I don't think Wittgenstein agrees that our inner life is a grammatical fiction. In rejecting the claim that the meaning of a word is determined by our inner life, he is not denying that we have an inner life. — Fooloso4

In my original post, I distinguished between our inner life as a metaphysical fiction (denying that we have inner experiences) vs. a grammatical fiction (denying that the meaning of a word is determined by our inner experiences). You are conflating the two here. But, otherwise, it seems we are in agreement.

In addition to linguistic meaning there is the meaning experienced in living. A meaningful life is not one that has untangled our grammatical confusion, although that may be involved. It can't be denied that his work centered around this problem — Fooloso4

Yes, but I don't think that's what he is referring to in PI 307.

The series discussing "grammatical" behaviorism does end with:

...And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them. — PI, 308 — Paine

Yes, exactly.

I think we are in agreement.

BTW, I note that in the other thread linked to by @Banno above, you requested links to Daniele Moyal-Sharrock's work. I don't know which particular work is mentioned in that thread, but you can find at least some of her articles here:

https://herts.academia.edu/DanieleMoyalSharrock
https://herts.academia.edu/DMoyalSharrock

I get your careful "thinking we are in agreement."

Thank you for the links. I am not accustomed to these debates between commentators.

Are you joining the new site?

I get your careful "thinking we are in agreement."

Thank you for the links. I am not accustomed to these debates between commentators. — Paine

:up:

Are you joining the new site? — Paine

I didn't realise it was a new site. Are we all moving there? Anyhow, I've just joined. Thanks.

I distinguished between our inner life as a metaphysical fiction (denying that we have inner experiences) vs. a grammatical fiction . You are conflating the two here. — Luke

We differ as to what the grammatical fiction is. The behaviorist is not talking about the meaning of words. The behaviorist claims that the only thing we can know is behavior. 307 is part of an extended discussion that centers on such things as pain and pain behavior. According to the behaviorist we cannot even say that there is pain, only pain behavior. However, he cannot even talk about pain behavior if we cannot talk about pain. The grammatical fiction is in denying that the pain is something.[Added: that is not to say that it an pain is an object].

Yes, but I don't think that's what he is referring to in PI 307. — Luke

I agree. So what did I bring it up? At the forum is about to close I wanted to point to something other than grammar as central to Wittgenstein's philosophical concerns.

It is not by any means clear to me, that I wish for a continuation of my work by others, more than a change in the way we live

The grammatical fiction is in denying that the pain is something. — Fooloso4

What's grammatical about that? It sounds metaphysical.

“And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a Nothing.” — Not at all. It's not a something, but not a nothing either." — PI 304 (my emphasis)

“But you surely can’t deny that, for example, in remembering, an inner process takes place.” — What gives the impression that we want to deny anything?" — PI 305 (my emphasis)

"And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them." — PI 308 (my emphasis)

Wittgenstein doesn’t reject the reality of inner experience, but he does reject the idea that these private sensations are what give our language its meaning.

The evidence was submitted to support the event in the real world as true statements which had taken place in the real world. It is an independent verification statement for the conclusion, not a circular argument. — Corvus

How can seeing a cup be evidence that a cup exists in the world, when your seeing may be an illusion or an hallucination?

How can seeing a cup be evidence that a cup exists in the world, when your seeing may be an illusion or an hallucination? — RussellA

Because you cannot prove seeing a cup is an illusion or hallucination. Can you prove your seeing a cup is an illusion or hallucination?

Nobody has ever experienced a dragon before, or infinity before, either. Where does the meaning of these concepts come from? — Luke

An interesting question. Where does infinity get its meaning from if no one has ever had the private experience of infinity.
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Can a blind person never understand what others mean by the word, even if you explain to them what it means? — Luke

If a blind person has never seen a sunset, they can only know its meaning by description, such as “the disappearance of the Sun at the end of the Sun path, below the horizon of the Earth due to its rotation”

Some of these words the blind person will know the meaning of by direct experience, such as “disappearance, end, path, below, rotation.”

Some of these words the blind person will not know the meaning of by direct experience, such as “Sun”.

If a blind person has never seen the Sun, they can only know its meaning by description, such as “a massive, nearly perfect sphere of hot plasma”.

As before, the blind person will know some of these words by direct experience, such as “massive” but not others, such as “plasma”.

The problem is, there are no absolute definition of any word, no complete description. Therefore, any description to the blind person must sooner or later contain words that the blind person has never directly experienced.

But it remains true that infinity means something to us even if we have never directly experienced it and sunset means something to a blind person if they never directly experience it.

As you say:

My argument - which is my interpretation of Wittgenstein's argument - is only that the meaning of a word does not come from any person's individual, private experience. — Luke

I agree that there are some words in the language game, such as infinity and sunset to a blind person, whose meaning cannot come from a person’s individual private experience.

But the meaning of the words cannot come from the language game either, as no word can be completely defined or described within the language game.

