What do you mean by 'classic realism'? — Wayfarer

I mean that which is typical of it's class, the conventional meaning for the word 'classic', not 'Classical' as in the historical period. I'm sorry if that caused some confusion, although your resultant potted history was very interesting nonetheless.

But the point of all of this is to call into question the statement that 'realism', in the sense we understand that today, is 'perfectly rational'. — Wayfarer

I'm not at all sure the history of Realism shows this. To my mind the history of Realism shows a marked trend towards the distancing of concepts once held to be part of observable reality in order to preserve them in the face of advancing observational power. It's no different to the distancing of the Gods, once they were super-powerful humanoids sat on a mountain, as that became increasingly untenable they had to be removed to inaccessible realms (but kept the long beards, interestingly) but with real influence on the world (Old Testament style) as the source of these influences became more directly observable, their influence became more removed from observable reality too. Basically we've invented anti-realism as a place for the gods to live and act as their place in the 'real' observable world becomes less and less tenable in the face of increasing understanding about it's workings.

I see no difference (despite the change in subject matter) in the history of universals or that of free-will. As a concept that people hold dear become more untenable philosophical, instead of letting it go, philosophers create a magical place for it out of nothing, whether that be dualism of one sort or another, or solipsism, or modern versions of 'spirituality'.

The point I've been trying to make on this thread, which no-one seems to have picked up, is that when we talk about doubting Realism (or more often Materialism/Physicalism, which seems to be what most posters are actually talking about), we inevitably judge whether that has happened to the degree we're expecting by the extent to which someone adopt the tenet of some other alternative. It seems inexplicably insufficient for someone to doubt Realism, but doubt theism, dualism or solipsism even more. Somehow that seems to be not good enough, we're still labelled as "narrow-minded". I know of no modern materialist, not even people like Churchland, who say that they are 100% certain that everything is exactly as it seem to be, it's just that they find the available alternatives even less convincing and so fell they can dismiss them from their world view, I can't understand what's wrong with that.

We can't possibly believe everything, so we must make some judgements, we don't need to make them with absolute certainty, but part of that process will be to reject some options. If, like Dawkins, you believe that religion does more harm than good, then it is morally incumbent upon you to attempt to persuade others to abandon it's practices, i.e. you must "act" on your belief, it is not possible to suspend judgement because you believe some harm might be done. That, again, is why I keep returning to this point about action. Everyone has (in effect) suspended their judgement on things about which they do not need to act, they may be mentally weighing the option, even favour one view, but they have not really committed until they act.

It is those things about which we need to take some action that we must commit ourselves to one view or the other and this necessity does not leave any room for the sort of Skepticism that's being asked for here. We must decide where to spend the state money, we must decide if religious belief is harmful to society, we must decide what to teach our children, we must decide whether to pay for the shamanic healing. We cannot suspend judgement on these things (be sceptical of them) when they are there in the world for us to do something about.

The philosophy with respect to which I am 'anti-' is just the bloodless stuff that wants to be a depersonalized armchair science. — ff0

As to philosophic justifications, while I hold deep empathy for pathos given outlooks that provide wisdom, I’ve come to believe that only logos can convince logos. This, then, does lead toward one of those dry, analytic forms of argumentation … at least this—I guess unfortunately—is the formal approach I’m taking in putting together whatever philosophy I’ve got.

There's a world outside of me that contains me and I share it with others who are also in this world. I was just at the memorial of someone I've known for twenty years. I have their dog now. The world survived their passing. — ff0

Condolences, and may things work out for the best.

It's up there with love not as a duty but as a self-justifying higher pleasure. — ff0

I’d use the word “happiness” for, to me, this concept encompasses that of pleasure. All the same, I like the way you’ve stated this. Hence, then, the supposed pinnacle of love—that of absolute, selfless love—is not an issue of duty but one of attraction toward a self-justifying highest (or deepest) happiness of personal being (by which I take for granted the love of other; interpreting one’s proximity to this pinnacle to be proportional to the degree—dwelling at least within individual moments—to which distinction between self and other fizzles away … be this relation one of romance or otherwise). Anyways, nicely worded.

I do like non-subjective actuality. — ff0

:) Thanks for so saying. I’ll begin to make use of it, then.

Of course we know how to do things, but there's something like a massive ignorance that (in my view) we mostly ignore. Yet this same ignorance when experienced is wonder itself. — ff0

See, it is this very aesthetic that makes philosophical skepticism so wonderful a stance for me. Somehow always feel the strain in saying this from those who are Cartesian or else interpret skepticism from a Cartesian stance of “doubt”—now common fare culturally. Nevertheless, this (occasionally felt) experience of beauty in there being unending wonder and unending discoveries is to me part and parcel of what philosophical skepticism is all about.

"Unless you mean the whole default position deal," — T Clark

Yes I do mean the whole "default position deal". Earlier put forward Plantinga's rather weak argument in favour of of his theism and seemed to suggest that no such argument exited for Realism which the realists themselves believed. I'm demonstrating that such an argument does exist, the "default position" argument is much more subtle and well-thought out than you caricature it as being. It may be wrong, of course, but to suggest it is so absurd that even the Realists don't believe it is nonsense.

"Oh, those craaaazy theists," is not a rational argument. — T Clark

And you had just done with accusing me of mis-characterising the argument and the arguers! I have never presented an argument which states or implies that because theists are crazy we should ignore them. The only use of the word crazy was to describe the way in which we would consider someone who believed in fairies, or believed they were Admiral Nelson. These people are locked up and yet we have no more reason to dismiss their belief than we have someone who believes in God. The same denial of Realism on the grounds that we cannot prove it can be applied to the insane. How can we prove that they're not Admiral Nelson? Only by our belief in the fact that re-incarnation doesn't work like that, hence we treat them for their Schizophrenia, not consult them about naval strategy.

