That's argumentum ad ignorantiam.

Why is objective morality needed for moral actions to have intrinsic value? Subjective values can have intrinsic value.

I decided to no longer use the word preference because I think it was misleading for my point. The burden of proof is on you however because I am taking the position of being unconvinced that morality is objective or non-objective. I am not making assertions so if you claim that it is objective, that is up to you to support. — SonJnana

Ok I will jump through your hoop. What would count for objectivity? My claim would be others in agreement. It all depends on this. A philosophical term for this is intersubjectivity.

So if there is an isolated group of humans that have a completely different lifestyle and have never made contact with the rest of the world, would you tell them murder is objectively wrong? — SonJnana

I would say that In our society it is objectively wrong, even for the psychopaths. If they wanted to live in our society then it would be objectively wrong for them too, even if they are a psychopath.

That's argumentum ad ignorantiam. — BlueBanana

You'd be right if I asserted that morality was non-objective but I'm not asserting that. I'm not asserting it to be objective or non-objective.

Why is objective morality needed for moral actions to have intrinsic value? Subjective values can have intrinsic value. — BlueBanana

If there is a dictator killing people and you tell him to stop because his murdering is immoral. He asks you why he should listen to you, What makes it so bad? What is your argument to the dictator?

Ok I will jump through your hoop. What would count for objectivity? My claim would be others in agreement. It all depends on this. A philosophical term for this is intersubjectivity. — bloodninja

Under these definitions if everyone was in agreement that the earth was flat, then wouldn't it be objectively true that the world was flat?

After all, morality certainly seems to appear to us as "objective", as a command-from-afar, an imperative, something we must do out of free will. — darthbarracuda

What you describe sounds like morality simpliciter. What is particularly "objective" about it? Or, to put it another way, what would a non-objective morality be like in your view?

Under these definitions if everyone was in agreement that the world was flat, then wouldn't it be objectively true that the world was flat. — SonJnana

Good point. Yes it would. BUT there would be relevant people (the people who determine the particular kind of objectivity) and irrelevant people (the people who have no influence on the particular kind of objectivity). So for example the shape of the earth is a question that can be fulfilled scientifically and not religiously. This is because it is a scientific question. If there is a general scientific agreement that the earth is flat then it would be true that the earth is flat. It turns out that there is no general scientific agreement that the earth is flat. Some religious groups think this, but they do not belong to an appropriate group to satisfy the objectivity claim in this case.

The objectivity in question won't always be scientific. It could be artistic, moral, law, philosophical, etc.

R. M. Hare, a non-cognitivist (non-objectivist) moral philosopher, recognized that there was a difference between expressions of emotion and moral utterances, between "I don't like liver" and "murder is wrong", and agreed that Emotivism is unable to account for the normative force of moral claims. He articulated the view, which became to be called Prescriptivism, that moral claims have an imperative, or prescriptive, element. To say that murder is wrong says both "I disapprove of murder" AND "Do thou likewise!"

You'd be right if I asserted that morality was non-objective but I'm not asserting that. I'm not asserting it to be objective or non-objective. — SonJnana

And if it's objective it's intrinsic, if it's not it can still be intrinsic. Therefor, the only way to come to the conclusion that nothing is intrinsically wrong is to take the premise that morals are subjective.

If there is a dictator killing people and you tell him to stop because his murdering is immoral. He asks you why he should listen to you, What makes it so bad? What is your argument to the dictator? — SonJnana

That it's my subjective opinion that killing people has an intrinsic negative moral value.

If there is a general scientific agreement that the earth is flat then it would be true that the earth is flat. — bloodninja

And if they later re-evaluated and agreed that the Earth is actually a sphere then what? You're telling me that they would say the earth used to be flat but now its a sphere because we changed our mind? How does that make any sense?