The meaning of these words cannot come from use outside language either, as we cannot use “infinity” as we can use a “hammer” to knock in a nail. So it cannot be the case of “meaning as use”.

Summarising, the meaning of a word “infinity” cannot come from i) private experience ii) description within the language game iii) use outside the language game.

So, where does the meaning of “infinity” come from?

Because you cannot prove seeing a cup is an illusion or hallucination. Can you prove your seeing a cup is an illusion or hallucination? — Corvus

We see a cup.

I cannot prove it is an illusion or hallucination. You cannot prove it is not an illusion or hallucination.

Perhaps scepticism is the only solution.

Perhaps scepticism is the only solution. — RussellA

No, it is not.

We see a cup. — RussellA

I cannot prove it is an illusion or hallucination. — RussellA

That is the proof the cup exists.

You cannot prove it is not an illusion or hallucination. — RussellA

I don't need a proof, because I know it is not an illusion or hallucination.

See my profile.

That is the proof the cup exists. — Corvus

Seeing a cup is not proof that the cup exists in the outer world. The cup may only exist in the inner mind.

That people see a mirage in the desert is not proof of the existence of water.
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I don't need a proof, because I know it is not an illusion or hallucination. — Corvus

There are many Persian sayings about illusions, including “The neighbour's chicken is a goose".

...no word can be completely defined or described within the language game. — RussellA

So? We can still learn how to speak a language and use words.

...we cannot use “infinity” [...for some purpose...] as we can use a “hammer” to knock in a nail. — RussellA

Why not?

Why not? — Luke

We can use a “hammer” to knock in a nail because we can pick up a hammer, but have you ever picked up an infinity and been able to use it for anything?

We can use a “hammer” to knock in a nail because we can pick up a hammer, but have you ever picked up an infinity and been able to use it for anything? — RussellA

Oh I see. I was talking about the word "infinity", whereas you are talking about the referent of the word "infinity".

Anyhow, this was the point of my examples of dragon and infinity: that we have not experienced any dragons or infinity and yet "dragon" and "infinity" are not meaningless concepts. This goes against your argument that a word is meaningless if a speaker has never experienced its referent.

What's grammatical about that? — Luke

The behaviorist claims that there is pain behavior, but what could that mean if pain is a fiction? It is the language of the behaviorist that is not grammatical.

Anyhow, this was the point of my examples of dragon and infinity: that we have not experienced any dragons or infinity and yet "dragon" and "infinity" are not meaningless concepts. This goes against your argument that a word is meaningless if a speaker has never experienced its referent. — Luke

We agree that the meaning of the word “infinity” cannot come from private experience.
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I'm not arguing that the meaning of a word "comes from the language itself". My argument - which is my interpretation of Wittgenstein's argument - is only that the meaning of a word does not come from any person's individual, private experience. — Luke

The meaning of the word “infinity” cannot come from any definition or description within language, as definitions and descriptions will be never ending.

The meaning of the word “infinity” cannot come from any use of infinity outside language.

The meaning of the word “infinity” cannot come from how it is used in language. As you said:

How do you measure or determine a "successful use" of "xyz" here? How could "xyz" be used correctly or incorrectly in this example? I don't doubt that you could say or use the string of letters "xyz", but what does it mean? — Luke

How does one know the meaning of the expression “the number of numbers is xyz” without knowing the meaning of “xyz”?

Yet the word “infinity” does have a meaning to us.

The question is, where does “infinity” get its meaning?

That people see a mirage in the desert is not proof of the existence of water. — RussellA

You can deny seeing a cup, but you cannot deny you are seeing something which looks like a cup. You are not denying that you are seeing something, which looks like a cup.

Therefore you must define what a real cup is, before you can deny what you are seeing is a fake cup.

Please define a real cup, and a fake cup you are seeing. What are they, and what is the difference between real cup and fake cup?

The behaviorist claims that there is pain behavior, but what could that mean if pain is a fiction? It is the language of the behaviorist that is not grammatical. — Fooloso4

At PI 307, W is accused of being a behaviourist in disguise who is "basically saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction." W replies: "If I speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction."

PI 307 isn't an argument against the behaviourist's grammar so much as a clarification of his own. W does not deny that we have sensations (unlike the behaviourist), but he does deny that private sensations are objects to be named (unlike the mentalist).

Suppose that everyone had a box with something in it which we call a “beetle”. No one can ever look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. — Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. — But what if these people’s word “beetle” had a use nonetheless? — If so, it would not be as the name of a thing. The thing in the box doesn’t belong to the language-game at all; not even as a Something: for the box might even be empty. — No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say, if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and name’, the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. — PI 293

The "grammatical fiction" that W rejects is precisely this model of "object and name". This model is presupposed by both the behaviourist and the mentalist.

The question is, where does “infinity” get its meaning? — RussellA

Are you asking how we learn the language or learn the meaning of a word? Most often from other people.

PI 560. “The meaning of a word is what an explanation of its meaning explains.”