Here’s the key point Wittgenstein is trying to keep us from blurring: criteria versus causes.
Criteria answer: “What would count as correctly applying this word here?”
Causes answer: “What produced this state or this behavior?” — Sam26

As you say, both Criteria and Cause are important

“I also don’t think it’s right to say that a word only has use if it “refers to what they objectively do” as opposed to what they’re thinking.”

I agree that if a person is motionless and says “I am in pain”, we can often assume the Cause, their inner hidden feeling, even if there is no Criteria, such as flinching or moaning.

He’s telling us to get clear on what we mean first, what would count as using the word correctly, and only then go looking for causes where causes are the right question. — Sam26

This is a problem.

How can we use a word correctly if we don’t know the cause of why we are using the word in the first place. For example, how can a person know whether it is correct to say “I am in pain” or “I am not in pain” if they don't know whether they are in pain or not? First they must know whether they are in pain or not and then they can correctly say whether “I am in pain” or “I am not in pain”.

But it doesn’t follow that the meaning of “I feel xyz” is fixed by a private inner object called xyz. — Sam26

If we felt no xyz, pain, hunger, thirst, fear or love, then there would be no need for a language.

In language, we say things such as “I feel xyz”, “I feel pain”, “I am hungry”, “I am thirsty”, “I am in fear” and “I am in love”.

It seems highly likely that there is a consistency between what we feel and what we say, in that the language game would be unworkable if when feeling pain one day I said “I feel pain” and the next day I said “I feel hungry”.

I agree that on the next day I could be lying, but the language game can only work on the assumption that people are generally truthful.

The language game can only work if when a person feels pain they generally say “I feel pain”.

In general, the language game can only work if when a person feels xyz they say “I feel xyz”.
=======================================================================

but what fixes the meaning is the expression’s role in a shared practice, when it’s appropriate to say it — Sam26

It is true that it would be pointless for a person in an empty room to say “I feel pain”. It would only be useful to say “I feel pain” if another person knowing the same language game hears them. But the meaning of “I feel pain” does not change when someone hears it, in that “I feel pain” does not mean one thing when spoken in an empty room and means a different thing when spoken in a crowded room.

It may be a waste of time to say “I feel pain” in an empty room, but it does not follow that the expression “I feel pain” has no meaning when spoken in an empty room.
=================================================

So inner feelings matter, they’re part of the background, but they don’t supply the rulebook that makes the words meaningful. — Sam26

The language game is only workable if there is a general consistency, in that, if a person feels in pain, they don’t one day say “I feel pain” and the next day say “I feel hungry”.

The language game is founded on the rulebook that says there is a general consistency between what the person feels and what the person says.
===================================

Inner life makes language possible, while the meaning of our words is stabilized by their public grammar, the shared practices of use, correction, and uptake that give those words their place in our shared language life. — Sam26

There is a contradiction here.

Without inner feelings there would be no language game, but you say that the meaning of “I feel pain” is determined by the language game, not inner feelings.

This raises the question, if the language game is independent of feelings, of what use is a language game that can exist independently of the feelings of the people who are actually using it?

I am sure that somewhere in the Andromeda Galaxy there is a species who have their own language game, but of what relevance is that language game to us If it exists independently of any human thoughts, emotions, desires or feelings?

Without inner feelings there would be no language game, but you say that the meaning of “I feel pain” is determined by the language game, not inner feelings. — RussellA

The difficulty is that our inner feelings are not simply given, but are conditioned by our environment, including the language games we learn to participate in.
I think you are right, that language is not self-sufficient; it requires a context in which it can develop. But, for Wittgenstein, the ultimate foundation is not "inner feelings", which are a language game in themselves, but "form of life" or "way of life".

But, for Wittgenstein, the ultimate foundation is not "inner feelings", which are a language game in themselves, but "form of life" or "way of life". — Ludwig V

Without inner feelings there would be no Form of Life. There would be no social activities such as playing football, no cultural events such as going to the theatre, no language game, no financial systems, no production, distribution and trade of goods and services, no Philosophy Forum.

As our Form of Life would literally not exist without our inner feelings, in this sense, it seems that the ultimate foundation can only be “inner feelings”.

