On the surface you're right; before we grasp our own moral systems we're not in conscious control over their development, leaving them vulnerable to arbitrary influences. Our first consciously understood moral positions are generally given as commands when we're children (don't hit, don't lie, don't steal), but before we're given coherent and rigid moral instruction or are able to analyze our own moral systems, can we still exhibit moral behavior?

Consider the following:



Does the sharing of the nuts in the above video actually depict ethical/moral behavior?

If so, what might this indicate about early human morality?

Firstly, the nuts themselves are inherently desirable to the monkeys due to their biology (they want and enjoy the taste and satisfying feeling of eating them); nobody had to impart the idea that nuts are valuable to the monkeys. For the monkeys in this situation, access to nuts is like a starting value or goal, and it's presumably nearly universal to all monkeys who find themselves in such a situation.

The intriguing question is then "why were the nuts shared?". It just so happens that in-group food sharing is a mutually beneficial cooperative strategy, and could possibly have been selected for in the evolutionary past of monkeys and great apes, which presumably would have generated biological mechanisms to facilitate that behavior. I surmise that it is primarily an intuitive and emotional understanding which causes the monkey to share the nuts; one monkey see's the other upset and longing for some nuts, and sympathizes. It is most likely an intuitive feeling which entices the monkey to share, rather than a conscious understanding of the strategic upshot of doing so. That the monkey was able to divide the six nuts into two exactly equal shares probably has more to do with the number 6 being very easy to intuitively/visually divide than it has to do with any careful or conscious consideration on the part of the monkey

What the video does seem to demonstrate is that the intuitive "moral" decision making of monkeys can emerge naturally from biology and circumstance, without the need for formal language or reflective analysis on their part. Without knowing it, the monkey is naturally carrying out a mutually beneficial strategy of cooperation that brings about long term and mutual success in many environments (basically any tribal environment). Rational agents are able to recognize the strategic moral value behind such forms of cooperation, but evolution discovered it long before we did, and it has imbued hominids with a biological capacity to unconsciously employ cooperative (and competitive) strategies.

Just because something is an evolutionary devised strategy doesn't make it a moral strategy though, because not all strategies are cooperative or entail mutual benefit. The more a given strategy/moral arrangement necessitates an unequal or one-sided distribution of burdens and benefit, the less mutually agreeable it becomes from the perspective of the losers. We can indeed thank evolution for designing things like empathy and compassion, which emotionally and intuitively push us in the direction of cooperation where possible, but we can also blame evolution for human capacities like xenophobia and violent aggression which cause individuals and groups to exclude others from moral consideration. Specific groups and individuals can form exclusive moral clubs, but from the perspective of the morally excluded (example: the "untouchable" caste of historical India), what could rationally persuade them to buy into a moral premise that is harmful or un-beneficial to them? (note: it's fully possible to indoctrinate someone into an ideology which oppresses them, but intuitively, and by appealing to more persuasive and universal starting values (life, freedom, well-being), it's quite easy to bereave one's self, or be bereaved, of such positions). (note: it's possible to incorporate competition into a "moral" arrangement, but it will only be morally agreeable to everyone if it can be seen to benefit them (see: the economics of capitalism)).

In practice humans refer to quite a large variety of things as moral or morality. A virtue ethicist might say morality comes from virtues, a consequentialist might say morality comes from outcomes, and a theologian might say morality comes from god. All three of them might deny that we can think of Virgil the Capuchin as capable of moral behavior because he cannot understand virtue, the long term ramifications of it's actions, or god's will (traditionally we think of most animals as amoral). And yet, as if by coincidence, Virgil demonstrably engages in the exact same act that the virtue ethicist, the consequentialist, and the theologian would all argue is the right and moral course of action; understanding the what and why of Virgil's moral intuition encapsulates the origin of what our own moral systems are actually servicing (our basic human needs for survival, health, and happiness).

The kind of intuition that Virgil must have relied on to make his decision is the same kind of intuition that most humans rely on when making moral decisions of their own. The realm of conscious and higher moral thought and study contains a plethora of varying postulates and approaches that tend to frame morality as serving something greater, but inexorably they are all attempts to serve the very same set of nearly universal biological drives that spawns our moral intuition in the first place. A consequentialist appeals to the intuitive desirability of certain outcomes and possible states of affairs, while a virtue ethicist appeals to the power of certain virtues to actually bring about those intuitively desirable outcomes and states of affairs. Theology takes many and much more indirect roads, but generally the hope that an all-loving god has your back and has reserved a place for you in eternal paradise is the form of the appeal (it's not surprising how committed religious people are to their ideas given that religious ideology powerfully exploits the nearly universal human desire to go on living and to be happy; what could possibly be more valuable than eternal life with infinite happiness to boot?).