And if it's objective it's intrinsic, if it's not it can still be intrinsic. Therefor, the only way to come to the conclusion that nothing is intrinsically wrong is to take the premise that morals are subjective. — BlueBanana

Like I said, I've already found some holes in what I was originally saying so I've re-evaluated and changed my position. I'm not asserting anymore. The burden of proof is on you.

That it's my subjective opinion that killing people has an intrinsic negative moral value. — BlueBanana

Please explain.

Please explain. — SonJnana

What is there to explain? I don't want him to kill people because it human life has subjective intrinsic value to me and that's my subjective view. He should, in my opinion, respect my opinion but objectively he doesn't have to.

The burden of proof is on you. — SonJnana

Not unless you question the view and to do that you have to have the opposite view, and then the burden is on you as well.

R. M. Hare, a non-cognitivist (non-objectivist) moral philosopher, recognized that there was a difference between expressions of emotion and moral utterances, between "I don't like liver" and "murder is wrong", and agreed that Emotivism is unable to account for the normative force of moral claims. He articulated the view, which became to be called Prescriptivism, that moral claims have an imperative, or prescriptive, element. To say that murder is wrong says both "I disapprove of murder" AND "Do thou likewise!" — Mitchell

I agree, moral attitudes seem to be prescriptive: they are aimed at compelling or constraining actions, which other attitudes such as pleasure, disgust, sadness, gratitude, fear, tenderness, etc. do not do in and of themselves. And they tend to have a more-or-less general character: not just do that in this particular instance, but whenever anyone finds themselves in similar circumstances, they ought to do something like that. So an argument can be made that moral attitudes can be grouped into a natural kind distinct from other attitudes (although the boundary is going to be somewhat fuzzy).

But that is a modest, commonsensical conclusion of conceptual analysis: it only assures us that the predicate "moral" is meaningful and expressive. It doesn't tell us much about the metaphysics of morality.

First I must apologize: I accidentally flagged your post, and don't see a way to undo it. That's what I get for browsing on my phone. I'm new to this forum so I'm not sure if anything will come of it, but I hope a mod sees this comment and realized it was an accident.

Not unless you question the view and to do that you have to have the opposite view, and then the burden is on you as well — BlueBanana

I don't think this is accurate. The burden of proof lies on the person making a positive claim. You can counter a positive claim with a negative claim, which still leaves the burden of proof on the first person. An example would be:

"The Earth is round."
"No, it isn't."

There isn't a burden on the second person because they haven't made a positive claim to prove. If the person had said, "No, it's flat." Then that would hold a burden of proof.

Burden of proof is on anyone making any claim. That the Earth couldn't be proven to be round would not be a proof for it being flat, or even not round in general.

The claim is that morality is objective. If I take the position of not believing that morality is either objective or non-objective, then the burden of proof lies on someone to demonstrate that it is objective. And in the absence of any argument for it that is convincing, I think it is unfair for me to say that any action is objectively wrong even if that feels uncomfortable to me.

I don't think I have to argue for my position because it is a lack of belief of objective morality. And one has to make an argument that something nonphysical exists, not the other way around. That would be like you telling me that there is an invisible unicorn in the room and telling me to prove that it isn't there. — SonJnana

Don't misconstrue this as the same thing as the equally-silly notion of an "agnostic atheist", where atheism is just assumed-to-be-true-unless-proven-wrong. That's precisely not how philosophy works. We don't just assume things are right or wrong. We don't assume anything, we start from the basics and work from there. And the basics are definitely not that physicalism is true, God does not exist, and morality isn't real.

The "invisible unicorn" schtick is frustrating because it shows you are not actually an agnostic here. You're a moral anti-realist. There's no "agnostic moral anti-realist" just as there is no "agnostic atheist". You can believe in the reality of x, deny it, or withdraw from commitment. You can't withdraw from commitment but still have your toe dipped in one camp. Well, I guess you can but it doesn't help the discussion at all, because we're concerned about the status of beliefs and not the status of how deeply you personally believe in something.