As to philosophic justifications, while I hold deep empathy for pathos given outlooks that provide wisdom, I’ve come to believe that only logos can convince logos. This, then, does lead toward one of those dry, analytic forms of argumentation … at least this—I guess unfortunately—is the formal approach I’m taking in putting together whatever philosophy I’ve got. — javra

In my view, we work with a persuasive speech that is both logical and feeling-tinged. For instance, I might ask you what it is for logos to convince logos. What is this being convinced? Is this not something like a feeling about the way that sentences hang together? A good feeling that approves? (I realize that this stress on feeling drags along the specter of irrationalism. )

Condolences, and may things work out for the best. — javra

Thank you.

I’d use the word “happiness” for, to me, this concept encompasses that of pleasure. All the same, I like the way you’ve stated this. Hence, then, the supposed pinnacle of love—that of absolute, selfless love—is not an issue of duty but one of attraction toward a self-justifying highest (or deepest) happiness of personal being (by which I take for granted the love of other; interpreting one’s proximity to this pinnacle to be proportional to the degree—dwelling at least within individual moments—to which distinction between self and other fizzles away … be this relation one of romance or otherwise). Anyways, nicely worded. — javra

Beautifully written. I like how you mention that the distinction of the self and the other fizzles away. This is the stuff we live for, right? We are absorbed in the play. The theoretical mode vanishes. And the selflessness of the love is absorption in the object. Love poems as the true theology. If philosophy has no interest in that, fine --but then some other discourse becomes the highest discourse. It's nice to know things. It's nice to be correct and/or clever. But all of this is small in the face of love. It's also small in the face of terror and agony.

In my highest moments, I invented poems. These poems were sometimes theses, codifications of the realization that was alive there in that moment. They were 'mystic truths,' and yet utterl carnal and of the flesh and of the world --pointing to nothing beyond the laughing flesh and this world. Why would they point away from paradise? Of course those moments are rare. The same statements mock their author if re-read in a low moment. Concept/metaphor alone is impotent. At best they can help to kindle a total, embodied situation. At worst they 'neurotically' prevent such a moment. (Julien Sorel in the early part of The Red and the Black comes to mind --a great novel.)

See, it is this very aesthetic that makes philosophical skepticism so wonderful a stance for me. Somehow always feel the strain in saying this from those who are Cartesian or else interpret skepticism from a Cartesian stance of “doubt”—now common fair culturally. Nevertheless, this (occasionally felt) experience of beauty in there being unending wonder and unending discoveries is to me part and parcel of what philosophical skepticism is all about. — javra

I completely agree. Whitman is a master of the beauty of this not-knowing and this letting-be. I guess that's the 'wisdom' aspect, though I don't want to use 'wisdom' in a smug way. The metaphor of the child comes to mind. Staying green and open. Not rusting into a know-it-all system-drunk fixity. What words won't eyes can. Here in this world I can meet eyes with someone beautiful and say something behind and around the words. I can't say what this saying is. Call me cunt-struck, but how do 'theologians' neglect this language of the eyes? How do folks dream that all can be made explicit? That our little nets of concepts get the job done? That our being here is neutralized by some 'explanation'?

Surely not, but if not, why should it follow, from the fact that I use the word 'laptop' to mean a being which exists unperceived, that the thing actually exists unperceived? — PossibleAaran

Hi. I've enjoyed your posts and this thread as a whole. I just thought I'd chime in to stress that (in my view) ordinary language is not metaphysical. It's like one of Zizek's jokes about the progammer's not providing code for the insides of houses that the characters aren't allowed to go in. No need.

I'm skeptical about whether we can ever really pluck language out of the total context of action. It's like a surface that we don't think to check behind --most of the time. Then philosophers come along and plausibly fill in the gaps. But as they fill in one gap they themselves are gliding on the surface of all the words they take for granted to this. Our ignorance (inexplicit know-how) is massive, as I see it. And I only began to see it long after I had been immersed in it for many years.

As a first approximation, recall that old trick of repeating a word until its strangeness appears. We make these meaning-charged sounds, meaning-charged marks. But what is this meaning? It is just there. Whatever we pile on top of it is just more meaning. In my experience, this meaning is foggy. Here and there we can sharpen it. Certain poets used resonant objects (objective correlative) to damp this ambiguity. But that gives a crisp image that is all the more ambiguous in terms of feeling and intention.

We can't possibly believe everything, so we must make some judgements, we don't need to make them with absolute certainty, but part of that process will be to reject some options. — Inter Alia

True. I would add that we largely find certain options already rejected. They are dead for us on impact. Ruled out. Right away we reach for a refutation, a defense. When a real choice is thrown at us, it's genuine burden. Being caught between two live options hurts. (At least when there is more risk involved than optimal versus not-quite-optimal pleasure attainment --which ice cream to buy. What I have in mind is, for instance, whether to abandon one's wife, quit one's job, hang oneself, etc.)

If, like Dawkins, you believe that religion does more harm than good, then it is morally incumbent upon you to attempt to persuade others to abandon it's practices, i.e. you must "act" on your belief, it is not possible to suspend judgement because you believe some harm might be done. — Inter Alia

The inconsistency here is that ‘the conscience’ is generally understood as an innate moral faculty, which you’re here applealing to. But it is just such innate moral faciulties which Dawkins has devoted considerable energy to de-bunking on the grounds that what really motivates human actions are the unconscious motives of the selfish gene. So there’s a kind of irony in a self-righteous call to action on the basis of the very faculty which the Dawkins of this world declare a religious delusion.

