How can you determine whether or not reasoning is valuable when you have to rely on the conventions of reasoning to come up with a reason to value it? If you need reason to understand why you need reason, that is an example of a circular argument. If a circular argument is a conventionally accepted way to determine a bad form of reasoning, but the evaluation of reasoning itself rests on a circular argument, then how can we trust reasoning at all? — MonfortS26

Reason is for those of us who want to know the truth. Wanting to know the truth is not a rational impulse - it's about values. A statement - This is important. Once you've said that, the next question is "What's the best way of knowing the truth." I think reason is a pretty good method - not the only one - but good.

Inductive reasoning is answered by the evidence. It leads to predictions. Those predictions either tell you the theory was true or not.

So circularity is solved by hierarchy. The logical circle is "broken" when it becomes a feedback loop connecting the general with the particular, the global with the local.

Deductive reasoning and predicate logic are rather stuck in a closed world if taken in isolation. But reasonable inquiry is founded in the larger practice of open-ended inductive argument. Deduction and predication are only particular tools we use to sharpen the derivation of predictions from theories.

They are tautologically circular. Or symmetric and closed. And that is its own strength.

But then reasoning more generally is about producing the asymmetry, the hierarchy, which is global theory that can be cashed out in terms of particular acts of measurement.

A full account of reasoning is three staged. First comes abduction or "a productive guess". Then comes the deduction needed to shape the guess into the formal hierarchical structure of a theory. Then comes the inductive confirmation - the acts of measurement which feed back to tell us the "truth" of the theory and its grounding assumptions.

A full account of reasoning is three staged. First comes abduction or "a productive guess". Then comes the deduction needed to shape the guess into the formal hierarchical structure of a theory. Then comes the inductive confirmation - the acts of measurement which feed back to tell us the "truth" of the theory and its grounding assumptions. — apokrisis

Isn't that just the foundation of the scientific method though? Would it be correct to define that as reasoning or science?

Isn't that just the foundation of the scientific method though? — MonfortS26

Exactly. Science is what reasoning looks like at its most rigorous level of application.

This is the point made by CS Peirce, the guy who invented the philosophy of pragmatism. Reasoning - when considered in its full sense - is this three stage process of abduction, deduction and induction. That is, hypothesis, theory and test.

Now philosophy seems to split off deduction. Somehow the logical derivation of consequences from axioms or premisses feels the core action. It is the most mathematical part of the business of reasoning. Philosophy disconnects from the world to work with pure abstract argumentation. Then science is the rough trade, the uncouth element, that goes out into the world and fusses about with observations and measurements.

It is a nice conceit. But human reason is a method of induction that tries to guess the truth of the world and then seeks to cash that out in terms of predictive knowledge. It seeks intelligibility.

Deductive argument - the exercise of "pure reason" - is an important part of the process. It goes "beyond the evidence" by drawing out the detailed consequences of some set of "plausible" grounding assumptions. It enables us to reach further by framing our ideas in a definite or counterfactual fashion.

But those clear and reasonable ideas are nothing unless they check out against the reality they claim to represent.

The ideas can't just be true in themselves. They can only be logically "valid" in some tautological fashion - the closed circularity you were pointing out. To be true in the way we want to mean it, the ideas must prove themselves in the court of our interactions with the world.

And even then - a longer subject - they can only have pragmatic truth, not absolute Kantian thing-in-itself truth. We can't actually transcend the closed circularity of our reasoning about the world. But the scientific method is what it looks like to structure our thinking in the most rigorous, hierarchically-organised, fashion. The best way to "break out" is to create that sharp separation between the part of our thoughts which is a general theory, and the part which is its answering act of measurement or confirming observation.

How can you determine whether or not reasoning is valuable when you have to rely on the conventions of reasoning to come up with a reason to value it? — MonfortS26

If course you are correct. Reasoning is entirely self-congratulatory and had no meaning or validity beyond that.

Reason never has been said to go 'all the way down'. Isn’t that one of the things that falls out of Godel’s theorem? That any system will always have at least some axioms that are true but not provable?

I think another point is that I don’t know of any philosophical system that claims to be wholly based on reason. For example in classical philosophical theology, reason is valued, but revelation is also a given.

As for reason in the case of science, it must always start with some assumptions and axioms. There is no way it can metaphysically bootstrap itself into existence on the basis of 'pure reason'.

Reasoning is entirely self-congratulatory and had no meaning or validity beyond that. — Rich

There is that which surpasses reason, and that which fall short of reason. Important distinction.

This is the point made by CS Peirce, the guy who invented the philosophy of pragmatism. Reasoning - when considered in its full sense - is this three stage process of abduction, deduction and induction. That is, hypothesis, theory and test. — apokrisis

So do the 3 different forms of reasoning have individual value, or are they dependant on eachother?