Hi ,
I think we're actually very close to being in complete agreement here. We both place the inner feelings as prior, as "what make these language games possible", but there is some inconsistency between us as to how we interpret Wittgenstein's representation of "the concept". In the end, we seem to agree that concepts are not a part of the inner, but we both get there in slightly different ways.

The key to understanding the difference between us, I believe is to separate "inner" from "object". The inner is very real, but there is no such thing as an inner object for Wittgenstein. So, when "concept" is understood as abstract "object" it cannot be something inner.

Yes, a person can reflect on what they feel, but that reflection is optional and secondary. If you treat it as the foundation, you’ve already put the inner object picture back at the center. — Sam26

This is what Wittgenstein does, he puts the inner at the centre. His point though is that the inner is incorrectly portrayed as "object". This is what he demonstrates when he does the little thought experiment where he labels "a sensation" as "S", and ,marks in his journal every time that he feels "S". He is demonstrating that the recurrence of the inner sensation is not the recurrence of an object which can be named, as we name an external object. In this way he takes "object" out of the picture, but he leaves "the inner" as still central, but consisting of something other than objects.

You also say Wittgenstein rejects concepts, but that only works if concept means a private mental thing we consult before we speak. That isn’t Wittgenstein’s view. He relies on concepts in the public sense, the grammar of a word, what counts as using it correctly, what counts as a mistake, and what follows from it. If you deny concepts in that sense, you’re denying the very thing he’s investigating. — Sam26

What I said is that he rejects concepts as primary, fundamental, or natural. He describes the reality of concepts as a practise of applying boundaries for a purpose. So concepts are constructed with the use of language, the application of rules, formal logic, etc.. They are not something which underlie language use as its base.

Notice that "what counts as a mistake", requires rules, in the sense that it is an action contrary to a rule. But a "rule" under Wittgenstein's usage requires language for its existence. He is very clear on this. And "mistake" can only be judged as what is not consistent with conceptual rules.

However, the majority of natural language use (such as your example of "game") is not bound by these rules. Therefore the concept of "mistake" does not even apply to natural language use under Wittgenstein's description. When a person uses slang for example, using a word in a very unorthodox way, this is not a mistake. Neither is any new or innovative use of a word, a "mistake", because the person is not acting within a conceptual structure of "rules" concerning the words used. The person is creating one's own use within one's own mind, where rules do not apply.

The same point shows up in the game example. Wittgenstein isn’t saying there is no concept of game. He’s saying there’s no single essence of game. He uses game to point out that a concept can be held together by family resemblance rather than a strict definition. Saying “there is no concept” disregards his point and replaces it with something he never claims. — Sam26

Saying "there is no single essence of game" has the same effect as saying "there is no concept of game". To produce a concept of "game" requires rules which stipulate necessary criteria, an essence. Accordingly, there might be numerous concepts of "game" which people would produce for a variety of different reasons, but this is not saying that there is a concept of "game", it is saying that there is a multitude of concepts of "game".

I believe that his point is not to show "that a concept can be held together by family resemblance" it is to show a distinction between "concept" and "family resemblance". The natural way that meaning exists is as described by the family resemblance analogy. The concept however, is created by applying rules, boundaries which are applied for specific purposes. So the family resemblance usage of words may provide the basis for a multitude of different concepts of "game" ("game" as defined for this purpose and that purpose), produced from those different natural ways of using the word, but this is not a holding "the concept" together, it is a multitude of distinct concepts, each with its distinct set of rules. Following one set of rules would be making a mistake by another, and the same word, "game" supports distinct concepts. Notice specifically, that intentional ambiguity may be natural, and not a case of breaking any rules.

Finally, your picture collapses normativity into imitation. “Choosing to behave like others” explains copying, not rule following. Rule following requires the distinction between what seems right and what is right, between correct and incorrect moves. That distinction shows itself in training and correction. — Sam26

The point is, that rule following must be willful. We cannot force people to follow rules of language. So even training and correction require that underlying desire. Therefore "choosing to behave like others" does explain rule following. The fundamental desire for communion, to be a part of the group, is what enables rule following. Force does not enable rule following.