The inconsistency here is that ‘the conscience’ is generally understood as an innate moral faculty, which you’re here applealing to. But it is just such innate moral faciulties which Dawkins has devoted considerable energy to de-bunking on the grounds that what really motivates human actions are the unconscious motives of the selfish gene. So there’s a kind of irony in a self-righteous call to action on the basis of the very faculty which the Dawkins of this world declare a religious delusion. — Wayfarer

Firstly, that Dawkins might be hypocritical in his use of morality does not refute the argument, it just dodges it. Let's say Dawkins never wrote the Selfish Gene and was a committed humanist in the sense of a belief in human altruism as an emergent property. The argument that he must then act on that belief still stands. a realist can still believe in innate moral faculties, Ethical Naturalists do.

You haven't answered the point, in common with the rest of this thread, that most world-views clash and will inevitably lead to a requirement to act one way or another. At that point one must decide, up until that point one is, by default, in a state of suspended judgement, so no-one is a skeptic when it come to actions and everyone is a skeptic before that.

I’m not dodging anything. You cite Dawkins in support of an ‘argument from moral principle’ then you’d better be prepared for the implications.

Furthermore, I did answer the exact point, by pointing out the sense in which it is the very adoption of ‘world views’ which vitiates the whole argument. Scepticism is about not adopting ‘world views’ as a kind of global opinion.

So there’s a kind of irony in a self-righteous call to action on the basis of the very faculty which the Dawkins of this world declare a religious delusion. — Wayfarer

That's a good point. A self-righteous self-declared accidental ape. Why should science or reason be holy or sacred under such assumptions? The position seems vaguely deterministic, too, so the self-righteousness is also questionable from that angle.

I like science well enough, but it does make for a pretty lame god and cure-all. Hitler's famous book has lots to say about men as animals. It even has lots to say about altruism. Suffice it to say that the man as ape metaphor isn't as scientific as it pretends (in my view). It projects one kind of discourse, trustworthy in its own context perhaps, as a quasi-reigious dominant discourse. It's not that man can be usefully understood for certain purposes as another animal that troubles me, but rather the self-subverting assertion that man is essentially an animal. Such a position ignores us as a god-chasing world-reshaping language users.

I think it's supposed to come off as a seductive humility. Those who deny that we are 'mere' animals are supposed to be sentimentalists or flakes. But of course this ignores the way we actually live and think and speak in terms of good and evil, wise and foolish. What do we do with animals (whether we should or not)? Factory farming, euthanasia when they are inconvenient or threatening, etc. It's no small thing to reduce man to another animal, another piece of programmed meat. Even if it's largely true.
That small(?) 'trans-animal' aspect or potential is not something we want to snuff out?

I'd be interested to get your thoughts on what constitutes a "good reason" for believing that objects continue to exist when they are not perceived. You mention observation and inference, so let's head down that path a bit.

Consider classical physics. It is it reasonable to claim that classical physics is the best available model for understanding the motion of inanimate, macroscopic objects? Classical theories assume continuous trajectories and temporally persistent masses. They predict that if objects disappeared when unobserved then there would be observable consequences that we simply do not experience. A reasonable explanation, given the assumptions built into our best model, is that those objects don't disappear when unobserved, but continue to exist much as they were when last observed.

Is this philosophically air-tight? No. Is it reasonable and responsible for the purposes of belief? No question.

What are your thoughts?

Scepticism is about not adopting ‘world views’ as a kind of global opinion. — Wayfarer

Right, so back to my earlier question of what does skepticism look like then? You seem quite convinced that there's not enough skepticism but I'm lost as to how you reached that conclusion. If it's not the adoption of any 'world view' how does such a person act that people (including the Dawkins' and Church land's of the world) aren't currently doing?

Isn't the belief that we shouldn't adopt any particular 'world view' itself a 'world view'. If you've justified skepticism by its necessity, rather than its utility, then how come it isn't also necessary when deciding whether skepticism is the right approach?

Even if we were to adopt a "don't adopt any world view as a global opinion" approach, how does that apply to Dawkins' attacks on religion, he's not suggesting that materialism is his "world view" in 100% of all thought, just that it isn't when it comes to morality, the afterlife etc. What's wrong with that?

I'm demonstrating that such an argument does exist, the "default position" argument is much more subtle and well-thought out than you caricature it as being. It may be wrong, of course, but to suggest it is so absurd that even the Realists don't believe it is nonsense. — Inter Alia

I don't remember saying that the default position is absurd, I said it is wrong. And I don't mean metaphysical wrong, I mean real in-the-world wrong. What do they call that..., oh, wait, that's right - realism. [Fe] That's not the way the world works. It's not the way the human mind works. It's not the way children or parents work.

And you had just done with accusing me of mis-characterising the argument and the arguers! I have never presented an argument which states or implies that because theists are crazy we should ignore them. — Inter Alia

I was making a joke. Being ironic. I'll start using the international symbol for irony [Fe] from now on.

The only use of the word crazy was to describe the way in which we would consider someone who believed in fairies, or believed they were Admiral Nelson. These people are locked up and yet we have no more reason to dismiss their belief than we have someone who believes in God. The same denial of Realism on the grounds that we cannot prove it can be applied to the insane. — Inter Alia

I have a very conventional, very sane friend who believes in reincarnation. People with unconventional understandings of the world are not ipso facto crazy just like very conventional people are not necessarily sane. Speaking for myself, I have never denied realism. It can't be denied, it's not a fact, it's a way of thinking, a story we tell. It has no consequences for the real world, although it may have consequences for how we see it. Realism, idealism, mysticism, whatever - it's the same damn world.

