What other classes of investigation is he considering with regard to hinges? — Fooloso4

:meh:

Most of the text is to do with other examples, as per Sam's Tool 1. Look and see.

You’re overreading Witt by turning a clarifying point into a definition, and by treating “incontrovertible” as if it names a fixed epistemic point.

Yes, OC 341-342 are connected, and Witt uses scientific investigation as a clear case, i.e., inquiry works only against a background of things that aren’t doubted. But it doesn't follow that hinges are only propositions “belonging to scientific investigations.” That’s your restriction, not Witt. OC develops the same structure far beyond science under other labels, what stands fast, framework, world-picture, river-bed, and the contrast between what we test and what makes testing possible; and as I said, science is one sharp illustration of the structure, not the whole domain.

On “incontrovertible,” your own citations work against the way you’re using the word. Witt distinguishes between propositions like “I am called …,” which can be practically beyond dispute, and mathematical propositions that are “officially” stamped as immovable hinges (OC 655–657). So “incontrovertible” does not equal “hinge,” and it doesn’t define the class. It marks specific roles in different contexts, and Witt is careful about those differences.

And your “of course not, science isn’t a priori” reply misses the point. Nobody is claiming hinges are a priori truths. The real issue isn’t a priori vs empirical, it’s role. A hinge can be empirical in content and still function as what stands fast in a practice. “Incontrovertible” in this context means “not up for doubt within this practice, here,” not “guaranteed true forever.” That’s exactly why Witt uses the river-bed e.g., what stands fast can harden and later shift.

Finally, “read him on his own terms” doesn’t mean treating “hinge” as a technical term whose meaning is exhausted by three examples. Wittgenstein’s method in OC is to show the function across cases, not to provide you a tidy definition. Your restriction to a scientific subclass is exactly the kind of point that the text resists.

That's an excellent diagnosis.

Seems your thread must deal with both hinges and the unhinged. :wink:

Have another look at OC §470 through §475. In part, his puzzlement here is addressed by later work on constitutive utterances. "L.W." counts as a reference to Wittgenstein, and that it does so does not "emerge from some kind of ratiocination", it's in the doing...

How is look and see a hinge? It is a good policy to follow but even under Sam's description it is not a hinge. The policy may hold fast but it tells us nothing about things that hold fast.

Regardless of interpretations made of the contents of the work, I have long been puzzled why On Certainty has been received as worth serious consideration when compared with other works by Wittgenstein. The Preface says:

It seemed appropriate to publish this work by itself. It is not a selection; Wittgenstein marked it off in his notebooks as a separate topic, which he apparently took up at four separate periods during this eighteen months. It constitutes a single sustained treatment of the topic. — On Certainty

By this reasoning, Heidegger's treatment of Nietzsche's notebook Will to Power is equal to Nietzsche's published works. This sort of thing does not clarify the intent of the author.

How is look and see a hinge? — Fooloso4

What?

Seems to be a comprehension problem here. On several levels.

This is interesting because OC 470–475 is practically tailor made for the dispute we've been having, i.e., whether hinges are “scientific propositions” with epistemic status, or do they fit a role within our broader practices, learned in how we training takes place, and shown in what gets investigated and what doesn’t.

Here’s how I read it, for what it's worth:

OC 470: “Why is there no doubt that I am called L. W.?”
Witt is showing us a simple picture, if something is “beyond doubt,” we must have established it beyond doubt by some super evidence. But our names aren’t like that. It’s not “indubitable” because we demonstrated it through a proof, it’s indubitable because doubting it doesn’t normally gain a foothold in our everyday lives. It’s a hinge-like case, but definitely not because it’s “scientific.” It’s because it has a place in the background of ordinary uses.

OC 472–473: training is what fixes what’s up for doubting or investigation
This answers the “science-only” reading. The child learns language and at the same time learns what counts as worth checking and what doesn’t. The cupboard example makes this very plain; we don't teach a child to treat “is this a real cupboard or a stage set?” as what we normally accept. We teach stability as the norm first, and only later do we learn the cases where instability/doubting becomes relevant. That’s a form-of-life point, not a scientific-epistemology point.