So, the point is simple. Inner feelings make these language games possible, but they don’t fix meaning. Concept isn’t some spooky inner tool, it’s the public grammar of use. And rules aren’t authoritarian commands; they’re the norms of what makes correctness and mistake intelligible. If you want to disagree with Wittgenstein, disagree with that, not with behaviorism or private mental classification, because those aren’t his positions. — Sam26

See, you are in complete agreement with me at the basic level, "Inner feelings make these language games possible. The "inner" is at the base of language. Where we disagree is with our understanding of "concept". What I'm saying is that Wittgenstein separates "concept", as we generally understand this word as an "abstract object", out from this "inner" which is at the base of language. But as you also agree, the "concept" is something dependent on community and language, therefore it is better described in that way, as a property of the public and its rules, rather than as something inner. So the point is that the inner is still prior and fundamental, as you agree, but "the concept" is not something inner, which you also agree to.

This is how we get to understand Wittgenstein's distinction between "what seems right and what is right". What is right is what is dictated by the rules and can only be judged in a public way. That is a grounding in justification. But, despite the fact that a person can learn and understand rules, and even apply them to oneself, the judgement will always be "what seems right" due to the influence of the inner, which cannot be rules, therefore never a proper "what is right".

I don’t think there’s a contradiction here, but I do think you’re sliding between two different claims, viz., what makes language possible versus what fixes the meaning.

You’re right the language game like “I’m in pain” only works against a background where people are generally sincere and where there’s regularity between pain and pain expressions. If today “I’m in pain” and tomorrow “I’m hungry” were random noises with no stable pattern, the practice would collapse. But that point is about the conditions under which the practice is usable, not about the meaning being fixed by a private inner object. The regularity that keeps the practice going is part of the public grammar: it’s exactly what shows up in training, correction, and in what we count as misusing the words.

On the “empty room” point, I agree, the sentence doesn’t change meaning depending on audience size. If I say “I’m in pain” alone, it’s often pointless, but it isn’t meaningless. The meaning is still what it is because the expression belongs to a language I already speak. Wittgenstein’s claim isn’t “no audience, no meaning.” It’s “no practice, no meaning.” The empty room e.g. presupposes the practice is already in place.

Where your argument goes off is when you say the language game is founded on a rulebook that asserts a consistency between feeling and saying. That “rulebook” isn’t an extra layer behind the practice. It just is the practice as it’s lived, i.e., we treat “I’m hungry” said in pain as a mistake, a joke, a lie, confusion, or a special case, and those distinctions make sense because the language already has standards of correct application.

So, the relationship is the following: inner life is necessary for these language games to exist at all, but inner life doesn’t fix meaning privately, by itself. Meaning is stabilized publicly, by the norms of use that make it possible to distinguish correct use, misuse, pretense, and error. That’s why your Andromeda example doesn’t land. A language game isn’t some free-floating abstract structure that exists independently of beings who live it. It’s inseparable from our form of life. Our language games are relevant to us precisely because they are woven into human needs, feelings, and responses, and that’s where Wittgenstein is working.

In practice, grammar check and language game don't refer to a fixed order. — Sam26

Thanks. It took me a while to figure out what I was missing, but I get it now. If there's a new language game in town, you'll discover the grammar first. As so often, the blindspot is obvious once you see it. Sometimes you get hung-up on the wrong lines. For example here:

That’s why Wittgenstein can start from either end: sometimes you identify the game first, sometimes you notice a grammatical problem first and then realize you’ve got the wrong game. — Sam26

This sort of slotted neatly in my preconceptions: I thought, well, that's not starting from the other end, that's just misidentifying the language game, right? Thinking like this blocked me from seeing what I've been missing. Your post was quite helpful. Thanks.

All those years I've never quite grasped what Wittgenstein meant by language games. I'm not sure I'm quite there yet, but I'm certainly closer than ever before.

Without inner feelings there would be no Form of Life. There would be no social activities such as playing football, no cultural events such as going to the theatre, no language game, no financial systems, no production, distribution and trade of goods and services, no Philosophy Forum.

