They are evaluative predicates — Esse Quam Videri

Yes, and this evaluation is inextricably tied up in the sensations they cause us to feel. That's why even Banno says "John feels cold in the water" and "Jane feels hot in the water". What do the words "hot" and "cold" mean in the phrases "feels hot" and "feels cold"? You appear to accept that the sensations occur but then for some reason think that they have nothing to do with the meaning of the words we use. And I think that's ridiculous. We can talk about anything in the world — and even things that aren't in the world. Sensations are no exception. The word "sensations" is proof enough of this.

Yes, and this evaluation is inextricably tied up in the sensations they cause us to feel. — Michael

I don’t deny that sensations occur, that they matter, or that we can talk about them. What I deny is that their occurrence fixes the meaning or reference of words like “hot” and “cold.”

When we say “John feels hot,” we are not redefining “hot” as a private sensation; we are reporting that John is undergoing the kind of bodily response that ordinarily counts as evidence for calling something hot under normal conditions. That’s why we can intelligibly say things like “It feels hot, but it isn’t,” or “It is hot, even if you don’t feel it.”

Sensations play a causal and evidential role in our evaluative practices, but meaning is fixed by public, world-directed norms of application, not by private feelings. The fact that we can talk about sensations doesn’t show that evaluative predicates are names for sensations any more than the fact that we can talk about muscle strain shows that “heavy” means “causes this feeling.”

Yes, I had never heard of Direct and Indirect Realism ten years ago. — RussellA

Saying, you see a ship directly or indirectly sounds like, if there are any obstacles in the middle of the path of the seeing, rather than seeing the ship itself. It just sounds like it is a statement something unnecessarily confusing.

You would only say that when asked - how do you see the ship? Was there anything between you and the ship, not blocking the view?

Direct Realism does not claim to know what initiated the causal chain. That’s not a weakness of DR; it’s a basic feature of any sane theory of perception. — Esse Quam Videri

As far as I know, DR is exactly the claim that they know what initiated the causal chain. In our example, they claim that they know the Sun initiated the causal chain. That is why it is not a “sane theory of perception.”

From IEP - Objects of perception

1 Direct Realism
Perceptual realism is the common sense view that tables, chairs and cups of coffee exist independently of perceivers. Direct realists also claim that it is with such objects that we directly engage.
2 Indirect Realism
The indirect realist agrees that the coffee cup exists independently of me. However, through perception I do not directly engage with this cup; there is a perceptual intermediary that comes between it and me.

=================

Perception is not an inference from present effects to past causes; it is a current perceptual relation to an existing object.......................The object does not need to be known as initiator in order to be known as perceived......................The inference itself still depends on perceptual contact with something, and that perceptual contact is still not knowledge of causal initiation. — Esse Quam Videri

Totally agree.
===============

IR does not escape the alleged logical impossibility either — it simply relabels perception as inference, which only leads to a regress, as we’ve already identified. — Esse Quam Videri

For the IR, perception is not inference. First there is perception and later there can be inferences made about this perception.

Suppose I regularly perceive a yellow circle. Using my reason I can then infer using best explanation that my regularity of perception was caused by a regularity in the world. For convenience, yellow circles can be named “Sun”, though it could be named anything. The word “Sun” then refers to not only i) perceived yellow circles but also ii) an unknown regularity in the world causing such perceptions.

I don’t see where any regress comes in.

It feels hot, but it isn’t — Esse Quam Videri

Which means what?

1. John feels hot₁ in the water
2. The water is hot₂

Are you saying that "hot₁" does not refer to the sensation John feels in the water?

Are you saying that "hot₁" and "hot₂" do not mean the same thing? If so, then what does "hot₂" mean? We've already established that being hot₂ is distinct from being of a certain temperature — given that John and Jane "disagree" over whether 37°C water is hot₂ or cold₂ — so what other property does the word "hot₂" refer to, i.e what does the neutral third-party scientist have to look for to either verify or falsify John and Jane's "conflicting" claims?

Saying, you see a ship directly or indirectly sounds like, if there are any obstacles in the middle of the path of the seeing, rather than seeing the ship itself. It just sounds like it is a statement something unnecessarily confusing. You would only say that when asked - how do you see the ship? Was there anything between you and the ship, not blocking the view? — Corvus

When the IR says “I see the ship indirectly” the word “indirectly” is not referring to the space between the person and the ship but rather is referring to what is happening in the mind of the IR.

There are things we do, and then there are the actual things. Calling the voice on the phone "my wife's voice" is what's known as an **idealization (ironically). You are hearing something different to your wife's voice. You can just shift this to be listening to a recording of your wife's voice. There isn't even a tenuous connection, at the time, to your wife uttering anything. Your wife's voice is the vibrations in the surrounding air upon her larynx engaging and producing sounds.

The recording cannot be your wife's voice. It can be a recording of it. But that's unweildy, so we idealize to get through conversations more efficiently.

