I think the early sceptics doubted convention and conventional ways of understanding, and cast doubt on the values imputed by those around them on such things as wealth, possessions, social status, respectability, the social contract, and the kinds of things that ‘everyone knows’ to be true. — Wayfarer

I think this is still true of the type of skepticism being discussed here, it's just that one of the "kinds of things that ‘everyone knows’ to be true" today is the scientific explanation for the world we experience through sense perception, the laws of physics etc. It's not necessarily that fewer people believe in non-physical entities like the soul or heaven, it's that they find it much harder to justify their belief in the language of the modern era and so skepticism becomes a useful tool, they must call into question the veracity of the modern description of the world in order to talk about their beliefs. This was simply not necessary for most of (modern) history because the modern description of the world contained entities like heaven and souls at the time, they were objects taken for granted to exist by most people. Indeed, the skeptics at the time would have been those who called the existence of such things into doubt.

This is why I made the point earlier, and I'd be very interested to hear other peoples experiences here, that I have never heard a skeptic (of the type we're talking about in this thread) suggest that because we can't know for sure, it would be a good idea to both pray to mecca, and attend church, after all we should 'doubt' the veracity of both stories and hedge our bets. The rhetoric is always, we should not dismiss {insert spiritual activity here}, because we cannot prove that the scientific view of the world (which concludes such activity is probably hogwash) is true. The problem is not so much with the latter half of that proposition, but the former. This is because;

(1) It can be used to justify literally any action whatsoever, yet it's basically populist, any popular religion, spirituality, or non-realist philosophy is included in the list of things we should not dismiss, but the wild fantasies of the clearly delusional are never thus defended despite the fact that we equally cannot disprove them.
(2) "We should not dismiss..." in my opinion is generally interpreted as we shouldn't argue against, judge as nonsense, ridicule those who believe in, or (more worryingly) should actually give state support to {insert spiritual activity here}. None of these actions, however, amount to the same thing as concluding that {insert spiritual activity here} is beyond all doubt wrong, they're just expressions of our current judgement, judgements that we must all make.

Ultimately, and I think this is the point was alluding to, we cannot suspend judgement. If, say, the Calvinist God exists (and he might), we must immediately refrain from doing loads of stuff otherwise we might be tormented for eternity in the afterlife, if he doesn't exist we can carry on as we were, but (and this is the most important bit) we may also be harmed by others acting as if he does exist. Not only is it not possible for us to suspend judgement (we must fall down on one side or the other) but having made our choice it sometimes becomes incumbent upon us to argue against, dissuade and perhaps even ridicule those who made a different choice entirely because we did not suspend judgement, we came down on one side and that has implications for how we interact with other people as well as for ourselves.

Doubt is not suspension of judgement, it's the questioning of the truth or validity of something based on reasons (e.g. some anomaly). Suspension of judgement would be something like agnosticism or indecision. — gurugeorge

Alright, so you define 'doubt' as the questioning of truth based on reasons. Then you conclude that its incoherent to doubt something without reasons. Well I suppose your argument is correct, if only because its patently trivial. If that's what you mean by 'doubt', then I do not claim that we can 'doubt' everything. I claim the theses which I mentioned in my last post, all of which you ignored.

If they are truly objects of perception, then necessarily they exist unperceived, so doubting that objects of perception exist unperceived doesn't make any sense. Generally, with odd exceptions like rainbows, objects of perception just are the kinds of things that exist unperceived (or: if it doesn't exist unperceived, then it wasn't an object of perception after all). You can easily verify the existence of unperceived objects by means of instruments (e.g. using a watch, shut your eyes and simultaneously take a picture with a camera with a timestamp). — gurugeorge

You can't just define 'objects of perception' as 'things which exist unperceived' and then claim to have won some victory. I am currently having a certain sensory experience as I type these words. It is an experience I would describe as 'of a laptop'. The object of my experience is just that which I am aware of at that moment. Does that thing, 'the laptop', exist unperceived? Its clearly false that, as you say, 'objects of perception necessarily exist unperceived', since the present object of my perception could very well only exist when perceived. There is no contradiction in supposing that the laptop which I am currently aware of does not exist when unperceived.

You could define 'object of perception' so as to make yourself right, but that's hardly impressive. I think the disagreement we have had here is because you took me to be using 'object of perception' in a different way than I was.

Yes, but you've given us no reason to take it seriously and to replace our ordinary use of "illusion" with it. It's just an imaginary usage, a flight of fancy that bears little relation to the ordinary, everyday concept of illusion. The ordinary use of "illusion" is contextual - illusion in relation to veridical perception, and one doubts perception based on reasons. Imagining a deceiving demon isn't a reason to doubt perception — gurugeorge

Why do I need to give you a reason to accept a stipulated definition? I told you what I mean by illusion. An object of perception is illusory if and only if that object does not exist unperceived. If that isn't the ordinary usage, that's nice, but why does that matter? If you just don't like me using the word 'illusion' in a non-ordinary way, then use the word 'smillusion' for my concept. Is the ordinary concept somehow the word of God, so that I dare not ever introduce a non-ordinary concept for the discussion of a philosophical issue?

