This isn't the first time I've described the sciences as philosophy's children, and every time the description seems more apt. The sciences are like a son who takes over his dad's garage, but the old man keeps stopping by, getting underfoot, trying to tell his son how to do his job. "Dad, they've got computers in them now! These new cars, they're not like what you used to work on."

And I say this as father. If you've done right by them, they've got the values they need to make their own way. Your example is what counts the most.

I think this a position often held by positivists. Russell makes similar points about philosophy:

As soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science...

Some people hold a view that philosophy is merely speculative, whereas science deals with reality - no doubt there are hard and sift version of this.

I think this a position often held by positivists. Russell makes similar points about philosophy: — Tom Storm

I'd like to differentiate myself from positivists in some way.

Some people hold a view that philosophy is merely speculative, whereas science deals with reality - no doubt there are hard and soft version of this. — Tom Storm

I wouldn't put it like that.

To use Srap's story -- it's not like the grandparents cease to visit in or have influence.

As soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science... — Russell

Ha! I've said this a number of times on the forum, and never knew I was plagiarizing Russell. (I'll check out the source.)

As I said before, this to me is just historical fact. I tend to think of science as the fulfillment of philosophy; some people think of science as, I don't know, second-rate philosophy.

it's not like the grandparents cease to visit in or have influence — Moliere

Hmmmm. Be nice if your parents and grandparents were proud of you, instead of second-guessing everything you do. (Mine were. Randy Newman tells a story about visiting his dad: "Hey Pops! I won an Academy Award!" "Yeah? For what?" Oof.)

I wouldn't put it like that. — Moliere

I would. But perhaps you’re saying that’s not how you see yourself in relation to a claim like: ‘science is what we arrive at when philosophy has been successful and weeded out all the dead ends.'

But perhaps you’re saying that’s not how you see yourself in relation to a claim like: ‘science is what we arrive at when philosophy has been successful and weeded out all the dead ends.' — Tom Storm

Yes.

I'd put it that science shares a genealogy from philosophy, but has become something a bit different than what philosophy has pursued in doing metaphysics. The interests are the same along with various commitments to reason. I don't see philosophy as a dead end at all but as a fruitful activity that will always be around, but I can see how we do science now relates to philosophical influence, and how science has gradually become independent from philosophy -- at least as a discipline (i think philosophy of science is a thing and interesting and worth investigating too).

For me what remains interesting is that science is built upon philosophical axioms ( e.g., reality can be understood) and how strongly these are believed depends on how scientistic we are or whether we are metaphysical or methodological naturalists.

Good post. I think your argument is a bit overstated, but I agree with the spirit of what you've said. Philosophers overstep when they try to legislate rationality, pontificate from the armchair, or tell scientists how to do their jobs.

That said, I don't think Hart is aiming to do any of those things. His arguments are designed to put pressure on a certain metaphysical picture while pointing the way to an alternative that he thinks is more compelling than contemporary intellectual culture gives it credit for. That's it.

Should he be ignored? I don't see that he's doing anything particularly egregious or underhanded. Unlike Zeno, the topics he is addressing are considered "live" within contemporary philosophy and science. Sure, his metaphysical views are idiosyncratic, and he blusters a bit too much, but that doesn't make him unworthy of engagement per se.

That said, I can totally see why certain people would ignore him, whether out of distaste or disinterest. That's fine. I don't think his arguments "demand" an answer, though I think anyone who is interested in the topics should probably grapple with the underlying conceptual issues at some point.

For me what remains interesting is that science is built upon philosophical axioms ( e.g., reality can be understood) and how strongly these are believed depends on how scientistic we are or whether we are metaphysical or methodological naturalists. — Tom Storm

Is science built upon philosophical axioms? Is "Reality can be understood" an axiomatic belief?

My thought is that scientism is the belief that science can resolve philosophical questions or that it has priority in all matter of things regarding reality, ethics, and knowledge. I'd say this is a philosophical belief, though, and not a scientific axiom. I don't think that methodological naturalism is necessary for the sciences, even -- one who believes that the universe is intelligibly structured due to our inability to understand intentionality can still do science with or without that commitment.

Much of my insistence on dividing philosophy from science is that I think both are valuable and different from one another, and I think a multitude of philosophical beliefs which conflict can contribute towards scientific practice: it doesn't matter if we believe we're describing random patterns or nature's structures or the results of a deeper intelligibility which structures reality what matters is that we're able to do science together through a shared practice.

