[Dawkins] has chosen materialism out of the range of equally valid ideologies — Inter Alia

Begs the question!

I still don't feel like anyone has answered, why? All that's happened is there's been a robust proof that naturalism is just an ideology like any other, so? What is then wrong with choosing it as often as we like and following the moral implications of doing so? — Inter Alia

Two answers - the general answer is, because ideology is just the kind of thing that the sceptic ought to avoid.

The particular answer is, that as philosophical naturalism now occupies a similar role in culture to that previously occupied by religion in the sense of being a normative belief system, then it is also deserving of scepticism when it is treated as an authoritative source in respect of issues which are not themselves scientific questions.

(While it is perfectly true that the empirical claims of science may be validated by empirical means, the broader claims of the so-called ‘scientific worldview’ are often a different matter. But that is strictly speaking a different topic.)

"I perceive something" still presupposes realism (that the something exists). "I experience an internal sensation, one I've come to associate with perceiving something" is a description that does not assume Realism. It is obvious then that whilst you're not looking, that experience goes away, it comes back when you start looking again. This does not tell us anything about the laptop whilst you weren't looking, but it doesn't tell us anything about the laptop whilst you were looking either. Unless we relate the experience to the existence of an object outside of our minds the issue with closing your eyes and opening them again is an unnecessary distraction. The question is simply, does the experience relate to a thing outside of your mind? — Inter Alia

Hold your hand up and look at it. You are perceiving something at that moment. There are certain qualitative features or properties of which you are aware. This doesn't entail that those features or properties exist unperceived. It only entails that they exist right now, as you are perceiving them. Hence, I don't see how what I said presupposes Realism, so long as understood carefully. However, the phrase 'I experience an internal sensation' puts the sensation in as the object of the perception (the sensation is what I perceive, and that idea presupposes the veil of perception - that I can only perceive my sensation of a hand and never a 'hand'. This doctrine confuses the object of experience with the experience itself. That's a confusion which gurugeorge has been accusing me of and which I've been trying to avoid.

PA

, every instinct in your body would be crying out to tell you that £300 of equipment is about to be nicked. — Inter Alia

Are my instincts a reliable guide to reality? It doesn't seem so. When I look at the stick immersed in water my instincts urge me to believe that it is bent, before I learn that it isn't. It isn't clear that what I instinctively believe is reliable at all, and hence, not clear that this 'evidence' is really any good. At any rate, there are two senses of instinct. In one sense, a belief is instinctive just if it is 'hardwired' in. As I have said before, I highly doubt that Realism is hardwired, and suspect it is just implied by things we are taught as children and so we swallow it unconsciously. In another sense, a belief is instinctive just in case I cannot help believe it at this particular time. When you say 'every instinct in my body would be crying out', it seems that 'instinct' is taken in the second sense, and if so, I am quite confident that this is a wholly unreliable means of belief formation. Believing what I cannot help believe at a given time is an easy way to get taken in by dogma, persuasion, propaganda and merely popular ideas.

PA

Begs the question! — Wayfarer

Care to explain how?

ideology is just the kind of thing that the sceptic ought to avoid. — Wayfarer

How does one avoid ideology? That's the question I've been trying to address here. What does not having an ideology look like. What sort of things would Dawkins do differently if he didn't have an ideology?

as philosophical naturalism now occupies a similar role in culture to that previously occupied by religion in the sense of being a normative belief system, then it is also deserving of scepticism — Wayfarer

Again, what would such skepticism look like? I'm sure you're not doing it deliberately, but it feels like you keep dodging the question by describing the current state of affairs without identifying the harm or describing the solution.

Are my instincts a reliable guide to reality? — PossibleAaran

As reliable as any other, that's the point. Your instincts are there already, for whatever reason, call it hardwiring, call it indoctrination, but they're there. So the question is not can they be trusted, but can anything else be trusted more?

When we see the bent stick, or any other illusion we recognise that we can't trust our initial sense data, but where do we look for an alternative explanation? Do we leap to the conclusion that it must be magic because we're standing in a fairy grove? No, we look back to other, more complicated sense data from experiments with light, we see how this thing we sense as light gets refracted and we presume that's what's happened to the stick, not because it's infallibly right but because we have no better explanation than the one we somehow seem to have entered adulthood with.