You don't need to imagine the demon for my purpose. I remind you again that I have no thesis about doubt understood in the way you understand it. I have maintained (1) We cannot prove to someone who does not believe it that the objects of sense perception exist unperceived, (2) we cannot even locate a reliable source for that belief to the satisfaction of realists themselves. I have discussed attempts to refute both of these theses (since I hope at least the 2nd one can be refuted) with several others. I can't find any argument in what you say against either (1) or (2). I can only find the insistence that we define 'doubt' in a certain way, that we define 'illusion' in a certain way, the ungrounded claim that 'the objects of perception necessarily exist unperceived' and the assumption that if a concept isn't an ordinary language concept, we aren't allowed to use it.

PA

I think this is still true of the type of skepticism being discussed here, it's just that one of the "kinds of things that ‘everyone knows’ to be true" today is the scientific explanation for the world we experience through sense perception, the laws of physics etc. It's not necessarily that fewer people believe in non-physical entities like the soul or heaven, it's that they find it much harder to justify their belief in the language of the modern era and so skepticism becomes a useful tool, they must call into question the veracity of the modern description of the world in order to talk about their beliefs. This was simply not necessary for most of (modern) history because the modern description of the world contained entities like heaven and souls at the time, they were objects taken for granted to exist by most people. Indeed, the skeptics at the time would have been those who called the existence of such things into doubt. — Inter Alia

There's some difficult questions here, but I do think the mention of 'the laws of physics' sticks out. I think what you're really talking about in your post, is worldviews, and the kinds of ideas which ought to be considered credible. On one side, the 'laws of physics', representing principles which have been validated by science; on the other side, 'praying to mecca', 'attending church', [ insert spiritual practice here ] as a competing, and presumably conflicting, set of beliefs and practices. So I think you're implicitly endorsing the 'conflict theory', which is the view that religious and scientific attitudes are necessarily in competition or conflict. But I think the 'conflict thesis' itself, and this way of viewing religious and scientific ideas as being in conflict, is the product of a particular cultural history, arising out of the complex relationship between religion and science in European history. But that is all quite tangential to this particular topic.

I think the 'conflict thesis' itself, and this way of viewing religious and scientific ideas as being in conflict, is the product of a particular cultural history, arising out of the complex relationship between religion and science in European history. — Wayfarer

I agree, and I'm not so sure is is tangential to this discussion. I think it relates to 's second assertion that "we cannot even locate a reliable source for that belief to the satisfaction of realists themselves." I think there is a confusion between the anti-realism of solopsists or epistemological dualists and historical religion, which can be quite realistic in parts, adopting a Russellian monism (that there is scope for the soul and heaven to both be 'real' things we just haven't yet found a method of observing directly.

What I'm suggesting is that the realist do have a perfectly rational source for their belief which they themselves are satisfied with, it generally that realism (in the classic sense) seems like the 'default' position. The argument against that (that many people are religious or spiritual) makes the error I've outlined above, presuming these people are anti-realists when they are in fact more like reductive monists. They're not deliberately suspending judgement on the existence of a soul, they think there is one and if someone invented a 'soul measuring device' it would proceed to detect one without trouble.

I claim the theses which I mentioned in my last post, all of which you ignored. — PossibleAaran

I didn't ignore it, I said that it's a flight of fancy you've given me no reason to take seriously. It's just a different definition of "doubt" from the everyday one which I've outlined (which you agree is what we normally use).

I am currently having a certain sensory experience as I type these words. It is an experience I would describe as 'of a laptop'. The object of my experience is just that which I am aware of at that moment. Does that thing, 'the laptop', exist unperceived? — PossibleAaran

If it's truly a laptop you're perceiving then of course it exists unperceived. Laptops are just the sort of thing that exists unperceived, and you can check for yourself, in the way I outlined, that your laptop exists unperceived.

If you are talking about (abstracting away) your experience of the laptop, then it obviously doesn't exist unexperienced.

But these are two very different things.

IOW, there's a sleight of hand here between "object of experience"=laptop and "object of experience"=experience-of-laptop.

So not only are you giving me an idiosyncratic definition of "doubt" without giving me any reason why I should follow you in your redefinition, you're also giving me an idiosyncratic definition of "object" without giving me any reason why I should follow you in that redefinition.

You may think you're revealing something profound and interesting, but from my point of view you're just redefining words in a way that creates a queer artificial mystery. No mystery exists in relation to the normal uses of the concepts, the mystery, the puzzle, only appears when one takes seriously your proposed redefinitions of those concepts.

But you will forgive me for being sceptical: why should I re-jig my concepts so that "object" means "experience-of-object?"