“Nonsubjective actuality”, for example, doesn’t yet seem to me to be proper terminology for this concept—again, the concept of “a reality that is perfectly indifferent to personal preferences and opinions regarding what is or what ought to be”.

So, if either of you feel like offering your opinions on this, could “nonsubjective actuality” be cogently understood to express this stated meaning? Such as in the proposition: “that the first person point of view holds presence while it is in any way aware is a nonsubjective actuality”. (this being the first example that comes to my mind) — javra

I'm back after a rest and ready to get back in the fray. So, "nonsubjective reality" is your term that could include both the Tao and objective reality, as a way to avoid pointless argument about terminology. Is that correct? Off the top of my head, have no problem with that, although I'll think about it some more. Wherever I finally come down, I appreciate the effort and understand the impulse. The problem for me is that the really interesting issues are found between the two concepts. This is a fight between the Tao and OR, not one where they join together like a Power Ranger to create a mighty Nonsubjective Reality to fight for truth and justice. Wow, that's some metaphor. I'm really proud of that.

I don't remember saying that the default position is absurd, I said it is wrong. And I don't mean metaphysical wrong, I mean real in-the-world wrong. — T Clark

Great, that's at least tangible, so could you explain why you think the theory that children naturally, instinctively understand the data they receive from their senses in a classically realist sense (physicalist, even materialist) is wrong?

I was making a joke. — T Clark

Yes, so was I. We also need a symbol to indicate when we've got it.

People with unconventional understandings of the world are not ipso facto crazy — T Clark

Yes but clearly we treat some of them as such, why is someone who believes they're Admiral Nelson not consulted on naval strategy but someone who believes they can speak to God (the Pope) is consulted on morality?

It has no consequences for the real world, — T Clark

Did you not previously describe it as a toolbox, are they now all tools which you never use because they don't actually do anything? I'm a bit lost now.

Great, that's at least tangible, so could you explain why you think the theory that children naturally, instinctively understand the data they receive from their senses in a classically realist sense (physicalist, even materialist) is wrong? — Inter Alia

Aw, geez, you mean you want me to get facts. I hate that. Just trust me.

Ok, ok, I'll do some homework and come back to discuss further. By which I mean that I'll wait till you forget about this and deny ever saying anything. I am really, really lazy. That's my version of Occam's Razor - if it takes any effort, screw it.

Yes, so was I. We also need a symbol to indicate when we've got it. — Inter Alia

I spent some time with the periodic table but couldn't find anything good. How about [O][K]. Or you could use if you don't find the discussion interesting. [EDIT - Ha, I guess we can't use B in brackets. All that does is bold the text. I'll use {B} instead]

Yes but clearly we treat some of them as such, why is someone who believes they're Admiral Nelson not consulted on naval strategy but someone who believes they can speak to God (the Pope) is consulted on morality? — Inter Alia

Poor analogy - the belief that the Pope has a direct relationship with God is supported and reinforced by a vast social and cultural network. He may be wrong, but he's not crazy. Do you really think he is?

The Pope's job is to understand what God wants. Who better to give their opinion than someone who talks to God?

Did you not previously describe it as a toolbox, are they now all tools which you never use because they don't actually do anything? I'm a bit lost now. — Inter Alia

It's an intellectual tool box. It has to do with our understanding of the world, not the world itself. Is a wrench the car? That may be a stupid metaphor. I'll think about it.

I spent some time with the periodic table but couldn't find anything good. How about [O][K]. — T Clark

I was thinking - we should just use [K]. That's the cute short hand for OK now. Because, you know, like OK is too hard to type.

In my view, we work with a persuasive speech that is both logical and feeling-tinged. For instance, I might ask you what it is for logos to convince logos. What is this being convinced? Is this not something like a feeling about the way that sentences hang together? A good feeling that approves? (I realize that this stress on feeling drags along the specter of irrationalism. ) — ff0

Yea, you’re of course correct that there is no such thing as emotion-devoid logic. Logic is, I very strongly believe, strictly a tool via which our cherished emotions (e.g., sense of well-being) are safeguarded, embellished, and so forth. Hence, our emotive experience of being is primary and our logic (or even wisdom) secondary—thought the first is strongly dependent upon the second. Yet, even in this, merely so saying will not be enough to convince someone who deems logic to be the superlative faculty of intellect to which, ideally, all emotions (including those of desire and sense of satisfaction/comfort) then become subservient slaves of. So, while I agree with you, I still personally find the fine-tuning of logical arguments to be very worthwhile. Then again, there’s wisdom in how one best goes about conveying what one intends to convey, this again addressing the emotive aspects of what is expressed … and I’ve so far found myself direly lacking in this department. But I’m aiming to fail better next time around. :)

So, "nonsubjective reality" is your term that could include both the Tao and objective reality, as a way to avoid pointless argument about terminology. Is that correct? Off the top of my head, have no problem with that, although I'll think about it some more. Wherever I finally come down, I appreciate the effort and understand the impulse. The problem for me is that the really interesting issues are found between the two concepts. This is a fight between the Tao and OR, not one where they join together like a Power Ranger to create a mighty Nonsubjective Reality to fight for truth and justice. Wow, that's some metaphor. I'm really proud of that. — T Clark

Very cool. To my mind, if it could be agreed upon (else, logically demonstrated) that nonsubjective reality holds presence, this would then simplify a great deal of ongoing arguments—mostly dealing with at least some issues of what can be labeled subjectivism. Then the concerns become solely focused on what in fact is nonsubjectively real. A lot of disagreements would yet occur, but at least we’d all agree that there is something real which underlies all that we otherwise imagine to be—maybe even including a strictly subjective opinion that there is a logical contradiction to the Tao and OR co-occurring. (Maybe.)