I am quite confident that this is a wholly unreliable means of belief formation. — PossibleAaran

But do you have a better one?

What does not having an ideology look like. — Inter Alia

If I can interrupt and answer with a sincere joke, I think not having an ideology looks like corpse.

So the question is not can they be trusted, but can anything else be trusted more? — Inter Alia

And maybe there's also the question of what we are trusting in the first place in order to manufacture theoretical doubt. For instance, the idea of some inaccessible reality. Or the very language that such doubts and questions are expressed. Or that someone is out there listening, placed in a sufficiently shared reality to understand the question/theory as relating to a shared situation.

When I look at the stick immersed in water my instincts urge me to believe that it is bent, before I learn that it isn't. — PossibleAaran

But why is the bent stick the illusion and the unbent stick the reality? I suggest because the unbent stick is what figures in the total practical context. Optical illusions are illusions, it seems to me, because they aren't something we can generally build on. We are future oriented beings. We make plans. It's in terms of these plans that we care about seeing a situation 'accurately' (usefully, enjoyably). If we weren't future-oriented beings who work and suffer now to avoid more work and more suffering later, we might not bother with doubt. In my view, recalling that care and projects are at the center of human life clarifies epistemological issues.

“Nonsubjective actuality”, for example, doesn’t yet seem to me to be proper terminology for this concept—again, the concept of “a reality that is perfectly indifferent to personal preferences and opinions regarding what is or what ought to be”. — javra

What I like about this is its focus on emotion. It's the idea of something that will not be moved with tears, prayers, flattery. It is the real that resists. It is the tree that has fallen across the road. We have to be clever and push it or drag it out of the way. This isn't metaphysical 'reality.' Instead it's a pain in the ass, a bone in the throat of our project.

I think we can also get a better picture of doubt this way. Two friends are trying to get to a party, let's say. Romantic opportunities await. But how to move the tree? They spend time and stress on doubt because the fear wasting even more time and stress on a plan that will not work. The thinking is structured by the goal in the future (the tree out of the way, but really the promising possibility of the party around the bonfire, and everyone's going to be there.) But back to the first point. They don't ask the tree nicely to move. They've accepted the end of animism. The world is not their parents when they were children. Importantly, the attack the tree problem without some explicit theory of materialism. Their imaginations run simulations. They exchange words to compare, persuade, etc.

Begs the question!
— Wayfarer

Care to explain how? — Inter Alia

Certainly. The point at issue was my criticism of the naturalistic ethics of Dawkins and the like. So to say that his choice of materialism amounts to one amongst 'a range of equally valid ideologies', assumes what it sets out to prove - which is the precise meaning of 'begging the question'.

That's the question I've been trying to address here. What does not having an ideology look like. What sort of things would Dawkins do differently if he didn't have an ideology? — Inter Alia

Presumably he would stick to science instead of engaging in anti-religious polemics.

With respect to the what an actual sceptical philosopher would be like - the examples of ancient sceptics (and cynics, who were similar) is that they were renunciates, living outside the normal constraints of society and culture. In that respect, they were rather similar to the religious recluses that one still encounters in India to this day. Plainly us modern urbanites are generally not going to adopt such a radical lifestyle, but I would say, in practical terms, that a sceptical philosophy ought to try and avoid dogmatic creeds and rigid ideologies. But it goes a bit deeper than that - one of the tenets of scepticism is 'withholding judgement regarding that which is not evident'. In practice, we are constantly inclined to such judgements - our minds are quite frequently a constant stream of them. (I know mine is, anyway.)

I could say more, but it would be a long digression.

recalling that care and projects are at the center of human life clarifies epistemological issues. — ff0

Exactly. We might well conclude that we can't trust our eyes or that materialism might not encompass all there is, I'd entirely agree, but it's a very big leap from that to "the inherent trust that modern culture places in naturalism is something certainly deserving of scepticism." and "Naturalism has far too easy a time these days...".