In short, I relate to your 'who says?" reaction and at the same time defend the primality of being in the world. My defense fits with your critique elsewhere in the thread of exaggerated skepticism. We aren't bodiless computers in an air-conditioned room searching for perfect string of symbols. We have to eat and breath and excrete just to survive as bodies. We have to interact as babies and children to learn language and become more or less fully human in an emotional sense long before we can indulge in epistemological niceties and pretend to pretend that the world isn't really there. Our world, the world our bodies and hearts live in, has to be in pretty good shape already (as the result of work and suffering) for us to soar with the strange and long words of the metaphysicians. Is this something I need to prove? Ah, but if this isn't 'obvious' to my conversational partners, how I can hope to relate to those who know neither work nor suffering? Those do can doubt the existence of the hammer as it smashes their thumb? Those for whom the eyes of the beloved are an illusion? — ff0

A world seen through non-realist eyes is not chaotic or unknowable. It isn't the same thing as skepticism of any of the types we have been discussing. Also, I never rejected realism as a useful way of looking at the world. I only said it isn't the only one or even the best one. As I sit here eating my lunch, I don't question whether the chili and salad I'm eating are really there.

At the same time, especially when I'm actively participating in the forum, I'm also paying attention to my internal experience, my awareness. Just a moment ago I stopped for a second and examined what was going on inside me to see what I am really feeling and seeing. The two - external and internal - interact all the time. It is my position, and I'm not the only one, that the best way of looking at the world for me, most of the time is as a weaving together of what's outside and what's inside. The Tao Te Ching talks about human action bringing the world into existence. That makes a lot of sense to me - in a very practical and down to earth way.

It can be used to justify literally any action whatsoever, yet it's basically populist, any popular religion, spirituality, or non-realist philosophy is included in the list of things we should not dismiss, but the wild fantasies of the clearly delusional are never thus defended despite the fact that we equally cannot disprove them. — Inter Alia

We're not talking about action, we're talking about belief in the nature of the world. We're not talking about any fact (except, I guess, for the existence of God). Knock yourself out - dismiss anything you want. And I will dismiss, or reject, or at least argue against, your dismissal. Not because you're wrong, there is no right or wrong on this question, but because you are cutting yourself off from potentially useful ways of seeing things.

"We should not dismiss..." in my opinion is generally interpreted as we shouldn't argue against, judge as nonsense, ridicule those who believe in, or (more worryingly) should actually give state support to {insert spiritual activity here}. None of these actions, however, amount to the same thing as concluding that {insert spiritual activity here} is beyond all doubt wrong, they're just expressions of our current judgement, judgements that we must all make. — Inter Alia

As I said, dismiss anything you want. It is my opinion that you are cutting yourself off from valuable ways of seeing the world. I have been trying to make that argument in this thread, which is one of my favorites ever. (Thank you @PossibleAaran). I never have any problem with anyone arguing against any metaphysical position, although, as I've said before, I think most of those arguments show a misunderstanding of what a metaphysical position actually means. Same goes for "judging as nonsense."

As for "ridicule those who believe in." Well, I can't complain too much since I am not without sin, but I'll at least say it is a weak and logically faulty rhetorical method. Not to mention inconsiderate. I am a firm believer in separation of church and state. On the other hand, I would not necessarily have trouble with support for study or practice of meditation, mindfulness (a word I hate), established alternative medicines, and other similar approaches.

We're not talking about action, we're talking about belief in the nature of the world. — T Clark

The "action" I'm referring to is that by which others are being judged to be not skeptical enough, the post started by (and I've interpreted many of the subsequent posts as) suggesting that people have lost the appropriate degree of Skepticism and gave examples.

Naturalism has far too easy a time these days, with few sceptical challengers. Your acid metaphor is apt, since what tends to happen these days is alternatives to Naturalism are scoffed at and treated as absurd. I cannot count the number of articles I have read in which Idealism is dismissed as unbelievable, incredible, 'dead', or just plain silly. Theism gets a similar treatment, though to a lesser degree because it has been defended as of late by some capable philosophers. What tends to happen with Naturalism is that anyone who dares raise a challenge to it is insulted and discredited ad hominem. — PossibleAaran

What I'm asking is what does the appropriate (useful, to put it in your terms) amount of Skepticism (particularly about naturalism) actually look like, and how do we determine its utility? You must have some idea in order to conclude that there's not enough of it, and that more might be useful, but I'm struggling to see how such a degree of Skepticism would manifest itself, useful to do what?

It would seem that if someone comes up with some metaphysical idea and we all scoff at it as absurd, that's too skeptical we should apparently be more be believing of such an idea, but if someone presents the idea that things are pretty much as they seem, that's absurd and we should all be much more skeptical of that. I still don't feel like we've had any explanation as to why we should be that skeptical (no more, no less) only that logic allows us to be.

The fact that you would have no problem with giving state money to meditation is exactly the sort of "action" in response to doubting the materialist definition that I'm talking about. What about funding fairy research, or hollow-earth expeditions, the idea that I can cure you with my mind? It seems basically like you're saying we should be more prepared to belive all the popular alternative metaphysics but we can obviously ignore all the 'crazy' ones. What I'm asking is by what standard these are to be judged?

