Indirect realism isn't disputing this. Remember that it is realism. — frank

Yes, and the question is, is your use of "cold" only about some mental image, or about the water? The disagreement only makes sense if we are talking about the bath water and not just our sensations.

Yes, and the question is, is your use of "cold" only about some mental image, or about the water? The disagreement only makes sense if we are talking about the bath water and not just our sensations. — Banno

I'm afraid if I answer this, our disagreement will disappear. :grin:

The very notion of conflict about the bath would evaporate. — Banno

As it should, because the words "hot" and "cold" really do refer to each person's private sensations. John says "the bath is hot" because he feels hot sitting in it and Jane says "the bath is cold" because she feels cold sitting in it. Both are correct. Their "disagreement" is a fiction. We have a tendency to think that the way we experience the world is "right" and so anyone who experiences the world another way is experiencing it "wrong". It's the naive view that any person educated in physics and physiology should reject when considering the science and philosophy of perception. Your continued appeal to ordinary language and ordinary norms just doesn't work as a refutation of indirect realism.

So now, in order to maintain your account, you must say their difference is a fiction? you deny that John is hot and Jane is cold? But disagreement exists only because words do not refer solely to private sensations. Physics and physiology explain how perception works, not what words mean.

Again, we might agree entirely as to the physics and psychology. None of which serves to fix the reference of "cold", in the way your account insists. Jane and John can disagree only because the words they use function in their shared world.

I'm afraid if I answer this, our disagreement will disappear. :grin: — frank

And that would be bad? End of the thread, I suppose.

But disagreement exists only because words do not refer solely to private sensations. — Banno

This is false. The words "hot" and "cold" refer to the sensations that John and Jane feel when sitting in the bath and yet they disagree on whether the bath is hot or cold. This is a very straightforward and common sense proof that we can disagree even when our words refer to private sensations. Rather than accept this as proof against your interpretation of language, you blindly commit to your interpretation of language and deny the obvious.

The words "hot" and "cold" refer to the sensations that John and Jane feel when sitting in the bath and yet they disagree on whether the bath is hot or cold. — Michael

Here you are not presenting an argument, but blandly restating your opinion. That's not a proof af anything.

The bottom line is that John and Jane are not disagreeing as to their sensations. Jane can agree that John feels the water is hot, and maintain that she feels the water is cold, and vice versa, without inconsistency.

What happens next? Do they add hot, or add cold, or wait? Or dot hey talk about why one feels cold and the other hot? The incident is not isolated, it's part of an ongoing and historical discussion. Sensation varies across people, while meaning, reference, and disagreement persist because words are embedded in a public, normative, world-directed practice. It’s not an isolated utterance; it’s a system of practices over time.

Jane can agree that John feels the water is hot, and maintain that she feels the water is cold, and vice versa, without inconsistency. — Banno

Yes, and the word "hot" in "John feels the water is hot" refers to the sensation John feels when sitting in the water and the word "cold" in "Jane feels the water is cold" refers to the sensation Jane feels when sitting in the water. It's certainly not the case that the words "hot" and "cold" refer to two mutually exclusive properties such that the water either has one or the other and that either John or Jane is feeling it wrong.

This is why their "disagreement" is over a fiction (assuming it isn't a faux disagreement). They act as if the way the water feels to them is something else; something "really" true of the water. It's naive, and it's wrong, and the fact that they "argue" over which of "the water is hot" or "the water is cold" is true does not entail that the words "hot" and "cold" don't refer to the sensations they feel in the water.

End of the thread, — Banno

It never ends. :smile:

It never ends. :smile: — frank

It certainly won't, if all can do is repeat his assertion that "hot refers to the sensation".

John and Jane's disagreement is not a fiction; perhaps they really do differ in their beliefs. That Michael denies this shows the poverty of the insistence that "hot" is nothing more than a sensation. Treating it as a fiction does not help decide what to do.

:grin:

- Sorry, I've been meaning to get back to this...

If both the form and content of each link can change, how exactly is this information about what initiated the causal chain expressed within each link? — RussellA

It doesn’t need to be encoded in each link as representational content. On Direct Realism, the causal chain is a means of acquaintance, not a carrier of descriptive information. The chain enables perceptual contact with the object; it does not transmit a message that must be decoded.

it is logically impossible to determine the position of the snooker balls a moment in the past. — RussellA

This is still epistemic, not logical. The laws of physics do not entail a contradiction in the past state having been thus-and-so; they only show that the past is not recoverable from the present state alone. Logical impossibility would mean no possible world in which the past state is known—which is false.