To advise more skepticism, or giving naturalism a harder time, we'd surely have to have some reason within the context of human endeavours some benefit doing so might bring, which in turn implies some better way, neither of which I feel have been addressed. Maybe people feel it's too off topic, but the question was "what is Skepticism?" and I'd say the simple answer would be it is exactly that quality that virtually every single human already displays, no-one is 100% certain of anything, deep down. Which means what we're really talking about is "are people skeptical enough?", as revealed by the two quotes I've cited above. To answer this we must first answer "enough for what?".

to say that his choice of materialism amounts to one amongst 'a range of equally valid ideologies', assumes what it sets out to prove - which is the precise meaning of 'begging the question'. — Wayfarer

Nope, not getting any of that, are you saying it isn't a valid ideology, or it isn't one amongst many? Those are the only two assertions contained within the premise.

Presumably he would stick to science instead of engaging in anti-religious polemics. — Wayfarer

Why? He's a materialist, he thinks that the materially detectable universe is all there is, and that some consequences of people believing otherwise are harmful, why on earth shouldn't he state his case? If he's not allowed to speak against religion because he is a scientist then who is. You're getting dangerously close to suggesting that no one should be allowed to speak out against religion.

in practical terms, that a sceptical philosophy ought to try and avoid dogmatic creeds and rigid ideologies. — Wayfarer

That's not "in practical terms" that's just restating the question, I asked what it means. You need to decide whether to use contraception or not, Catholicism sounds a bit like a dogmatic creed to me so we ignore what the Pope says about it, but hang on, those who suggest religion is a load of nonsense are now dogmatic too, so maybe we should listen to the Pope, what does the skeptic do?

But do you have a better one? — Inter Alia

Is this strictly relevant? We began looking for a reliable source for the belief that things exist unperceived. You suggest instinct and I replied by saying that pure instinct is unreliable. You now ask me whether I have a more reliable method than instinct to suggest. I admit that I don't, but that is just to admit that there is no reliable source for this belief at all. Its just a wild speculation.

Imagine that we began by looking for a reliable source for the belief that ghosts exist. You suggest instinct and I say that instinct isn't reliable. You then counter 'ah, but do you have a better method for establishing that ghosts exist?'. No, I don't but that's no defence of the belief that ghosts exist. It is still wild speculation.

But why is the bent stick the illusion and the unbent stick the reality? I suggest because the unbent stick is what figures in the total practical context. Optical illusions are illusions, it seems to me, because they aren't something we can generally build on. We are future oriented beings. We make plans. It's in terms of these plans that we care about seeing a situation 'accurately' (usefully, enjoyably). If we weren't future-oriented beings who work and suffer now to avoid more work and more suffering later, we might not bother with doubt. In my view, recalling that care and projects are at the center of human life clarifies epistemological issues. — ff0

Well, if I were to say that some experience is an 'illusion', I wouldn't mean that the experience 'isn't one that I can build on'. What I would mean is that the thing which I experience does not exist unperceived. If I say that the bent stick I perceive is an illusion, what I mean is that the bent stick doesn't exist unperceived. And to add to this that 'what really exists is an unbent stick', is to add that an unbent stick exists unperceived. That's what I would mean by those words, at any rate. I certainly wouldn't mean anything merely pragmatic.

PA

But I don't believe you did 'already tell me'. This argument about taking a picture is a new argument introduced with this post, is it not? — PossibleAaran

No, I proposed such a test in post 131625, and you even quoted it yourself en passant in a later post:

"You can easily verify the existence of unperceived objects by means of instruments (e.g. using a watch, shut your eyes and simultaneously take a picture with a camera with a timestamp)."

At any rate, this isn't all that clear. What exactly does taking the picture prove? So at this moment, T1, I am perceiving something. I close my eyes at T2. Does that which I perceived when my eyes were open still exist when unperceived? I take a picture with my eyes closed at T3. When I open them at T4, I can see on the camera a picture which 'looks just like' that which I experienced with my eyes open. What is the evidence we have at this stage? Well I remember perceiving something at T1 and I remember taking a picture at T3, and I am currently perceiving something else (namely, the picture which looks like what I perceived at T1, on a camera screen) at T4. These three bits of evidence don't logically entail that something existed unperceived and which the camera took a picture of. — PossibleAaran

They do logically entail that, because that sort of test (perhaps tightened up with watch and timestamp, as I proposed) is just the kind of standard by which we'd normally decide whether something exists unperceived, in the ordinary sense of "exists unperceived" (such as real vs. hallucination). And normally it's even simpler than that: we just ask a friend. If you think that standard isn't good enough, you need to say why.