It would seem that if someone comes up with some metaphysical idea and we all scoff at it as absurd, that's too skeptical we should apparently be more be believing of such an idea, but if someone presents the idea that things are pretty much as they seem, that's absurd and we should all be much more skeptical of that. I still don't feel like we've had any explanation as to why we should be that skeptical (no more, no less) only that logic allows us to be. — Inter Alia

First of all - we don't all scoff at the metaphysical ideas we've been discussing. You do. No one said you should believe any of it. Nor did anyone reject realism. I said that, in my opinion, there are other ways of seeing things that are also valuable. We don't have to choose just one way of seeing the world. I've said this dozens of times, but I'll say it again - metaphysics is not a matter of fact, it's a choice. I think your rigid support for realism makes it hard for you to see that.

The fact that you would have no problem with giving state money to meditation is exactly the sort of "action" in response to doubting the materialist definition that I'm talking about. What about funding fairy research, or hollow-earth expeditions, the idea that I can cure you with my mind? It seems basically like you're saying we should be more prepared to belive all the popular alternative metaphysics but we can obviously ignore all the 'crazy' ones. What I'm asking is by what standard these are to be judged? — Inter Alia

I believe in separation of church and state for political reasons. To me, that's in a whole different class of issues than support for secular ideas. There are procedures for determining whether specific research is valuable. I'm not suggesting that those procedures be abandoned. The fact that you equate meditation with fairies is telling. To me, it means your mind is closed to anything that doesn't fit within the very narrow confines of how you see things. Even though much of the world sees things differently, they must all be wrong.

Why can I only doubt on the basis of some other things held to be true? — PossibleAaran

You must use language to doubt, no? Which is to assume that language is coherent and represents what you wish to doubt in such a way that doubting it could make sense.

The two - external and internal - interact all the time. It is my position, and I'm not the only one, that the best way of looking at the world for me, most of the time is as a weaving together of what's outside and what's inside. The Tao Te Ching talks about human action bringing the world into existence. That makes a lot of sense to me - in a very practical and down to earth way. — T Clark

I agree and relate. I might speak of a whole that we organize with categories internal and external. The way it all flows together is hard to articulate. We have words enough for most purposes, but it's hard to say what it is like to be there perfectly. Fail again. Fail better.

What I'm suggesting is that the realists do have a perfectly rational source for their belief which they themselves are satisfied with, it generally that realism (in the classic sense) seems like the 'default' position. The argument against that (that many people are religious or spiritual) makes the error I've outlined above, presuming these people are anti-realists when they are in fact more like reductive monists — Inter Alia

What do you mean by 'classic realism'? Today when we speak today of 'realism', it means, as I'm sure everyone here knows, a very different thing to what 'realism' meant for the medievals. The medieval version of 'realism' was realism in respect of universals (probably best preserved in Aquinas). Their opponents were nominalists, notably William of Ockham and Francis Bacon who (not coincidentally) were also foundational in modern scientific method.

I'm not saying that to drag the debate into arguments over universals (which was never resolved, by the way) but to make one point: that the meaning of the modern sense of 'realism' developed to a large extent out of the rejection of medieval realism. So whereas medieval realism used to consist of analysis of 'how the intellect receives the intelligible form of things', 'realism' nowadays basically refers to the acceptance of the data of raw experience as a kind of indubitable starting point for knowledge. It is based on the stance that natural human sense, if you like, is the basis for knowledge; I suppose this is also evident from the empirical principle that knowledge acquired scientifically has to be replicable in the third person, i.e. it must be something that can be known by anyone given the same circumstances, assumptions, equipment and so on (and leaving aside the recently-identified 'replication crisis' in the sciences).

Something that is easily overlooked in all this is that the pre-modern stance of realism with respect to universals, was already a critical philosophy in respect of 'natural knowledge', based on Platonic epistemology as modified by Aristotle and the subsequent tradition. But as those ideas became ossified into scholastic dogmas they lost their vitality (which is clearly seen in the effect of suffocating authority of Aristotle in the Middle Ages). Then along comes Newton and Galileo, and Descartes with his division of mind and matter and algebraic geometry; and, with that, and the Enlightenment, the overthrowing and rejection of scholastic metaphysics and classical realism, and even the growth of wholesale doubt about the reality of Descartes' res cogitans in the first place (which is the basis of all materialist theories of mind). All of these became major ingredients in today's 'scientific realism'.

But what was lost in all of this, was the original intent of scepticism, visible even in Descartes, in the sense of questioning the veracity of natural knowledge - the idea that our innate or instinctive sense of what is real, might be in some way fundamentally deficient or flawed (Descartes 'evil daemon').

Now that idea, in turn, was represented in Christian dogma, in the form of the 'doctrine of the Fall'. This was the view that the intellect had become corrupted by the original sin, for which faith was the remedy. (Indeed one of the motivations of 15th and 16th century science was to ameliorate the effects of the original sin through science, for which, see Harrison, The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science.)

Now obviously there are many major historical and philosophical issues lurking behind all of this, which are the subjects of dense and enormous books. But the point of all of this is to call into question the statement that 'realism', in the sense we understand that today, is 'perfectly rational'. In fact, it's an historically-conditioned set of attitudes and normative beliefs that is the consequence of a preceding dialectical process that has unfolded over the centuries. And that conditions 'scepticism', in that there is now an implied normative framework, wherein 'the scientific worldview' now occupies the place formerly reserved for 'the revealed Word'.