So much confusion and and contradiction tends to result when conscious moral systems are not constructed with a clear and reliable conception of what they're really trying to service. Strictly religious moral systems not only conflate and pervert our starting values with unreasonable intermediaries (example: "pleasing god is the most desirable" because god will then please us out of gratitude), they also pervert the strategic aspect of actually getting to a state of affairs which pleases god (and subsequently us). Example: "God's nature is heretosexual, therefore it is beneficial for every individual to also be heterosexual" (this particular example contains a mixed bag of irrational indirect appeals to intuition such as "god knows what's best" and "displeasing god will bring about the worst case scenario").

What actually caused me to leave religion and theism behind was a lucky ability to recognize the importance of my own emotional and intellectual well-being. As a child with no formal moral system aside from religious commandments (which are absorbed on authority), I was trapped by the painful lie that to disobey meant I would have to suffer in hell along with the rest of my somewhat non-religious immediate family. Ultimately cognitive dissonance forced me to conclude that my beliefs were not rational, but more importantly, were not healthy (hell was the most memorable of what I came to view as harmful beliefs but there were a broad collection of them that contributed to my present day state of irreligiosity).. And from what I know now, it turns out I was intuitively correct. Strict old world religious moral tenets only tend to result in successful communal living in primitive and chaotic environments rife with uncertainty and lacking science of any kind. Out of my own condition and reason I was able to come to the position that my previous religious beliefs were at the very least, not the best or most correct way of doing things; immoral.

I agree that our first worldview is more often that not thrust upon us, but our biology gives rise to a moral intuition that precedes any coherent worldview and is often the well obscured root appeal of moral systems based upon any formalized world view.

That was a segue into understanding the bit you asked about. There is no fallacy of composition in saying that apples are always a basic elemental constituent of apple pies. That's a layperson way to explain what I'm prepared to show you, if you show me that you're worth my time. Up to you.

I'm not talking about what's on the surface. I'm setting out what all thought and belief is comprised of, without exception. That's a bold claim. However, when there are no exceptions, it's also the strongest possible justificatory ground. All it would take to refute what I'm prepared to argue is one exception to the contrary. You ready to listen, or still just waiting for your turn to talk?

You ready to listen, or still just waiting for your turn to talk? — creativesoul

I've responded to every single point you've raised, and what I'm waiting for is for youto construct a relevant argument. (not an analogy, not the promise of an argument; an argument). If you've got some grand and deep and bold and revolutionary moral understanding, then just state it. This all started with you trying to convince me that ridicule never works, and now I'm wondering if you're about to tell me of the wonders of the great Hare Krishna mantra...

Stop asking me if I'm ready to listen or if i "agree with you so far" and just type out your actual argument.

At conception, we are all void of any and all thought and belief...moral belief notwithstanding. Some thought and belief are extremely complex. Others are not. Calculus cannot be understood prior to understanding arithmetic. Moral belief systems cannot be understood as such by an agent until s/he has one to talk about. Thought and belief begins simply and gains in it's complexity.

At conception, we are all void of any and all thought and belief...moral belief notwithstanding — creativesoul

I'll grant you this, sure, but we're not devoid of "feeling" at birth (is feeling a kind of thought?). We're born with fixed emotional and physical responses to certain stimuli (I.e, cry when hungry, suckle when nursed).

Calculus cannot be understood prior to understanding arithmetic — creativesoul

Since Virgil's understanding is not relevant to my description and argument, what is the relevance of this?

Moral belief systems cannot be understood as such by an agent until s/he has one to talk about. Thought and belief begins simply and gains in it's complexity. — creativesoul

We're born with an intuitive system that induces us to behave morally. I fail to see how you have addressed my point.

We're born stupid and then we get smarter, gotchya, but Virgil's moral behavior never came from his own understanding, it came from evolutionary happenstance.

What makes Virgil's behaviour moral?

The fact that it is mutually beneficial to his and Vulcan's well-being (life, health, happiness).