Now, as I said before, you could load a bunch of "but what ifs?" on top of the tests, but at each stage you'd have to justify it - and merely thinking up something that's logically possible that might require a higher standard of justification if it were the case (such as: objects that otherwise have all the normal characteristics of physical objects, except that they blink out of existence when unperceived) isn't a actually a justification for dissatisfaction with that standard.

For example, "but what if my memory is playing me false?" Well, do you have any reason to think your memory is playing you false? Just the mere thought "my memory might be playing me false" isn't in and of itself a reason to doubt that your memory is being reliable, it's just a logical possibility hanging in a vacuum.

I know at this point you will likely complain that they do entail it, because cameras take pictures of things and they can't take pictures of things which don't exist. So if I really did take a picture of something at T3, it follows that the thing I took a picture of existed unperceived at that time. But now it is clear that this whole language of the camera 'taking pictures of things' assumes that Realism is true and hence begs the question. — PossibleAaran

What else is it doing if it's really and truly a camera?

In other words, it is an interpretation of the evidence to suggest that I took a picture of something which existed unperceived at T3 and that thing is what I have a picture of at T4. — PossibleAaran

No, it just falls out from what cameras are and what physical objects are, and you need to give me a reason why I should suspect that what I'm using isn't a camera and what it's taking a picture of isn't a physical object.

The experiences I have at T1-T4 do not entail that interpretation. We should describe the evidence neutrally, in a way that doesn't just assume that something existed at T3 of which I took a picture. If we do that then the evidence I have is that I perceive something at T1, then I close my eyes at T2, then I press a button at T3 and hear a clicking sound, then at T4 I perceive a picture of something which looks like the thing I perceived at T1. None of that entails that things exist unperceived, so how do you cogently infer that things exist unperceived from this data? This would be an intriguing argument, if you could fill the details in. — PossibleAaran

That's not "describing the evidence neutrally", it's redescribing the evidence in a weird way that automatically creates the mystery you're supposedly trying to solve (for example "I press a button at T3 and hear a clicking sound" is just a queer way of saying "I take a picture with a camera").

As I said, the sheer positing of alternative logical possibilities (such as laptops that blink in and out of existence depending on whether they're perceived or not) simply isn't good enough reason to doubt, therefore the idea that someone else has to provide you with something you're calling "evidence" to guard against those possibilities is a meaningless rigmarole. That's just not what evidence is, it's not the kind of thing that links or unlinks imagined alternative logical possibilities to experience, but rather it connects experienced object to experienced object in a continuum, weaving a coherent story. It doesn't have to step outside the continuum of experience to take account of mere imaginings - such as physical objects that blink into and out of existence - and "prove" that the imaginings aren't really the case.

We don't have to "cogently infer" that things don't flash out of existence when unperceived, because a) there's no reason to think that there is any such thing as an object that has all the sense-available characteristics of physical objects, except that it blinks out of existence when it's unperceived, and b) we can easily test by perfectly ordinary means whether things do or don't exist unperceived.

This is the 2nd time you have accused me of this conflation. I am well aware of the difference, which Moore pointed out, between the experience of something and the object of the experience. I am not sure I even used those words in my last post. At T1 I perceive something. It is something which I would ordinarily call a 'laptop', but since you insist that if it is a laptop then it must exist unperceived, I do not call it a 'laptop'. Instead I try to characterize the perception in a way that doesn't presuppose Realism, by saying merely 'I perceive something'. This was also the reason I spoke of the 'object of my experience'. The 'object', as I was thinking of it, is merely that which I see. I see a black, rectangular thing with a slightly lighter front face. What I don't see, is the property of unperceived existence, which is why if the thing I perceive really has that property, I can only reliably tell that this is so by inference. — PossibleAaran

Again, it's the very narrowing of your description that's causing the problem, but it's actually impossible to say what you want to say unless you are in fact doing what you say you aren't doing.

For example, as soon as you say "see", then that automatically carries connotations of physical objecthood - unless you're doing what you say you aren't doing, which is taking "experience-of-object" for "object".