OK then, so my resolute stance is then one of nonsubjective realism. (Just trying to get used to expressing this phrase … still weird to me, but I’ll be using it.)

Aw, geez, you mean you want me to get facts. I hate that. Just trust me. — T Clark

[K]

Poor analogy - the belief that the Pope has a direct relationship with God is supported and reinforced by a vast social and cultural network. He may be wrong, but he's not crazy. Do you really think he is? — T Clark

I think he might be, yes, but let's not dwell on that. You're right it was a poor analogy because what I'm trying to say is that the reason the Pope is consulted and our Nelson delusion is not is only because of the social network and I just don't think that's a very good reason to give any greater credit to what the Pope says than to our Nelson. But I agree it might be a good reason to think our Nelson's mad and the Pope isn't.

Scepticism is about not adopting ‘world views’ as a kind of global opinion.
— Wayfarer

Right, so back to my earlier question of what does skepticism look like then? You seem quite convinced that there's not enough skepticism but I'm lost as to how you reached that conclusion. If it's not the adoption of any 'world view' how does such a person act that people (including the Dawkins' and Churchland's of the world) aren't currently doing? — Inter Alia

The materialism of those types of thinking is an ideology, a constellation of ideas, which form the basis for judgements about what is and isn't true. For that reason, they are examples of 'unbelief as a belief'. Your own appeal to Dawkins illustrates a similar tendency: the view that science is (pardon the irony) the 'path of righteousness' while religion is a pernicious error; it puts science in the place of a religion, not in its methods, but in the sense of being the source of normative judgement.

'Dawkins's message is basically that we are social animals on an evolutionary trajectory to ever more rational, and therefore higher, moral standards, but that the process has been derailed somewhere along the line by the appearance of religion. It had looked until recently as though we were shaking off religion and entering an Age of Reason. But now, with the rise of religious fundamentalism, there is a relapse which accounts for the world's present troubles. Nevertheless, thanks to the enlightenment Science brings, we can root out religion and get back on track. ¹'

Isn't the belief that we shouldn't adopt any particular 'world view' itself a 'world view'. If you've justified skepticism by its necessity, rather than its utility, then how come it isn't also necessary when deciding whether skepticism is the right approach? — Inter Alia

That's a good question, to which I refer back to my initial response.

I am presently asking whether what I ordinarily think is actually true, and whether I have any reliable means of figuring it out. — PossibleAaran

I already told you: do something like take a picture while you have your eyes closed, and you will be able to verify that the object of your experience exists unperceived. Or just ask someone else. It's not that complicated or difficult, and there's no great mystery about it.

As I said, you're only making it seem difficult and mysterious because you're mixing up the abstraction of the experience of the object with the object. This is also the reason why you think I'm begging the question, or defining things into existence.

Your experience of the laptop, certainly, cannot possibly exist unperceived. In the case of experiences as such, abstracted away from what they're experiences of, esse most certainly is percipi.

But objects, the things we normally perceive, are not the sorts of things that exist only while being perceived, they exist unperceived, and that is easily verified by means such as I outlined (instruments, like cameras or other causally-connectable things).

A painfully simple way to see the difficulty with your argument here is as follows. Every Theist means by 'God', a being which actually exists. Does it then follow that God exists, just from the fact that the Theist uses a word a certain way? Surely not, but if not, why should it follow, from the fact that I use the word 'laptop' to mean a being which exists unperceived, that the thing actually exists unperceived? — PossibleAaran

It doesn't follow from the fact that you use the word "laptop" that the laptop exists unperceived, it follows from the fact (if it is a fact) that you're really and truly perceiving a laptop that it exists unperceived.

Again, if you're really perceiving a laptop, then necessarily it exists unperceived, because a laptop is a physical object and physical objects are just the sorts of things that exist unperceived (a fact that can easily be verified by various kinds of instruments, as I said).

And you check whether it's really a laptop (a physical object) by means of further inspection - e.g. by switching it on to see if it functions as a laptop, by opening it up; or by taking a picture, or asking someone else, if you suspect you might be having something like a laptop hallucination (which would be something that only exists while perceived).

what I'm trying to say is that the reason the Pope is consulted and our Nelson delusion is not is only because of the social network and I just don't think that's a very good reason to give any greater credit to what the Pope says than to our Nelson. — Inter Alia

This is true of all of us. My place in the world on a day to day basis comes from my social network. I'm an engineer. I have a job and can practice because of the social network. Ditto for you. You, me, the Pope, we're all in this together. He may be wrong, but he got here the same way you and I did.

