"So, one person can simply do whatever s/he chooses to do to another and it would not be right nor wrong - so long as there is no agreement?"

correct, no one is bound to something they are not a part of, or in agreement with. — DPMartin

So, to be clear, according to you:One can rape pillage and plunder another group, so long as they do not have an agreement that stops them from doing so, and that would not be immoral.

:-}

Sure hope you do not have any real power over anyone...

I'd say the 'pursuit of true happiness' is futile, because if you are pursuing something then it does not currently exist within yourself.
If true happiness is an internal state that you desire, are you not furthering yourself from that state by conditionalising happiness on external occurrences?
If so, can you ever be truly happy unless certain conditions are met?
This, for me at least, disregards the whole idea of true happiness, and if we follow, the same can be applied to our agreed conceptions of goodness.
Find goodness within and it need not be conditioned by externals. — Qurious

I'm reminded of Sheryl Crow here...

It's not getting what you want, it's wanting what you have...

How might your understanding suffice when within the context of another animals life? — Qurious

I extend moral consideration to animals (where possible) even though they cannot reciprocate.

If I was in their situation I would not want to be abused is probably the best explanation I can come up with as to why at the moment. Ultimately it's an appeal to empathy, but if we were to encounter an advanced alien species that made us look like cattle by comparison, we would definitely want them to be considerate of us even though we can offer nothing in return.

Even if we might conceive it as serving our own base-ends, that conception is limited by a presupposition that 'human nature' equates to no more than securing our own interests, and by fulfilling this naively accepted purpose we are somehow doing good. — Qurious

From the perspective of an individual, securing our own interests is the very content of life. Individually, we do good by securing our individual interests. Socially we do good by securing everyone's interests (the realm of morality).

Sustaining the planet for the sake of the elephants and tigers is noble and all, but it's much more important to me that we sustain the planet for the sake of humans. We are locked in a struggle for survival, against nature, in what is in many ways a zero sum competition. In order for humans to eat, many animals must die. One day we may be technologically and logistically able to take the most morally praiseworthy path without sacrificing actual human lives, but until then extending all possible moral considerations to animals leads to a breakdown of morality when survival and health dilemmas arise.

Thus, subjective morality. — Qurious

The real value of my moral approach is that it is very clear from the outset regarding the "subjective" element of moral judgments: nuanced and subjective conceptions of "goodness" are less persuasive and therefore secondary to a specific set of basic values/desires which are nearly universal to all humans (and most animals too). The desire to go on living, the desire to be free and free from strife, and to pursue happiness (in Locke's sense).

Moral arguments concerning and critical to the very preservation of life take utile and persuasive precedence over all other moral arguments. The few exceptions where individuals contend that they value something more than life (excluding valuing the lives of others above one's own, which emotionally many humans are geared for (see: in-group altruism)) are, A), predominantly the result of delusion or mental disorder (I.E: heavens gate), and B), of no moral consequence, given that individuals who do not desire life, liberty, or happiness (yes I realize the contradiction), generally don't care a whole lot about anything else either.

Because they are nearly universally subjectively held by all humans, the enlightened ideals of life and liberty become functionally objective in practice.

I'd say the 'pursuit of true happiness' is futile, because if you are pursuing something then it does not currently exist within yourself. — Qurious

What makes pursuing something that does not currently exist in yourself futile though? Humans have achieved much.

If true happiness is an internal state that you desire, are you not furthering yourself from that state by conditionalising happiness on external occurrences? — Qurious

Life and liberty are dependent on external sources, and they are both required for happiness. So in many ways, no, by conforming external sources to our will we are improving our odds at achieving higher states of happiness. It may be possible through meditation to hijack the cognitive and emotional stimulus-response reward system that produces happiness and achieve it with nothing more than a bowl of rice and a tree to sit under, but really both approaches work!

Cheers!