How can causal originals be reconstructed even with uncertainty — RussellA

Direct Realism does not claim that causal origins must be reconstructed—at all. This is the repeated mistake. Perception is not an inference from present effects to past causes; it is a current perceptual relation to an existing object.

especially when you accept 8. — RussellA

I don't accept it. I was simply granting it as an expression of your own commitment: "as an IR, I accept this impossibility". This is simply a statement of your position, not an argument against DR.

How does the Direct Realist know what initiated the causal chain, if we only know about what initiated the casual chain because of the causal chain itself, and you agree that we cannot reconstruct prior causal links. — RussellA

The inability to infer causal history does not imply that the object of perception is internal. That conclusion only follows if one assumes—without argument—that perception requires inferential access to causal origins. That assumption is exactly what Direct Realism rejects.

What else is there? — RussellA

What else is there is perceptual acquaintance itself. On Direct Realism, we know the Sun because we see the Sun, not because we infer it from causal data. The causal chain explains how perception occurs, not what is perceived.

Needing causal reconstruction to know the object is an Indirect Realist requirement, not a neutral constraint.

However, in philosophical language, when looking at a ship in front of them, the Direct Realist could say “I am directly looking at the ship” and the Indirect Realist could say “I am indirectly looking at the ship”. When looking through a telescope, the Direct Realist could say “I am indirectly looking at the ship” and the Indirect Realist could say “I am directly looking at an image of the ship” — RussellA

Doesn't it sound odd to add "directly" and "indirectly" on these statements, when they perfectly make sense without these words?

There is ordinary language and philosophical language. — RussellA

Really? How do you tell the difference between the two?

Its seem the DRists among us have retreated into semantic arguments.

So be it. Onward we move..

Really? How do you tell the difference between the two? — Corvus

That is why posts on the Forum get confused when people mix up ordinary language and philosophical language.

The expression “I am a Direct Realist” would mean something different to the person in the street and a philosophy person.

Some here seem to think that how we speak in ordinary life is the answer to all the questions. They're just burying their heads in the sand. — Michael

:up:

Ordinary language
As the SEP article on Fictionalism points out, ordinary language uses figures of speech, metaphors, exaggerations and fictions in general.

For example “I see a ship directly in front of my eyes, I can smell its anger and feel its pain as it wanders aimlessly across the dark and mysterious ocean”

Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP)
For example John Searle and the later Wittgenstein. John Seale is a Direct Realist and in his 2015 book “Seeing Things as They Are” argues against the “Bad Argument” of Indirect Realism”. He maintains that humans are able to directly perceive physical objects in the world, such as apples, because “apples” is already a Category within a public “Language Game”. For Searle, as a Direct Realist, such apples exist in the world even if never seen by a human. OLP argues that once everyday expressions are carefully analysed, many so-called philosophical problems disappear. OLP is an inquiry into meaning as use, rather than meaning as truth, whereby the meaning of an expression in language is inseparable to its use in the language game that is part of a Form of Life.

For example “I see a ship directly in front of my eyes”.

Metaphysical philosophy
One problem with OLP as a philosophy is that it does not question its own presuppositions. It does not question its own presupposition that objects such as apples exist in the world even if never observed by a human. Given such a presupposition, OLP can then make a valid case about the relation of language to the world. This is where the metaphysical philosopher comes in, to question such presuppositions.

For example, OLP is presupposing that relations ontologically exist in the world, which is not necessarily the case. There are many reasons why relations cannot ontologically exist in the world, If relations don't exist in the world, then neither can apples, as an apple can only have an identity if there are relations between its parts.

OLP is assuming that apples are discovered in the world, tending to support Direct Realism, whereas apples are invented in the mind supports Indirect Realism.

It is the metaphysical philosopher that thinks about people’s presuppositions.

Well said!

That is why posts on the Forum get confused when people mix up ordinary language and philosophical language. — RussellA

It sounds really confusing when you say that you see a ship directly or indirectly, when you can say you see a ship. Why add those words, and make the statements unclear and muddled?

The expression “I am a Direct Realist” would mean something different to the person in the street and a philosophy person. — RussellA

It is not what you call yourself, which makes you a philosopher. It is how you think, see, understand and explain on the world and mind, which makes you one. Wouldn't you agree?

