What other classes of investigation is he considering with regard to hinges? — Fooloso4

:meh:

Most of the text is to do with other examples, as per Sam's Tool 1. Look and see.

You’re overreading Witt by turning a clarifying point into a definition, and by treating “incontrovertible” as if it names a fixed epistemic point.

Yes, OC 341-342 are connected, and Witt uses scientific investigation as a clear case, i.e., inquiry works only against a background of things that aren’t doubted. But it doesn't follow that hinges are only propositions “belonging to scientific investigations.” That’s your restriction, not Witt. OC develops the same structure far beyond science under other labels, what stands fast, framework, world-picture, river-bed, and the contrast between what we test and what makes testing possible; and as I said, science is one sharp illustration of the structure, not the whole domain.

On “incontrovertible,” your own citations work against the way you’re using the word. Witt distinguishes between propositions like “I am called …,” which can be practically beyond dispute, and mathematical propositions that are “officially” stamped as immovable hinges (OC 655–657). So “incontrovertible” does not equal “hinge,” and it doesn’t define the class. It marks specific roles in different contexts, and Witt is careful about those differences.

And your “of course not, science isn’t a priori” reply misses the point. Nobody is claiming hinges are a priori truths. The real issue isn’t a priori vs empirical, it’s role. A hinge can be empirical in content and still function as what stands fast in a practice. “Incontrovertible” in this context means “not up for doubt within this practice, here,” not “guaranteed true forever.” That’s exactly why Witt uses the river-bed e.g., what stands fast can harden and later shift.

Finally, “read him on his own terms” doesn’t mean treating “hinge” as a technical term whose meaning is exhausted by three examples. Wittgenstein’s method in OC is to show the function across cases, not to provide you a tidy definition. Your restriction to a scientific subclass is exactly the kind of point that the text resists.

That's an excellent diagnosis.

Seems your thread must deal with both hinges and the unhinged. :wink:

Have another look at OC §470 through §475. In part, his puzzlement here is addressed by later work on constitutive utterances. "L.W." counts as a reference to Wittgenstein, and that it does so does not "emerge from some kind of ratiocination", it's in the doing...

How is look and see a hinge? It is a good policy to follow but even under Sam's description it is not a hinge. The policy may hold fast but it tells us nothing about things that hold fast.

Regardless of interpretations made of the contents of the work, I have long been puzzled why On Certainty has been received as worth serious consideration when compared with other works by Wittgenstein. The Preface says:

It seemed appropriate to publish this work by itself. It is not a selection; Wittgenstein marked it off in his notebooks as a separate topic, which he apparently took up at four separate periods during this eighteen months. It constitutes a single sustained treatment of the topic. — On Certainty

By this reasoning, Heidegger's treatment of Nietzsche's notebook Will to Power is equal to Nietzsche's published works. This sort of thing does not clarify the intent of the author.

How is look and see a hinge? — Fooloso4

What?

Seems to be a comprehension problem here. On several levels.

This is interesting because OC 470–475 is practically tailor made for the dispute we've been having, i.e., whether hinges are “scientific propositions” with epistemic status, or do they fit a role within our broader practices, learned in how we training takes place, and shown in what gets investigated and what doesn’t.

Here’s how I read it, for what it's worth:

OC 470: “Why is there no doubt that I am called L. W.?”
Witt is showing us a simple picture, if something is “beyond doubt,” we must have established it beyond doubt by some super evidence. But our names aren’t like that. It’s not “indubitable” because we demonstrated it through a proof, it’s indubitable because doubting it doesn’t normally gain a foothold in our everyday lives. It’s a hinge-like case, but definitely not because it’s “scientific.” It’s because it has a place in the background of ordinary uses.

OC 472–473: training is what fixes what’s up for doubting or investigation
This answers the “science-only” reading. The child learns language and at the same time learns what counts as worth checking and what doesn’t. The cupboard example makes this very plain; we don't teach a child to treat “is this a real cupboard or a stage set?” as what we normally accept. We teach stability as the norm first, and only later do we learn the cases where instability/doubting becomes relevant. That’s a form-of-life point, not a scientific-epistemology point.

OC 474: “worth” is not “ground”
This one is lethal to the move “it works; therefore it’s justified.” Witt grants that the practice’s success may explain why it survives, but he denies that this success is the justification or “ground” of it. This fits what I've saying, don’t turn these remarks into a proof, treat them as a description of how our checking practices sit on something that isn’t itself grounded/justified by further checking.