If following the rules does not require knowing them, then one can follow the rules simply by acting in ways that does not break them. You're bringing sentience into the matter doesn't help, it just continues to move the goalposts. If Virgil can act morally by virtue of acting in a way that you think is moral, but he does not need to be aware of the fact that he's following the rules, then the notion of choice making is moot as well. That would be to say that one can make a choice to act moral without considering what's not. Choosing presupposes volition. Virgil has none. I suspect you know that and that's why you glossed it over earlier... — creativesoul

It wouldn't be to say that "one can make a choice to act moral without considering what's not" because I never said Virgil's decision was to act moral. His decision was to not hoard and share the nuts. Virgil certainly does have some degree of volition.

You're still appealing to your own unsubstantiated assertion that morality is only to do with consciously choosing to follow the rules. I never suggested Virgil made a decision to follow the rules, I suggested he made a decision to not keep all the nuts for himself, which corresponds (corresponds, not "is equivalent to") to what you would describe as the result of following the rules. The fact that Virgil could have acted otherwise per his volition is the same basis of why we bother entertaining the question of how we morally ought to act in the first place, otherwise we would just accept our behavior as inevitable and unalterable.

If monkeys have no volition then children certainly don't, which leads me to think that young adults don't either, nor adults for that matter. Hard free will is an illusion you know...

P.S I had to bring up sentience because you compared Virgil to a dandelion. I

You're still appealing to your own unsubstantiated assertion that morality is only to do with consciously choosing to follow the rules. — VagabondSpectre

That's not what I said, nor does it follow from what I've said.

I said that acting morally requires thinking morally.

The problem here is clear. Either there are moral behaviours, in and of themselves, or not. In order for Virgil to be acting morally even though he cannot think about the moral rules, then it must be the case that certain behaviours are moral in and of themselves.

You're attempting to argue that some behaviours are moral in and of themselves. The problem is that your criterion admits of clearly immoral behaviour.

P.S I had to bring up sentience because you compared Virgil to a dandelion — VagabondSpectre

Admitting ad hoc isn't compelling you know.

X-)

At the heart of it all, your position, at a minimum, is one where the ends justify the means. This has always been the case with what you've been proposing. On the old forum, there have been numerous people with numerous examples of behaviours which meet your criterion but are clearly immoral. Here, you've neglected to answer my earlier objections regarding that, and instead moved the goalposts. — creativesoul

I've gone out of my way to clarify the ways in which the ends may not justify the means, to whom, and why. Here it is again: the moment an individual unwillingly becomes a scape-goat sacrifice is the moment they reject the moral framework which would go against their own interests, potentially leading to a breakdown entire social moral systems. The ends don't justify the means in situations where individuals are unwillingly harmed because to them it is not agreeable and decidedly not beneficial; harmful.

I'm not responsible for every spec of ridicule that gets haphazardly shat into digital existence. If you would like to criticize my own actual behavior, please do so, or if you would like to use the behavior of others in an argument showing some contradiction in my own moral framework, please explain their behavior and point out the contradiction once my moral approach is applied.

If you wish to talk in meta-ethical terms, regarding what counts as being moral or not, then what methodology do you find fit to do so? — creativesoul

A clear and agreeable starting point is the most successful. Acknowledging that morality is to do with our survival and welfare rather than some kind of divine or eternal truth goes a long way.

I say, we look to all morality(codes of conduct) to see what they have in common that is morally significant. We can set aside all the individual particulars and look at what remains extant after doing so. What's left would be universally extant, that is - what's left would be a part of all morality. We could then make statements that would be true of all codes.

You seem to be taking a similar route with the bit about what you claim all morality has in common, promoting social and individual welfare(or words to that affect/effect). — creativesoul

I've already brought up several moral systems which inexorably are proliferated precisely because they promote human welfare in given environments, but also because they are intuitively persuasive based on the idea that following them will somehow lead to desirable future outcomes. All superstitious morality is selfish and self serving at heart, virtue and deontological ethics similarly so (virtues rules and rituals are supposedly/intuitively good/persuasive because of their products, not because of what they inherently are). Can you think of an ethical or moral framework which is not persuasive based on it's direct or indirect appeals to life and welfare?

Admitting ad hoc isn't compelling you know. — creativesoul

What's also not compelling is comparing a living creature with a nervous system and conscious mind, capable of complex and varied behavior, to a dandelion.

