where does Aristotle do this? — Mitchell

I believe there is a couple different spots where he argued this, one in his Metaphysics. I paraphrased the argument, above.

The problem with this perspective is that the two determinate states cannot be contiguous, because change occurs between one and the other, and change takes time. — Metaphysician Undercover

What if change from one state to another is instantaneous? Do you have an argument for why it could not be so?

We can't saying that X ceases to be, and then Y begins being, because that implies a point of nothing, so this would not be seamless. On the other hand, X cannot overlap Y temporally or this would be contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then we can just say instead "It is X, and then it is Y". 'Transition' is the wrong word then, and there is no "process of change" between the two states. The change then is nothing other than the difference between the two states.

In this connection think of cinematography. There is nothing in between the different still frames, but as watchers we perceive continuous change and movement.

That was a nice summary.

However notice also your triadic resolution of the dichotomistic categories...

So I think that in its early development the category of "existing" was produced as a wider category which could include both the categories of "being/not-being" and "becoming". Both of these categories, which are inherently inconsistent, are allowed to be real under the category of existing, which is therefore the more general category. — Metaphysician Undercover

So existence was the more generic category that could subsume being~becoming as a dialectical possibility. You had two contradicting extremes of metaphysical possibility. And they could be resolved by the unity of becoming one within a higher order abstraction. Being and becoming became merely two forms of the same basic thing - existing.

The scholastics though, then produced a dichotomy between existence and essence, and in this way they re-introduce the incompatibility. "Essence", is now the category of what is, and what is not (1), while "existence" is relegated to the material realm of becoming (2). — Metaphysician Undercover

But then scholasticism buggered this up because of the need to bolster Christian dualism. Existence became about material/effective cause alone - the world experienced through the senses. The world of material accidents. And essence - the formal/final cause of being - became split off and associated with the separate realm of mind, spirit, nous, the ideal. The world known through the human intellect. And then ultimately through beatific vision. Men could know God just as directly and surely as they knew the world.

So an actually logical metaphysics - one that treated reality as individuated being - became one based on the acceptance of an actualised contradiction. A dualised or disconnected ontology of matter and mind.

A philosophy of the supernatural replaced a philosophy of nature.

What Aristotle demonstrated is that "continuous change" is incompatible with the logical principles of what is and what is not, being and not being. — Metaphysician Undercover

I like that you cash out the formal half of the story in terms of "what is and what is not". But that itself then says that becoming has to apply to the becoming of what is not, as well as the what is. So when we are considering "states of existence", we have to explain why they are failing to change and so partake in the "what is not". So that anti-becoming is happening continuously while actual change is failing to take place.

While things are changing, the mystery would seem to be how one state of non-change becomes the next state of non-change. But a non-changing state then has a matching (ie: dichotomous) mystery on this score. There is the puzzle of how it is continually expressing its "what is" by preventing the actualisation, or maintaining as potentia, its "what is not".

What if change from one state to another is instantaneous? Do you have an argument for why it could not be so? — Janus

Then, as you say change is nothing. There is one state, then the next state. This is not change. Change is the act of becoming different. But in this description we have difference with no act of becoming different, and therefore no change. To describe things in this way is to say that change is not real.

Then we can just say instead "It is X, and then it is Y". 'Transition' is the wrong word then, and there is no "process of change" between the two states. The change then is nothing other than the difference between the two states. — Janus

Right, under this description change, becoming, is not real.. That's the point Aristotle was making, if we describe the world in terms of states, then becoming (change) is not real. And if we describe the world in terms of becoming (change), then the states of being are not real. the two are incompatible.

But then scholasticism buggered this up because of the need to bolster Christian dualism. Existence became about material/effective cause alone - the world experienced through the senses. The world of material accidents. And essence - the formal/final cause of being - became split off and associated with the separate realm of mind, spirit, nous, the ideal. The world known through the human intellect. And then ultimately through beatific vision. Men could know God just as directly and surely as they knew the world. — apokrisis

I think dualism was already inherent in the premise of "existence". To exist was to be a duality of being and becoming, (form and matter in Aristotelian terms). What "buggered this up", was the Neo-Platonist, and Christian, principle that Form (essence) is prior to existence. This principle dictates that there is a pure Form, or pure essence, without becoming (or matter), which is existence in a non-temporal, eternal sense. This pushes the need for a more radical dualism. The real problem is that being and becoming are so fundamentally incompatible, that it was a mistake to attempt to put them in the same category under the name existence, in the first place.

So that anti-becoming is happening continuously while actual change is failing to take place. — apokrisis

I wouldn't call being "anti-becoming", it is simply different. These are two distinctly different ways of describing reality. We can describe reality in terms of what is, and what is not, or we can describe reality in terms of activity (becoming). What is not, is anti-what is (being), but this is categorically different from becoming, which is activity. So being is not anti-becoming, it is anti-not being. That becoming and being are two distinctly different ways of describing reality indicates that reality consists of these two distinct aspects. We need this categorical separation to allow that a thing which stays itself, as that thing, through time, such as myself, is also changing. It is not the case that part of me is not-becoming (anti-becoming), and therefore does not change, while another part of me can change. What is the case is that I refer to distinct aspects of reality, and relative to one aspect or principle, I stay the same as myself, but relative to another aspect or principle, I change. These two principles, one that allows me to say that I am the same person as I was, and one that allows me to say that I have changed, are completely different, and are validated by completely different aspects of reality.

Then, as you say change is nothing. There is one state, then the next state. This is not change. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the two states are not exactly the same, then there is, by definition, change, I would say.

Maybe the two what you term "incompatible" ways of looking at things, in terms of either states or processes; are logically incompatible, and cannot be combined in one view. But it would seem, nonetheless, that we need both to understand how things are in the world. If this is so, then it would seem to be a dialectic with thesis and antithesis, but lacking a unitary synthesis. Perhaps the synthesis consists in holding in one's mind two seemingly incompatible views, and valuing each for their own unique insights, while refraining from demanding that either one or the other must be absolutely the case.

If the two states are not exactly the same, then there is, by definition, change, I would say. — Janus

But that's not what "change" means. It means that one state becomes another. To have two distinct states is to have two distinct states, and this does not imply change. "Change" indicates that there is a certain type of relationship between the two states, a relationship of becoming, which is not indicated if the word is not used.

Maybe the two what you term "incompatible" ways of looking at things, in terms of either states or processes; are logically incompatible, and cannot be combined in one view. But it would seem, nonetheless, that we need both to understand how things are in the world. If this is so, then it would seem to be a dialectic with thesis and antithesis, but lacking a unitary synthesis. Perhaps the synthesis consists in holding in one's mind two in seemingly compatible views, and valuing each for their own unique insights, while refraining form demanding that either one or the other must be absolutely the case. — Janus

This is why I believe that dualism provides the only coherent approach toward understanding reality.

The real problem is that being and becoming are so fundamentally incompatible, that it was a mistake to attempt to put them in the same category under the name existence, in the first place. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hence the Peircean process view. Now being is emergent and so an eternal state of becoming. You only have degrees of definiteness.

Matter and form now become the hylomorphic triadic relation in which chance is opposed to necessity (Peircean firstness and thirdness, or tychism and synechism), and then their interaction results in substance or actuality (Peircean secondness).

So the Peircean view fixes things with a hierarchical structure. You have two opposed limits on being - material spontaneity or local degrees of freedom and formal necessity, or global constraints. Then definite being emerges as the concrete action that arises between these two bounds.