It comes down to this: what reason do you have to suspect that things could possibly exist that to all appearances seem like normal physical things, except that they pop out of existence when they're not being perceived?

If you did have a reason to suspect that such things existed, then yes, you'd have a hell of a puzzle trying to figure out an evidentiary standard for distinguishing them FROM "normal" physical objects that don't blink out of existence when unperceived.

But you don't have any reason to think such things exist, so there's no reason to think that the ordinary evidentiary standard for "exists unperceived" (such as I've given you) is somehow insufficient for distinguishing whether objects exist unperceived.

I'm not talking about how he got his job, I'm talking about why there is a movement within epistemology to take his views seriously, but not those of our delusional Nelson. Lots of other people believing him is a perfectly good reason to conclude he's probably not mad, it's also a perfectly good explanation of how he got his job, it is not an epistemological argument. — Inter Alia

I won't make any defense of the claims of Catholicism, Christianity, or any other church. I do think that a religious/spiritual point of view allows experience of important aspects of the world that so-called realist or materialist world views are blind to. I've made this case in previous threads. There is not room enough or time to make it here.

Is this strictly relevant? We began looking for a reliable source for the belief that things exist unperceived. You suggest instinct and I replied by saying that pure instinct is unreliable. You now ask me whether I have a more reliable method than instinct to suggest. — PossibleAaran

No, I'm asking you if you have a better alternative to Realism, not a better justification for a belief in it.

The reason I'm asking is because the question you asked was not quite "looking for a reliable source for the belief that things exist unperceived". It was looking for 'any' justification that even the Realists themselves believed.

I have argued that such a justification exists and it is that, for whatever reason (evolution or indoctrination), Realism is the default position we, as adults find ourselves with. I've used the laptop thief as an example to show you that (you would not keep your eyes closed in such a situation, you do not really believe for a minute that the laptop is not there).

But, being the default position is not really a very good reason to keep thinking something, in fact it's a rubbish reason unless there is no better alternative, in which case it becomes an excellent reason for continuing to believe something.

That is why I keep asking so many times for someone to describe, or provide an example of how some way of looking at things other than Realism provides some advantage and how we identify such circumstances that we might profit from this alternative.

I've yet to have such an example in anything other than really vague generalisations with no demonstration of how they are better.

Sceptism is a tool that uses what isn’t or what hasn’t happened to define what is.

I've made this case in previous threads. There is not room enough or time to make it here. — T Clark

Is there some way you could provide links to these threads, the case for what benefits alternatives to Realism bring is exactly what I've been asking about. See my post above for how I think it links to the question here.

Is there some way you could provide links to these threads, the case for what benefits alternatives to Realism bring is exactly what I've been asking about. See my post above for how I think it links to the question here. — Inter Alia

http://www.dictionary.com/browse/scepticism

Realism is the exact opposite of scepticism.

http://www.dictionary.com/browse/realism

Nope, not getting any of that, are you saying it isn't a valid ideology, or it isn't one amongst many? — Inter Alia

What I am saying is that when you simply assert that ‘materialism is an equally valid choice’ among ‘other choices’, then you’re begging the question, because instead of arguing for WHY materialism is ‘equally valid’, you’re simply assuming it. Hence, begging the question.

If he's not allowed to speak against religion because he is a scientist then who is. — Inter Alia

I'm not suggesting for a moment that he not be allowed to argue against religion, all I am saying (and very many of his critics agree ^{1, 2}) is that he makes a hash of it, because he doesn’t know what he’s talking about. He’s misled by a false belief, which is exactly why I think he is deserving of scepticism in this regard.

You need to decide whether to use contraception or not, Catholicism sounds a bit like a dogmatic creed to me so we ignore what the Pope says about it, but hang on, those who suggest religion is a load of nonsense are now dogmatic too, so maybe we should listen to the Pope, what does the skeptic do? — Inter Alia

If you assent to being Catholic (which incidentally I am not) then presumably you ought to agree to the rules as it is indeed a dogmatic creed. So I suggest, a skeptic would not likely to assent to being a Catholic (although I suspect that some scholarly Catholics would have a very good rebuttal to that suggestion.)

