To get straight to the point, what criteria warrants something becoming a fact?

Then I again ask, what is the difference between the fact that the cup is on the table and the cup being on the table? — Posty McPostface

To repeat a question talked about before, what is the difference between the cup being on the table and the cup on the table?

If you are using "fact" to mean the sentence "the cup is on the table", then, one is a state of affairs, the other a sentence.

If you are using "fact" to mean a state of affairs, then there is no difference between the cup being on the table and the state of affairs of the cup being on the table.

Confusion arrises when these two are mixed. — Banno

I think that there are three types of things involved:

1. "the cup is on the table"
2. the cup on the table
3. the cup being on the table

The first is a sentence, the second is an object, and the third is... what? The state of affairs? I think the distinction between 2 and 3 is the most interesting area of discussion.

I think that there are three types of things involved:

1. "the cup is on the table"
2. the cup on the table
3. the cup being on the table

The first is a sentence, the second is an object, and the third is... what? The state of affairs? I think the distinction between 2 and 3 is the most interesting area of discussion. — Michael

I'm not sure if this makes sense; but, 3 seems to prescribe a sense of intentionality (mistakenly?) when speaking about the object of interest, the cup, that is, being on the table.

Just to be clear, what I set out here is one grammar among many. But I think it works.


I don't see any difference between 2 & 3.

Interesting that neither is a well-formed statement.

The cat is on the mat. That's a fact.

"The cat is on the mat" is not a fact, it is a statement - contra

A fact is a group of words that express an idea that has a positive truth value. — Sir2u

I don't see any difference between 2 & 3. — Banno

I can drink from the cup on the table but I can't drink from the cup being on the table (or to put it another way, I can't drink from the fact that the cup is on the table). So there must be a difference between the cup on the table and the cup being on the table.

So a fact can be a truth-bearer, in which case it's a statement; because it is statements that are able to be true or false.

And a fact is also a state of affairs, and so not a sentence at all. — Banno

So for the purposes of my suggested grammar, a fact is not a statement, and we ought reject the idea that a fact has a truth-value.

The cat is on the mat. That's a fact. — Banno

Sure, but is the cat on the mat a fact? Surely it's more correct to say that the cat on the mat is an animal. Whereas that the cat is on the mat isn't an animal (and nor is it a sentence).

There's clearly a difference between the cat on the mat and that the cat is on the mat (and also "the cat is on the mat"). There's the animal and the state of affairs (and the sentence).

So how does the animal (and the fabric) differ from the state of affairs?

So how does the animal differ from the state of affairs? — Michael

One is an animal, the other a fact?

One is an animal, the other a fact? — Banno

Sure, so objects are one thing and facts are another (and sentences are a third). We have 1) the cat on the mat, 2) that the cat is on the mat, and 3) "the cat is on the mat". We have 1) the cup on the table, 2) the cup being on the table, and 3) "the cup is on the table".

The distinction between 1) and 2) is the most interesting area of discussion. What is the ontological difference between an object and a state of affairs; between a red cup and a cup being red?

I'm not sure if this makes sense; but, 3 seems to prescribe a sense of intentionality (mistakenly?) when speaking about the object of interest, the cup, that is, being on the table. — Posty McPostface

I can understand this. Perhaps if we draw a distinction between sentences and propositions we can say that a fact is a true proposition.

Perhaps if we draw a distinction between sentences and propositions we can say that a fact is a true proposition. — Michael

Yes, but only if it obtains to a state of affairs in the world. Do you also see the fallacious circularity in stating that facts are true propositions?

Do you also see the fallacious circularity in stating that facts are true propositions? — Posty McPostface

No?

No? — Michael

So, to what state of affairs do facts, or a fact, correspond to, in order for it to be a proposition?

EDIT: This is where,

3) A fact is just a sui generis type of entity in which objects exemplify properties or stand in relations.

, seems to be true in some observer independent or dependent sense.

So, to what state of affairs do facts, or a fact, correspond to, in order for it to be a proposition? — Posty McPostface

I don't know what you mean by this. It's a proposition if it's the meaning of a sentence.

I suppose this is where we are at risk of equivocation. Some people talk about (obtaining) states of affairs as being facts, whereas others talk about (true) propositions as being facts. I suppose it might be simpler if we abandon the term "fact" and just use the terms "(obtaining) state-of-affairs" and "(true) proposition".