I say "not even methodological naturalism" is necessary because of the different metaphysical frames we can interpret scientific evidence in, and it seems that the practice has evolved to a point that it's somewhat independent of metaphysical beliefs. Rather than necessary preconditions or necessary philosophical presumptions there's a multiplicity of possibles.

And I'd say I'm not committed to positivism or scientism with this because I don't believe science is the end-all-be-all on reality. There's history. There's personal experience. There's art. There are all kinds of ways of knowing reality that aren't bounded by scientific practice or inference.

Is science built upon philosophical axioms? Is "Reality can be understood" an axiomatic belief? — Moliere

You’re right. Axiom may not be the right term. But it is a metaphysical presupposition. There are others, like causation and the idea that the world is ordered. And pragmatically this works for us ( for the most part).

And I'd say I'm not committed to positivism or scientism with this because I don't believe science is the end-all-be-all on reality. — Moliere

I’m not attempting to define who is a positivist or a scientistic thinker.

Is Dawkins? Many would say so. And yet he writes with vitality about the centrality of art, poetry and music in his life. I think, perhaps, that scientism arises from the belief that reality is transparently accessible to us, that it can be captured in a complete descriptive system, and that scientific inquiry alone provides genuine insight into what matters. ( eg, consciousness) Or something like that. How do you see scientism?

But it is a metaphysical presupposition. There are others, like causation and the idea that the world is ordered. And pragmatically this works for us ( for the most part). — Tom Storm

I want to say that intelligibility, causation, and the idea of an ordered world can be metaphysical presuppositions, but I don't believe they must be a part of science as a whole.

We could interpret "causation" as "patterns of events" and make events ontologically primary to the logical category of causation -- i.e. here causation wouldn't be a metaphysical presupposition but an epistemic collective necessity where one is reporting events but not committed to metaphysical causation actually existing.

This is what a basic anti-realism of science looks like: there are constraints of method, but these are not metaphysical presuppositions.

Is Dawkins? Many would say so. And yet he writes with vitality about the centrality of art, poetry and music in his life. I think perhaps scientistic tendencies begin with the idea that we apprehend reality and it can be described in full and that science is the only pathway to truth about subjects that matter ( eg, consciousness) Or something like that. How do you see scientism? — Tom Storm

Dawkins fits, by my lights. I'd differentiate myself here in saying that I'm not just saying that philosophy is important while science is the best method for discovering causal reality, or something along those lines. I genuinely believe there's more to knowledge than science. Even philosophy counts here -- it's just seeking a different kind of truth than science seeks, by my lights, and due to the practices of science being made relatively free of metaphysical commitments (at least, necessary metaphysical commitments), which is evidenced by the wide interpretations of science even by scientific practitioners (i.e. a naturalist vs. an idealist, say) while the practice continues to be successful.

Making any kind of sense?

I want to say that intelligibility, causation, and the idea of an ordered world can be metaphysical presuppositions, but I don't believe they must be a part of science as a whole. — Moliere

Interesting. Do you think many scientists identify as anti‑realists, and also as Kantians, understanding space and time as forms of cognition rather than external features of the world?

. I genuinely believe there's more to knowledge than science. — Moliere

What are you thinking here?

Even philosophy counts here -- it's just seeking a different kind of truth than science seeks, by my lights, and due to the practices of science being made relatively free of metaphysical commitments (at least, necessary metaphysical commitments), which is evidenced by the wide interpretations of science even by scientific practitioners (i.e. a naturalist vs. an idealist, say) while the practice continues to be successful. — Moliere

Yes, I find this interesting. Are there many scientists who believe that time and space do not exist as external realities? Or should I have written ‘spacetime’ instead?

What would count as a different kind of truth?

Interesting. Do you think many scientists identify as anti‑realists, and also as Kantians—understanding space and time as forms of cognition rather than external features of the world? — Tom Storm

I don't think so, no. But I don't know, either -- I'm not sure if we'd be able to even poll the group "All Scientists" due to lack of ability to ask everyone who is a scientist.

Realism I think is more common among scientists, but what that realism is realism about varies quite a bit. A mentor of mine in biochemistry was both a determinist and a Catholic which is pretty much the exact opposite of my view on the world and on science. :D

And I've run into many different worldviews among scientists. Philosophy is only sometimes a shared interest and usually I don't get the time to talk it because we're talking science(also, I don't broach it).

What are you thinking here? — Tom Storm

History is my go-to example because it is academic, it's about the world, and people generally believe that historical events are also real: we may disagree on the causes of World War 2, but that there were causes of World War 2 is a frequent belief.