Notice how a lack of belief in something is not inherently asymmetrical. The agnostic lacks belief in both moral realism and anti-realism. You need to be uncommitted to both to be an agnostic. Whereas you are only lacking belief in realism, and have anti-realism as your fall-back position. Which is question-begging, as I said before.

So going back to the invisible unicorn: if you think the invisible unicorn does not exist, then you aren't agnostic about its existence. It's very, very simple and I get very frustrated when this sort of reasoning keeps cropping up. I blame it entirely on the new atheist charlatans. Sorry if this sounds like I'm attacking you personally, I just get really triggered by this.

I am just unconvinced that it is objective. I'm taking the position that if someone were to ask me "why is murder objectively morally wrong," I would say I don't know. I won't tell them that it is, but I also won't tell them that it isn't. So that is up to you argue for since I am not asserting that morality is objective or non-objective.

(My position from the original post has changed a little bit because I have found some holes in what I was originally, and I thank you all for that). — SonJnana

Okay, I did not know you had changed your views. So now you are agnostic on this, at least you claim to be. If you are agnostic then you aren't sure if morality is real or not. But remember that a failure to provide a convincing argument for A does not entail ~A, logically. It just means there hasn't been a good argument for A; in the absence of all evidence for A, we may feel compelled to adopt ~A, but ~A still has not been demonstrated itself. Something about A has to be proven to be contradictory or incorrect for ~A to be proven.

It makes perfect sense. That's what happened....

You're right, that's my mistake. The example I gave didn't accurately portray my intended point. I was conflating claiming something isn't true with claiming something is false. An accurate example would be one person claiming that it is true that the Earth is round, and the other person claiming that it is not true.
If someone claims something is true, and you claim it is not, there is no burden of proof on you. That's what I originally meant. This is because, as darthbarracuda just said:

a failure to provide a convincing argument for A does not entail ~A, logically. It just means there hasn't been a good argument for A; in the absence of all evidence for A, we may feel compelled to adopt ~A, but ~A still has not been demonstrated itself. Something about A has to be proven to be contradictory or incorrect for ~A to be proven. — darthbarracuda

So, the claim that something isn't true is not the same as the claim that it is false.

So, the claim that something isn't true is not the same as the claim that it is false. — JustSomeGuy

No, it's more like, the absence of evidence for A is not evidence of the absence of A. Saying something isn't true is equivalent to saying it is false. Saying someone has not provided sufficient reason for believing in A does not mean A is false.

Not unless you question the view and to do that you have to have the opposite view, and then the burden is on you as well. — BlueBanana

Questioning a view doesn't mean I have the opposite view. If you tell me that there is an even number of gumballs in a jar, I can question your view. I'll ask you okay show me how you know. But just because I haven't been convinced that the number is even, that doesn't mean I believe it's odd either.

You're right, that's my mistake. The example I gave didn't accurately portray my intended point. I was conflating claiming something isn't true with claiming something is false. An accurate example would be one person claiming that it is true that the Earth is round, and the other person claiming that it is not true.
If someone claims something is true, and you claim it is not, there is no burden of proof on you. — JustSomeGuy

Yes, there is. For something to be false is the same as it being not true, and the burden of proof being on someone means that their claim is not proven to be true. As long as it's not been proven the Earth is not round, it can't be considered to be not round and anyone claiming it's not true that the Earth is round has the burden of proof on them.

Don't misconstrue this as the same thing as the equally-silly notion of an "agnostic atheist", where atheism is just assumed-to-be-true-unless-proven-wrong. That's precisely not how philosophy works. We don't just assume things are right or wrong. We don't assume anything, we start from the basics and work from there. And the basics are definitely not that physicalism is true, God does not exist, and morality isn't real. — darthbarracuda

An agnostic atheist doesn't assume God is not real. It lacks the belief in a god.