Yea, you’re of course correct that there is no such thing as emotion-devoid logic. Logic is, I very strongly believe, strictly a tool via which our cherished emotions (e.g., sense of well-being) are safeguarded, embellished, and so forth. Hence, our emotive experience of being is primary and our logic (or even wisdom) secondary—thought the first is strongly dependent upon the second. Yet, even in this, merely so saying will not be enough to convince someone who deems logic to be the superlative faculty of intellect to which, ideally, all emotions (including those of desire and sense of satisfaction/comfort) then become subservient slaves of. So, while I agree with you, I still personally find the fine-tuning of logical arguments to be very worthwhile. Then again, there’s wisdom in how one best goes about conveying what one intends to convey, this again addressing the emotive aspects of what is expressed … and I’ve so far found myself direly lacking in this department. But I’m aiming to fail better next time around. :) — javra

All good points. What's interesting to me is that an investment in the superiority or priority of logic is still 'irrational' in a certain sense. We take our most fundamental criterion in a blindly passionate sort of way. Because what's so great about being logical? We can't use logic to justify this, since the authority of logic as a criterion is what's at stake. On the other hand, something like being logical is experienced as a self-justifying value. It's 'aesthetic' in some sense. How are logic textbooks written? With what authority? With an intuitive authority. Strip away everything where bias plays a role, and we all agree intuitively on the skeleton.

The problem with real language is ambiguity. We're never finished deciding what our non-trivial terms mean. One might say that reason is rhetoric, self-persuasive and other-persuasive. Or reason is rationalization. Of course we use these words pejoratively when describing speech that fails to persuade us. That it persuades others we chalk up to bias, weak-mindedness or lying, etc.

I understand the charm of fine-tuning arguments. Still, I think the most revolutionizing speech often involves a strong new metaphor --an analogically shifted paradigm, etc.

I'd be interested to get your thoughts on what constitutes a "good reason" for believing that objects continue to exist when they are not perceived. You mention observation and inference, so let's head down that path a bit.

Consider classical physics. It is it reasonable to claim that classical physics is the best available model for understanding the motion of inanimate, macroscopic objects? Classical theories assume continuous trajectories and temporally persistent masses. They predict that if objects disappeared when unobserved then there would be observable consequences that we simply do not experience. A reasonable explanation, given the assumptions built into our best model, is that those objects don't disappear when unobserved, but continue to exist much as they were when last observed.

Is this philosophically air-tight? No. Is it reasonable and responsible for the purposes of belief? No question — Aaron R

A good reason to believe it would be any means of reliably establishing it to be true. Sense perception and inference I discussed because these are our most obvious and relevant reliable faculties.

It is true that classical physical theories assume that things exist unperceived, but this is hardly a justification of that claim. What reason do these classical theories give for supposing that things do exist unperceived? They certainly say it, but why do they say it? The theories predict that 'if objects disappeared when unobserved then there would be observable consequences'. What would those consequences be? It seems like the hypothesis that things only exist when perceived has all of the same predictive consequences as the hypothesis that they exist also unperceived. Perhaps I have missed something. But if so, it would be good to be clear about what.

I already told you: do something like take a picture while you have your eyes closed, and you will be able to verify that the object of your experience exists unperceived. Or just ask someone else. It's not that complicated or difficult, and there's no great mystery about it. — gurugeorge

But I don't believe you did 'already tell me'. This argument about taking a picture is a new argument introduced with this post, is it not? At any rate, this isn't all that clear. What exactly does taking the picture prove? So at this moment, T1, I am perceiving something. I close my eyes at T2. Does that which I perceived when my eyes were open still exist when unperceived? I take a picture with my eyes closed at T3. When I open them at T4, I can see on the camera a picture which 'looks just like' that which I experienced with my eyes open. What is the evidence we have at this stage? Well I remember perceiving something at T1 and I remember taking a picture at T3, and I am currently perceiving something else (namely, the picture which looks like what I perceived at T1, on a camera screen) at T4. These three bits of evidence don't logically entail that something existed unperceived and which the camera took a picture of.

I know at this point you will likely complain that they do entail it, because cameras take pictures of things and they can't take pictures of things which don't exist. So if I really did take a picture of something at T3, it follows that the thing I took a picture of existed unperceived at that time. But now it is clear that this whole language of the camera 'taking pictures of things' assumes that Realism is true and hence begs the question. In other words, it is an interpretation of the evidence to suggest that I took a picture of something which existed unperceived at T3 and that thing is what I have a picture of at T4. The experiences I have at T1-T4 do not entail that interpretation. We should describe the evidence neutrally, in a way that doesn't just assume that something existed at T3 of which I took a picture. If we do that then the evidence I have is that I perceive something at T1, then I close my eyes at T2, then I press a button at T3 and hear a clicking sound, then at T4 I perceive a picture of something which looks like the thing I perceived at T1. None of that entails that things exist unperceived, so how do you cogently infer that things exist unperceived from this data? This would be an intriguing argument, if you could fill the details in.

As I said, you're only making it seem difficult and mysterious because you're mixing up the abstraction of the experience of the object with the object. This is also the reason why you think I'm begging the question, or defining things into existence.

Your experience of the laptop, certainly, cannot possibly exist unperceived. In the case of experiences as such, abstracted away from what they're experiences of, esse most certainly is percipi. — gurugeorge

This is the 2nd time you have accused me of this conflation. I am well aware of the difference, which Moore pointed out, between the experience of something and the object of the experience. I am not sure I even used those words in my last post. At T1 I perceive something. It is something which I would ordinarily call a 'laptop', but since you insist that if it is a laptop then it must exist unperceived, I do not call it a 'laptop'. Instead I try to characterize the perception in a way that doesn't presuppose Realism, by saying merely 'I perceive something'. This was also the reason I spoke of the 'object of my experience'. The 'object', as I was thinking of it, is merely that which I see. I see a black, rectangular thing with a slightly lighter front face. What I don't see, is the property of unperceived existence, which is why if the thing I perceive really has that property, I can only reliably tell that this is so by inference.