OC 474: “worth” is not “ground”
This one is lethal to the move “it works; therefore it’s justified.” Witt grants that the practice’s success may explain why it survives, but he denies that this success is the justification or “ground” of it. This fits what I've saying, don’t turn these remarks into a proof, treat them as a description of how our checking practices sit on something that isn’t itself grounded/justified by further checking.

OC 475: the anti-rationalist origin story
Here Witt says, don’t picture language as something that came out of some prior philosophical theory, a prior reasoning, or a prior epistemology. Think of the human being as an animal with instinct and training, and you’ll stop trying to find an “ultimate rational foundation” for the most basic linguistic moves. That’s exactly the opposite of reading hinges as “traditional epistemology.” It’s a reminder that the bedrock is practical and learned, not a set of scientific theses.

How this lands in our hinge dispute
OC 470–475 supports my main point against Fooloso4, i.e., Witt is not defining hinges as a special scientific subclass. He’s showing how “not doubting” is woven into training and practice before science even gets going. Science is a clear case where the structure is visible (OC 342), but these remarks show the structure is already there in ordinary life and child learning.

If we wanted one sentence for the thread, OC 470–475 shifts the axis from “which propositions are proven incontrovertible?” to “how are we trained into a practice where some things are treated as the background of inquiry rather than things within it?”

These passages fit nicely within the thread. Thanks.

You’re overreading Witt by turning a clarifying point into a definition, — Sam26

It is a description and the only one that he provides. That is not to say that there are other things that might count as a description but you argue against the attempt to identify them.

and by treating “incontrovertible” as if it names a fixed epistemic point. — Sam26

I have not claimed that it is an epistemic point. It is something that is characteristic of hinges, but not everything that is incontrovertible is a hinge.

Witt uses scientific investigation as a clear case, /quote]

Science is at the foundations of our way of life. Both in terms of the assumption that things have causes and can be explained and the technologies that increasingly shape our lives.
— Sam26

OC develops the same structure far beyond science under other labels, what stands fast, framework, world-picture, river-bed, and the contrast between what we test and what makes testing possible — Sam26

These are not things beyond science. The framework of our lives is scientific. This is not the case, for example, with primitive societies. Both our world-picture and the river-beds are scientific. Magic plays no role.

what we test and what makes testing possible — Sam26

And for us both what we test and what is tested are governed by science rather than magic or superstition.

So “incontrovertible” does not equal “hinge, — Sam26

Right. That is my point. As I ask Banno:

He [Wittgenstein] says the mathematical propositions is a hinge but one cannot say that about the proposition "I am called ...". It being incontrovertible is not sufficient for it to be a hinge. Why not? What is missing? — Fooloso4

And your “of course not, science isn’t a priori” reply misses the point. Nobody is claiming hinges are a priori truths. — Sam26

It is because nobody asking that claim that I said of course not. And yet you thought it necessary to say:

“incontrovertible” in OC shouldn’t be read as “a priori, — Sam26

The real issue isn’t a priori vs empirical — Sam26

Once again you raise objections to things I did not say.

“Incontrovertible” in this context means “not up for doubt within this practice, here,” not “guaranteed true forever.” — Sam26

Again, not something I said.

“read him on his own terms” doesn’t mean treating “hinge” as a technical term whose meaning is exhausted by three examples. — Sam26

And once again not something I said.

The question is what we are warranted to claim is a hinge? We are on solid ground when we attend to what Wittgenstein actually says. Beyond that is conjecture and needs textual support.

Have another look at OC §470 through §475. — Banno

Well I am glad to see that you are attempting to give textual support, but unfortunately it fails from the get go. He is clear that "I am called L. W." As I quoted above he explicitly denies that it is a hinge.

475 actually supports my point. We grant instinct not only to man but to animals. Do you want to grant hinges to animals as well? I must admit that they look and see, but they do not look to see

l...how the words are actually used in ordinary situations. — Sam26

An excellent appraisal, . Yep, I thought the bit might fit.

Pearls...

I think your reading is too rigid. You treat “hinge” as one uniform class, basically “officially immovable” like Witt’s mathematical case, and then you exclude anything else as not really a hinge. But OC is mapping a role, and that role comes in degrees.