You're still appealing to your own unsubstantiated assertion that morality is only to do with consciously choosing to follow the rules — VagabondSpectre

That's not what I said, nor does it follow from what I've said. — creativesoul

It's precisely what you said. Here:

"Morality is rule based. If one follows the rules, s/he is behaving morally. Behaving in a way that does not break the rules is not equivalent to following them."

And here's where you evoked this idea again, just above:

" If Virgil can act morally by virtue of acting in a way that you think is moral, but he does not need to be aware of the fact that he's following the rules, then the notion of choice making is moot as well. That would be to say that one can make a choice to act moral without considering what's not."

You imply here that one cannot choose to act moral without considering what's not moral when the conscious choice to act moral (the conscious choice to follow the rules per your description) was never a part of my description of Virgil's behavior and what makes his actions moral. It's your own enduring presumption that morality is about choosing to follow rules.

The problem here is clear. Either there are moral behaviours, in and of themselves, or not. In order for Virgil to be acting morally even though he cannot think about the moral rules, then it must be the case that certain behaviours are moral in and of themselves.

You're attempting to argue that some behaviours are moral in and of themselves. The problem is that your criterion admits of clearly immoral behaviour — creativesoul

It's not the behavior in and of itself that is "moral". It's the fact that the behavior is mutually beneficial toward the shared interests of Virgil and Vulcan both, which is also dependent on the environment they are in. You might argue that in-group resource sharing is a moral rule, but I can actually explain what makes it intuitively persuasive and in which environments it is actually beneficial to carry out, and why: it's that it strategically serves the mutual long term interests of all of us, making it mutually agreeable as a standard of behavior going forward in social environments.

Sustaining the planet for the sake of the elephants and tigers is noble and all, but it's much more important to me that we sustain the planet for the sake of humans. We are locked in a struggle for survival, against nature, in what is in many ways a zero sum competition. In order for humans to eat, many animals must die. One day we may be technologically and logistically able to take the most morally praiseworthy path without sacrificing actual human lives, but until then extending all possible moral considerations to animals leads to a breakdown of morality when survival and health dilemmas arise. — VagabondSpectre

I'd say the error here is that you still presuppose humans must live against nature to survive.
Humans are a part of nature, not apart from it. It's to our greatest interest to sustain nature because we are it. Our survival struggle is no longer a struggle to survive against nature per se, that's too primitive.
Our new struggle appears to be in clambering up the socio-economic ladder by increasing our wealth and social position, thereby establishing some amount of seeming superiority over another, but isn't that primitive too in relation to the big picture?
So what is morality within our context?
The phrase "What is normal to the spider is chaos to the fly." comes to mind.

The real value of my moral approach is that it is very clear from the outset regarding the "subjective" element of moral judgments: nuanced and subjective conceptions of "goodness" are less persuasive and therefore secondary to a specific set of basic values/desires which are nearly universal to all humans (and most animals too). The desire to go on living, the desire to be free and free from strife, and to pursue happiness (in Locke's sense). — VagabondSpectre

I like this. I would agree there are some values/desires which are virtually universal to humans and most if not all animals, and I think if anything this highlights the commonality of different organisms, and despite their different context, a sense of universality.

What makes pursuing something that does not currently exist in yourself futile though? Humans have achieved much. — VagabondSpectre

The point is that it wouldn't exist in yourself. That's the problem.
Humans having 'achieved much' has done little but increase the problem of trying to satisfy everyone.
Let's say satisfaction and true happiness are two different things.
We are satisfied when our survival needs are met, when we achieve something, or when we crack a joke and someone laughs.
We have a choice, however, to be truly happy. We can choose true happiness over mere satisfaction.
I think Bruce Lee said it best: "Be happy, but never satisfied."
We must be mindful, however, of what it is we consider satisfactory.
If satisfaction doesn't equate with moral goodness, then we are met with a dilemma
It's not all about humans, y'know? After all, we are some insignificant speck of dust spread amongst trillions of billions of other specks of dust in a vast cosmic abyss, why should we have all the answers?

Life and liberty are dependent on external sources, and they are both required for happiness. So in many ways, no, by conforming external sources to our will we are improving our odds at achieving higher states of happiness. — VagabondSpectre

I don't extend such conditions to true happiness. True happiness is something I give myself, whereas satisfaction is something received from external things or occurrences.