History is about the real world, and yet produces knowledge. And History does not follow the methods or presuppositions of Science. Ergo, there's more to knowledge than science even in the highly constrained world of academia.

But also I like to note that almost all of our beliefs are formed by non-scientific means. Science's stringency is such that even if we're committed to science as the best and only we can't possibly fulfill that in our day-to-day life, and this kind of knowledge is still knowledge. I know that my wife will want me to do such and such not because I've done studies but because we have a relationship in which we communicate.

In some ways this personal knowledge is "higher" than scientific knowledge: Newton's Laws were true, but my marriage is preserved because I do what I need to do to keep it that way.

What would count as a different kind of truth? — Tom Storm

Philosophy! :D

At least I tend to think so. It's hard to characterize just what is learned by studying philosophy, but I can see that people who do are more able at thinking. It's not that they will not fall for traps but they'll be somewhat aware of possible traps and be open to error more than people who do not.

But art is another good example here I think. I think art explores the human condition and seeks Truth over decoration, at least at times.

Then there's the knowledge of the trades I think of: knowing the different types of switches you can install into a control panel is about reality but it's not really a scientific knowledge and it's not only know-that. It's technical knowledge. Plumbing, machining, electrical work seem to fit here as genuine kinds of truth that are even about the world but they're not doing the science thing.

I think the idea that is being circled around here without really being stated is metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realism is the philosophical position that a mind-independent world exists, holding that objects, their properties, and the structure of reality remain the same regardless of whether they are thought of, perceived, or experienced. It asserts an objective reality exists independently of perception or reason. But as William James said 'The trail of the human serpent is over everything' - and I think time has borne that out (said in a lecture in 1907).

A concrete example is the arguments about physics (without necessarily going into all the details). But suffice to say that Albert Einstein was a committed metaphysical realist, in the above sense, and consistently rejected any suggestion that observation or measurement could materially affect the objects of analysis in sub-atomic physics. Again, time has not been on Einstein's side in this regard, the so-called 'anti-realist' interpretations of physics seem to hold sway nowadays.

But I think many scientists are nowadays aware of the dangers of metaphysical realism, the antidote to which is simply circumspection. 'We don't say this is how the world really is, but that is surely how it appears to be.'

Be nice if your parents and grandparents were proud of you, instead of second-guessing everything you do. — Srap Tasmaner

I think that's the attitude I'm encouraging.

Though, to be fair, the children second-guess everything the parents/grandparents do, too -- and it'd be nice if we could recognize our common humanity and stop that game.

Yes.

In spite of my pronouncements, though, I believe I'm a realist of the metaphysical sort.

But I would not follow your description of Einstein's realism. From what I can see God plays dice.

A safe bet, I think. ;-)

:rofl:

Then there's the knowledge of the trades I think of: knowing the different types of switches you can install into a control panel is about reality but it's not really a scientific knowledge and it's not only know-that. It's technical knowledge. Plumbing, machining, electrical work seem to fit here as genuine kinds of truth that are even about the world but they're not doing the science thing. — Moliere

I’m not sure I agree. I take something closer to Susan Haack’s view of what counts as a scientific approach. Methods that have been established within an intersubjective community, that have replicable and predictable results, where there's a body of standards and best practices based on empirical experience, would certainly include areas like plumbing, electrical work, and even boat building. All achieved over time through testing an idea, trial and error and experiment. Many fields fit this broader account of disciplined, evidence‑based inquiry.

Philosophy! :D

At least I tend to think so. It's hard to characterize just what is learned by studying philosophy, but I can see that people who do are more able at thinking. It's not that they will not fall for traps but they'll be somewhat aware of possible traps and be open to error more than people who do not. — Moliere

I hear you. Although I wouldn’t say philosophy as a whole. Some philosophy, perhaps even most. But I wouldn’t include something like logical positivism, for example. The problem is whether we can treat all philosophy as a form of truth, even while recognising that some philosophy is mistaken, and in some cases perhaps even wilfully ignorant.

I think the idea that is being circled around here without really being stated is metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realism is the philosophical position that a mind-independent world exists, holding that objects, their properties, and the structure of reality remain the same regardless of whether they are thought of, perceived, or experienced. — Wayfarer

Exactly. Thanks for the term. Queue The View from Nowhere by Nagel. An important argument.

I’m not sure I agree. I take something closer to Susan Haack’s view of what counts as a scientific approach. Methods that have been established within an intersubjective community, that have replicable and predictable results, where there's a body of standards and best practices based on empirical experience, would certainly include areas like plumbing, electrical work, and even boat building. All achieved over time through testing an idea, trial and error and experiment. Many fields fit this broader account of disciplined, evidence‑based inquiry. — Tom Storm

That's interesting.