This is why philosophers routinely use different meanings for words - to make them more consistent and accurate. You don't have to accept my position, I'm just explaining why the move to forego sorting this out isn't attractive to me. — AmadeusD

I don't have a problem with your using the modifier "real" to describe certain voices and "fake" other voices, but those words, like all others, gain their meaning through use, not by imposing some special metaphysical status to it. That is, if I speak falsetto, you can say that is not my "real" voice. If you want to say that my real voice is what you hear when we're next to each other talking, but a recording of my voice isn't my real voice, that's fine. But none of that suggests there is this metaphysically true voice that can be meaningfully (and by "meaningfully" I mean that can be identified and discussed coherently) identfied.

Identifying that "real" voice is impossible. Is it the vibrations, the way you hear it, the way your ear drum vibrates? Is it still "real" if through helium?

I’m not introducing “hot₁” and “hot₂,” nor am I saying that “hot” has two meanings. The word “hot” has a single, public, evaluative meaning. Sensations play an evidential role in its application, but they do not fix its reference.

When we say “It feels hot, but it isn’t,” we are not distinguishing two senses of “hot.” We are saying that the usual evidential route to applying the concept—how it feels—is defeated in this case by other considerations (context, comparison, purpose, measurement). That’s why the statement is coherent.

The neutral third party does not look for a hidden property called “hot₂.” They look at the network of public criteria that govern correct application: temperature, exposure, human responses, safety norms, and practical context. That’s exactly why agreement on temperature does not settle whether something is hot, and why disagreement about whether it is hot is real rather than fictional.

The sentence “John feels hot” is a true description of John and the sensation he is feeling, and contrasts with the false description “John feels cold”. The word “hot” obviously refers to the sensation John has and the word “cold” obviously refers to the sensation he doesn’t have, which is why the former sentence is true and the latter sentence is false (and regardless of what the rest of the world believes about John).

If you can’t agree with this then once again we’ve reached an impasse, because your continued appeal to “no it’s about norms of public assessment etc.” is utterly unconvincing.

I can understand theism and moral realism and even direct realism - even though I disagree with them - but I cannot understand this approach that you and Banno are taking. It just seems so patently absurd.

Sensations play a causal and evidential role in our evaluative practices, but meaning is fixed by public, world-directed norms of application, not by private feelings. — Esse Quam Videri

This seems the crux of the problem, where cause is summoned to determine meaning. Cause can be admitted without attaching it to meaning.

As far as I know, DR is exactly the claim that they know what initiated the causal chain. — RussellA

No. Direct realism says: "the object perceived is the mind-external object itself, not an intermediary". It does not say: "perception includes knowledge that the object caused the perception". That is an extra thesis you keep tacking on.

For convenience, yellow circles can be named “Sun”, though it could be named anything. The word “Sun” then refers to not only i) perceived yellow circles but also ii) an unknown regularity in the world causing such perceptions. — RussellA

But this doesn’t solve the problem; it relabels it. The question is not about how we name things. The question is about how our judgments are constrained by the world rather than free-floating regularities in experience. Naming does no epistemic work unless perception already puts us in touch with something that can make judgments true or false. Otherwise, the “unknown regularity” is doing all the work with no epistemic access—which collapses into skepticism or instrumentalism.

I don’t see where any regress comes in. — RussellA

You seem to be arguing something like:

(1) First there is perception (yellow circles)
(2) Then inference to a regularity in the world
(3) The word “Sun” refers to both the perception and the inferred cause
(4) No regress

But the regress is not about when inference happens. It’s about what grounds reference and justification.

The inference to a “regularity in the world” must be answerable to something. That “something” cannot be the inferred regularity itself, or the bare perceptual appearances alone (since those are compatible with many worlds).

So the inference presupposes that perception already places you in epistemic contact with the world in a non-inferential way, but that is exactly what Direct Realism claims.

So IR does not eliminate the regress; it pushes it back a step and then quietly assumes the very contact it officially denies.

This seems the crux of the problem, where cause is summoned to determine meaning. Cause can be admitted without attaching it to meaning. — Hanover

Yes—exactly. Admitting a causal role for sensation doesn’t entail that sensation fixes meaning or reference. Confusing those two is what generates the illusion that disagreement must be fictional if experiences differ.

I agree with you that “John feels hot” is true when John has a certain sensation and that “John feels cold” is false in that case. I don't deny that. What I deny is that this shows that the word “hot” refers to a sensation, rather than that sensations make certain uses of the word “hot” true. Conflating those two is exactly the point at issue.

You are repeatedly sliding from the claim that sensations make certain reports true to the claim that sensations fix the meaning or reference of the predicates used in those reports. That inference is exactly what’s in dispute. Truth-makers are not meanings.

On my view, sensations play a causal and evidential role in our use of evaluative predicates, but meaning is fixed by public, world-directed norms of application. Simply restating that sensations are involved does not address that distinction—it assumes it away. If you reject that distinction, then yes, we’ve reached bedrock disagreement.