In my terminology, there are bedrock certainties that are fixed for ordinary life, what stands fast so doubt and inquiry can get traction at all, and there are more local hinges that are treated as “not doubted” within a practice but can shift when the practice shifts. That’s why “I am called L. W.” can be beyond doubt in ordinary identification without being “officially stamped” as immovable the way a mathematical proposition is.

This is why @Banno said "Look and see."

:up:

It's clear from and that you are misunderstanding both what Wittgenstein is writing and Sam's responses to those misunderstandings, and now my own small contribution.

It's as if we wandered into a mixed forest and you, finding an Oak, concluded that the whole forest consists of oaks; And when Sam points out an elm, you say "but look, that one over there is an oak". Yes, it is, but that does not make the forrest a forrest of only oaks.

Look and see.

See §657, in which he says, of "I am called L.W", "And so we have here a buttress similar to the one that makes the propositions of mathematics incontrovertible".

On Certainty grants the opportunity to see some of how Wittgenstein works. It is unpolished, and certainly not a coherent, complete argument for a particular view. It is instead a record of the application of the various tools you have listed, of his struggle to identify exactly why, and even whether, "This is a hand" is not certain. He is playing with various formulations, looking for what works and what doesn't, "that which stands fast", "river beds", "mythology" “hinges”, and “animal certainty” all taking a part, are examined and critiqued and then he passes on. And it woudl be a mistake to presume that he reaches a conclusion.

It's not a treatise, it's a workshop.

It’s not “indubitable” [that he is called LW>because we demonstrated it through a proof, it’s indubitable because doubting it doesn’t normally gain a foothold in our everyday lives. — Sam26

Wittgenstein says it is indubitable because:

... the evidence's being overwhelming consists precisely in the fact that we do not need to give way before any contrary evidence.

(657) But again, he says that this is not a hinge. See above.

OC 472–473: training is what fixes what’s up for doubting or investigation
This answers the “science-only” reading. — Sam26

What is the hinge at 472? Wittgenstein says the child

... isn't taught to doubt whether what it sees later on is still a cupboard or only a kind of stage set.

Why would it doubt it? There is no reason to doubt it. The problem of doubt does not arise Are you claiming that hinges are the absence of doubt? Soon we will not be able to even open the door because of all the hinges.

The same goes for 673.

474 - The game is played because there is some worth in playing it. It would be worthless if things changed suddenly.

475 see above

there are bedrock certainties that are fixed for ordinary life, what stands fast so doubt and inquiry can get traction at all, and there are more local hinges that are treated as “not doubted” within a practice but can shift when the practice shifts. That’s why “I am called L. W.” can be beyond doubt in ordinary identification without being “officially stamped” as immovable the way a mathematical proposition is — Sam26

For Wittgenstein, even mathematical propositions derive their special status from their role in our practices. They are rules of grammar within certain language-games. Their certainty is not a higher-order metaphysical immovability but a function of their use. So the difference between “I am called L. W.” and a mathematical truth is not that one is contingently undoubted and the other metaphysically fixed; rather, they occupy different grammatical roles in different practices.

I largely agree with those statements.

I think your reading is too rigid. You treat “hinge” as one uniform class, basically “officially immovable” like Witt’s mathematical case, and then you exclude anything else as not really a hinge. — Sam26

It there are things that are hinges and things that are not then there must be distinguishing characteristics. This is not to say that all things that are hinges must have a specific feature in common. You can use a hammer to drive in a screw but it will do a poor job of it.

Rather than me excluding things you want to include many things or everything that has any of the features Wittgenstein identifies, even if he denies that that thing is a hinge.

I think a large part of the problem is that Wittgenstein uses the term science in a much wider way than you allow. You underestimate the role it plays in our form of life. Scientific investigations are not limited to the specialized work of scientists. If we assume that things have a natural explanation and we soi seek to find them then our inquiry is scientific. Our world view is inextricable scientific. Unless that is understood and unless you understand why this is of great concern to Wittgenstein you are bound to misunderstand him.

Scientific investigations are not limited to the specialized work of scientists. — Fooloso4

It's not just cheese makers, it's dairy producers of all kinds. :up:

At the risk of repeating myself I will repeat what Wittgenstein actually says about hinges: They are propositions that belong to our scientific investigations. As such they are epistemological in the traditional sense. He does not simply accept them, he concludes that they are incontrovertible. (OC 657) — Fooloso4

For Wittgenstein, part of Moore’s mistake is in saying “I know here is one hand” rather than “here is one hand”.