Yes, many fields do.

Would judges, in a court of law, count?

I hear you. Although I wouldn’t say philosophy as a whole. Some philosophy, perhaps even most. But I wouldn’t include something like logical positivism, for example. The problem is whether we can treat all philosophy as a form of truth, even while recognising that some philosophy is mistaken, and in some cases perhaps even wilfully ignorant. — Tom Storm

I think logical positivism is a worthy area of study.

Basically I think it's worthwhile to study false things. Sometimes I think it's more worthwhile to study false things than true things, but then I shake myself back to reality :D

Also I ought note that one need not study philosophy to be good at what I was saying. One can have their own ways of listening which the philosophers we read have not bothered to articulate and those ways of listening is what I think philosophy can help one learn.

The odd part there is that in studying philosophy one can also learn to do the opposite -- to defend one's viewpoint from all possible objections and prove oneself right.

But I think many scientists are nowadays aware of the dangers of metaphysical realism, the antidote to which is simply circumspection. 'We don't say this is how the world really is, but that is surely how it appears to be.' — Wayfarer

On the other hand, the idea that reality could be other than it appears to be is absurd unless what is meant by "how the world appears" allows that what appears to us is not exhaustive, since we have reason to believe it appears differently to other animals. I don't think theories should be included in "how the world appears" either, since they are obviously defeasible.



Ironically the idea that reality could be some absolute way apart from how it appears introduces the very the notion of the "God's eye view from nowhere" that you are constantly arguing against.

Every working scientist presupposes that nature is intelligible, that valid inference tracks truth, and that explanation is possible when they do their work. Those are philosophical commitments, whether or not anyone stops to examine them. — Esse Quam Videri

You make it sound as though there could be an alternative.

"Again, time has not been on Einstein's side in this regard, the so-called 'anti-realist' interpretations of physics seem to hold sway nowadays."

I don't think this is the case. Certainly I don't think that observer dependence commits one to anti realism. That the world at the micro scale works in ways that are very unintuitive to inhabitants of the macro scale shouldn't be too surprising.

There are obviously lots of interpretations. The one I prefer is that the world is fundamentally lazy. It commits to as little definite state as it can get away with. And if it does commit, that state remains as local as it can get away with. Interaction simply merges the local determinate state of both terms of the interaction. And observation is, definitionally, the interaction we are aware of. Nothing woo about it.

The one I prefer is that the world is fundamentally lazy. — hypericin

Whereas I would prefer ‘indeterminate’.

Those sympathetic to this position suggest that this is a metaphysical, not merely empirical, problem. If minds and meanings arise from purely blind physical processes aimed at survival rather than truth, then the fact that our thoughts reliably refer to the world and track its structure appears contingent or unexplained. Naturalism can describe how cognition functions, but it seems less able to explain why cognition should be about reality at all, rather than merely useful for navigating experience. — Tom Storm

I think you have answered your own question. The intelligibility of reality, and the "unreasonable effectiveness" of mathematics (Wigner), are not scientific questions. So we should not expect naturalistic answers. Also, any philosophical answers postulated will be limited to metaphysical and metaphorical conjectures. Are you OK with that? :wink:

What do others think about the notion of intelligibility? Does the apparent fit between human reason and the world require grounding in some kind of greater mind or God, or is intelligibility better understood as a feature of human interpretation rather than of reality itself? No doubt there are other options. — Tom Storm

Since the worldviews of Materialism (random & meaningless) and Spiritualism (purposeful & worshipful) are radically opposed, perhaps a perspective somewhere in-between can offer a different interpretation of the evidence. On another thread we have been discussing various aspects of Cosmos and Consciousness.

There, we learned that the names we use to label the subject of investigation may put limits on what we expect to learn. For example, if a scientist refers to the physical World as "Universe", it's simply what exists within our sphere of perception : no before or after, just what-is physically. But, if a philosopher calls the subject of inquiry "Cosmos"*1, its properties go beyond physical & material to include metaphysical qualia of Order, Structure, Harmony, and Meaning. Both views assume rational Intelligibility, but the latter implies, not just comprehensibility, but also personal feelings & meanings.

Although Plato refrained from picturing the metaphysical Logos*1 & Cosmos2 in humanoid terms, most religions of the world have personified the abstract Universal-powers-that-be in metaphors based on their experience with flesh & blood rulers over men. And based on their encounters with mercurial kings and punishing potentates, people assumed that the overlords above --- thundering weather gods and savage war gods --- were to be feared & worshiped & obeyed without question.

