Some folks voted other. Does this mean neutral monism, or does it mean both? Kant can be understood to say there is a real world, but we construct our experience of a world, which may be quite different.

I'm curious about a synthesis between the two, since it would seem there have been compelling arguments in favor of both. I tend more toward scientific realism than direct, so I would be okay with a Kantian synthesis, provided it didn't leave the real totally unknowable.

If we can get at the real world through careful investigation, which is different from our experiences of it, then that would be both realism and idealism, without giving up at skepticism.

IOW, the ideal realist would say the skeptic is lazy, and gives up too easily. It's hard work knowing what's real. Just a thought - I have heard one realist philosopher say pretty much that.

Perhaps the answer is that the philosophers that were any good declined to answer the question on the grounds that it is ill-formed and meaningless. :D

1. All thought/belief consists of mental correlation(s) drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent itself(it's own state of 'mind' when applicable).
2. Correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content.
3. Thought/belief presupposes the existence of it's own content.(from1,2)
4. 'Objects' of physiological sensory perception are external to thought/belief.
5. All thought/belief presupposes the existence of an external world.(from3,4)
6. All meaning is attributed by virtue of drawing mental correlation(s) between that which becomes symbol/sign and that which becomes symbolized/signified.
7. The attribution of meaning happens entirely within thought/belief formation.(from1,6)
8. All meaning is existentially contingent upon presupposing the existence of an external world.(from5,7)
9. All philosophical positions consist entirely of meaningful thought/belief.
10. All philosophical positions presuppose the existence of an external world.(from8,9)

Is that a bit more convincing?

X-)

It effectively refutes solipsism as well, and not merely 'by definition' mind you. The 'definition' of thought/belief contained in 1. is not arbitrarily chosen. To quite the contrary, it is arrived at by virtue of looking at all meaningful use of the terms "thought" and "belief". All thought/belief consists of mental correlations. All mental correlation counts as thought/belief. All predication is correlation. Not all correlation is predication. Thought/belief is not existentially contingent upon language. To quite the contrary, it's the other way around.

Thought/belief formation happens prior to language. Thought/belief is accrued. That which rudimentary thought/belief is existentially contingent upon and/or consists in/of, so too is/does the more complex. Thought/belief begins with drawing rudimentary correlations(think Pavlov's dog) and gains in complexity in direct accordance with/to the complexity of the correlations drawn between object(s) and/or self.

Enough for now. I don't get paid enough for this...

It's hard work knowing what's real. Just a thought - I have heard one realist philosopher say pretty much that. — Marchesk

Seems like common sense to me. That which is real has an affect/effect.

4. 'Objects' of physiological sensory perception are external to thought/belief. — creativesoul

You've begged the question.

10. All philosophical positions presuppose the existence of an external world.

It effectively refutes solipsism as well — creativesoul

Do idealism and solipsism "presuppose the existence of an external world"? If not then 10. is false. And it seems pretty obvious that (subjective) idealism and solipsism don't presuppose the existence of an external world, given that their claim is "there isn't (or might not be) an external world".

Besides, if presupposing the existence of an external world contradicts the meaning of the claim "there isn't (or might not be) an external world" (which you seem to be saying) then the meaning of the claim "there isn't (or might not be) an external world" isn't 'existentially contingent upon presupposing the existence of an external world', and so it would seem that 8. is (also) false.

4. 'Objects' of physiological sensory perception are external to thought/belief.
5. All thought/belief presupposes the existence of an external world.(from3,4) — creativesoul

How does sense data fit into this? Is sense data included in your talk of "thought/belief", or is it "external" to it? If "external" to it, at best all you can argue is that sense data exists (which even the subjective idealist and skeptic can accept) and is required for meaning. But that's not the same thing as showing that there must be an external world (as ordinarily understood).

Are you denying that 4 is true?

:-}

I'm saying that you've begged the question.

So true premisses beg the question?

:-}

So true premisses beg the question? — creativesoul

A premise begs the question if it assumes the conclusion. Whether or not a premise is true has no bearing on whether or not it begs the question. Both true and false premises can beg the question.

If all you're going to do is assert your conclusion and "defend" it by claiming it to be true then why bother offering an argument at all? Just say that idealism and skepticism are wrong.

But if you actually want to offer a good argument against idealism and skepticism than it can't beg the question. Premise 4 is fallacious (even if true).

The poll result shows the naiveté, of those voting. You cannot know existence except through the senses and this is an ideal reality. It is unavoidable.

You cannot know existence except through the senses — charleton

I might only know that someone has been walking on the beach because I see footprints, but it doesn't then follow that those footprints are all there is (there was in fact a person walking on the beach).

that does not help you since the beach, the footprints and the person can only be objects of your perception, and can only be known through the concepts and impressions that they give you.

that does not help you since (1) the beach, the footprints and the person can only be objects of your perception, and (2) can only be known through the concepts and impressions that they give you. — charleton

You've missed the point. You can't go from "I can only know of X except through Y" to "only Y exists". So if we consider the above, 2 doesn't entail 1.

It could be that I only see footprints but that also there was an (unseen) person walking on the beach. If this is a coherent situation then your epistemological claim doesn't entail your ontological claim.

Which conclusion is assumed in 4?

Which conclusion is assumed in 4? — creativesoul

That there is an external world.