I agree and relate. I might speak of a whole that we organize with categories internal and external. The way it all flows together is hard to articulate. We have words enough for most purposes, but it's hard to say what it is like to be there perfectly. Fail again. Fail better. — ff0

The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao.

What I'm suggesting is that the realist do have a perfectly rational source for their belief which they themselves are satisfied with, it generally that realism (in the classic sense) seems like the 'default' position. The argument against that (that many people are religious or spiritual) makes the error I've outlined above, presuming these people are anti-realists when they are in fact more like reductive monists. They're not deliberately suspending judgement on the existence of a soul, they think there is one and if someone invented a 'soul measuring device' it would proceed to detect one without trouble. — Inter Alia

Unless you mean the whole default position deal, I haven't heard any "rational" argument from the realists. Or do you mean Sapientia's "It's patently absurd!!!" I won't argue whether or not it's rational. The problem for the realists is that it's wrong. I'm not religious, not spiritual, and not anti-realist. I don't have any particular belief about the soul. You are mischaracterizing the argument and the arguers without directly addressing the substance of the question.

"Oh, those craaaazy theists," is not a rational argument.

The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao. — T Clark

To get back to the question of objective (bias-impartial) reality (be it physical or not, or both and co-related):

This statement to me is one that attempts to specify to the intellect an objective reality. It is not what may be termed a subjective reality—such as which flavor of ice-cream tastes better—but, if the statement indeed corresponds to what is objectively real, a statement conveying an otherwise purely noumenal objective truth.

For instance, one can say the same of the neo-Platonist “the One”: “the One” is a phenomenal item (a word written and read, or a sound, or a tactile structure) that is not itself that which is addressed: a purely noumenal, unified/part-less, non-quantity, superlative state of being that, hence, is perfectly devoid of all phenomena, for phenomena ratios. … Something like this at least.

BTW, I discovered a way of embellishing my former logical argument for objective reality, but I’ll save it for some other time (given contingents).

Exactly. We try to find the words. It's a pleasure or a spiritual practice to look for those words, to become more awake to the way we are there. That the final word eludes us in one more aspect of this wakefulness. We are awake to the gulf between our doing-being and our saying.

This statement to me is one that attempts to specify to the intellect an objective reality. It is not what may be termed a subjective reality—such as which flavor of ice-cream tastes better—but, if the statement indeed corresponds to what is objectively real, a statement conveying an otherwise purely noumenal objective truth. — javra

When you say "this statement" do you mean my statement about the Tao? If so, in my understanding, it has nothing to do with objective reality. In a sense, the Tao is the opposite of objective reality. It's an idea, an experience, that I find much more useful then the idea of objective reality. It's much more in line with how I see reality.

I think I can relate to your position in the post above. For lack of a better word, there's a kind of theoretical pose or sense of what one is about that makes for confusion. I think talk about the Tao is as you suggest not part of the usual metaphysical game. It's a way of pointing outside of it --outside of a way of using language.

Lots of philosophers want to do a kind of armchair science that's concerned with largely traditional entities. That's fine. Who am I to stop them? But this isn't the only way to practice 'philosophy.' It may even look artificial and bloodless from another perspective.

Lots of philosophers want to do a kind of armchair science that's concerned with largely traditional entities. That's fine. Who am I to stop them? But this isn't the only way to practice 'philosophy.' It may even look artificial and bloodless from another perspective. — ff0

If I understand what you're saying, it's not just artificial and bloodless, it can be misleading.

When you say "this statement" do you mean my statement about the Tao? — T Clark

yes

If so, in my understanding, it has nothing to do with objective reality. In a sense, the Tao is the opposite of objective reality. It's an idea, an experience, that I find much more useful then the idea of objective reality. It's much more in line with how I see reality. — T Clark

Hmm, as I previously tried to specify it from the perspective of metaphysical realism: “objective” in the sense of “impartial to, or independent of” personal preferences; “real”, I’ll now add, in the sense of what is “actual” and not fictitious, etc. So this definition of “objective reality” does not strictly relate to the physical world; although, by definition, it can well relate to the physical world. (and, for the materialist, strictly to the physical world)

Think, for example, of Platonic realism: it is not materialist naturalism (personally find the natural world an exceedingly important component to what is objectively real, but not the only component; I do also hold belief in an Aristotelian-like final cause as itself being objectively real); yet, despite not being materialism/naturalism/scientism, it yet upholds an idealistic type of reality to be in manners independent of personal preferences. Hence, it is yet a worldview that upholds the presence of an objective reality—this as I’ve just expressed it.

So, in the sense I’ve previously denoted, “the Tao which cannot be expressed” is, then, a reference to what is here taken to be objective reality. (It is not a mere whim of fancy or a fleeting emotion—though, I take it affirmed by Taoism that it can nevertheless be experienced and, in this sense, simultaneously both felt and cognized)

If you do find fault with my way of interpreting what objective reality signifies, can you explain why? I can’t now think of an alternative terminology for what I’ve herein referred to as “objective reality”.