I completely agree with you that our language itself isn't metaphysically loaded. I think ordinary language is far less precise than most philosophers suppose that it is and doesn't have 'build in' views on philosophical issues. I think Bertrand Russell saw this clearly. I do think, though, that most non-philosophers believe that Realism is true, at least implicitly.

PA

I completely agree with you that our language itself isn't metaphysically loaded. I think ordinary language is far less precise than most philosophers suppose that it is and doesn't have 'build in' views on philosophical issues. I think Bertrand Russell saw this clearly. I do think, though, that most non-philosophers believe that Realism is true, at least implicitly. — PossibleAaran

Yes, I agree that non-philosophers accept realism as a true, in a sort of unconscious way. Indeed, I think we all think some kind of 'primordial' realism is true. In our Humean studies we can play with other ideas, but everywhere else the pre-theoretical sense of a shared world is primary. We can only bother to communicate from this half-conscious half-conceptual assumption. We can only bother to debate about what is the case because there is a sort of shared space about which statements can be true or false. Or that's how I see it. Thanks for your reply.

We take our most fundamental criterion in a blindly passionate sort of way. Because what's so great about being logical? We can't use logic to justify this, since the authority of logic as a criterion is what's at stake. On the other hand, something like being logical is experienced as a self-justifying value. It's 'aesthetic' in some sense.

[...]

I understand the charm of fine-tuning arguments. Still, I think the most revolutionizing speech often involves a strong new metaphor --an analogically shifted paradigm, etc. — ff0

Hesitantly—and kind’a encouraged by the last quoted statement—I’ll be a bit creative in this post’s expressions so as to condense an otherwise hard to communicate concept:

I sometimes liken logic (logos as it was addressed in Ancient Greek) to itself be a universal metaphor—in the sense here intended, a metaphor for pure being as it is and as it, in all its existentially divided parts, operates via process of becoming. This can probably become a multifaceted stance—and maybe you’ll agree that poetic speech might be both helpful for conveyance of meaning between some while simultaneously being a hindrance as regards meaning-conveyance among others. Still, relying on the Ancient Greek concept of Logos: logic, reasoning, ratios and rationing (or, partitioning this from that; appropriating relations between; proportionality; etc.), rationalizing, and language itself—among other concepts—were all interlinked in the concept of Logos. Are all interlinked, I’d say. Our inability to get behind language—which you’ve previously mentioned—is then, from certain vantages, one and the same with our inability to get behind the logos within which we dwell and of which we are in large part composed … and—like the fish’s lack of awareness of the water within which it swims, which you’ve addressed—quite often of which we can’t help but be utterly unaware of. IMO, due to our inability to get behind all the logos that is, we in some ways then cannot ever get to the pure, non-linguistic, being that is—for which we as beings use logos to address.

That perspective briefly mentioned, logic—in the form of the principles of thought being consistently applied—then serves as our common, human, universal language—or common meta-language if one prefers. (For my part, the particulars of formal logic then follow suit, but are not as universal as the principles of thought themselves.)

To cut to the chase, what I’m here trying to make the case for is this: imo, the optimal metaphor would be one that consists of a logical expression readily accessible to all—such that the meaning holds the potential to become commonly understood by (as extremely overreaching an ideal as this is) all people. Since all people share the aesthetic for consistency in what is and what is deemed to be—otherwise said, all are subjects to the principle of noncontradiction—all could then in principle come to understand such logos-bound expressions.

… or so I’m currently thinking. And waxing a bit too poetic at that, I imagine. (Heck, not all poetic verse is good even from the vantage of its author.) But I trust that some of this can come across in a comprehensible manner—though maybe not to everyone.

Still, relying on the Ancient Greek concept of Logos: logic, reasoning, ratios and rationing (or, partitioning this from that; appropriating relations between; proportionality; etc.), rationalizing, and language itself—among other concepts—were all interlinked in the concept of Logos. Are all interlinked, I’d say. Our inability to get behind language—which you’ve previously mentioned—is then, from certain vantages, one and the same with our inability to get behind the logos within which we dwell and of which we are in large part composed … and—like the fish’s lack of awareness of the water within which it swims, which you’ve addressed—quite often of which we can’t help but be utterly unaware of. IMO, due to our inability to get behind all the logos that is, we in some ways then cannot ever get to the pure, non-linguistic, being that is—for which we as beings use logos to address. — javra

Yes. Very well put. I follow you well here. We can't behind the logos completely. I think 'factic life' is a one name of this impossible target --the fantasy of the unmediated. Moment zero, unstained by the past, unstained by the inherited pre-interpretaion through which we always already are forced to peer through as if through stained glass. Unmediated being, the smooth untrodden snow, a sort of holy virgin of uncontaminated truth.

That perspective briefly mentioned, logic then—in the form of the principles of thought being consistently applied—then serves as our common, human, universal language—or common meta-language if one prefers. (For my part, the particulars of formal logic then follow suit, but are not as universal as the principles of thought themselves.) — javra

Right. And we can agree on the basic structures when we filter out all the usual content about which we are biased. But plug in the word 'God' or 'virtue' or 'science' or 'rationality' and the stain of history is there, including personal history. The words we care about are wet.

To cut to the chase, what I’m here trying to make the case for is this: imo, the optimal metaphor would be one that consists of a logical expression readily accessible to all—such that the meaning holds the potential to become commonly understood by (as extremely overreaching an ideal as this is) all people. Since all people share the aesthetic for consistency in what is and what is deemed to be—otherwise said, all are subjects to the principle of noncontradiction—all could then in principle come to understand such logos-bound expressions.