As our Form of Life would literally not exist without our inner feelings, in this sense, it seems that the ultimate foundation can only be “inner feelings”. — RussellA

Yes, without inner life there’d be no human form of life, that's obvious. No hunger, fear, joy, pain, interest, boredom, no motives to act, no point to practices. I’m not disputing that. But it doesn’t follow that inner feelings are the ultimate foundation in the sense of what fixes meaning, normativity, or rule following.

Inner feelings are part of the background that makes our practices possible. The foundation Wittgenstein is talking about, when he talks about bedrock or what stands fast, isn’t a hidden inner item that guarantees correctness. It’s the public practice itself, viz., training, shared responses, correction, agreement in judgement, the whole web in which “right and wrong use” has a place. If you try to make inner feelings the foundation in the stronger sense, you collapse correctness into “whatever seems right to me,” and you lose the very distinction between seeming and being correct that rule following requires.

I’ll grant the first claim, no inner life, no human world. But the conclusion doesn’t follow, viz., inner life doesn’t function as the rulebook or meaning fixer. It’s a condition for having language games, not what determines the grammar of the moves within them.

Example: Two people feel the same inner feeling: a tight chest, racing heart, sweaty palms.

One says, “I’m excited.” The other says, “I’m anxious.”

Their inner feeling might be identical, but the meaning of “excited” vs “anxious” isn’t fixed by that inner feeling. It’s fixed by the public grammar, again what counts as appropriate use, what follows from it, what kinds of reasons support it, what responses you might get, what counts as correction (“No, you’re not excited, you’re worried”), and how we learn the words.

So inner life is the condition that makes this whole region of talk possible, but it doesn’t act as a private rulebook that determines which word is correct. So, the grammar lives in the practice.

:up:

Without inner feelings there would be no Form of Life. There would be no social activities such as playing football, no cultural events such as going to the theatre, no language game, no financial systems, no production, distribution and trade of goods and services, no Philosophy Forum.

As our Form of Life would literally not exist without our inner feelings, in this sense, it seems that the ultimate foundation can only be “inner feelings”. — RussellA

Wittgenstein’s focus was on how we understand each other through language , and how we then use that language when we are alone with our thoughts. Phenomenologists focus on how perception is felt bodily. For both Wittgenstein and the phenomenologists, feelings are not inner data but world-directed engagements.

in Wittgenstein it often means, look until what looked obvious becomes strange, and until you can see the grammar that was leading you. — Sam26

Although the grammar is important I think there is something more fundamental and important that informs grammar and can become obscured by a focus on language. If, however, you do not think it is outside the scope of your thread I can re-post it.

I wouldn’t separate these into “preliminary clarification” versus “the deeper thing,” as if clarity were just stage one and then the real philosophy starts. — Sam26

I agree that it is not a matter of stages. It is, rather, a question of what one is working toward:

Work on philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more work on oneself. On one's own conception. On how one sees things. (And what one expects of them.)

(CV, 24)

And the “primeval chaos” remark fits that too. It’s not chaos as mystical darkness, it’s the pre theoretical mess of our actual practices and reactions, the place where our pictures lose their grip and we have to find our way without a single master key. — Sam26

I interpret it somewhat differently. It is the pre-theoretical state of the world that is obscured from us by our scientific attitude. For the early Wittgenstein it is the world seen aright when one transcends propositions, (Tractatus 6.54) For the later Wittgenstein it is a rejection of scientism:

... philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does’

(Blue Book, p. 18).

Man has to awaken to wonder . . . Science is a way of sending him to sleep again’

(CV 5).

I think your point would be better served in a separate thread.

Wittgenstein’s focus was on how we understand each other through language , and how we then use that language when we are alone with our thoughts. Phenomenologists focus on how perception is felt bodily. For both Wittgenstein and the phenomenologists, feelings are not inner data but world-directed engagements. — Joshs

Wittgenstein isn’t mainly explaining “how we understand each other,” and he isn’t doing an inside to outside story from public talk to private thought. He’s doing grammar, how our words for feeling, meaning, and understanding actually function, what counts as correct use, and what pictures mislead us. And while some phenomenologists do emphasize embodied, world-involving experience, that doesn’t capture Wittgenstein’s point. He doesn’t need to say feelings are “world-directed engagements” to reject the inner data picture, his point is that inner feelings aren’t private objects that fix meaning.