Nonetheless, whatever works for you in this journey of life, my friend.

You're still appealing to your own unsubstantiated assertion that morality is only to do with consciously choosing to follow the rules
— VagabondSpectre

That's not what I said, nor does it follow from what I've said.
— creativesoul

It's precisely what you said. Here:

"Morality is rule based. If one follows the rules, s/he is behaving morally. Behaving in a way that does not break the rules is not equivalent to following them." — VagabondSpectre

That's not precisely what I said.

Morality is ruled based. Behaving morally is only to do with following the moral rules. Behaving morally is not morality.

It's not the behavior in and of itself that is "moral". It's the fact that the behavior is mutually beneficial toward the shared interests of Virgil and Vulcan both, which is also dependent on the environment they are in. — VagabondSpectre

So, being moral equates to being mutually beneficial toward the shared interests of Virgil and Vulcan. Writ large that would be to say that moral behaviour is behaviour which is mutually beneficial towards the shared interests of the behaving agent and... someone else... anyone else... or everyone else effected/affected by the behaviour?

P.S.

The SEP defines morality exactly how I've been employing the term...

I'm not sure what you're going on about here... — creativesoul

What I'm saying is that in order to describe any action as moral we must presume at least the 'goodness' of the outcome and it must be an action which at least appears to be one selected from a range of choices. The first requirement distinguishes 'moral' actions from 'immoral' ones, the second ensure we're only applying such judgement where they could serve any purpose rather than to inanimate object or inevitable events. This is entirely pragmatic and does not require any ontological justification (I might have one, of course, but it isn't necessary). There are arguments about whether intent is also required but again these are not necessary, it is entirely possible for morality to function as that subset of behaviours which bring about a 'good' state of affairs out of a set of behaviours which it is possible to exhibit.

The distinction you make between "being moral and being called so" is irrelevant. Every action, human or otherwise, is something we 'call' moral in the hope that we have correctly identified it as moral. The fact that we're 'calling' Virgil's behaviour moral because it looks like it is obviously doesn't automatically mean it is moral, we might be wrong, but we might be right also, I'm not sure what pointing that out does for the argument?

We can get the two requirements I've outlined above for moral behaviour out of Virgil's actions. We can postulate that sharing would be 'good' for his society (it seems something we think is 'good' for our, so it follows that the presumption is not an unreasonable one). It certainly appears to be an action that is selected from a range of possible actions, animals do not always share. Hence we can conclude it is moral.

You might not agree, you might decide that intention is an important part of morality and Virgil didn't intend to me moral, or that other primates don't have free will so didn't really have a range of options. But neither of those are necessary and neither are simpler. They're just your opinion. The simplest explanation, the one with "fewest unprovable assumptions" as you put it, would not add something to morality which is not a necessity. It would not ascribe something to humans which is not present in primates which is simply assumed to be there and unprovable.

So the simplest explanation for Virgil's behaviour is that it is moral, that uses the minimum unprovable assumptions about what morality is and the minimum unprovable assumptions about the differences between humans and other primates.

So, being moral equates to being mutually beneficial toward the shared interests of Virgil and Vulcan. Writ large that would be to say that moral behaviour is behaviour which is mutually beneficial towards the shared interests of the behaving agent and... someone else... anyone else... or everyone else effected/affected by the behaviour? — creativesoul

Yes, that's exactly what morality is, you have another definition?

That's not precisely what I said.

Morality is ruled based. Behaving morally is only to do with following the moral rules. Behaving morally is not morality. — creativesoul

I took issue with the "consciously choosing" bit, not the "rule based" but, in this particular case. When I say "Virgil behaves morally" I mean to say that his actions conform to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons, and there's nothing untrue about that observation.

This is the semantic issue: you're merely using a different definition of "behaves morally"; I'm referring to the strategic/situational component of the actions themselves while you're referring to a conscious choice/intention to carry out actions because they are moral. If you switch to my definition, you will see there is no issue.