4 doesn't say that

4 doesn't say that — creativesoul

3. Thought/belief presupposes the existence of it's own content.(from1,2)
4. 'Objects' of physiological sensory perception are external to thought/belief.
5. All thought/belief presupposes the existence of an external world.(from3,4)

Then how do you derive 5 from 3 and 4?

Just like it says...

You're not making any sense. If 4 doesn't say anything about there being an external world then 5 can't derive anything about an external world from it.

Either 4 begs the question or 5 is a non sequitur.

Oh, I see. If I say something about an external world in any of my premisses, then I beg the question, but if I don't then I cannot derive anything about an external world from them...

Clear as mud. Makes perfect sense...

What are you denying Michael?

Oh, I see. If I say something about an external world in any of my premisses, then I beg the question, but if I don't than I cannot derive anything about an external world from them...

Clear as mud. Makes perfect sense...

What are you denying Michael? — creativesoul

You're trying to argue that there's an external world, and yet one of your premises amounts to "there is an external world". That's question-begging.

What you need as a premise is an "if X then there is an external world". You don't have anything like that.

What I have offered is the strongest justificatory ground possible for an argument about an external world. What follows immediately below may be easier for you to follow. I'm surprised that you don't recognize the brute strength of the long form; I mean given your overt fondness for the notion of entailment...

Because all philosophical positions consist entirely of meaningful thought/belief and all meaningful thought/belief presupposes the existence of an external world, then it only follows that all philosophical positions presuppose the existence of an external world.

One can always say that a valid argument begs the question... that's not convincing, nor is it always a case of actual question-begging.

The poll result shows the naiveté, of those voting. — charleton

Pretty sure the voters in the poll are aware of idealist arguments.

You cannot know existence except through the senses and this is an ideal reality. It is unavoidable. — charleton

Even if perception is ideal, that doesn't mean that existence is. But one doesn't have to accept that perception is ideal. Direct realism would deny that.

I don't get paid enough for this... — creativesoul

:-O

This might be an opportune time to provide a few of the textbook examples of 'problems with correspondence theory', as I'm sure they're relevant to 'correlation' also.

According to this theory (correspondence), truth consists in the agreement of our thought with reality. This view ... seems to conform rather closely to our ordinary common sense usage when we speak of truth. The flaws in the definition arise when we ask what is meant by "agreement" or "correspondence" [or 'correlation'] of ideas and objects, beliefs and facts, thought and reality. In order to test the truth of an idea or belief we must presumably compare it with the reality in some sense.

1- In order to make the comparison, we must know what it is that we are comparing, namely, the belief on the one hand and the reality on the other. But if we already know the reality, why do we need to make a comparison? And if we don't know the reality, how can we make a comparison?

2- The making of the comparison is itself a fact about which we have a belief. We have to believe that the belief about the comparison is true. How do we know that our belief in this agreement is "true"? This leads to an infinite regress, leaving us with no assurance of true belief.

Randall, J. & Buchler, J.; Philosophy: An Introduction. p133

Although it seems ... obvious to say, "Truth is correspondence of thought (belief, proposition) to what is actually the case", such an assertion nevertheless involves a metaphysical assumption - that there is a fact, object, or state of affairs, independent of our knowledge to which our knowledge corresponds.

"How, on your principles, could you know you have a true proposition?" ... or ... "How can you use your definition of truth, it being the correspondence between a judgment and its object, as a criterion of truth? How can you know when such correspondence actually holds?"

I cannot step outside my mind to compare a thought in it with something outside it.

Beck, L.W. & Holmes, R.L.; Philosophic Inquiry, p130.

(...) Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its object. In consequence of this mere nominal definition, my cognition, to count as true, is supposed to agree with its object. Now I can compare the object with my cognition, however, only by cognising it. Hence my cognition is supposed to confirm itself, which is far short of being sufficient for truth. For since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgement on is whether my cognition of the object agrees with my cognition of the object.

(Kant, 1801. The Jasche Logic, in Lectures on Logic.)

Correspondence is another topic in it's own right Jeep. We've been over this many times before as well. In fact, on the old forum, you once(during our first discussion about truth) told me that I had offered you the best defense of correspondence 'theory' that you'd ever read. I'm not a typical correspondence theorist.

With regard to this topic...

I find it interesting how those quotes presuppose an external world. Kant even openly says it. So, I'm not sure what your point here was?

:-|

Self-reference is among the usual suspects (read: pitfalls) of idealism.

As mentioned somewhere, mind is typically used as an umbrella term, including the likes of, or synonymous with some of: (1st person) experiences, qualia, (self)awareness, consciousness, sentience, thinking, ideation, feelings, pain/joy/love; mind = such activities of our individuated selves. So, mind is the means by which we understand things, talk about the world, etc, in the first place.

Idealism then strides right ahead and situates mind as the fundamental constituent of literally everything, i.e. self-elevation, since it's already a prerequisite for any thinking about non/idealism and such cognitive activities.

Is there an alternative to self-identity, in this context? Not as far as I can tell.

For that matter, we already know self-reference can be troublesome (like paradoxes).

Either way, consciousness comes and goes, starts and ends, and there isn't anything in particular that unconsciousness is like. The bulk of available evidence (by far), will have it that mind is contingent on something else. When some think that they themselves, or their mind, is persistent/ever-present, they're evidently wrong.

I already know that I can be the only solipsist, whether solipsism is or is not the case.
Solipsism is a performative contradiction, for example:

1. morals are social
2. solipsism is not social
3. morals are inconsequential to a solipsist