To get back on the track because I think this point is rather interesting... subjective morals can still have intrinsic value, can't they? And objective ones could lack that as well.

Because like I've said many times now, originally I was asserting that it was subjective. But I don't know how clear I can make it, that I've changed my position since I made this topic. I've mentioned it so many times in my responses and even made an edit in the original post.

I am not asserting that morality is non-objective. — SonJnana

This is clear, but the semantics of agnosticism/atheism and who has the burden nof proof are so interesting that we're sticking to those topics on a more general level even if you refuse to be an example.

No, it's not. It's belief in the lack of something, which does obviously include the lack of belief in that something, but a lack of belief is agnosticism, not atheism. — BlueBanana

I told you not to go there. But since you went there:

Definition of atheism
1 a : a lack of belief or a strong disbelief in the existence of a god or any gods

To get back on the track because I think this point is rather interesting... subjective morals can still have intrinsic value, can't they? And objective ones could lack that as well. — BlueBanana

Possibly. But then I would ask you why would a dictator care if you intrinsically value to not kill if he intrinsically values murder if it's only subjective.

Okay, so you are agnostic on this and want people to convince you that objective morality is true? — darthbarracuda

Yes, because I lack the belief that morality is objective.

Okay. Just to be clear, dictionary definitions are not always the best tool to go to for philosophical things. How atheism is defined colloquially is not how atheism is used in rigorous philosophy.

Possibly. But then I would ask you why would a dictator care if you intrinsically value to not kill if he intrinsically values murder if it's only subjective. — SonJnana

Hmm... when I imply that he wouldn't care or have any reason to, and you ask me why he would care, how should I answer the question?

Also, I don't think the dictator would intrinsically value killing. For him it'd only be means to achieve safety, success, well-being, or whatever.

Okay. Just to be clear, dictionary definitions are not always the best tool to go to for philosophical things. How atheism is defined colloquially is not how atheism is used in rigorous philosophy. — darthbarracuda

If it's not used the way the dictionary defines it then fine, define it how you want. I'm not gonna argue about the semantics of a word. You understand that my position is the lack of a belief, we don't need any labels that carry baggage.

Now that we have clarified your current view, what is it about objective morality that makes you unsure if it exists?

Wait - the burden is on those who believe it to be objective.

But it's the burden of the agnostic to clarify why they are agnostic, so the moral realist can know what to focus on, no? Certainly agnosticism has to be motivated by something.

Hmm... when I imply that he wouldn't care or have any reason to, and you ask me why he would care, how should I answer the question?

Also, I don't think the dictator would intrinsically value killing. For him it'd only be means to achieve safety, success, well-being, or whatever. — BlueBanana

I ask this because I find it interesting that when someone says murder is wrong then, it's only because they subjectively intrinsically value something. But if anyone can intrinsically value any act then there doesn't seem to be good reason to tell someone that they shouldn't do something. You'd essentially be saying don't do it because I subjectively value it.

↪darthbarracuda
Wait - the burden is on those who believe it to be objective. — BlueBanana

Thank you

But it's the burden of the agnostic to clarify why they are agnostic, so the moral realist can know what to focus on, no? Certainly agnosticism has to be motivated by something. — darthbarracuda

I lack the belief because I haven't been presented with an argument that convinces me morality is objective. So do you have one?

Well, there can be other reasons, which would be rather intriguing, but the claim not being proven is the likeliest, isn't it?

I lack the belief because I haven't been presented with an argument that convinces me morality is objective. So do you have one? — SonJnana

Argh, sniped.

But if anyone can intrinsically value any act then there doesn't seem to be good reason to tell someone that they shouldn't do something. — SonJnana

Ah, you come from the utilitarianist point of view - if you can't convince them, why tell them what you think, right? But of course if you value something, you want the others to value the same thing, which is why you'd tell them to act the way you think is right.