OC 475: the anti-rationalist origin story
Here Witt says, don’t picture language as something that came out of some prior philosophical theory, a prior reasoning, or a prior epistemology. Think of the human being as an animal with instinct and training, and you’ll stop trying to find an “ultimate rational foundation” for the most basic linguistic moves. That’s exactly the opposite of reading hinges as “traditional epistemology.” It’s a reminder that the bedrock is practical and learned, not a set of scientific theses.

How this lands in our hinge dispute
OC 470–475 supports my main point against Fooloso4, i.e., Witt is not defining hinges as a special scientific subclass. He’s showing how “not doubting” is woven into training and practice before science even gets going. Science is a clear case where the structure is visible (OC 342), but these remarks show the structure is already there in ordinary life and child learning.

If we wanted one sentence for the thread, OC 470–475 shifts the axis from “which propositions are proven incontrovertible?” to “how are we trained into a practice where some things are treated as the background of inquiry rather than things within it?”

These passages fit nicely within the thread. Thanks.

You’re overreading Witt by turning a clarifying point into a definition, — Sam26

It is a description and the only one that he provides. That is not to say that there are other things that might count as a description but you argue against the attempt to identify them.

and by treating “incontrovertible” as if it names a fixed epistemic point. — Sam26

I have not claimed that it is an epistemic point. It is something that is characteristic of hinges, but not everything that is incontrovertible is a hinge.

Witt uses scientific investigation as a clear case, /quote]

Science is at the foundations of our way of life. Both in terms of the assumption that things have causes and can be explained and the technologies that increasingly shape our lives.
— Sam26

OC develops the same structure far beyond science under other labels, what stands fast, framework, world-picture, river-bed, and the contrast between what we test and what makes testing possible — Sam26

These are not things beyond science. The framework of our lives is scientific. This is not the case, for example, with primitive societies. Both our world-picture and the river-beds are scientific. Magic plays no role.

what we test and what makes testing possible — Sam26

And for us both what we test and what is tested are governed by science rather than magic or superstition.

So “incontrovertible” does not equal “hinge, — Sam26

Right. That is my point. As I ask Banno:

He [Wittgenstein] says the mathematical propositions is a hinge but one cannot say that about the proposition "I am called ...". It being incontrovertible is not sufficient for it to be a hinge. Why not? What is missing? — Fooloso4

And your “of course not, science isn’t a priori” reply misses the point. Nobody is claiming hinges are a priori truths. — Sam26

It is because nobody asking that claim that I said of course not. And yet you thought it necessary to say:

“incontrovertible” in OC shouldn’t be read as “a priori, — Sam26

The real issue isn’t a priori vs empirical — Sam26

Once again you raise objections to things I did not say.

“Incontrovertible” in this context means “not up for doubt within this practice, here,” not “guaranteed true forever.” — Sam26

Again, not something I said.

“read him on his own terms” doesn’t mean treating “hinge” as a technical term whose meaning is exhausted by three examples. — Sam26

And once again not something I said.

The question is what we are warranted to claim is a hinge? We are on solid ground when we attend to what Wittgenstein actually says. Beyond that is conjecture and needs textual support.

Have another look at OC §470 through §475. — Banno

Well I am glad to see that you are attempting to give textual support, but unfortunately it fails from the get go. He is clear that "I am called L. W." As I quoted above he explicitly denies that it is a hinge.

475 actually supports my point. We grant instinct not only to man but to animals. Do you want to grant hinges to animals as well? I must admit that they look and see, but they do not look to see

l...how the words are actually used in ordinary situations. — Sam26

An excellent appraisal, . Yep, I thought the bit might fit.

Pearls...

I think your reading is too rigid. You treat “hinge” as one uniform class, basically “officially immovable” like Witt’s mathematical case, and then you exclude anything else as not really a hinge. But OC is mapping a role, and that role comes in degrees.

In my terminology, there are bedrock certainties that are fixed for ordinary life, what stands fast so doubt and inquiry can get traction at all, and there are more local hinges that are treated as “not doubted” within a practice but can shift when the practice shifts. That’s why “I am called L. W.” can be beyond doubt in ordinary identification without being “officially stamped” as immovable the way a mathematical proposition is.

This is why @Banno said "Look and see."