We might well conclude that we can't trust our eyes or that materialism might not encompass all there is, I'd entirely agree, but it's a very big leap from that to "the inherent trust that modern culture places in naturalism is something certainly deserving of scepticism." and "Naturalism has far too easy a time these days...". — Inter Alia

I agree. There's no necessary leap there, as far as I can see. I do however reject materialism in the name of a sort of higher materialism. Why? Because these 'isms' are all too theoretical in a particular sense. Materialism is 'theological' and theology is 'mechanical.' I'm coming from a phenomenological perspective here. I like early Heidegger, for instance. For me the game tends to operate on a falsely depersonalized level. We want to be rational, etc., and yet cultural criticism is fairly nakedly a 'religious' kind of thinking. It's roughly politics at a higher level of abstraction. What I don't see enough of for me own taste is an awareness of how personal or 'existential' this kind of talk really is.

Maybe people feel it's too off topic, but the question was "what is Skepticism?" and I'd say the simple answer would be it is exactly that quality that virtually every single human already displays, no-one is 100% certain of anything, deep down. Which means what we're really talking about is "are people skeptical enough?", as revealed by the two quotes I've cited above. To answer this we must first answer "enough for what?". — Inter Alia

Yeah, I agree completely. 'Enough for what?' For me the general structure is a more or less vague idea of what humans ought to be which is projected outward rhetorically. 'Be more like this, more like me.' I don't pretend to escape this structure myself. We impose our own value-driven vision of the shared world rhetorically. To be reasonable is to take that ubiquitous skepticism into account and to wrestle against.

I think we have reached an impasse. From where you see it, my characterization of the issue is just an odd way of talking which creates problems. For me, you are just insisting that things exist unperceived by definition. I will try once more to try to make you see it my way.

Look at your computer. What do you see, literally? Describe every property of the thing you are looking at, without adding any property which you can't see. You might say things like 'a black, rectangular, three dimensional thing with letters on it'. No matter how careful and detailed is your description, you will never say 'which exists when I am not perceiving it'. If you did say this, you would no longer be describing, literally, what you can see. You would just be adding a property which you believe the object to have, but which you can't see that it is, rather like the amateur artist who draws the human eye as a perfect oval, because that's the shape he believes it has (artists have to work quite hard to learn only to draw what they see and nothing more).

If you have never seen the property of unperceived existence, how do you know the object you are looking at has this property? Can you infer that property from what you do see? If you can't, then how can you possibly know it? 'Know' is being used here merely in the weak sense of reliably produced true belief. How can you reliably believe it?

You have said that if you take a picture with a camera then that will prove that things exist unperceived. But how? Since you cannot literally see that things exist unperceived, I took it that you meant to offer an argument for it here, but I think that argument is fallacious. Here is something we ordinarily believe about cameras: you can put a camera up in a room when no one is in it and the camera can get you a picture of the things which exist in that room when no one is there. Equally, you could close your eyes and take a picture of your computer, and the camera would show you what the computer was doing when you weren't looking.

I think once I lay out this ordinary understanding of a camera in this way, you can see immediately that nobody who wasn't already convinced of Realism would accept without further question that any of it is true. Someone who does not believe Realism to be true would not accept that you can put a camera up and leave it to take a picture of what exists unperceived. Equally, if I do not accept Realism already, I will not just swallow the claim that the picture which I get when I close my eyes and press the camera button is one which is of a thing which existed when I wasn't looking. That is why it begs the question to assume that my pressing the camera button has this effect. Assuming it has this effect is assuming Realism and no one who doesn't already believe Realism will swallow that without question. Yes, it is our ordinary understanding of cameras and it might (though I doubt it) be part of the very concept of 'camera'. None of that changes the fact that no one except someone already committed to Realism will simply accept that ordinary understanding.

It comes down to this: what reason do you have to suspect that things could possibly exist that to all appearances seem like normal physical things, except that they pop out of existence when they're not being perceived? — gurugeorge

'To all appearances seem like normal physical things' is tantamount to 'to all appearances seem like things which exist unperceived', but as I have pointed out, you never see that something exists unperceived and so, literally, it never seems that way. Perhaps you can infer that things exist unperceived from something which we do see, but the insistence that what we mean by 'camera' is 'something which takes pictures of things that exist unperceived' and the insistence that we dare not speak otherwise is not going to do the trick. Nor is the, repeated, accusation that I conflate the object of experience with the experience. If by 'object of experience' you mean 'something which exists unperceived', then I am questioning whether there is any such thing as that. But to merely question it isn't to confuse it with the experience itself.