Virgil's behavior was the objectively moral behavior if mutual survival and well being is a starting moral consideration because it is the most effective course of action available to him to ensure those ends (or avoids a threat to those ends)

It's like making the right or wrong move in a chess game.

The fact that it is mutually beneficial to his and Vulcan's well-being (life, health, happiness). — VagabondSpectre

Two problems here. The first is that Virgil's behaviour is driven by his thought and belief. He is not thinking about acceptable and/or unacceptable behaviour. Therefore, Virgil does not have moral thought and/or belief.

The second is that behaviour can be both mutually beneficial and immoral. Thus, being mutually beneficial does not constitute being moral.

The first is that Virgil's behaviour is driven by his thought and belief. — creativesoul

His actions were driven by his instincts, his "intuition" not his "thought and belief".. This is a critical distinction you have consistently neglected to address.

The second is that behaviour can be both mutually beneficial and immoral. Thus, being mutually beneficial does not constitute being moral. — creativesoul

Care to give an example?

His actions were driven by his instincts, his "intuition" not his "thought and belief".. This is a critical distinction you have consistently neglected to address. — VagabondSpectre

Actually I'm making it. All thought and belief consists entirely in and/or of mental correlations drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent's own state of 'mind'.

What counts as instinct or intuition?

All thought and belief consists entirely in and/or of mental correlations drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent's own state of 'mind'. — creativesoul

No. Fixed emotional responses are not "mental correlations drawn between objects of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent's own state of 'mind"

If you prick the foot of a newborn baby, there is no mental correlation between foot pricking and crying, the response of crying due to pain is hardwired directly into the mind and nervous system of the baby.

What counts as instinct or intuition? — creativesoul

It's the set of emotions and isntincts that naturally guide us toward mutually beneficial regimes of behavior. (I.E: sympathy and empathy providing an emotional reward for sharing).

I'm still waiting for an example of something that is mutually beneficial but also immoral...

All thought and belief consists entirely in and/or of mental correlations drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent's own state of 'mind'.
— creativesoul

No. Fixed emotional responses are not "mental correlations drawn between objects of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent's own state of 'mind"

If you prick the foot of a newborn baby, there is no mental correlation between foot pricking and crying, the response of crying due to pain is hardwired directly into the mind and nervous system of the baby. — VagabondSpectre

No?

When did I say that autonomous reflexes(which is what you're talking about is) were thought and belief? I didn't. So, yet another red herring, non-sequitur, strawman. You'll have to do better than that.

I'm still waiting for an example of something that is mutually beneficial but also immoral... — VagabondSpectre

Capitalism rewards mutually beneficial but immoral behaviour. Have a look for yourself. Being mutually beneficial doesn't require being fair, nor just, nor good, nor moral.

What counts as instinct or intuition?
— creativesoul

It's the set of emotions and isntincts that naturally guide us toward mutually beneficial regimes of behavior. (I.E: sympathy and empathy providing an emotional reward for sharing). — VagabondSpectre

Set it out. Enumerate these emotions. Articulate exactly what those instincts consist in/of. Involuntary reflex is irrelevant.

Harvey Weinstein's behaviour was immoral. Ignoring it was mutually beneficial to all who did and him.

No?

When did I say that autonomous reflexes(which is what you're talking about is) were thought and belief? I didn't. So, yet another red herring, non-sequitur, strawman. You'll have to do better than that. — creativesoul

Emotions. The experience of pain and pleasure. The sensation of liking or not liking something. These aren't thoughts or beliefs, they're feelings. We have a hardwired biological capacity to feel emotions. Fixed action responses demonstrate that our behavior isn't always the result of belief or thought.

These are what we might call "instincts", and some of them guide us toward moral action, such as in the case of Virgil. That's what moral intuition is.

Capitalism rewards mutually beneficial but immoral behaviour. Have a look for yourself. Being mutually beneficial doesn't require being fair, nor just, nor good, nor moral. — creativesoul

Can you give an example of such behavior? Broadly pointing to capitalism isn't sufficient. What kind of actions are mutually beneficial and also harmful, specifically?

Harvey Weinstein's behaviour was immoral. Ignoring it was mutually beneficial to all who did and him. — creativesoul

Obviously his behavior and the behavior of those who stayed silent was not beneficial for his victims or possible future victims Please try again.

Set it out. — creativesoul

You want me to make a comprehensive list of all of our instincts which promote cooperation?