Although this still doesn't explain the difference between objects, like a red cup, and states-of-affairs, like a cup being red. Perhaps states-of-affairs are to objects as propositions are to sentences? I don't know.

I don't know what you mean by this. It's a proposition if it's the meaning of a sentence. — Michael

Yes, but, the issue is with the truth or falsity of the proposition. If it obtains, then it's a fact. That a sentence or proposition is a fact doesn't change the content of the sentence.

Another way to talk about this issue is whether you believe in the correspondence theory of truth, where propositions are facts if they correspond with states of affairs in reality or if you subscribe to a different theory of truth that makes facts representative of an actual state of affairs. In fact, I don't believe there are other theories of truth that incorporate the importance of a proposition being true just based on whether it obtains with a certain state of affairs, thus making the sentence a fact or not.

Although this still doesn't explain the difference between objects, like a red cup, and states-of-affairs, like a cup being red. Perhaps states-of-affairs are to objects as propositions are to sentences? I don't know. — Michael

In my view, the only difference between the two is one of incorporating intentionality into the sentence, thus making it more of a declarative sentence and not the typical descriptivist sentence, seen when trying to obtain a state of affairs.

So, something being red is qualitatively distinct from that something is red. In one case the subject is dissociated from the utterance and in the other, the subject is participating in the content or meaning of the utterance.

SO facts are statements? — Banno


A fact is a group of words that express an idea that has a positive truth value. Whether that counts as a statement would depend on the definition of statement. And yes that does seem circular. — Sir2u

A statement is an utterance that tells (truthfully or falsely) about a fact.

A fact is a state-of-affairs, an aspect of the way things are.

...or as SEP worded it (more difficultly and maybe problematically, it seems to me), a property of a thing, or a relation among things.

Things are whatever can be referred to.

So facts and statements are things too.

Michael Ossipoff

It seems to me that 2+2=4 is best regarded as a hypothetical fact that's the "then" conclusion of an inevitable abstract if-then fact: — Michael Ossipoff

When I said that, I meant "hypothetical fact" to mean something that's like a fact, except that it's only hypothetically a fact. It isn't necessarily a fact.

The "then" conclusion of an if-then fact is conditional upon another hypothetical fact. (the premise of the if-then fact)

So, just as a convicted "criminal" isn't necessarily a criminal, so a hypothetical "fact" isn't necessarily a fact.

Michael Ossipoff

The difference between a name and a predication?

"It seems to me that 2+2=4 is best regarded as a hypothetical fact that's the "then" conclusion of an inevitable abstract if-then fact:" — Michael Ossipoff


This. '2+2=4' doesn't seem to be anymore a fact in itself than '2+2 — Akanthinos

Regarding 2+2=4 in terms of its usual route of proof, 2+2=4 is only a hypothetical fact, not an inevitable fact. It's conditionally a fact. It's a fact if the additive associative axiom is a fact.

2+2 isn't a state of affairs. I've defined "state of affairs" as "an aspect of the way things are". 2+2 is a thing, an abstract object, but it isn't a way something else is.

The SEP definition that I referred to says that a fact is a property of a thing, or a relation among things.

2+2 is a thing, but it isn't a property of a thing or a relation among things.

or '2=2'.

That's often or usually regarded as conditionally a fact. It's a fact if a certain number-axiom is true.

It [2+2=4] is a mathematical proposition

That too.

It's a mathematical proposition or the conclusion part of a theorem, and can be regarded as a conditional fact that's the "then" conclusion of an inevitable abstract fact whose "if " premise is the hypothetical fact consisting of the additive associative axiom.

But I'd say that the proposition or theorem is that 2+2=4 if the additive associative axiom is true.

Of course there are other experiential ways to arrive at 2+2=4. ...via direct experience with 4 objects, for example. Of course our experience isn't always formal mathematics.

A proof is probably is good way.

The following abstract fact in parentheses: (If the additive associative axiom is true, then 2+2=4) can be proved. It's an inevitable abstract fact.

Michael Ossipoff

What is the ontological difference... ...between a red cup and a cup being red? — Michael

The former is directly perceptible and the latter is not.