… or so I’m currently thinking. And waxing a bit too poetic at that, I imagine. (Heck, not all poetic verse is good even from the vantage of its author.) But I trust that some of this can come across in a comprehensible manner—though maybe not to everyone. — javra

I mostly agree. I do speculate that some metaphors will only speak to certain types of people. For instance, some don't give a damn about Nietzsche's poetry of solitude. It speaks to me. He also writes that the spirit is a stomach. That too speaks to me. But others don't like the idea of consumption,that life is a bloody maw in some sense, digesting experience, turning disaster into opportunity. The spirit must instead be a sort of diamond apart from the 'filth' of time-trapped flesh. So we might speak of esoteric metaphors, of 'passwords.'

But I generally agree. A metaphor can become literalized for a culture. 'Love is the only law. ' This, for instance, would institute a way of holding any particular law as an imperfect approximation of some foggy ideal law. With this notion comes 'the letter killeth, but the spirt giveth life.' And then maybe we have implicit metaphors, such as the physicist as priest who connects us to inhuman really real reality.

The materialism of those types of thinking is an ideology, a constellation of ideas, which form the basis for judgements about what is and isn't true. For that reason, they are examples of 'unbelief as a belief'. Your own appeal to Dawkins illustrates a similar tendency: the view that science is (pardon the irony) the 'path of righteousness' while religion is a pernicious error; it puts science in the place of a religion, not in its methods, but in the sense of being the source of normative judgement. — Wayfarer

Yes. The question was what's wrong with that? Where's the epistemological or moral error? Dawkins has taken an issue - say contraception - he's deciding how to look at it. He chosen materialism out of the range of equally valid ideologies, the tools in his toolbox to borrow an analogy, no reason why he should have chosen any other. Having done so, a moral issue arises, the Pope (who just some bloke, we've chosen materialism as our world view for this one) is suggesting that people shouldn't use it and this seems to be risking the harm of unwanted pregnancies and STDs, so now he has a moral obligation to try and dissuade people from following the precepts of that religion.

He looks at another issue, the afterlife. Chooses his world-view, his ideology, that's going to help him understand this one and he chooses materialism again, after all it seemed to help last time and it's a perfectly valid choice among others. He sees maybe how a belief in the afterlife comforts some people, but others without such a belief are not falling apart so it can't be that important, but he sees how a belief in the afterlife can be used to promote suicide bombing. Another moral obligation arises, to dissuade people from this belief for which the benefits seem small and easily replaced, but the harms seem quite serious.

Now he notices a trend. All these moral obligations would be served if he could just convince people not to be religious. There doesn't seem to him to be any advantage that can't be easily replaced, but there are all these harms he feels morally obliged to try and avoid, all of which would be avoided if people stopped being religious.

Now replace religion with homoeopathy and the moral harm is the spending of Health Service money on something which doesn't work (according to the world-view that's been selected to look at the problem), or astrology and the harm is people being given false guidance for money they might not easily afford, the list goes on.

This is essentially the campaigning materialist's position that is being subtly attacked here (or at least criticised); but where is the epistemological or ethical error? Are they not allowed to pick materialism so often, are we obliged to pick some other world view once in a while, do we have to allocate one problem to each world view out there just to give them all a fair chance?

You said;

I think the inherent trust that modern culture places in naturalism is something certainly deserving of scepticism. — Wayfarer

I still don't feel like anyone has answered, why? All that's happened is there's been a robust proof that naturalism is just an ideology like any other, so? What is then wrong with choosing it as often as we like and following the moral implications of doing so?

This is true of all of us. My place in the world on a day to day basis comes from my social network. — T Clark

I'm not talking about how he got his job, I'm talking about why there is a movement within epistemology to take his views seriously, but not those of our delusional Nelson. Lots of other people believing him is a perfectly good reason to conclude he's probably not mad, it's also a perfectly good explanation of how he got his job, it is not an epistemological argument.

At T1 I perceive something. It is something which I would ordinarily call a 'laptop', but since you insist that if it is a laptop then it must exist unperceived, I do not call it a 'laptop'. Instead I try to characterize the perception in a way that doesn't presuppose Realism, by saying merely 'I perceive something'. — PossibleAaran

"I perceive something" still presupposes realism (that the something exists). "I experience an internal sensation, one I've come to associate with perceiving something" is a description that does not assume Realism. It is obvious then that whilst you're not looking, that experience goes away, it comes back when you start looking again. This does not tell us anything about the laptop whilst you weren't looking, but it doesn't tell us anything about the laptop whilst you were looking either. Unless we relate the experience to the existence of an object outside of our minds the issue with closing your eyes and opening them again is an unnecessary distraction. The question is simply, does the experience relate to a thing outside of your mind?

I don't think anyone here is then arguing that it can be proven beyond all doubt that it does, you might be looking at a picture of a laptop and be deceived, you might be a schizophrenic and be experiencing a very powerful hallucination of a laptop, or Berkeley might be right and there is no laptop, only your experience of it. The question is what difference does it make?

Imagine you're sat in a public library working on your laptop, there's been a spate of thefts recently. You close your eyes to daydream for a while and hear the rustle of clothing indicating someone is reaching out to where you laptop was. What do you think it would be best to do? Open your eyes to prevent the thief, or think "it's OK the laptop probably isn't there because I can't see it, it'll be fine"?
You would never dare do the latter, every instinct in your body would be crying out to tell you that £300 of equipment is about to be nicked. That is the 'evidence' you're looking for as to why Realists are Realists.