Sure, I'll give one. Morality is given to us in the form of a command-from-afar, as something we ought to do. It is not an expression of an emotion, although is certainly involves emotions in consequence. Perceiving something as having moral content is intuitive and self-evident, requiring no further explanation. Unless there is an opposing argument, such moral perception should be taken as similar to any other sort of perception.

Actually, I'm strongly seeing the utilitarianism in your views, but I think you're mistaken in the nature of that theory. Utilitarianism is a theory that one only believes in as the theory explaining their personal views on ethics - not as a way of explaining the way people in general see the morals.

Morality is given to us in the form of a command-from-afar, as something we ought to do — darthbarracuda

A command from who?

Perceiving something as having moral content is intuitive and self-evident, requiring no further explanation — darthbarracuda

It does require explanation because it's not intuitive and self-evident. If it was we wouldn't be having this conversation. You can't just say I'm right because it's obvious. You have to explain that.

A command from who? — SonJnana

I'm hesitant to answer this. I'm only describing what it's like. It's a command from the Other, whether that be God, a victim's face, or whatever.

It does require explanation because it's not intuitive and self-evident. If it was we wouldn't be having this conversation. You can't just say I'm right because it's obvious. You have to explain that. — SonJnana

Again I'm describing the experience of perceiving something as having moral content. Do you doubt that we do, in fact, see things as objectively right and wrong, good and bad, even if they aren't actually?

The point I'm making is that the perception that something is good or bad, right or wrong, is intuitive in the same way it is intuitive that a triangle has 180 degrees. It's synthetic a priori.

Ah, you come from the utilitarianist point of view - if you can't convince them, why tell them what you think, right? But of course if you value something, you want the others to value the same thing, which is why you'd tell them to act the way you think is right. — BlueBanana

I don't like to label myself as having a point of view so I can't really speak for that.

Now of course this is all speaking hypothetically as if there were no objective view.
If a psychopath values murder and another person values to not kill. And then a thousand other people come along and decide say they also value to not kill. Then they make the rules. So that would mean that the people who have the power and similar values will then implement their rules and it'd be like a might makes right.

I'm hesitant to answer this. I'm only describing what it's like. It's a command from the Other, whether that be God, a victim's face, or whatever. — darthbarracuda

Why should I believe that there is a command coming from anything? I lack a belief in that.

Again I'm describing the experience of perceiving something as having moral content. Do you doubt that we do, in fact, see things as objectively right and wrong, good and bad, even if they aren't actually?

The point I'm making is that the perception that something is good or bad, right or wrong, is intuitive in the same way it is intuitive that a triangle has 180 degrees. It's synthetic a priori. — darthbarracuda

I personally don't see things as objectively morally good or bad because I haven't been convinced so yet. Also, just because something feels intuitive doesn't make it true. I can intuitively think that what I see in a magic trick is true, but that doesn't mean it is true.

Why should I believe that there is a command coming from anything? I lack a belief in that. — SonJnana

I am only saying that morality oftentimes takes the form of a command-from-afar. I'm providing a phenomenological description of our experience of morality.

I personally don't see things as objectively morally good or bad because I haven't been convinced so yet. — SonJnana

But why haven't you been convinced yet? What's the argument against what I've said? I want to know what the metaphysical framework you're coming from is.

Also, just because something feels intuitive doesn't make it true. I can intuitively think that what I see in a magic trick is true, but that doesn't mean it is true. — SonJnana

You misunderstand me. Essentially I am saying that if you deny objective morality than you ought to deny that mathematics is also objective. Consider how both operate through intuitive principles that can be applied through logical reasoning. Both can be rationally argued for - at least, we do believe that someone can be right or wrong about mathematics, so why cannot someone be right or wrong about morality?

I am only saying that morality oftentimes takes the form of a command-from-afar. I'm providing a phenomenological description of our experience of morality. — darthbarracuda

You originally said "Morality is given to us in the form of a command-from-afar, as something we ought to do." So tell me, why should I believe that there is this command coming? Explain to me where it is how you know there is a command, where is it coming from, and why should I believe that it is objective? I don't hear this command.