Transcendentals may be thought of as 'real but not objective', as they are prior to the division of subject and object. Nowadays it is automatic to equate 'objective' with 'really existing' but that is a naturalistic axiom not a metaphysical principle.

So, in the sense I’ve previously denoted, “the Tao which cannot be expressed” is, then, a reference to what is here taken to be objective reality. (It is not a mere whim of fancy or a fleeting emotion—though, I take it affirmed by Taoism that it can nevertheless be experienced and, in this sense, simultaneously both felt and cognized) — javra

Here's something I wrote about 6 months ago:

In this corner – the challenger, Tao.
[1] The ground of being
[2] The Tao that cannot be spoken
[3] Oneness is the Tao which is invisible and formless.
[4] Nature is Tao. Tao is everlasting.
[5] The absolute principle underlying the universe
[6] That in virtue of which all things happen or exist
[7] The intuitive knowing of life that cannot be grasped full-heartedly as just a concept

In this corner – the reigning champion, objective reality.
[1] The collection of things that we are sure exist independently of us
[2] How things really are
[3] The reality that exists independent of our minds
[4] That which is true even outside of a subject's individual biases, interpretations, feelings, and imaginings
[5] The world as seen by God
[6] Things that we are sure exist

In the thread, which I can't figure out how to link to, I was trying to lay out my understanding of how a world view centered around the Tao differs from one centered around objective reality. It is my opinion that objective reality does not exist, at least not as a real phenomenon in the world. It is a metaphysical assumption which can be useful in some situations, but can also be extremely misleading. The Tao is also a metaphysical entity. It doesn't exist or not exist. It's also a way of thinking about the world we live in. One I find very comfortable intellectually and emotionally.

Right.

Still, any advice on how I/anyone who’s interested in philosophical issues (even at the expense of current cultural norms) should then specify that which I’ve intend in my previous posts?

“Nonsubjective actuality”, for example, doesn’t yet seem to me to be proper terminology for this concept—again, the concept of “a reality that is perfectly indifferent to personal preferences and opinions regarding what is or what ought to be”.

So, if either of you feel like offering your opinions on this, could “nonsubjective actuality” be cogently understood to express this stated meaning? Such as in the proposition: “that the first person point of view holds presence while it is in any way aware is a nonsubjective actuality”. (this being the first example that comes to my mind)

Transcendentals may be thought of as 'real but not objective', as they are prior to the division of subject and object. — Wayfarer

Yet this depends on how one uses language. For example: Transcendentals are themselves the objects of awareness of any subject which is so aware of them--thereby here constituting objects within the subject-object divide. But yes, of course current cultural norms would have it otherwise, even though the linguistic use of "objects" or "object-hood" I've just engaged in to me currently seems philosophically valid.

Edit: on second thought, please overlook this second remark to you. Just realized that I’ve here addressed the idea of transcendentals and not transcendentals themselves. While the idea is an object of awareness, the transcendental itself—like the a priori understanding of causation, I presume—is not. My bad.

Sorry, there are a couple of threads open now that have been dealing with similar issues and I've lost track of what goes where. I feel like the tiger running around and around in circles, faster and faster. Looks like I've finally turned to butter.

This really is a wonderful thread.

X-) No problems. Thanks for the reply.

, you say that I have been redefining words so as to create a mystery. From my perspective, it is you that is obfuscating things with words. Your insistence on never using a word in any sense other than the 'ordinary one' prevents any interesting discussion of a real philosophical issue. Let me try to state the problem again.

The problem is this. I am presently looking at something. This thing, which is in front of me, has a certain shape and size and colour. Does it still exist if I leave the room and no one is perceiving it? What you said in this connection is:

If it's truly a laptop you're perceiving then of course it exists unperceived. Laptops are just the sort of thing that exists unperceived, and you can check for yourself, in the way I outlined, that your laptop exists unperceived.

If you are talking about (abstracting away) your experience of the laptop, then it obviously doesn't exist unexperienced. — gurugeorge

But this is clearly just a semantic trick devised to dodge the substantive issue. Yes, the way we ordinarily use the word 'laptop' is such that 'laptops' exist unperceived. Fine, forget the word 'laptop'. The thing which I am looking at right now, does it exist unperceived? Yes, I ordinarily think that it does and I ordinarily use a word, 'laptop' in such a way that 'laptops' exist unperceived, but this is all irrelevant. I am presently asking whether what I ordinarily think is actually true, and whether I have any reliable means of figuring it out. That I use the word 'laptop' in a realist way is irrelevant.

So not only are you giving me an idiosyncratic definition of "doubt" without giving me any reason why I should follow you in your redefinition, you're also giving me an idiosyncratic definition of "object" without giving me any reason why I should follow you in that redefinition.

You may think you're revealing something profound and interesting, but from my point of view you're just redefining words in a way that creates a queer artificial mystery. No mystery exists in relation to the normal uses of the concepts, the mystery, the puzzle, only appears when one takes seriously your proposed redefinitions of those concepts.