So, being moral equates to being mutually beneficial toward the shared interests of Virgil and Vulcan. Writ large that would be to say that moral behaviour is behaviour which is mutually beneficial towards the shared interests of the behaving agent and... someone else... anyone else... or everyone else effected/affected by the behaviour? — creativesoul

Basically, yes. Descriptively, groups of people make agreements which are beneficial for their group and they call it moral (religions and states carrying out wars of aggression is a great example) but obviously individuals and groups who are explicitly dis-considered or harmed by a particular moral agreement will contest that it is immoral, and will not agree.

Moral systems which are more inclusive in their consideration are better because they inherently benefit more people (or harm/dis-consider fewer) and can be agreeably held by more people, which enables them to function in broader social environments.

P.S.

The SEP defines morality exactly how I've been employing the term... — creativesoul

If you would take the time to read the entire article, you would find there are many dilemmas and areas of disagreement when it comes to defining morality. That said, I don't feel the need to explicitly challenge the "code of conduct" description because my own framework can easily incorporate and overlap upon it. I would however like to point out that "rule" and "code of conduct" is rather ambiguous; does it mean instructions for specific situations or a set of ideas that acts like a formula to tell us the correct moral action in any given circumstance?. Perhaps it refers to the very rational foundation of morality itself and the rules of logic that govern it which when understood allow us to be genuinely consciously moral?

I could say "follow the rules of consequentialist utilitarianism" or "virtue ethics is about codes of conduct"; it matters not because I'm not disagreeing that morality is about somehow governing behavior, my point is about what morality is for (the aims and impact of the behavior) and what moral behavior actually looks like as prescribed by a moral system designed to be mutually beneficial to the basic interests of all individuals living in a social/tribal setting.

One behaviour(doing A) of group X mutually benefits everyone in group X while harming everyone in group Y.

Doing A is not moral. Otherwise, you've just invented an unnecessarily complex way to state what's already obvious. This group thinks A is moral, and that group doesn't.

The distinction you make between "being moral and being called so" is irrelevant. Every action, human or otherwise, is something we 'call' moral in the hope that we have correctly identified it as moral. The fact that we're 'calling' Virgil's behaviour moral because it looks like it is obviously doesn't automatically mean it is moral, we might be wrong, but we might be right also, I'm not sure what pointing that out does for the argument? — Inter Alia

It points out that either being moral is wholly determined by what we say it is, or we can get it wrong. If you do not see the significance of that, I'm not sure I can help... Either X is moral in and of itself, or X is moral simply because we say so. The difference strikes right to the heart of the thread... the origen of morality.

If you mean by universal that it applies absolutely, then I would respond that any moral code is dependent upon the nature of reality, and the nature of the beings it's being applied to. Thus, it may not be absolute. On the other hand, if by universal you mean that it applies equally to all humans, I'll buy into that. Moreover, a universal moral code is dependent on some objective criteria, unless you can get all of humanity to subscribe to a set of moral rules or principles, which is highly unlikely.

Many of our moral principles do come from religious ideas, but some do not, depending on the culture or society. Other moral principles or rules come from theories of morality, and there are different competing theories about what's moral and/or immoral.

For me, what's immoral or evil, and this takes into account intentional and/or accidental immoral acts, as well as natural evil, always involves some kind of harm to those involved or even those not involved. In these cases the harm done can be objectively observed, at least most of the time. Sometimes it requires a great deal of thought to understand that harm as occurred. For example, the harm done to one's character or psyche is hard to quantify, nevertheless I believe it does occur.

Moral actions are closely connected to what we value as humans, or what is intrinsically valuable. For example, kindness has intrinsic worth, and most people recognize that it does. Thus, we value it as part of a ethical code of conduct. Furthermore, I believe it can be demonstrated that kindness is not a matter of subjective beliefs, but has objective characteristics that can be demonstrated. Also moral actions are always intentional, which is why they are praiseworthy. One doesn't praise someone for a good that results from their unintentional acts. It's a good, just not one that resulted from a morally good action, that is, an intentional moral act.

either being moral is wholly determined by what we say it is, or we can get it wrong. — creativesoul

If we define a moral thing as a thing which has some properties (x,y,and z), then (presuming we all still agree it has those properties), it is possible for everyone in the world to be wrong, they could all call X moral, but it does not have properties x,y and z which they have all just agreed a moral thing has so they have all made a logical error.