On Direct Realism, the causal chain is a means of acquaintance, not a carrier of descriptive information. The chain enables perceptual contact with the object; it does not transmit a message that must be decoded. — Esse Quam Videri

How does that work? I am acquainted with an apple in the world even if I cannot describe it?
==============================================

The laws of physics do not entail a contradiction in the past state having been thus-and-so; they only show that the past is not recoverable from the present state alone. — Esse Quam Videri

If the laws of physics show that the past is not recoverable from the present state alone, then why does the Direct Realist believe that an apple as it existed in the past is recoverable from our present state of perceiving an apple?
======================

Perception is not an inference from present effects to past causes; it is a current perceptual relation to an existing object. — Esse Quam Videri

How can we know about the apple in the world independently of any causal chain from the apple to our perceiving it?
=================

On Direct Realism, we know the Sun because we see the Sun, not because we infer it from causal data. The causal chain explains how perception occurs, not what is perceived. — Esse Quam Videri

We seem to agree that:

1 - We can only know about a Sun in the world because of a causal chain from it to us
2 - There is a change in both form and content of each link in this causal chain
3 - We cannot know either the form or content of a prior link even if we knew a present link
4 - All our information about the external world comes through our five senses
5 - The causal chain is temporal, in that what initiated the causal chain is temporally prior to our perception in the mind.
6 - Something in the external world initiated this causal chain
7 - The Indirect Realist believes that we can infer to the best explanation from the final link in this causal chain to what initiated the causal chain.

Yet you say that the Direct Realist knows what initiated the causal chain. How?

Pardon the interjection, but I think your reply here nicely captures the nub of the ongoing disagreement. There is a distinction that is being collapsed here. Words like "hot" and "cold" can be used in two different ways—(1) as sensation reports or (2) as world-directed predicates.

I think the mistake here is treating all uses of “hot” and “cold” as sensation-reports. Of course John and Jane can agree without inconsistency that John feels hot and Jane feels cold. But that is not what is at issue when they say “the bath is hot” or “the bath is cold.”

In those cases they are applying a public, world-directed concept governed by norms of comparison, measurement, and practical response. That’s why it makes sense to add cold water, wait, or get out—and why a thermometer is relevant. The disagreement is not fictional; it concerns how the bath should be described and dealt with under shared standards, not whose private sensations are correct.

Sensations may causally influence what we say, but they do not fix meaning or reference. If “hot” and “cold” referred only to private feelings, then disagreement, correction, and error about temperature would be impossible. But they plainly are not.

It sounds really confusing when you say that you see a ship directly or indirectly, when you can say you see a ship. Why add those words, and make the statements unclear and muddled? — Corvus

In Ordinary Language, we say “I see a ship”. In Philosophy Language, the Direct Realist says “I see a ship directly” and the Indirect Realist says “I see a ship indirectly”.

Words need to be added because the Direct Realist, Indirect Realist and person in the street understand the world in different ways.
======================

It is not what you call yourself, which makes you a philosopher. It is how you think, see, understand and explain on the world and mind, which makes you one. — Corvus

:up:

Words need to be added because the Direct Realist, Indirect Realist and person in the street understand the world in different ways. — RussellA

Yes, they can add these words in their sentences, but it seems making the meaning of the sentence more confusing. It is ambiguous on telling why they are seeing a ship directly or indirectly. The sentence begs for more explanations on why these folks are seeing a ship in those ways.

If you say, well because they are DRists and IRists, then it doesn't make any sense, and tells nothing meaningful, because it is not explaining why they see and understand the ship they are seeing in that way.

I am acquainted with an apple in the world even if I cannot describe it? — RussellA

Yes — and this is not controversial.

On Direct Realism, acquaintance is not description-dependent. Infants, animals, and non-linguistic humans perceive objects without possessing concepts or the ability to describe them. Even for adults, perception typically outruns description: you can see a face you cannot describe, hear a sound you cannot characterize, or see an apple without knowing its variety, chemical composition, or causal history.

So acquaintance works like this: (1) you are perceptually related to an object, (2) that relation does not presuppose propositional knowledge, (3) description, classification, and judgment are subsequent cognitive acts

This is a standard point even outside Direct Realism. If acquaintance required description, perception would collapse into conceptual judgment, which neither IR nor DR actually wants.

If the laws of physics show that the past is not recoverable from the present state alone, then why does the Direct Realist believe that an apple as it existed in the past is recoverable from our present state of perceiving an apple? — RussellA

It doesn’t. This is the central misfire. Direct Realism does not claim that we can recover past states from present perception, or that perception gives us epistemic access to past events as such. What it claims is that perception is a present relation to a presently existing object, even though that relation is enabled by a causal history.

Recovering the past is a task for inference, science, and explanation — not for perception itself. You are projecting a retrospective epistemic demand onto a theory that is about current openness to the world.

How can we know about the apple in the world independently of any causal chain from the apple to our perceiving it? — RussellA

We can’t — and Direct Realism does not say we can.This question rests on a false contrast:

• either perception is independent of causal chains, or
• perception is inferential from causal data

Direct Realism rejects both horns. The correct picture is:

• Perception is causally dependent on the object
• But it is not inferentially dependent on knowledge about the causal chain

You don’t need to know anything about optics, photons, or neural signals to see an apple. The causal chain enables perception; it is not something you reason from.