But you will forgive me for being sceptical: why should I re-jig my concepts so that "object" means "experience-of-object?" — gurugeorge

Don't 'rejig' your concepts at all. Leave them where they are. Use the word 'laptop' so that it means something which exists unperceived. My question then is, is that thing in front of me at the moment a 'laptop'? That is, is it something which exists unperceived!

Don't follow me in my 'redefinitions' if you don't want. Just recognize that I am presently looking at something, and there is a fact of the matter as to whether that thing exists unperceived or not. I am wondering whether there is any truth conductive source for the belief that it does exist unperceived. If there isn't, that belief will turn out to be a baseless speculation. Whether you call it a 'laptop' or not I don't much care. Whether you say the issue is one of 'illusion' or not doesn't matter to me. Whether we describe the issue as about 'doubt' or not is something you can decide.

You don't need a bundle of special concepts to create an issue here. The issue is that there appears to be no reliable way for humans to have come to believe that Realism is true.

A painfully simple way to see the difficulty with your argument here is as follows. Every Theist means by 'God', a being which actually exists. Does it then follow that God exists, just from the fact that the Theist uses a word a certain way? Surely not, but if not, why should it follow, from the fact that I use the word 'laptop' to mean a being which exists unperceived, that the thing actually exists unperceived?

The dogmas of the day are often etched into the meaning of our words, but one shouldn't think that the fact that they are so etched means that they must be true, or that they are beyond question. Not even Austin, the paradigm ordinary language philosopher, thought that.

As a side note, I deny that there is any such thing as 'the ordinary language concept' of anything, beyond a vague association of a word with other words, together with a list of examples to which the word applies. I don't think ordinary people have very precise concepts at all, or that people all have the same concepts so that it makes sense to say that there is 'the ordinary concept'.

You must use language to doubt, no? Which is to assume that language is coherent and represents what you wish to doubt in such a way that doubting it could make sense — Janus

You raise an interesting question. Can I coherently doubt that my language means what I think that it means? I believe Kripke discusses this at length in connection with Wittgenstein. I am honestly not sure of the answer, though I think its a fascinating question. It depends what is meant by 'meaning'. I would think several different explications of the concept are possible, which extrapolate from a vague ordinary notion, and the question may have different answers on different explications.

I have enjoyed the thread too. I want to read over the discussion between you and Wayfarer. Perhaps in the morning when I am less tired.

PA

You raise an interesting question. Can I coherently doubt that my language means what I think that it means? — PossibleAaran

Actually that was not quite the question I wanted to ask. The question was more to do with whether we do not need to assume that language refers to the world in the way we think it does (even minimally just refers to the world as we assume it to be intersubjectively perceived) in order to raise doubts about the metaphysical, or even merely physical, nature of that purportedly shared world.

So, in the sense I’ve previously denoted, “the Tao which cannot be expressed” is, then, a reference to what is here taken to be objective reality. (It is not a mere whim of fancy or a fleeting emotion—though, I take it affirmed by Taoism that it can nevertheless be experienced and, in this sense, simultaneously both felt and cognized) — javra

Hi. I don't claim any authority on the Tao, but I'd like to provide another way of thinking of it. Instead of the 'still-too-theoretical' idea of objective reality, it might also be taken as the flowing situation in its fullness. It is the way it is like to be there. It includes finding ourselves in a language, in a body, in feelings and traditions. It is the place from which we theorize that makes theorizing possible. To speak the Tao would be to get behind what makes our speaking possible or to get behind our own speaking. It would be to make the situation (existence, etc.) smaller than the theoretical mind. For me this looks impossible, though I understand the urge to do so. It is perhaps this very urge that reveals the impossibility of its satisfaction. Trying to say what it is to be there and being sensitive and open to poetic failure is what, in my opinion, leads to statements that the true way cannot be spoken.

So I like thinking of the Tao that is indeed always already being experienced. It is known in one sense and unspeakable in another. Reality is not wholly conceptual, one might say. We can, however, create concepts for that which swamps mere conceptuality. We use negation to indicate presence.

Of course only philosophers would dream that life can be tied up with a final set concepts in the first place --that a nice little system could conquer the worry and business of being there. Perhaps the general shape of the goal is to get back to a state of flow. But the metaphysician perhaps want to get off the wheel altogether, to stop the flow. Even this apparently anti-philosophical point is an attempt at clarification. It wants to name the general shape of the human situation. It does at least point back to direct experience.

Hello, and thanks for a reply.

I’ve got nothing against direct experience. Most who’ve begrudgingly come to know a little of my philosophical stances would likely claim that I give way too much importance to experience. And yes, to me flow is good. Philosophy, then, to me, is about the theories and discoveries which facilitate better experience of flow—at least in the long term, if not in the short.

As an apropos, when you say “anti-philosophical” I intuitively hear “anti-interest/love for wisdom (Sophia as she’s been called)”. While I do uphold that wisdom concerning life is not the truth of experience/life itself, that it is the map and not the terrain, I nevertheless deem wisdom of great value. At any rate, I take it you have something else in mind when you use the term(?).