But we have not yet agreed on the properties a moral thing has, that's what we're discussing, so it is possible for me to call a thing moral because it has properties x,y and z; yet you might not call it moral because you're looking for properties a,b and c, which the action in question does not have.

So of course X could be moral just because we say it is. We could define moral by first deciding properties x,y and z and then going around looking for everything with those properties, or we could define moral by collecting all the things we'd like to put together on the grounds of sufficient similarity and then look for what properties are both necessary and sufficient for membership of that group.

I'm saying (and I think Vagabond is too) that I think the behaviour exhibited by Virgil goes in the set of 'Moral things' I think it is similar enough in shared properties to be lumped in with all the other things we call moral behaviour. If you think it lacks some property that should be a necessary property of moral behaviour, that's fine, let us know what that property is, but we might not agree.

There are then only two ways of resolving that disagreement. We could either take an ordinary language approach and ask whose set of properties is most like the set used by most people when they use the word 'moral', or we could take an analytical approach and ask what job the word 'moral' does and which set of properties are necessary for it to do that job.

If we define a moral thing as a thing which has some properties (x,y,and z), then (presuming we all still agree it has those properties), it is possible for everyone in the world to be wrong, they could all call X moral, but it does not have properties x,y and z which they have all just agreed a moral thing has so they have all made a logical error. — Inter Alia

I think you've missed the point, but maybe not. I may be missing yours. I think we're close, regardless...

I'll try explaining it another way. I'm not saying that we 'get it wrong' by virtue of making a logical error(I'm not even sure what that means in this context). I'm saying that if being moral is not existentially contingent upon our awareness of it, then we can get it wrong by virtue of (misconception). Contrary to many, I hold that we can define things incorrectly. The types of things that we can define incorrectly are any and all things which are not existentially contingent upon our awareness of them. So, getting it wrong in all such cases would be for us to form and hold false belief about that which is not existentially contingent upon our awareness of it.

We could define moral by first deciding properties x,y and z and then going around looking for everything with those properties, or we could define moral by collecting all the things we'd like to put together on the grounds of sufficient similarity and then look for what properties are both necessary and sufficient for membership of that group. — Inter Alia

That's not the only method of approach.

I'm drawing the distinction between defining that which is existentially contingent upon our awareness and 'defining' that which is not. Those are two completely different sets of circumstances. We first need to establish whether or not it is even possible for a creature to act morally accidentally. If a creature can act morally despite it's inability to think morally(accidentally), then thinking morally isn't necessary for acting morally.

Either, the creature's behaviour is moral because we say so, or it's moral in and of itself.

Vagabond denied the latter. Are you agreeing? Thus, under all the overcomplicated explanations... he's just passing moral judgment. He thinks Virgil's behaviour meets his own standard of what counts as moral.

I'm saying (and I think Vagabond is too) that I think the behaviour exhibited by Virgil goes in the set of 'Moral things' I think it is similar enough in shared properties to be lumped in with all the other things we call moral behaviour. If you think it lacks some property that should be a necessary property of moral behaviour, that's fine, let us know what that property is, but we might not agree.

There are then only two ways of resolving that disagreement. We could either take an ordinary language approach and ask whose set of properties is most like the set used by most people when they use the word 'moral', or we could take an analytical approach and ask what job the word 'moral' does and which set of properties are necessary for it to do that job. — Inter Alia

Focusing upon the word 'moral'... as a means to argue whether or not Virgil's behaviour qualifies as being a case of acting morally despite the inability to think so...

I'd like to see you or Vagabond come up with a sensible notion of moral behaviour that requires neither morality nor volition. Put one forth and it will surely suffer from a reductio. Ad hocs won't save the notion. Can't. A criterion for acting morally that requires neither morality nor volition woud be forced to admit all sorts of absurd examples of creatures acting morally(by virtue of meeting the same criterion). In the end, it would still be a case of being called "moral" as opposed to being so.

Moral acts that require neither morality nor volition. Kinda like apple pies without apples and crust.