These hinges are not limited to science, but apply to our complete Form of Life. They form part of the framework of rational enquiry, and as such are not objects of knowledge but are exempt from doubt and not subject to evaluation. In this sense they are incontrovertible.

See §657, in which he says, of "I am called L.W" — Banno

You should follow your own advice. Look at what he says and maybe you will see. But only if you get the picture you have in mind out of your view:

655 Dispute about other things; this is immovable-it is a hinge on which your dispute can turn."

656. And one can not say that of the proposition that I am called L. W

What he says is that I am called L.W is not a hinge.

It might be helpful to consider why not?

I have been getting pushback on he claim that hinges have their place in our scientific investigations. Our scientific investigations form a system. It is within this system that hinges have a role.

105 All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure
for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life.

108. "But is there then no objective truth ? Isn't it true, or false, that someone has been on the moon?" If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the moon ... our whole system of physics forbids us to believe it...

141. When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions.
(Light dawns gradually over the whole.)

144. The child learns to believe a host of things. 1.e. it learns to act according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand unshakeably
fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it.

247. What would it be like to doubt now whether I have two hands ? Why can't I imagine it at all? What would I believe if I didn't believe that? So far I have no system at all within which this doubt might exist.

279 ...But how does this one belief hang together with all the rest?
We should like to say that someone who could believe that does not accept our whole system of verification.
This system is something that a human being acquires by means of observation and instruction. I intentionally do not say "learns"

286 ... If we compare our system of knowledge with theirs then theirs is evidently the poorer one by far.

410. Our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this system has a particular bit the value we give it.

Do you want to grant hinges to animals as well? — Fooloso4

I think at one point Wittgenstein implies that true "hinges" would have to actually be prelinguistic, and would be granted to animals other than human.

He is playing with various formulations, looking for what works and what doesn't, "that which stands fast", "river beds", "mythology" “hinges”, and “animal certainty” all taking a part, are examined and critiqued and then he passes on. And it woudl be a mistake to presume that he reaches a conclusion. — Banno

This is the point I am making. He proposes "hinges" as that which would be necessary for grounding knowledge in certainty. So he figures if there are hinges we should be able to identify them individually. He tries, but demonstrates that he cannot identify them.

He doesn't make any conclusion, but leaves the drawing of a conclusion to the reader. That is the way that Plato wrote, he stated the proposition, laid out the evidence, and allowed the reader to draw the conclusion. The conclusion which we ought to draw in this case, is that the proposal of "hinges" is a false proposition. The talk of hinges is idle talk. Wittgenstein has demonstrated that knowledge is not grounded in certainty. Knowledge is grounded in the skeptic's doubt, and certainty is an illusion which we produce to make ourselves feel better (therapy).

Let me quote you back in your own words so I’m not shadowboxing:

“I have been getting pushback on the claim that hinges have their place in our scientific investigations. Our scientific investigations form a system. It is within this system that hinges have a role.”

I’m not pushing back on system. I’m pushing back on the slide from “system” to “scientific investigations,” because your OC passages don’t support your claim.

Here's what you quoted:

OC 141: “When we first begin to believe anything… it is a whole system of propositions.”

OC 144: “The child learns to believe a host of things… Bit by bit there forms a system… some things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable to shift.”

OC 279: “This system is something that a human being acquires by means of observation and instruction. I intentionally do not say ‘learns’.”

That's not “scientific investigation.” That's training into what is meant by going on, and Witt is explicit that the system forms gradually and includes the things that stand fast and the things that shift. Science enters later, but the system he’s describing is already in place before science.

You also cite:

OC 247: “What would it be like to doubt now whether I have two hands?… I have no system at all within which this doubt might exist.”

That is an everyday case, not a scientific hypothesis. It shows exactly what I’ve been saying, viz., some doubts have no foothold because they don’t connect with any practice of checking inside the system.

And you also quote:

OC 105: “All testing… takes place already within a system… it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument.”

Again, “argument” and “testing” here are general. If you restrict that to “scientific investigations,” you’re limiting Witt’s point.