Tool 7 is pictures that hold us captive. This is Wittgenstein at his most diagnostic. Most philosophical problems don’t start with bad logic, they start with a certain picture, a model that takes over and makes certain questions feel unavoidable. Once the picture is in place, we demand answers that only makes sense within the picture, and then we’re surprised that nothing satisfies.

What it looks like in practice is simple. We say meaning must be the thing that accompanies a word, a rule must be soemthing that forces the next step, an inner feeling must be an object that guarantees the correct label, the mind must be a private theatre, certainty must be absolute, knowledge must be proof. None of these are argued for at first. They feel obvious because the picture is doing the work.

Wittgenstein’s move isn’t to refute the picture with a counter theory. He puts it on the table, then asks: how does this picture fit with our actual language games? What do we count as understanding here, what counts as a mistake, what counts as correction, what would it look like to apply this picture across cases? Often the picture collapses under that pressure, not because it’s false, but because it isn’t actually guiding our use, it’s distorting our use.

A quick example is the picture of an inner label. The temptation is, I have a private inner thing, I inspect it, and that inspection fixes the meaning. Wittgenstein’s reply is to show that the picture can’t supply standards of correctness, because any “inner pointing” still needs a rule for what counts as the same again. Once you see that, the urge to treat meaning as a private object loses its grip. The word’s meaning doesn’t float behind the scenes, it shows itself in the role the word plays in a practice.

So, find the picture, name it, and then test it by returning to ordinary use and to the differences between cases. When the picture stops looking compulsory, the philosophical pressure often disappears with it.

The “captive picture”

People think: “Meaning is a thing in my head. I understand a word because I’m focusing on that inner thing.”

Wittgenstein’s move

He says: stop guessing. Look at what we call “understanding” in real life.

Put 5 everyday cases side by side

Ask: what shows that someone understands?

Instruction: “Bring me a red book.”
They bring a red book. If they bring a blue one, we say they didn’t understand.

Word use: “Use the word ‘promise’ in a sentence.”
They use it correctly. They can explain the difference between a promise and a prediction.

Joke: “Get this joke.”
They laugh at the right spot, or can explain why it’s funny.

Directions: “Do you understand how to get to the station?”
They can get there, or give the route to someone else.

Math rule: “Continue: 2, 4, 6, 8…”
They write 10, 12, 14… If they write 2, 4, 6, 8, 16… we correct them.

What you notice

In all these cases, we don’t check for an inner object. We look at what they do, how they go on, and whether they can be corrected.

The point

Once you see these cases together, the “meaning is a thing in the head” picture stops feeling necessary. Meaning shows up in the use and the standards of the practice, not in a private inner item.

That’s what an overview is: you line up the examples until the tempting picture loses its grip on you.

We both place the inner feelings as prior, as "what make these language games possible", — Metaphysician Undercover

As our Form of Life would literally not exist without our inner feelings, in this sense, it seems that the ultimate foundation can only be “inner feelings”. — RussellA

I'm not clear what the difference is between a foundation and an ultimate foundation. But I don't see how inner feelings can be the only essential condition for language. They are necessary, perhaps, but not sufficient. If we were not social beings, there would be no language. Our form of life would be unrecognizable without inner feelings, social living, and language.
Are you saying that inner feelings exist independently of language? In an sense, that may well be true, but then social life can also exist independently of language.
But language is not something that is grafted on to our inner feelings or our social lives - an optional extra, available to human beings, but not other similar creatures. On the contrary, language transforms both our social lives and our inner feelings - so much so that I don't think we can really understand what either might be without language. To be sure, we can recognize parts of our form of life in animals and children who have not yet learned language, but how far those similarities go is a moot point.