Where does morality come from?

That's the question. Morality, as it is currently defined in academia, is a term used in order to talk about either current codes of conduct(descriptively) or a proposed code of conduct that all rational people would assent/agree to put forward(normatively).

So, where do codes of conduct come from?

How about us? People invent codes of conduct. That's a starting point. Seems like a perfectly reasonable answer. It is clearly supported by empirical evidence. No unprovable assumptions. Simple. Let's move on then...

But why?

I mean, if we're going to look for the origen of morality, it makes all the sense in the world to consider why and/or how(if you prefer) codes of conduct('morality' as it's currently defined) came to exist. Certainly, there was a need for governing human behaviour. So, we can surmise that not everyone was behaving in a way that was accepted by those who initially decided to write the rules. Note here that that is not to say that the behaviour in question was not good. Those who write the rules are not necessarily good actors to begin with. Not all rules are good. Some rules forbid good behaviour. Some rules reward bad behaviour. So, I want to only note that those who write the rules may not be promoting good behaviour or good things in general for that matter. As a result of this and this alone, we can be certain that being a rule that governs behaviour is insufficient for being a good rule.

Acting morally, requires acting in a good way whether that be a result of deliberately following a good rule, or whether that be a result of acting in a way that is good in and of itself. The latter includes the former but not the other way around. All cases of following a good rule are perfect examples of acting in a way that is good in and of itself. Not all cases of acting in a way that is good in and of itself are examples of following a good rule. There's more to being good than following a good rule.

There's more to being good than being rules of conduct.

We could say rules of conduct were necessary because putting them forth was good for the community of people. That wouldn't work though. I mean, lot's of rules aren't good, lot's of rules hurt most of the people. Putting forth rules that aren't good cannot sensibly be called good for the people, can they? Rules must be good for the people in order to be sensibly called "moral". But we learn as we go, right? If we once thought this or that behaviour was moral/good, but later came to realize that it wasn't, it could be that knowing the good required knowing the bad. So, when we become aware that something we once thought to be good is not, upon what ground do we change our mind? Consequences of the rule? Perhaps, but not necessarily. Consequences, if they are to be used as a means by which to measure goodness, must be an affect/effect of the rule in question. A system is only as successful as it's implementation, morality notwithstanding. The point here is that consequences alone are inadequate ground to base moral judgment about the rules themselves unless those consequences are clearly and undeniably a direct effect of properly implementing the rule being judged.

We could say that morality was/is beneficial to the success of our species. But... not all rules are good. So, being good isn't necessarily a part of being beneficial to the success of our species. At the very least, we must admit that our species has succeeded to the degree that it has despite having clearly bad rules in place. We can all surely think of senseless deaths that followed the rules. But we learn as we go, right? If we once thought this or that behaviour was moral/good, but later came to realize that it wasn't, upon what ground do we change our mind?

If the behaviour is clearly immoral, but it follows the rules, then the rules are wrong.

This begins to lay out the crucial distinction that needs to be drawn and maintained between codes of conduct(which are entirely subject to individual particulars) and being good/moral(which is not). Being moral/good is something that obtains regardless of the individual particulars. For example, being helpful is good regardless of familial, cultural, and/or historical particulars. Being helpful is always good, in every case. It is good in and of itself. A behaviour is helpful regardless of whether or not anyone is aware of it's being so. In other words, being helpful is something that is not existentially contingent upon our awareness. It is good/moral in and of itself. It is something that we become aware of, if we pay attention to the right sorts of things...

Virgil is being helpful.

X-)

What I'm saying is that in order to describe any action as moral we must presume at least the 'goodness' of the outcome and it must be an action which at least appears to be one selected from a range of choices. — Inter Alia

'Appears to have been selected from a range of choices' is not adequate for having been. Being moral as a result of being selected from a range of choices is much different than merely appearing to be. In order to select from a range of choices, the selecting agent must first know of those choices. In this case, it's moral choices. Virgil does not have what it takes to conceive of acting in a way that follows codification.

Virgil does have what it takes to behave in a helpful manner.