Now philosophy seems to split off deduction. — apokrisis

What do you mean when you say philosophy splits off deduction? Didn't Aristotle create deductive reasoning before the scientific method? Is there a way to map out different "degrees of rigor" where science isn't applicable?

If course you are correct. Reasoning is entirely self-congratulatory and had no meaning or validity beyond that. — Rich

I don't know about that. It has meaning when you use it in order to determine how to act, or what to do.

People just think in different ways. Some just prefer to think that they think better. It is a hierarchical thing without substance. I'm amused when those of deepest faith and dogma claim to be using reason for their own reasons.

People just think in different ways. Some just prefer to think that they think better. It is a hierarchical thing without substance. I'm amused when those of deepest faith and dogma claim to be using reason for their own reasons. — Rich

So are you saying that there aren't different degrees of intelligence?

What does such a question mean?

Everyone is evolving in their own way. For some reason, using reasoning, some people just absolutely insist on some artificial hierarchy. It's part of some people's way of seeing things.

Everyone is evolving in their own way. For some reason, using reasoning, some people just absolutely insist on some artificial hierarchy. It's part of some people's way of seeing things. — Rich

I suppose you're right, but I think the hierarchy is important in the sense that serious topics such as global warming or nuclear Armageddon aren't approached from a "Gods will" perspective. To some extent that hierarchy is necessary

People are going to come to their own actions irrespective of any self-proclaimed privileged position. One can simply state their views, and act upon them, without the need for a hierarchy of "truth". With that said, observe the amount of hypocrisy among the legions of environmentalists. Observing the nature of humans is interesting enough without invoking superiority.

How can you determine whether or not reasoning is valuable when you have to rely on the conventions of reasoning to come up with a reason to value it? If you need reason to understand why you need reason, that is an example of a circular argument. If a circular argument is a conventionally accepted way to determine a bad form of reasoning, but the evaluation of reasoning itself rests on a circular argument, then how can we trust reasoning at all? — MonfortS26

Reasoning is something that humans did long before they knew they were doing it. We named our thinking processes "reasoning". We came to find out that some methods were tried and true dependable means and others were not. So, it's not really circular at all. Using thought and belief in order to navigate the world successfully is not existentially contingent upon our awareness. We discover which methods of thought and belief are dependable, just as we discover which one's are more error prone.

So do the 3 different forms of reasoning have individual value, or are they dependant on eachother? — MonfortS26

They are three stages of the one process. So it is a natural sequence that leads from questions to answers.

The first one, abduction, is of course basically about intuition and inspiration. It is not easy to formalise as a method. You can't prescribe insight. But you can certainly create a culture and habits of work that support it.

What do you mean when you say philosophy splits off deduction? Didn't Aristotle create deductive reasoning before the scientific method? Is there a way to map out different "degrees of rigor" where science isn't applicable? — MonfortS26

The ancient Greeks were startled by the power of maths. They discovered the unreasonable effectiveness of axiom-based deductive arguments. So they were all about "the right way to reason". They didn't have to make a big deal about the right way to measure or confirm as they had enough to be getting on with just by using the confirmation possible by looking and seeing.

Amusingly, the famous slight against Aristotle by Bertrand Russell is that he typified the philosophical mindset by making wild claims about women having fewer teeth than men. "...although he was twice married, it never occurred to him to verify this statement by examining his wives’ mouths.”

And yet Aristotle was a close observer of nature - for his time. What he actually wrote was: ”Males have more teeth than females in the case of men, sheep, goats, and swine; in the case of other animals observations have not yet been made.”

So Aristotle was wrong about the facts. More accurate data would have been available. And eventually Western history produced the kind of experimental mindset that forced folk to start checking their claims.

The fork between philosophy and science happened about there. But if we are talking about the big picture of reasoning as a method, Aristotle spelt out the principles of induction too.

Deductions are one of two species of argument recognized by Aristotle. The other species is induction (epagôgê). He has far less to say about this than deduction, doing little more than characterize it as “argument from the particular to the universal”. However, induction (or something very much like it) plays a crucial role in the theory of scientific knowledge in the Posterior Analytics: it is induction, or at any rate a cognitive process that moves from particulars to their generalizations, that is the basis of knowledge of the indemonstrable first principles of sciences.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-logic/

For some reason, using reasoning, some people just absolutely insist on some artificial hierarchy. — Rich

Reason creates its own natural hierarchy. Cream floats to the top, cranks rant alone in the basement. What works, simply works. The rest is noise from off-stage.

I'm struggling to grasp your separation of science from philosophy. If the three forms of reasoning are all dependant on each other, and that is what makes up the scientific method, then what place does philosophy that isn't subjectable to the scientific method have?