When the assistant hears “bring me a slab”, he thinks about the expression “bring me a slab” and thinks about the physical consequences if he does not take the builder a slab. The assistant knows what “bring me a slab” means because he can think about the physical consequences of not taking a slab to the builder. — RussellA

Wittgenstein is asking how all this "thinking" got started:

32. Someone coming into a strange country will sometimes learn the language of the inhabitants from ostensive definitions that they give him; and he will often have to guess the meaning of these definitions; and will guess sometimes right, sometimes wrong.
And now, I think, we can say: Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child could already think only not yet speak. And "think" would here mean something like "talk to itself". — PI, 32, translated by Anscombe

Philosophical Investigations explores what "talking to oneself" involves (and not) during the discussion of the possibility of private language but it does not bring the "privacy" into question. The following is an example:

The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have this or something else. The assumption would thus be possible—though unverifiable—that one section of mankind had one sensation of red and another section another. — PI, 272

With the different goals and challenges he gives to himself and the reader, I don't think the dimension of the personal gets easier. In the Preface to the PI, he speaks of the work as a response to what he questions in his Tractatus. A few sentences later:

For more than one reason what I publish here will have points of contact with what other people are writing to-day.—If my remarks do not bear a stamp which marks them as mine,—I do not wish to lay any further claim to them as my property.
I make them public with doubtful feelings. It is not impossible that it should fall to the lot of this work, in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring light into one brain or another—but, of course, it is not likely. — ibid. viii

The comparisons to the Tractatus give a starting place for the method to be used There is the multiplicity of language games versus pure logic in Section 23. And this returned to again later:

114. (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5): "The general form of propositions is: This is how things are."——That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times. One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it. — ibid. 114

What does not seem to be abandoned from the Tractatus is the solitary element:

Here we see that solipsism, taken to its conclusion, coincides with pure realism. The solipsistic self shrinks down to an extensionless point and the reality coordinated with it remains. — Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 5.64

The move from "general explanations" in PI does not seem to have weakened Wittgenstein's view of the limited role of the "psychological" or "scientism" while looking at thought and language.

I'm not clear what the difference is between a foundation and an ultimate foundation. But I don't see how inner feelings can be the only essential condition for language. They are necessary, perhaps, but not sufficient. If we were not social beings, there would be no language. Our form of life would be unrecognizable without inner feelings, social living, and language. — Ludwig V

I think this is an interesting way to put it. The necessary condition may not be sufficient, likewise though, the sufficient conditions may not be necessary. So "social being" turned out to be the sufficient condition for language development, but language could have developed under different sufficient conditions. Then the language which developed would not be the same as that which did develop, but would still be language anyway. "Sufficient conditions" may be tricky and difficult.

So for example, "social being" may be the result of language development rather than a primary condition for it. For example, it could be the case that when language first started to develop it was under sufficient conditions other than social being. Then, as language developed the condition of social being took priority and became the primary condition. I am not arguing that this is the case, only that "sufficient conditions" lack the necessity required to draw certain conclusions.

Are you saying that inner feelings exist independently of language? In an sense, that may well be true, but then social life can also exist independently of language. — Ludwig V

Yes, it's quite likely that feelings are prior to what we consider to be "language", and this would allow us to say that they would exist independently. However, by the difference between "necessary" and "sufficient" we cannot turn this around as you propose. What is apprehended as a "sufficient" condition is not necessarily prior, and can arise simultaneously.

Wittgenstein isn’t mainly explaining “how we understand each other,” and he isn’t doing an inside to outside story from public talk to private thought. He’s doing grammar, how our words for feeling, meaning, and understanding actually function, what counts as correct use, and what pictures mislead us. And while some phenomenologists do emphasize embodied, world-involving experience, that doesn’t capture Wittgenstein’s point. He doesn’t need to say feelings are “world-directed engagements” to reject the inner data picture, his point is that inner feelings aren’t private objects that fix meaning. — Sam26

The relationship between Wittgenstein and phenomenology isn’t one-way, as though his grammatical approach is a corrective to their methods. Phenomenology of perception deals with aspects of experience Wittgenstein fails to address, pre-linguistic embodied sense-making. Both Wittgenstein and phenomenologists reject the inner data picture, but from different vantages and within different contexts.

I think we might be getting a little religious about Wittgenstein in this thread. His arguments are only as good as their premises, some of which have been proven to be incorrect.

I'll go further than that. The tragedy of Wittgenstein is what was missing from his toolbox.

For instance, an awful lot of Wittgenstein's puzzling over rules and grammar cries out for the sort of game-theoretic analysis David Lewis does later — but Wittgenstein didn't have game theory.