If you ask me if there is an even number of gumballs in a jar, just because I lack the belief doesn't mean I assume that it is not even and therefore odd. How could I say that it is even with out a reason to think so. How could I say it's not even (and therefore odd) if I don't have any reason to believe that either? I am unconvinced both ways.

Similarly if you can't convince me why morality is objective, I have no reason to believe it. It doesn't mean I believe morality is not objective either.

True, but that is someone makes the claim about their number. This is more about social norms and interpreting what's said between the lines than logic, but basically starting the thread questioning the view expresses the opinion of the OP in a very different way than replying to a thread where the view was claimed to be true.

If you ask me if there is an even number of gumballs in a jar, just because I lack the belief doesn't mean I assume that it is not even and therefore odd. How could I say that it is even with out a reason to think so. How could I say it's not even (and therefore odd) if I don't have any reason to believe that either. I am unconvinced both ways. — SonJnana

But that's just agnosticism, not agnostic atheism towards their number being even.

True, but that is someone makes the claim about their number. This is more about social norms and interpreting what's said between the lines than logic, but basically starting the thread questioning the view expresses the opinion of the OP in a very different way than replying to a thread where the view was claimed to be true. — BlueBanana

Like I've said many times, I originally was asserting that morality is not objective, but since then I've changed my position because I realized I couldn't back up the assertion. People are still asserting that morality is objective, however, so that's up to them to back up.

But that's just agnosticism, not agnostic atheism towards their number being even. — BlueBanana

That's how lay people like to use the word but technically atheism is simply a lack of a belief. Atheism and agnostic are not mutually exclusive. Look I'm not gonna argue about semantics of the word atheism, that's a waste of time.

My position is this. There is a claim that morality is objective. I lack that belief similarly to me lacking a belief that there are an even number of gumballs. That does not mean that I believe that morality is not objective or that there is not an even number of gumballs. So if you assert that it is objective, back it up.

An agnostic atheist doesn't assume God is not real. It lacks the belief in a god.

If you ask me if there is an even number of gumballs in a jar, just because I lack the belief doesn't mean I assume that it is not even and therefore odd. How could I say that it is even with out a reason to think so. How could I say it's not even (and therefore odd) if I don't have any reason to believe that either? I am unconvinced both ways.

Similarly if you can't convince me why morality is objective, I have no reason to believe it. It doesn't mean I believe morality is not objective either. — SonJnana

Agnostic atheism is an incoherent position that begs the question. Lacking belief in God does not mean you believe God does not exist just as lacking a belief in an even number of gumballs does not mean you believe there are an odd number of gumballs. Lacking a belief in objective morality does not mean you believe morality is subjective. I'm not seeing the issue here.

It makes perfect sense. That's what happened.... — bloodninja

That's nonsense. The earth didn't change from flat to round in this case. It was always round, but we were wrong. Because it being round affecting our lives.

I have never heard your type of reasoning.

theism is simply a lack of a belief. — SonJnana

No, it's not. It's belief in the lack of something, which does obviously include the lack of belief in that something, but a lack of belief is agnosticism, not atheism.

Lacking belief in God does not mean you believe God does not exist just as lacking a belief in an even number of gumballs does not mean you believe there are an odd number of gumballs. Lacking a belief in objective morality does not mean you believe morality is subjective. I'm not seeing the issue here. — darthbarracuda

Lacking a belief in god does not mean that I believe god does not exist - this is correct.
Lacking a belief in an even number of gumballs does not mean I believe there is an odd number of gumballs - correct.

Lacking a belief that there is an objective morality does not mean that I believe morality is subjective - correct.
Because like I've said many times now, originally I was asserting that it was subjective. But I don't know how clear I can make it, that I've changed my position since I made this topic. I've mentioned it so many times in my responses and even made an edit in the original post.

I am not asserting that morality is non-objective.

I am not asserting that morality is non-objective. — SonJnana

Okay, so you are agnostic on this and want people to convince you that objective morality is true?