Yet you say that the Direct Realist knows what initiated the causal chain. How? — RussellA

See above. This is not what is being claimed. Direct Realism says that we know the object we are perceptually related to, not the full causal history by which that relation was produced.

If you say, well because they are DRists and IRists, then it doesn't make any sense, because it is not explaining why they see and understand the ship they are seeing in that way. — Corvus

Yes, Direct and Indirect Realism are just names which need further explanation.

Yes, Direct and Indirect Realism are just names which need further explanation. — RussellA

Isn't it the case that anyone can see a ship directly or indirectly depending on the circumstances or the way they see a ship? A folk see a ship with his bare eyes, then he is seeing it directly. If he picks up a binoculars, and sees it, then he is seeing it indirectly?

Surely there are no such folks as DRists or IDists from their births, who must see a ship always either directly or indirectly no matter what situation under they see a ship?

So acquaintance works like this: (1) you are perceptually related to an object, (2) that relation does not presuppose propositional knowledge, (3) description, classification, and judgment are subsequent cognitive acts — Esse Quam Videri

As an IR, I agree.

But how does the DR know what initiated a causal chain when such knowledge is a logical impossibility?
===============================

Direct Realism does not claim that we can recover past states from present perception, or that perception gives us epistemic access to past events as such. What it claims is that perception is a present relation to a presently existing object, even though that relation is enabled by a causal history.Recovering the past is a task for inference, science, and explanation — not for perception itself. — Esse Quam Videri

So, DR does not claim we can recover past states from present perception, and recovering the past is a task for inference. As an IR, I agree.

I agree when you say that perception is a present relation to a presently existing object, which is the position of the IR
=======================

The causal chain enables perception; it is not something you reason from.......................Direct Realism says that we know the object we are perceptually related to, not the full causal history by which that relation was produced. — Esse Quam Videri

Totally agree. But how does the DR know the object that initiated the causal chain when logic shows us it is impossible to know what initiated a causal chain?

1 - We can only know about a Sun in the world because of a causal chain from it to us
2 - There is a change in both form and content of each link in this causal chain
3 - We cannot know either the form or content of a prior link even if we knew a present link
4 - All our information about the external world comes through our five senses
5 - The causal chain is temporal, in that what initiated the causal chain is temporally prior to our perception in the mind.
6 - Something in the external world initiated this causal chain
7 - The Indirect Realist believes that we can infer to the best explanation from the final link in this causal chain to what initiated the causal chain. — RussellA

How does DR overcome what is a logical impossibility?

Surely there are no such folks as DRists or IDists from their births, who must see a ship always either directly or indirectly no matter what situation under they see a ship? — Corvus

Yes, I had never heard of Direct and Indirect Realism ten years ago.

You keep asking "How does the Direct Realist know what initiated the causal chain, given that this is logically impossible?". I've addressed this multiple times.

Direct Realism does not claim to know what initiated the causal chain. That’s not a weakness of DR; it’s a basic feature of any sane theory of perception.

Even if the DR grants your claim that it is impossible to know what initiated a causal chain (and I don't), IR still doesn’t follow. This is because:

• Perception is not inference from effect to cause
• It is not reconstruction of the past
• It is not causal diagnosis

Perception is current openness to what is causally presentable right now.

The object does not need to be known as initiator in order to be known as perceived. Otherwise, absurd consequences follow:

• You wouldn’t perceive a table unless you knew its manufacturing history
• You wouldn’t perceive a sound unless you knew what struck what
• You wouldn’t perceive a face unless you knew its causal origin

But that's obviously wrong. You seem to think that IR avoids the problem by saying that we infer what initiated the causal chain, but that only shifts the problem. The inference itself still depends on perceptual contact with something, and that perceptual contact is still not knowledge of causal initiation.

So even by your own lights, IR does not escape the alleged logical impossibility either — it simply relabels perception as inference, which only leads to a regress, as we’ve already identified.

If “hot” and “cold” referred only to private feelings, then disagreement, correction, and error about temperature would be impossible. — Esse Quam Videri

Both John and Jane agree on the temperature. Is 37°C hot or cold? What do the words "hot" and "cold" mean in either case? I think it quite obvious that they refer to the different sensations that 37°C water causes John and Jane to feel.

Is 37°C hot or cold? — Michael

It's up for debate. That's the point.

“Hot” and “cold” are not names for sensations and temperatures. They are evaluative predicates whose application depends on:

• purpose (a bath? a drink? a radiator?)
• typical human responses
• practical consequences (stay in, get out, add cold water)
• contextual norms

That’s exactly why the question “Is 37 °C hot or cold?” is intelligible, even if underdetermined.