It is important to treat this as an epistemological question, not an ontological one. — Banno

I think this is the golden nugget of the thread. If 'fact' is a primitive, as I argued, then you can only demonstrate it's use, or refer to it in purely formal terms. As such, I'd say that 'fact' is epistemologically an unbound variable, where its use is to refer to a proposition obtaining a truth-value from a state-of-affairs.

Yeah, but facts do have ontological value, see;

3) A fact is just a sui generis type of entity in which objects exemplify properties or stand in relations.

I think this is the golden nugget of the thread. If 'fact' is a primitive, as I argued, then you can only demonstrate it's use, or refer to it in purely formal terms. As such, I'd say that 'fact' is epistemologically an unbound variable, where its use is to refer to a proposition obtaining a truth-value from a state-of-affairs. — Akanthinos

Not quite. False is a truth-value. Facts cannot be false(I mean if you're working from a framework where facts are either true statements or propositions). Facts aren't the sort of things that can be true/false on my view, but that's another matter altogether.

False is a truth-value. Facts cannot be false(I mean if you're working from a framework where facts are either true statements or propositions). Facts aren't the sort of things that can be true/false on my view, but that's another matter altogether. — creativesoul

I'm not going so far in my definition, but you are correct that it would be hard to see any other truth-value obtained from a state-of-affairs as 'fact'.

A more precise way : 'Fact' is an unbound variable, a pure demonstrative which use is to refer a proposition obtaining a positive truth-value from a state-of-affairs.

3) A fact is just a sui generis type of entity in which objects exemplify properties or stand in relations. — Posty McPostface

I guess I don't see how facts constitute entities (aside from the fact that they are intelligible in themselves) or how they are unique in regards to exemplifying relations or properties. That seems to me to be the case of all objects. Basically, it comes down to saying that facts are epistemological entities, which I guess to me just refers to a primitive.

I can think of two different uses of 'fact'. In both cases its use is to make an important distinction, but they are different distinctions.

case 1: Fact vs Opinion
When we say something is a fact with this intent, we are asserting that it is an objective feature of the world, not a subjective matter of opinion. In everyday life this distinction generally works well, and Fact is taken to mean 'a proposition to which almost any [say 99% of...] mature, sane, reasonably intelligent person observing this phenomenon would assent'.

When we try to carry that notion into philosophy we immediately run into trouble, because of dream hypotheses and uncertainty about the existence or meaning of a mind-independent world.

case 2: Fact vs Deduction
Here we take facts as readily observable propositions, and we distinguish those from a deduction made from those facts. For instance, it was a fact that Doctor Watson had a limp and a sun tan (I'm not sure of the 'military bearing' though - that sounds a bit subjective to me), but it was a deduction that he had recently been in Afghanistan.

The term "fact" is also used to talk about events; happenings; the case at hand; the way things are or once were; reality...

I find that that use is the only one that is able to properly account for truth in both... terms of truth conditions, and terms of what makes thought, belief, and statements thereof true.

So for the purposes of my suggested grammar, a fact is not a statement, and we ought reject the idea that a fact has a truth-value. — Banno

So are you saying that statements/propositions reflect facts, describe facts, mirror facts, etc? However, the statement itself is not "the fact?" "The fact" itself exists as a state-of-affairs represented by the arrangement of things in reality (at least generally). Moreover, when we say a statement is true, we are specifically referring to what the grammar itself reflects, that is, when we say a statement is true, we are talking about the statement itself.

It seems to me though that the way we use the word fact can be more expansive than you might suggest. Philosophers try to be more exact, and that might be part of the problem. For example, you might say to me, "Mary put the cat on the mat," and I might respond, "That's a fact," and in this case I'm simply responding to your statement, not the philosophers state-of-affairs definition. So what I'm saying is that there are times when we use the term fact, that it's simply a reflection of the statement itself. We see this in courts of law when we consider the statements people put forth as evidence or as statements of truth. So there are times when we use the word fact and the word true as synonyms. It's very difficult to pull oneself away from the philosophers idea of facts, which I believe, doesn't reflect the many uses of the term.

It's difficult to pull oneself away from the definition, as thought the definition is the be all and end all in terms of answering the question "What is a fact?" or "What is truth?" The tendency, for all of us, is to look for the thing, the object (definition or otherwise) that we can point too. I'm not necessarily disagreeing with you, but merely pointing out something important to add to this confusing topic.