:up:

It's clear from and that you are misunderstanding both what Wittgenstein is writing and Sam's responses to those misunderstandings, and now my own small contribution.

It's as if we wandered into a mixed forest and you, finding an Oak, concluded that the whole forest consists of oaks; And when Sam points out an elm, you say "but look, that one over there is an oak". Yes, it is, but that does not make the forrest a forrest of only oaks.

Look and see.

See §657, in which he says, of "I am called L.W", "And so we have here a buttress similar to the one that makes the propositions of mathematics incontrovertible".

On Certainty grants the opportunity to see some of how Wittgenstein works. It is unpolished, and certainly not a coherent, complete argument for a particular view. It is instead a record of the application of the various tools you have listed, of his struggle to identify exactly why, and even whether, "This is a hand" is not certain. He is playing with various formulations, looking for what works and what doesn't, "that which stands fast", "river beds", "mythology" “hinges”, and “animal certainty” all taking a part, are examined and critiqued and then he passes on. And it woudl be a mistake to presume that he reaches a conclusion.

It's not a treatise, it's a workshop.

It’s not “indubitable” [that he is called LW>because we demonstrated it through a proof, it’s indubitable because doubting it doesn’t normally gain a foothold in our everyday lives. — Sam26

Wittgenstein says it is indubitable because:

... the evidence's being overwhelming consists precisely in the fact that we do not need to give way before any contrary evidence.

(657) But again, he says that this is not a hinge. See above.

OC 472–473: training is what fixes what’s up for doubting or investigation
This answers the “science-only” reading. — Sam26

What is the hinge at 472? Wittgenstein says the child

... isn't taught to doubt whether what it sees later on is still a cupboard or only a kind of stage set.

Why would it doubt it? There is no reason to doubt it. The problem of doubt does not arise Are you claiming that hinges are the absence of doubt? Soon we will not be able to even open the door because of all the hinges.

The same goes for 673.

474 - The game is played because there is some worth in playing it. It would be worthless if things changed suddenly.

475 see above

there are bedrock certainties that are fixed for ordinary life, what stands fast so doubt and inquiry can get traction at all, and there are more local hinges that are treated as “not doubted” within a practice but can shift when the practice shifts. That’s why “I am called L. W.” can be beyond doubt in ordinary identification without being “officially stamped” as immovable the way a mathematical proposition is — Sam26

For Wittgenstein, even mathematical propositions derive their special status from their role in our practices. They are rules of grammar within certain language-games. Their certainty is not a higher-order metaphysical immovability but a function of their use. So the difference between “I am called L. W.” and a mathematical truth is not that one is contingently undoubted and the other metaphysically fixed; rather, they occupy different grammatical roles in different practices.

I largely agree with those statements.

I think your reading is too rigid. You treat “hinge” as one uniform class, basically “officially immovable” like Witt’s mathematical case, and then you exclude anything else as not really a hinge. — Sam26

It there are things that are hinges and things that are not then there must be distinguishing characteristics. This is not to say that all things that are hinges must have a specific feature in common. You can use a hammer to drive in a screw but it will do a poor job of it.

Rather than me excluding things you want to include many things or everything that has any of the features Wittgenstein identifies, even if he denies that that thing is a hinge.

I think a large part of the problem is that Wittgenstein uses the term science in a much wider way than you allow. You underestimate the role it plays in our form of life. Scientific investigations are not limited to the specialized work of scientists. If we assume that things have a natural explanation and we soi seek to find them then our inquiry is scientific. Our world view is inextricable scientific. Unless that is understood and unless you understand why this is of great concern to Wittgenstein you are bound to misunderstand him.

Scientific investigations are not limited to the specialized work of scientists. — Fooloso4

It's not just cheese makers, it's dairy producers of all kinds. :up:

At the risk of repeating myself I will repeat what Wittgenstein actually says about hinges: They are propositions that belong to our scientific investigations. As such they are epistemological in the traditional sense. He does not simply accept them, he concludes that they are incontrovertible. (OC 657) — Fooloso4

For Wittgenstein, part of Moore’s mistake is in saying “I know here is one hand” rather than “here is one hand”.

These hinges are not limited to science, but apply to our complete Form of Life. They form part of the framework of rational enquiry, and as such are not objects of knowledge but are exempt from doubt and not subject to evaluation. In this sense they are incontrovertible.