But philosophy does rely on observation of the world. There is a confirmation step involved in the beliefs it might form. Good philosophical argument involves being able to call forth particular examples that go to the generalities being claimed.

So philosophers, mathematicians, scientists and people in general reason in the same basic way. They make a guess, see that there are consequences of a view, claim support on the basis of what they then can observe.

If you tell me it is raining, I might ask how you know. You will say you stuck your head out and looked. There is no mystery here. I will think that a reasonable reply.

The difference arises in the focus of a discipline, in what it seeks to elevate to formalised practice.

Maths grants itself the freedom to become a pure play of deductive pattern spinning. There is no formal necessity to claim a connection to reality. Although maths is then culturally supported because it in fact does lead to some very big pay-offs in that regard.

Science then gets very serious about models of reality. It wants to formalise the act of measurement as much as possible - ensure it targets a notion of objectivity or mind-independence.

Philosophy plays another kind of useful game. It focuses on abductive conjectures and polishing the machinery of critical thinking. It doesn't have to be about the world. But it is hoped that it might be about the world. Ontologically, it wants to generate abductive possibilities. Then epistemically, it wants to cultivate the right kind of reasoning process. Through philosophy of science, for example, it wants to keep an eye on the habits of science, make sure they are still fit for purpose.

I'm not claiming there is a hard line between any of these reasoning domains. I'm saying they are all useful variations on the one theme.

And I'm not sure what you think could be the alternative. How can thought proceed except first with a fruitful guess, second with the logical working out of the general consequences of that, and third by some sufficient act of confirmation?

I'm not claiming there is a hard line between any of these reasoning domains. I'm saying they are all useful variations on the one theme. — apokrisis

So it seems like all of these concepts are overlapping. Math, Philosophy, Science. Where does pseudoscience fit into all of that? If there isn't a hard distinction between those 3 subjects, can we expect there to be a hard distinction between good and bad science? Or even good and bad reasoning?

It shouldn't be forgotten that many of the preoccupations of Greek philosophy were ethical - the nature of justice, virtue, goodness, and the best way to ensure that it was realised. Many of Aristotle's writings were specifically directed at those topics e.g. the Nicomachean ethics. Metaphysics was about the ground of being or most fundamental category of being. Modern science arguably is still in pursuit of the latter, but it is barely concerned with ethical concerns or the quest for sapience ('wisdom') in the classical sense, as it is organised almost entirely around what is measurable. In fact one of the major underlying changes between ancient and modern philosophy, was that in ancient times there was a general presumption that the Universe was literally governed by reason, but I don't know if that is still thought to be the case.

Where does pseudoscience fit into all of that? If there isn't a hard distinction between those 3 subjects, can we expect there to be a hard distinction between good and bad science? — MonfortS26

Pseudoscience doesn't fit in. And so it falls out. Not a problem. That is where the feedback loop comes in. The method is designed to amplify the good and damp the bad.

The distinction doesn't have to be hard. In fact it doesn't want to be. It wants to be intelligent and flexible. It wants to be reasonable, in other words.

Reason creates its own natural hierarchy. — apokrisis

Yep, the answer is always that it is "natural". The core of "scientific" biological reasoning. Coincidentally it is also the core of racist thinking. Something to ponder?

I would say that reasoning is merely habits of thought, trained partially under external supervision, that have been found to lead to survival advantages when precipitating action.

It is tempting to conclude that reasoning is successful for epistemological reasons, namely because reasoned-thinking mirrors the structure of nature in some way, but that doesn't make sense due to being a circular argument that depends on reasoning to both define the 'mirroring' relationship and to justify why it leads to success.

Perhaps we could say that the "habits of thought that mirror nature" are by definition the habits of thought that bestow the most benefits to society, thereby dissolving the question as to why reasoning is successful, albeit at the cost of sacrificing the notion of epistemology by redefining "truth" to mean "success".

While nobody appears to be in agreement as to what philosophy is, if we understand philosophy in terms of its psychological benefits, we could say, loosely speaking, that philosophy is the development of mental habits that bestow psychological benefits to the individual, i.e. it is a generalised form of cognitive-therapy.

Some just prefer to think that they think better. — Rich

Sorry, and this is not intended as a dig, this forum shows, if it wasn't obvious already, that some people do think better than others.

Sorry, and this is not intended as a dig, this forum shows, if it wasn't obvious already, that some people do think better than others. — T Clark

Lol. The gift of hubris.

Lol. The gift of hubris. — Rich

I love the hubristic act of pointing out someones hubris

Good philosophical argument involves being able to call forth particular examples that go to the generalities being claimed. — apokrisis

I like this...

The best philosophical arguments involve being able to call forth every particular example as a result of going to the generalities being claimed.