I don't think Wittgenstein agrees that our inner life is a grammatical fiction. In rejecting the claim that the meaning of a word is determined by our inner life, he is not denying that we have an inner life. — Fooloso4

In my original post, I distinguished between our inner life as a metaphysical fiction (denying that we have inner experiences) vs. a grammatical fiction (denying that the meaning of a word is determined by our inner experiences). You are conflating the two here. But, otherwise, it seems we are in agreement.

In addition to linguistic meaning there is the meaning experienced in living. A meaningful life is not one that has untangled our grammatical confusion, although that may be involved. It can't be denied that his work centered around this problem — Fooloso4

Yes, but I don't think that's what he is referring to in PI 307.

The series discussing "grammatical" behaviorism does end with:

...And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them. — PI, 308 — Paine

Yes, exactly.

I think we are in agreement.

BTW, I note that in the other thread linked to by @Banno above, you requested links to Daniele Moyal-Sharrock's work. I don't know which particular work is mentioned in that thread, but you can find at least some of her articles here:

https://herts.academia.edu/DanieleMoyalSharrock
https://herts.academia.edu/DMoyalSharrock

I get your careful "thinking we are in agreement."

Thank you for the links. I am not accustomed to these debates between commentators.

Are you joining the new site?

I get your careful "thinking we are in agreement."

Thank you for the links. I am not accustomed to these debates between commentators. — Paine

:up:

Are you joining the new site? — Paine

I didn't realise it was a new site. Are we all moving there? Anyhow, I've just joined. Thanks.

I distinguished between our inner life as a metaphysical fiction (denying that we have inner experiences) vs. a grammatical fiction . You are conflating the two here. — Luke

We differ as to what the grammatical fiction is. The behaviorist is not talking about the meaning of words. The behaviorist claims that the only thing we can know is behavior. 307 is part of an extended discussion that centers on such things as pain and pain behavior. According to the behaviorist we cannot even say that there is pain, only pain behavior. However, he cannot even talk about pain behavior if we cannot talk about pain. The grammatical fiction is in denying that the pain is something.[Added: that is not to say that it an pain is an object].

Yes, but I don't think that's what he is referring to in PI 307. — Luke

I agree. So what did I bring it up? At the forum is about to close I wanted to point to something other than grammar as central to Wittgenstein's philosophical concerns.

It is not by any means clear to me, that I wish for a continuation of my work by others, more than a change in the way we live

The grammatical fiction is in denying that the pain is something. — Fooloso4

What's grammatical about that? It sounds metaphysical.

“And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a Nothing.” — Not at all. It's not a something, but not a nothing either." — PI 304 (my emphasis)

“But you surely can’t deny that, for example, in remembering, an inner process takes place.” — What gives the impression that we want to deny anything?" — PI 305 (my emphasis)

"And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them." — PI 308 (my emphasis)

Wittgenstein doesn’t reject the reality of inner experience, but he does reject the idea that these private sensations are what give our language its meaning.