Now, OC 108 (the moon example) does show that within our present system, physics can rule out certain claims. Fine. But that doesn’t make the whole framework “scientific.” It shows that within a system, some propositions are treated as fixed or foundational. This is the hinge point. Science is one clear region where you can see it clearly.

Finally, you quote:

OC 286: “If we compare our system of knowledge with theirs then theirs is evidently the poorer one by far.”

This line only makes sense if Witt thinks there are different systems, some not “scientific.” So, the system talk can’t be identical with “scientific investigation.”

I'll state my position as clearly as I can. Hinges have their role within a system, and our scientific investigations are one part of that overall system. But hinge structure itself, what stands fast and what shifts, is already there in the child e.g., in ordinary doubt, in instruction, and in the background of how we verify. Your citations make this point unavoidable.

Paine It's not a treatise, it's a workshop. — Banno

These remarks in On Certainty seem to follow the distinctions made in Philosophical Investigations between natural science and the comparison of languages:

F. P. Ramsey once emphasized in conversation with me that logic was a 'normative science'. I do not know exactly what he had in mind, but it was doubtless closely related to what only dawned on me later: namely, that in philosophy we often compare the use of words with games and calculi which have fixed rules, but cannot say that someone who is using language must be playing such a game.—— But if you say that our languages only approximate to such calculi you are standing on the very brink of a misunderstanding. For then it may look as if what we were talking about were an ideal language. As if our logic were, so to speak, a logic for a vacuum.—Whereas logic does not treat of language—or of thought—in the sense in which a natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, and the most that can be said is that we construct ideal languages. But here the word "ideal" is liable to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages were better, more perfect, than our everyday language; and as if it took the logician to shew people at last what a proper sentence looked like.

All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning, and thinking. For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules. — PI, 81

Let the language games begin. The grammatical considerations of the rules are distinguished from the doubt that arises in experience:

A rule stands there like a sign-post.—Does the sign-post leave no doubt open about the way I have to go? Does it shew which direction I am to take when I have passed it; whether along the road or the footpath or cross-country? But where is it said which way I am to follow it; whether in the direction of its ringer or (e.g.) in the opposite one?—And if there were, not a single sign-post, but a chain
of adjacent ones or of chalk marks on the ground—is there only one way of interpreting them?—So I can say, the sign-post does after all leave no room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for
doubt and sometimes not. And now this is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical one. — PI, 85

Earlier on this thread, I quoted the Blue Book that cites the need for a model to explain the causes of what is hidden in nature.

The remarks in On Certainty look at the grammatical structures that give us confidence in our models.

Let me clarify some earlier remarks. The mathematical proposition and "I am called L.W." both stand fast, but they stand fast in different ways, and the difference is in the grammar.

A mathematical proposition like 12x12=144 is a hinge in the strongest sense (my bedrock sense) because its internal to the system. Once you're inside arithmetic, you can't doubt it without ceasing to do arithmetic. It doesn't rest on evidence. Nobody checks whether 12x12 still equals 144. The proposition has been given what Witt calls the "official stamp of incontestability" because of the way it functions as a rule within the system. Doubting it doesn't produce a question of value, it produces a breakdown of the practice.

"I am called L.W." is different. It stands fast because of the sheer weight of everything in our life. i.e., documents, people using the name, memories, responses, institutional records. The evidence is overwhelming, and Witt says exactly that. But it's still evidence. You can imagine, however remotely, a scenario where it turns out to be wrong, an elaborate deception, a bureaucratic mix-up, amnesia, something. However, you can't imagine a scenario where 12x12 stops equaling 144. So "I am called L.W." stands fast within ordinary life with a certainty that's practically unshakable, but it stands fast because of how the world happens to be, not because of the grammar of a system.

That's the distinction I think Witt is making, I believe, at 655-657. The mathematical proposition is a hinge because it functions as a rule, a piece of the framework that makes calculation possible. "I am called L.W." is incontrovertible but doesn't have that rule-like character. It's more like a proposition that has hardened into the riverbed because of the accumulated weight of life, not because it was always part of the bed.