I'm saying that if being moral is not existentially contingent upon our awareness of it, then we can get it wrong by virtue of (misconception). Contrary to many, I hold that we can define things incorrectly. — creativesoul

It's not contrary to many, this is the fundamental tenet of analytical philosophy, it quite well supported, but it is the second option I describe. You're saying that 'morality' has a set of properties first and that if we define something as moral that does not have that set of properties we have made an error - misconception. The question then is how did 'morality' acquire that set of properties, was it given them by God? What logical process of the world has ascribes these properties to the thing 'moral behaviour', how did it become a thing?

You keep repeating that moral behaviour is a rule, but that cannot be its sole property, 'Pawns can only move forward in chess' is a rule, but it's not moral, what's more, any pre-defined guide could be described as a rule, so anything other than entirely spontaneous or instinctive behaviour could be described as 'following a rule'. So. it sounds to me like you are asserting an analytical statement that the thing 'moral behaviour' must have three properties - it must be the result of 'free-will' (in your words, it must be a rule i.e. not spontaneous or automatic), it must be beneficial (to distinguish it from other types of rule such as the rules of chess), and it must be known to the perpetrator that this action meets this definition and other possible actions would not. That's fine, but you've not provided any further analytical statements to help us understand why you think it must have these three properties.

I personally think it requires only two properties, as I've explained above. I think that because that it the smallest number of properties that distinguish such actions to the outside observer. And this leads to the crux of my disagreement with you.

Virgil does not have what it takes to conceive of acting in a way that follows codification. — creativesoul

I simply disagree with this assertion, you have absolutely no evidence for it apart from an anthropogenic prejudice.

being helpful is something that is not existentially contingent upon our awareness. It is good/moral in and of itself. ... Virgil is being helpful. — creativesoul

This just seems to undermine everything you've just been saying You state quite clearly "being helpful is...good/moral in and of itself", "Virgil is being helpful". That's about as basic an analytical statement as it's possible to make. Doing X is being moral, Y is doing X therefore Y is being moral.

In case you haven't taken note, I'm now arguing from several 'sides' of the argument. Attempting to make sense of other perspectives.

I find that defining morality as a code of conduct is problematic, personally. I work with it to grant it as a means for checking consequences of holding it... as my second to last post showed.

On my view, acting morally requires thinking morally. Thinking morally requires metacognition. Metacognition requires written language. Virgil does not have what it takes. I've argued for that, despite the fact that it has went neglected. Evidence for that? There's plenty, and we could get into that of you so choose.

Virgil is acting in a way that he has acted before. On my view, that particular behaviour left him with good impressions/memories. He liked the results. When the situation arose again when he could share again, he acted accordingly.

I want to note, however, that you've made a habit of misattribution. Your reports of my claims are false.

Thinking morally requires metacognition. Metacognition requires written language. — creativesoul

So tribal peoples are not moral, that's quite a claim. One I think the colonialists would have some sympathy for but few others.

There is a definite case of confusion here. Let's see if we can clear it up.

It concerns the difference between what it takes for an agent to even be able to think morally, and our calling another agent's behaviour moral.

Would you agree that these are not the same?

Here's the issue that you and Vagabond have neglected to directly address...

If Virgil's behaviour is moral, and Virgil has no code of conduct, then either his behaviour is moral in and of itself and you're both correctly assessing the situation(aside from it's being moral in and of itself) by calling it "moral", or you're both simply passing moral judgment according to your own conception/criterion regarding what counts as moral.

Anthropomorphism.

So, with regard to the tribal peoples... we would all most likely agree that they behave in some ways that satisfy our own criterion for what counts as moral behavior. However, that is significantly different from acting with the intent to be moral; to do what's right; to choose what's good; to follow the moral rules; etc. That is acting morally as a result of thinking morally. That requires written language.

Virgil is a thinking creature. He draws mental correlations between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or his own state of mind(mental state). He drew a correlation between his behaviour and what followed. That is, he attributed/recognized causality. He drew a correlation between offering cookies to another and the events that followed, both external to himself(the way other things acted) and within himself(his own mental ongoings). He inferred that his behaviour caused what followed. He liked the results. That is how and why Virgil shares cookies.

Ockham's razor...