But, being the default position is not really a very good reason to keep thinking something, in fact it's a rubbish reason unless there is no better alternative, in which case it becomes an excellent reason for continuing to believe something. — Inter Alia

It is good that we agree that 'being the default' is not really a good reason for a belief. Let me ask, what is the advantage of believing Realism as opposed to Idealism? Is it a practical advantage?

PA

Well, if I were to say that some experience is an 'illusion', I wouldn't mean that the experience 'isn't one that I can build on'. What I would mean is that the thing which I experience does not exist unperceived. If I say that the bent stick I perceive is an illusion, what I mean is that the bent stick doesn't exist unperceived. And to add to this that 'what really exists is an unbent stick', is to add that an unbent stick exists unperceived. That's what I would mean by those words, at any rate. I certainly wouldn't mean anything merely pragmatic. — PossibleAaran

Right. But my point is that this way of talking about things ('exists unperceived') is (to my mind) something like an artificial game that rests on 'pragmatic' foundations. Why not doubt this theoretical framework itself? What is this framework parasitic upon? Do you assume some kind of Newtonian space? With time as a separate dimension running continuously? What does it mean that something is there, apart from all human purpose? Is it some kind of 'matter' that just endures there in 3-space? And maybe it blinks out when we turn our eyes away? But this assumes the correctness, meaningfulness, and stability of this 3-space and a certain mathematical notion of time.

In a way I'm being skeptical myself here, but about the framework rather than about the objects. I'm skeptical about the usual version of the epistemological game. For me it's as artificial as chess. What's wrong with being artificial? Nothing, really. But I have 'aesthetic' reasons for wanting to get closer to the lived situation, which you may or may not share. I want to be 'objective' in a non-theoretical sense, which is to say that I want theory to be closer to non-philosophical life.

Kantian transcendental idealism answers many of these questions.

It is true that classical physical theories assume that things exist unperceived, but this is hardly a justification of that claim. — PossibleAaran

Quite right. The justification for the assumptions built into the model is the empirical adequacy of the model as a whole. This is a pragmatic rather than a foundationalist approach to justification. Remember, we're just looking for "good reasons", not "deductive proof".

The theories predict that 'if objects disappeared when unobserved then there would be observable consequences'. What would those consequences be? It seems like the hypothesis that things only exist when perceived has all of the same predictive consequences as the hypothesis that they exist also unperceived. Perhaps I have missed something. But if so, it would be good to be clear about what. — PossibleAaran

For instance, classical models predict that if the planet Jupiter ceased to exist every time that no one was looking at it, then the earth would be displaced from its current orbit with catastrophic consequences for its inhabitants. This obviously doesn't happen.

I am not sure what the point of this is. Are you merely insisting that the word 'scepticism' describes your position and your position only? If so, that ignores the evident fact that philosophers have used the word 'scepticism' to refer to many different things. I am not sure why you insist on it being used in only your sense. — PossibleAaran

I think its clear enough that your use of the word is idiosyncratic, and atypical.

To anyone who is in any way interested with the topics of this thread:

Having read through a good portion of this thread, I’m starting to lose my aesthetic for the terms “skeptic” and “skepticism”. Common modern notions—as easily pinpointed in dictionaries—associate these terms as antithetical to something real being, and to belief in reality. OK, nothing new to me about common modern notions … but on a philosophy form? I’m starting to question my use of this term …

So, my question: is there a viable, alternative, philosophical terminology—other than that of a newly invented word that no one else know of—for what most take to be this rather simple, commonsensical, epistemological stance: that of, “we as of yet have not demonstrated any proposition to be perfectly secure from all possible error”.