But, in relation to my previous posts on this thread, here’s my sole, hopefully cordial-ish, rebuttal:

Trying to say what it is to be there and being sensitive and open to poetic failure is what, in my opinion, leads to statements that the true way cannot be spoken. — ff0

In the statement “the true way”, either “true” is referencing a path that is regardless of what anybody might say or believe or, else, it is not. If it is, then the Tao that can’t be spoken which is inextricable from life and experience is—ahum—a “non-subjective actuality” (just made this term up, but I’m hoping it’s understood given my recent posts on this thread). If it is not, then the Tao is as subjective a reality as is one’s preference for ice-cream, no more metaphysically significant than the clothes one chooses to wear on any particular day.

Same would apply for the Tao being the source of all that is: either it would be the non-subjectively actual source of all that is or, else, it would strictly be so believed to be by some without any real bearing on what the source of all things is.

So far, I very strongly presume Taoism to be addressing the former and not the latter.

So it’s known, I too am no expert on Taoism, but I hold affinities to the outlines of it that I pick up on.

Also, I’m not trying to make the case for what in fact is “non-subjectively actual”; I’ve only been trying to make the case that something “non-subjectively actual” is—whatever it might in fact be. The affirmation of the Tao then being an example of a concept specifying its referent to be non-subjectively actual.

Hello, and thanks for a reply — javra

My pleasure. Thanks for yours.

Philosophy, then, to me, is about the theories and discoveries which facilitate better experience of flow—at least in the long term, if not in the short. — javra

Yes, I relate to that.

As an apropos, when you say “anti-philosophical” I intuitively hear “anti-interest/love for wisdom (Sophia as she’s been called)”. While I do uphold that wisdom concerning life is not the truth of experience/life itself, that it is the map and not the terrain, I nevertheless deem wisdom of great value. At any rate, I take it you have something else in mind when you use the term(?). — javra

Actually we're more on the same page than it may appear. The philosophy with respect to which I am 'anti-' is just the bloodless stuff that wants to be a depersonalized armchair science. I wouldn't try to stop anyone from doing it that way, but I've come to find it fairly dry and insignificant. There's a world outside of me that contains me and I share it with others who are also in this world. I was just at the memorial of someone I've known for twenty years. I have their dog now. The world survived their passing. I and their dog are still here in the familiar surroundings. I and their dog will follow them into the void eventually, or so I expect.

As I see it, we want what might be called the true and the beautiful --to know it and to be it. I prefer that these words be understood vaguely. We sharpen these words in different ways. That's the drama, sometimes bloody. Wisdom I associate with truth and beauty. I want it. I sometimes feel that I have it. At other times life swells up with pain and I humbled again. The word is both good and perhaps the sound emitted by a kind of smug complacency. A luck that takes itself for granted. Same with (the words for) truth and beauty. And yet truth, beauty, wisdom 'themselves' as vague goals seem pretty stable. I think it's safe to say that most of us want to live truly and beautifully and die bravely. Anyway, I too deem wisdom of great value. It's up there with love not as a duty but as a self-justifying higher pleasure.

In the statement “the true way”, either “true” is referencing a path that is regardless of what anybody might say or believe or, else, it is not. If it is, then the Tao that can’t be spoken which is inextricable from life and experience is—ahum—a “non-subjective actuality” (just made this term up, but I’m hoping it’s understood given my recent posts on this thread). If it is not, then the Tao is as subjective a reality as is one’s preference for ice-cream, no more metaphysically significant than the clothes one chooses to wear on any particular day. — javra

You have put your finger on the issue. I confess that I do indeed assume that others experience in rough outline what I experience. They enjoy a hot bath after working outside in the cold in about the same way. Vanilla ice cream tastes the same to them. Moreover there is a pre-theoretical sense of shared-world to which statements may or may not conform. As we conceptualize this shared-ness, we nevertheless debate whether these conceptualizations somehow conform to what they are supposed to be conceptualizing in the first place. It's a kind of logical space that makes impassioned debate possible. We can argue about norms (to put it in another way) only because there is always already a norm in place. The norm-already-there is what we appeal to (perhaps unwittingly) when try to install a new norm beside or on top of it. We take the very language we argue with for granted. We see it for the most part no more than fish see water. We may focus on one word's true meaning (the word true), but we do this as we take every other meaning use to argue about it for granted.

So I was suggesting the Tao as something prior to and making possible everything we might say about it. Its an odd thing to point at. "It is older than time." It is older and newer than anything and everything. It's the flow of experience or that raging experience itself that I assume without trying that my conversational partners also 'are.' But it's not something that I'd try to prove something about --no more than a love poem is a kind of proof. I do like non-subjective actuality. That suggests a priorness to the subject-object distinction. For me all distinctions are something that we know how to use without knowing how we know how to use them. 'Since no man knows aught of all he leaves....' Of course we know how to do things, but there's something like a massive ignorance that (in my view) we mostly ignore. Yet this same ignorance when experienced is wonder itself.