A lot of what he says about concepts and seeing as, the whole midcentury recognition of theory-laden observation and the repudiation of the myth of the given — he's not unique in that, and all of it is stumbling toward what only becomes clear in the Bayesian framework, that evidence is the basis upon which a prior belief is updated, but it is not the basis of belief as such. Ramsey would have gotten there, as "Truth and Probability" shows, but whether he could have dragged Wittgenstein along, who knows?

Wittgenstein turns away from certain old ways of doing philosophy, and he seems to point—so tantalizingly!—toward a destination he never really gets near. It's why he is undeniably vague, inconclusive, difficult to interpret, why he goes over the same issues in subtly different ways for years on end. Having cut loose from the mainland of existing philosophy, he was at sea, and never made landfall. Heroic, in his own way, but tragic.

Pretty sure I'm the only one around here who thinks this.

:up:

Wittgenstein turns away from certain old ways of doing philosophy, and he seems to point—so tantalizingly!—toward a destination he never really gets near. It's why he is undeniably vague, inconclusive, difficult to interpret, why he goes over the same issues in subtly different ways for years on end. Having cut loose from the mainland of existing philosophy, he was at sea, and never made landfall. Heroic, in his own way, but tragic.

Pretty sure I'm the only one around here who thinks this. — Srap Tasmaner

My question is what you think about Kant, Hegel, Schelling, hermeneutics, phenomenology, enactivism and post-structuralism, because you won’t be able to do much with Wittgenstein without an adequate background in those areas. If David Lewis represents the cutting edge of your thinking then it doesnt look promising. Lewis belongs to a Humean tradition within philosophy. I tend to take a subsuming developmental view of the history of philosophy, and I like to make lists. So here’s my subjective list of philosophers ranked according to a developmental order, with the least advanced on the bottom and the most advanced on the top. Make of it what you will. You’ll notice Lewis and Wittgenstein are light years apart.


Wittgenstein
Gendlin
Joseph Rouse
Karen Barad
Nancy
Merleau-Ponty
De Jaegher
Varela
Gallagher
Thompson
Ratcliffe
Scharff
Donna Haraway
John Shotter
T. Fuchs
Slaby
Zahavi
Alva Noe
Colombetti
Vicky Kirby
Henry
Rorty
Gergen
Feyerabend
Gadamer
Bitbol
Kuhn
Dilthey
Lyotard

Bataille
Connolly
Massumi
Stiegler
Protevi
Zizek
Laclau
Butler
Lacan
Fanon

Sartre
Levinas
Braver
Caputo
Dewey
William James
Charles Taylor
Hannah Arendt
Kierkegaard
Alisdair McIntyre
Piaget
Vervaeke
Delanda
Stuart Kauffman
Adorno
Badiou
Schopenhauer
Byung-Chul Han
Whitehead
Schelling
Peirce
Dreyfus
Terrence Deacon
Althusser
Marx
Hegel

Habermas
McDowell
Ian Hacking
Chalmers
Nagel
P.F. Strawson
Freud
Kant

Darwin
Popper
Dennett
Jesse Prinz
Metzinger
Damasio
Hutto
Mark L Johnson
Lakoff
Andy Clark
Tegmark
Kastrup
Smolin
Searle
David Lewis
Hume

We've met, Josh. I am well aware who's on your fantasy baseball roster.

Points, though, for the most-to-least advanced list. That gave me a chuckle.

Read Schopenhauer, then read the Tractatus. It will become obvious that he's talking directly to Schop.

Read Schopoenhauer, then read the Tractatus. It will become obvious that he's talking directly to Schop. — frank

Who is he talking to in the Philosophical Investigations?

↪Joshs Points, though, for the most-to-least advanced list. That gave me a chuckle. — Srap Tasmaner

Chuckles are more useful if I know what you’re chuckling about. Pay careful attention to the family resemblances within each cluster, then run it through A.I. to highlight the vantage from which each group critiques a previous group.

run it through A.I. to highlight the vantage from which each group critiques a previous group — Joshs

You're on a roll tonight.

Who is he talking to in the Philosophical Investigations? — Joshs

Himself

run it through A.I. to highlight the vantage from which each group critiques a previous group
— Joshs

You're on a roll tonight. — Srap Tasmaner

What does your list look like?