No. I pointed to innate empathy and I think that's enough, refute that and I'll offer more, but until then I only need one example to make my point. We experience something painful and feel it as painful due to hardwired biology. Then when we see someone else going through that thing which we think is painful, and we empathize or sympathize with them, again, due to hardwired biology, sometimes seeking to help them as a result.

This is a much more comprehensive, specific, and useful explanation of why Virgil behaved the way he did than "all thought and belief consists of mental correlations drawn between objects of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent's own state of 'mind'" You might as well have said "just because".

Obviously his behavior was not beneficial for his victims. Please try again. — VagabondSpectre

Well, that's not true. They aspired to financial success, and achieved it, by virtue of keeping quiet and letting him make them lots of money. But I digress, I'll grant your objection because it's implications are such that you'll be special pleading or will find yourself unable to find an example of behaviour that meets your criterion...

So, then moral behaviour must be mutually beneficial to everyone?

No. I pointed to innate empathy and I think that's enough, refute that and I'll offer more, — VagabondSpectre

You're a twit.

Empathy is being able to put yourself in another's shoes... That's most certainly not innate.

Recognizing and caring about another's sadness is learned behaviour. Recognizing and not caring about another's sadness is learned behaviour. Recognizing another's emotional expressions requires drawing mental correlations between another and oneself.

They aspired to financial success, and achieved it, by virtue of keeping quiet and letting him make them lots of money. — creativesoul

So was it a consensual transaction? Were the women not harmed by the abuse?

So, then moral behaviour must be mutually beneficial to everyone? — creativesoul

For a moral agreement to exist between two parties, each party must perceive the agreement to be beneficial to them. If a particular party is irretrievably harmed and not benefited by the agreement, then they deem it immoral.

The most inclusive moral agreements therefore extend moral consideration to as many as possible. As a result they are universally appealing and persuasive, and better for everyone overall.

You're a twit.

Empathy is being able to put yourself in another's shoes... That's most certainly not innate. — creativesoul

Empathy is being able to share the emotions of another, and I see plenty of evidence that it is innate. When my dog see's me upset and tries to comfort me, he is not "putting himself in my shoes". He is being driven to act because seeing me upset makes him upset.

Why are you calling me a twit though? I thought ridicule never persuaded anyone?

You want me to make a comprehensive list of all of our instincts which promote cooperation? — VagabondSpectre

Yes, I do. You asserted that instincts and emotions are both innate and count as moral intuition...

Justify your claim.

Yes, I do. You asserted that instincts and emotions are both innate and count as moral intuition...

Justify your claim. — creativesoul

I already did. Empathy. Our penchant to feel something when we see others being harmed. At it's core it's an emotion, not something you learn.

Now your changing the subject... talking about moral agreements. I reject your criterion for what counts as moral behaviour, and have subsequently justified that claim. You're all gratuitious assertion. That's what makes you a twit. Now worries though, I'm a dickhead sometimes...

I already did. Empathy. Our penchant to feel something when we see others being harmed. At it's core it's an emotion, not something you learn. — VagabondSpectre

How is that not drawing mental correlations between an 'object' of physiological sensory perception(another person in this case) and oneself?

Emotion is fraught. Sure emotion is innate, at least fear. The rest are contentious matters. None-the-less, what you're describing requires thought and belief formation.

Actually we're not discussing our disagreement. I agree with the crucial importance of empathy, emotion, and innate potential. I disagree with your account. You're overstating the case.

Now your changing the subject... talking about moral agreements. I reject your criterion for what counts as moral behaviour, and have subsequently justified that claim. You're all gratuitious assertion. That's what makes you a twit. Now worries though, I'm a dickhead sometimes... — creativesoul

Twit: A silly or foolish person.

Foolish: (of a person or action) lacking good sense or judgment; unwise.

You're accusing me of changing the subject by bringing up moral agreements, but moral agreements are fundamental to how i communicate my own moral system. I brought up moral agreements in the second paragraph of my first post in this thread, well before you asked me if I was a priest. If you would like to understand how it's related to your question, go read that post.

In order for a moral agreement/system to actually exist between two or more parties, they must necessarily share some beliefs about what constitutes harm and happiness. Where conflict might arise that can infringe or damage our mutually shared values/beliefs, it becomes rational and appealing for us to come to an agreement in order to protect those values

You've unwisely demonstrated that you lack the good sense to read and respond thoroughly, and your judgment is thusly rendered poor and silly.

You're a twit.