Here's my key point, and this is where I think you and I actually disagree. That distinction doesn't mean "I am called L.W." plays no hinge-like role. It does. In everyday identification, in how I navigate the world, in how others address me, it functions as what stands fast. Doubting it in ordinary circumstances wouldn't be a proper inquiry, it would be a sign that something is amiss with the person doing the doubting. But it plays the role differently than a mathematical proposition does, and Witt is careful about the difference.

So, what's missing when Witt says you can't say of "I am called L.W." what you can say of 12x12=144? What's missing is the rule-governed, system-internal character. The math hinge holds its place by the grammar of the practice. The personal hinge holds its place by the weight of life. Both stand fast. But the way they stand fast, and the conditions under which they could shift, are different. That's why Witt withholds the "official stamp" from one and not the other, and that's why I think reading hinges as one uniform class with one set of credentials misses what OC is saying.

“system” to “scientific investigations,” — Sam26

Our system is inextricably scientific.

That's not “scientific investigation.” — Sam26

The child is not doing a scientific investigation. It begins to believe a whole system of propositions.(141) It is that system of propositions that is for us based on science. See 140:

We do not learn the practice of making empirical judgments by learning rules: we are taught judgments and their connexion with other judgments. A totality of judgments is made plausible
to us.

Our system of judgments is based on science. This is why at the time of his writing we rejected the idea that anyone had ever been on the moon.

That is an everyday case, not a scientific hypothesis. — Sam26

Right, it is not a scientific hypothesis. Moore's argument is empirical and attempts to provide proof.

It shows exactly what I’ve been saying, viz., some doubts have no foothold because they don’t connect with any practice of checking inside the system. — Sam26

What system? Wittgenstein says:

... we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education.

(298)

That does not mean that we our community is bound together by the practice of making hypotheses or whatever it is you imagine scientists do. Science is a body of knowledge that shapes our world view.

But that doesn’t make the whole framework “scientific.” It shows that within a system, some propositions are treated as fixed or foundational. — Sam26

Again, what system? The answer is a system of a community bound by science and education.

This line only makes sense if Witt thinks there are different systems, some not “scientific.” — Sam26

Yes, he is comparing our system of belief and knowledge with some other.

Hinges are not free floating. They have their place and function within a system. In order to understand how a hinge functions we must have some understanding of the system. Without that understanding we cannot understand how a proposition functions and so cannot determine whether or not it is a hinge.

What's missing is the rule-governed, system-internal character. — Sam26

Yes. I agree.

The personal hinge ... — Sam26

Is it a hinge or "

hinge-like — Sam26

?

It is in certain respects like a hinge but it is not a hinge. That is because it is personal. If it turns out that no one is called L.W. this does not disrupt our system of propositions or way of seeing the world. For the most part things still hold fast.

What he says is that I am called L.W is not a hinge. — Fooloso4

You left out the italicises "I", and ignore that he immediately qualifies that comment.

657. The propositions of mathematics might be said to be fossilized. - The proposition "I am called...." is not. But it too is regarded as incontrovertible by those who, like myself, have overwhelming evidence for it. And this not out of thoughtlessness. For, the evidence's being overwhelming consists precisely in the fact that we do not need to give way before any contrary evidence. And so we have here a buttress similar to the one that makes the propositions of mathematics incontrovertible.

I have been getting pushback on he claim that hinges have their place in our scientific investigations. — Fooloso4

No you haven't. You have been getting pushback for claiming that hinges are only about scientific investigations. For thinking the forest is only oaks. has explained this.

The "system" includes all language, the many games we play and things we do with it; from reading a train timetable to traveling to the moon in a dream, from calling for a block to multiplying 12 by 12.

The remarks in On Certainty look at the grammatical structures that give us confidence in our models. — Paine

Sure. And...?

OC is perhaps more like a ball game:

83. Doesn’t the analogy between language and games throw light here? We can easily imagine people amusing themselves in a field by playing with a ball like this: starting various existing games, but playing several without finishing them, and in between throwing the ball aimlessly into the air, chasing one another with the ball, throwing it at one another for a joke, and so on. And now someone says: The whole time they are playing a ball-game and therefore are following definite rules at every throw.

And is there not also the case where we play, and make up the rules as we go along? And even where we alter them a as we go along.

Perhaps in the OC L.W. is making up the rules as he goes along... And isn't this sometimes worth doing?