On the other hand, pragmatic scientists approached the physical Universe objectively as a resource to be exploited for the purposes of ordinary people. But a middle-ground philosophical approach to understanding the complexities & contradictions of the world-system views it more as a puzzle to be solved, or at least understood figuratively and non-literally.

Therefore, maybe Plato answered the "Intelligibility" question by choosing names that inherently imply accessibility to intelligence, but not to the physical senses. Logos & Cosmos don't inspire fear & trembling in the rational subjects of cosmic power. :smile:



*1. In Plato’s philosophy, Logos generally refers to divine reason, rational discourse, or the structural principle of the soul and cosmos. It represents the logical, cognitive part of the soul that directs behavior, and in a broader sense, it acts as the intelligible pattern or account that defines true knowledge, often contrasting with mere opinion.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=plato+logos

*1. In Greek mythology and philosophy, Kosmos (or Cosmos) refers to the universe as an orderly, harmonious system, the opposite of Chaos, representing the structured world of the gods, humans, and natural laws, rather than a specific deity,
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=greek+%22cosmos%22

Whereas I would prefer ‘indeterminate’. — Wayfarer

It's both indeterminate and determinate, depending on context. But it prefers indeterminacy, hence 'lazy '.

the idea that reality could be other than it appears to be is absurd unless what is meant by "how the world appears" allows that what appears to us is not exhaustive — Janus

Scientific realism believes that what is real can be discovered by science in principle even if not yet in detail. It posits hypotheses which are intended to be as general as possible about what is fundamentally real independently of what any individual might think. This is why Einstein would reject Wheeler’s claim that ‘no phenomena is a real phenomenon until it is observed.’ Scientific realism rejects this outright as a falsification of the mission of scientific explanation. Any number of online interviews can be found with Roger Penrose saying that.

The problem I see with scientific realism is that it has tried to arrive at a fundamental explanation in terms of fundamental, and therefore mind-independent, objects. But objects are contingent by nature - no really mind-independent object has ever been identified, save for the entities of the Standard Model of particle physics, which is mathematical through and through. So Heisenberg says ‘the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or — in Plato's sense — Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics.’

And the point about ideas in Plato’s sense is that they can maintain their identity through change. It is the capacity of the mind (nous) to grasp that identity-through-change which underwrites all science. And that is metaphysical!

It is the capacity of the mind (nous) to grasp that identity-through-change which underwrites all science. And that is metaphysical! — Wayfarer

I've been challenging this notion that metaphysics underwrites all science.

I can understand what you say here. I suppose I believe that we can grasp less than identity-through-change, that we are not connected to nous, and so on.

I guess I've come out, on the other side, as a metaphysical absurdist.

To say that no phenomenon is a real phenomenon until it is observed is not the same as to say that we bring things into existence by observing them. We know that in the context of how things appear to us that we can be mistaken. So, even in that context there are things real and things imagined, and their realness or imaginary status is not a matter of opinion. We and the other animals seem to share a world―and that is the way it appears to anyone with their eyes open―it's not a matter of opinion.

Science is a combination of observations (of what appears to us, obviously) and inference to the best explanation for those observations. It says nothing, and can say nothing, about how things are in any absolute, non-contextual sense. There is no such sense―not for us anyway―how could there be?

The objective world of science is only one half of human life. The other half is the world of dreams, feelings, visions, the world of the arts, literature, music, religion. The two are not, or should not be, in conflict―they are simply two different realms of human experience. The attempt to make the arts and religion sciences, and the attempts to make of science a religion are (although there is an element of art in the sciences), in my view, equally wrong-headed.

The odd part there is that in studying philosophy one can also learn to do the opposite -- to defend one's viewpoint from all possible objections and prove oneself right. — Moliere

Not odd to me, I suspect most people are drawn to philosophy to find “better” justifications for what they already believe. It’s hoarding weapons and artillery.

I think you have answered your own question. The intelligibility of reality, and the "unreasonable effectiveness" of mathematics (Wigner), are not scientific questions. So we should not expect naturalistic answers. Also, any philosophical answers postulated will be limited to metaphysical and metaphorical conjectures. Are you OK with that? :wink: — Gnomon

No.

How do we know that what we call reality and math’s aren’t simply the contingent products of cognition, culture and language. In other words the patterns and regularities are in how we see not what we see. There are significant philosophers who hold this in post modernism and phenomenology. And no doubt there are other explanations we haven’t thought of.