Note: this stance is one of unabashed certainty, not of doubt; it is also one of logical inference, and not one of supposition; lastly, it is one that implicitly affirms that truth—and, by extension, the ontic—does hold presence regardless of what people may claim or feel … with this specific, just underlined conclusion regarding human epistemology being itself upheld as an instantiation of such truths. Oh, and all this fully upheld, and entwined, with the commonsensical, self-evident truth that all the certainties we live by, aka subjective certainties (from the weakest to the strongest), are never contingent on some absolute certainty being first demonstrated by the intellect.

Whatever ready existent term for the aforementioned, underlined stance is in fact proper, it certainly is not that of “skepticism” as it has been used by at least half of the (philosophically learned) people of this thread. Uphold the stance previously underlined, and questions regarding things such as “how does one know (i.e., gain absolute certainty) that laptops don’t turn into seven headed evil demons that mock you behind your back every time you blink your eyes?” become exceedingly illogical … especially given all the justification for the contrary that has been so far provided.

Maybe this post comes off as off-putting. It’s not intended to be.

The underlined proposition above is logically valid, if not sound, given the arguments for it. To my knowledge so far, this commonsense position can only be termed one of skepticism. Hence, since so many people quite erroneously assert that global/philosophical “skepticism” entails lack of justified belief in reality, realism, etc. (nothing in the underlined stance justifies this) either a) there’s something quite wrong about the authoritarian biases of those who purport this entailment or b) there’s got to be a different philosophical term for the commonsensical, and quite ancient, philosophical position underlined above.

… eha, OK, maybe I’m not currently in the best of moods. Still, I find that the contents still hold.

Here's a link to a discussion of the Tao vs. objective reality. I just went back and reread a few posts. I remember how much I enjoyed the discussion.

instead of arguing for WHY materialism is ‘equally valid’, you’re simply assuming it. Hence, begging the question. — Wayfarer

Begging the question is a statement where the conclusion is presumed to some extent in the premise. I haven't provided you with my premise, just my conclusion. What I've made is an unsubstantiated proposition, that I think materialism is an equally valid world-view. Are you suggesting it isn't? I thought you were recently arguing against dogma and now you seem to be promoting your world-view so emphatically that you're implying materialism isn't even a valid opinion to hold, ever.

all I am saying (and very many of his critics agree 1, 2) is that he makes a hash of it, because he doesn’t know what he’s talking about. — Wayfarer

His critics think he's making a hash of it, well what a surprise! They'd be pretty rubbish critics if they thought he was doing a tremendous job wouldn't they? And I though we were talking about religion here, not science, how can anyone possibly 'know' what they're talking about, there's nothing to 'know' it is entirely made up. Dawkins simply makes arguments from his observation of the way religions act in the world. Those observations are as valid as any other, he doesn't need to 'know' anything about what religion says it is, he is reporting (within the constraint of his own bias, as everyone must) what he observes religion to actually be.

As to the issue around contraception, you still haven't answered the question of what a Skeptic would actually do. Yes Catholicism is dogmatic, but so, apparently, is a blanket rejection of Catholicism, so where does that leave the Skeptic?. Same with abortion, alternative medicine, gay marriage, burquas in public, faith schools, segregation... you have to decide about these things because the solutions are usually mutually exclusive, you can't spend your whole life on the fence.

what is the advantage of believing Realism as opposed to Idealism? — PossibleAaran

Simple, such a belief has been entirely harmless for the (more than I'd care to mention) years of my life so far. Can anyone say the same of Idealism?

You've not outlined what it is about my argument you disagree with, I'd be interested to hear, if you've time.

Simple, such a belief has been entirely harmless for the (more than I'd care to mention) years of my life so far. Can anyone say the same of Idealism? — Inter Alia

Fallibilism?

You're touching on a great issue here. Probably some could say the same of idealism. But if the realist and idealist live the same kind of sane life in terms of action (avoiding crimes, maintaining relationships), what then is the weight of such positions? In theory, they are big deal. Everything is real or ideal, etc. But in practice it looks like slapping this or that name on the shame shared reality.

Political isms probably get more attention precisely because they are better indicators of behavior. We care more about how others treat us than we do about the names they slap on the familiar world we share.

Here's a link to a discussion of the Tao vs. objective reality. I just went back and reread a few posts. I remember how much I enjoyed the discussion. — T Clark

Thanks. I will enjoy reading it.