But why haven't you been convinced yet? What's the argument against what I've said? I want to know what the metaphysical framework you're coming from is. — darthbarracuda

I don't need any framework. I am unconvinced that there are an even number of gumballs in the jar. So now it is up to you to explain why there is and I will be convinced if I don't see any holes in your reasoning. So you provide your moral framework since you're the one asserting that morality is objective.

You misunderstand me. Essentially I am saying that if you deny objective morality than you ought to deny that mathematics is also objective. Consider how both operate through intuitive principles that can be applied through logical reasoning. Both can be rationally argued for - at least, we do believe that someone can be right or wrong about mathematics, so why cannot someone be right or wrong about morality? — darthbarracuda

Someone who says one gumball plus two gumballs = three gumballs can be proven right because if you actually have one and add two, you end up with three. It's reliable and consistent for practical knowledge. Someone who says "murder is morally objectively wrong" why should I believe that that's right? So far all you've said to support this is that there is some command, but haven't explained how you know there is this command.

For something to be false is the same as it being not true — BlueBanana

No it isn't. Something false is necessarily not true, but something not true is not necessarily false. Something can be neither true nor false. This is true both in the sense that we're talking about (whether something has been proven) as well as in an objective sense.

So, if I claim something is true that is not proven true, and another person claims it is not true, they have no burden of proof because, as I said, the thing is not proven true.

Example: a person claims it is true that God exists, and I claim it is not true. I am not claiming that God doesn't exist, only that it is not proven true that God exists, which is correct.

lack of belief is agnosticism, not atheism — BlueBanana

This is a common misconception. Agnosticism relates to knowledge, not belief. This is why you can be an agnostic theist or an agnostic atheist. Agnosticism is just the position that we do not or cannot possess knowledge of something. You can be agnostic about matters other than theism.

You originally said "Morality is given to us in the form of a command-from-afar, as something we ought to do." So tell me, why should I believe that there is this command coming? Explain to me where it is how you know there is a command, where is it coming from, and why should I believe that it is objective? I don't hear this command. — SonJnana

You don't "hear" the calling of the face of a victim? You don't "hear" the inner voice of your conscience telling you to do something? You don't see morality as a system of imperatives, something we must do based on something that is higher than our own empirical desires?

Again, this is just phenomenology. I'm not necessarily saying here that there actually is someone who calls or grounds these imperatives. It's just how morality manifests in our consciousness.

I don't need any framework. — SonJnana

You do need a framework if you're going to explain what it is about my explanation that you find wanting. Otherwise it's just you denying anything I say as "unconvincing" without any dialectic argument. I need to know what you think is wrong with my argument.

Someone who says one gumball plus two gumballs = three gumballs can be proven right because if you actually have one and add two, you end up with three. — SonJnana

And we know this a priori. What I was pointing out was that one and two and three could just be "mental" stuff that doesn't apply to the "real" world, if we're to be nominalists, and the same could be said about moral things as well. So if we deny morality is real on the grounds that it's just "mental" and not "real", what prevents us from doing this with mathematical claims as well? Why are numbers real but morals not?

So far all you've said to support this is that there is some command, but haven't explained how you know there is this command. — SonJnana

I already said we know of moral things like rightness and goodness through an a priori intuition in the same way we know mathematical things. Rightness and goodness are sui generis concepts and are importantly simple, not being able to be reduced to parts. By the same way we know 2+3=5 and that triangles have 180 degrees, we can know that gratuitous suffering is bad and inflicting needless harm onto others wrong.

Example: a person claims it is true that God exists, and I claim it is not true. I am not claiming that God doesn't exist, only that it is not proven true that God exists, which is correct. — JustSomeGuy

That's not what not being true means. True things are true, even when not proven to be.

Agnosticism is just the position that we do not or cannot possess knowledge of something. — JustSomeGuy

No, agnosticism in philosophy is the lack of any belief on the matter. This is why agnostic atheism and agnostic theism are logically incoherent. Don't let the etymology trip you up here. Agnosticism is used not as a knowledge claim but as a middle-ground between positive beliefs.

From the SEP: "Nowadays, the term “agnostic” is often used (when the issue is God’s existence) to refer to those who follow the recommendation expressed in the conclusion of Huxley’s argument: an agnostic is a person who has entertained the proposition that there is a God but believes neither that it is true nor that it is false." Note that this is not denying the cognitive content of God talk but is denying any positive alignment with a view.

You don't "hear" the calling of the face of a victim? You don't "hear" the inner voice of your conscience telling you to do something? You don't see morality as a system of imperatives, something we must do based on something that is higher than our own empirical desires? — darthbarracuda

Just because your "conscience" tells you something is right or wrong doesn't mean that it is objectively morally right or wrong. If that were the case then if my friend conscience tells them to donate 50% of their money then that implies that it is objectively morally good to do that. But other peoples' conscience tells them to donate 25% maybe. You can't get to objectivity from conscience. That's nonsense. It could just be a psychological mechanism that our brains developed because those without empathy didn't pass on their genes and cooperation was promoted by evolution. You can't get an objective morality from that. If your brain were to activate hormones that make you feel bad when you murder because that kind of process was useful for your ancestors to survive, that doesn't make it objectively true that it is morally wrong to murder. Also, there may be people such as psychopaths who may not even have this conscience you speak of.

You do need a framework if you're going to explain what it is about my explanation that you find wanting. Otherwise it's just you denying anything I say as "unconvincing" without any dialectic argument. I need to know what you think is wrong with my argument. — darthbarracuda

You are laying out your argument for why there is objective morality and I'm clearly quoting you and explaining in each instance what I find wanting in your explanations.

By the same way we know 2+3=5 and that triangles have 180 degrees, we can know that gratuitous suffering is bad and inflicting needless harm onto others wrong — darthbarracuda

We can know 2+3=5 because we can take 2, add 3, and see that there are 5. We can create a triangle and measure the 180 degrees. These are objective facts. We can develop proofs for mathematics that are sound. But we cant say that it is objectively true harming others needlessly is objectively morally wrong. Show me the proof for that. I've already explained why conscience doesn't work for that.

As I recall, there was a difference between the Huxleyan Agnostic who strictly denies in principle we can ever know that God exists, and an agnostic whom just doesn't have the evidence to form a belief cogently.

That's not what not being true means. True things are true, even when not proven to be. — BlueBanana

That's another philosophical topic entirely. But to be brief, when we say something is true, what we mean is that it has been proven to be true based on the information we currently have. Things are always subject to change, and we often discover new information that forces us to change our "truths". It is impossible for us to say anything is objectively true because it is impossible for us to possess all of the information in the universe.

So, yes, true things are true whether we know they are true or not, but that isn't the kind of truth we're referring to when we typically discuss truth. We're referring to things that are "true" based on the information we currently have, which is incomplete and always will be.



From SEP:

The terms “agnostic” and “agnosticism” were famously coined in the late nineteenth century by the English biologist, T.H. Huxley. He said that he originally "invented the word “Agnostic” to denote people who, like [himself], confess themselves to be hopelessly ignorant concerning a variety of matters, about which metaphysicians and theologians, both orthodox and heterodox, dogmatise with the utmost confidence." (1884)

I know today it is often used to refer to a middle ground between atheism and theism, but that isn't the true meaning of the term. If you want to argue that a word's meaning should change based on its use, that's fine, I would just disagree. That essentially renders languages meaningless; you can say any word and claim it means anything you want.

The point is that agnostic atheism/theism complicates matters unnecessarily. We just want to know what you believe, not how "confidently" you believe in them or whatever. We just want to know: do you believe God exists, or not? It's very simple, you're either a theist, an atheist, or in between as an agnostic, and this is how it's used most commonly in the literature.