What I deny is that this shows that the word “hot” refers to a sensation, rather than that sensations make certain uses of the word “hot” true. — Esse Quam Videri

The sensation he has makes the use of the word “hot” true because it refers to the sensation he has, and the sensation he has makes the use of the word “cold” false because it refers to the sensation he doesn’t have.

It certainly has nothing to do with “public norms of assessment” because John can feel hot even if everyone else believes he feels cold.

You are repeatedly sliding from the claim that sensations make certain reports true to the claim that sensations fix the meaning or reference of the predicates used in those reports. That inference is exactly what’s in dispute. Truth-makers are not meanings. — Esse Quam Videri

I’ve never used the word “fix”. I’ve only ever said that words like “red” and “pain” and “cold” refer to sensations, just as I say that the word “Michael” (as has been often used in this discussion) refers to me. Am I saying that I “fix” the reference of the word “Michael”? I don’t even know what that means if it means something other than that the word “Michael” refers to me.

When the IR says “I see the ship indirectly” the word “indirectly” is not referring to the space between the person and the ship but rather is referring to what is happening in the mind of the IR. — RussellA

Once the image you saw enters into your mind, shouldn't you then consult neurology or brain science in order to find out what is happening with the perceived image in your mind, rather than calling it Indirect Realism?

The sensation he has makes the use of the word “hot” true because it refers to the sensation he has, and the sensation he has makes the use of the word “cold” false because it refers to the sensation he doesn’t have. — Michael

This nails your mistake exactly.

1. John says "I feel hot" because John is hot
is not equivalent to
2. John says 'I feel hot' means John is hot.

I feel hot because I have a fever <> "I feel hot" means I have a fever
I feel hot because I have a sensation of heat within me <> "I feel hot" means I have a sensation of heat within me.

Note the quotes to make clear I'm referring to the grammar of the sentence.

How could we know we've used the sentence "I feel hot" correctly if we have to rely upon an invisible private state?

has put his finger exactly on the issue.

The fact that a sensation makes a sentence true does not show that the words in that sentence refer to the sensation. That inference is precisely what I deny.

“I feel hot” can be true because of a sensation without “hot” meaning or referring to that sensation. Otherwise we could not distinguish truth from correctness, could not explain learning or misuse, and could not make sense of disagreement or error.

1. John says "I feel hot" because John is hot
is not equivalent to
2. John says 'I feel hot' means John is hot. — Hanover

I’m not asserting (2). I’m asserting (1) and that the word “hot” in John’s utterance “I feel hot” refers to the sensation he feels.

How could we know we've used the sentence "I feel hot" correctly if we have to rely upon an invisible private state? — Hanover

My private state isn’t invisible to me. I am intimately familiar with the sensations of feeling hot and cold. I can recognize and name which one I am feeling in any given environment — and even if I’m alone.

Direct realism says: "the object perceived is the mind-external object itself, not an intermediary". It does not say: "perception includes knowledge that the object caused the perception". That is an extra thesis you keep tacking on. — Esse Quam Videri

DR says that they directly perceive the Sun

If the DR says that they directly perceive the Sun, then it logically follows that it is their belief that the Sun caused their perception.

If the DR directly perceives the Sun, but it is the Moon that caused their perception, then this is one argument the IR makes against DR. The illusion argument.

This is not an extra thesis I keep adding on. It is a logical consequence of what the DR believes.
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Otherwise, the “unknown regularity” is doing all the work with no epistemic access—which collapses into skepticism or instrumentalism. — Esse Quam Videri

The IR avoids scepticism about an external world using inference to the best explanation.
=====================================================================

The inference to a “regularity in the world” must be answerable to something. That “something” cannot be the inferred regularity itself, or the bare perceptual appearances alone (since those are compatible with many worlds). — Esse Quam Videri

Yes, from a regularity in perception one can infer that there is a regularity in the world causing such regularities in perception. The inference that there is a regularity in the world causing regularities in perception is answerable to regularities in perception.

It is not necessary to be in epistemic contact with the world in a non-inferential way in order to make inferences about the world. That is why they are inferences. If one was in epistemic contact with the world in a non-inferential way then it would not be necessary to make inferences about the world, as you would already know about the world.

A person regularly perceives yellow circles.
Person A infers that their regularity of perception was caused by a regularity in the world.
Person A infers that their regularity of perception was caused by random events in the world.
Person C infers that their regularity of perception was caused by a God in the world.
Person D infers that their regularity of perception was caused by hallucinations.
We can then use reason to narrow these down to the best explanation.

All these inferences are answerable to something, a regularity of perception, and none involve any regress.

If I inferred from my inference then that would be a regress. In other words, if I inferred from my inference that my regularities of perception are caused by regularities in the world that there are regularities in the world, then that would be a regress.

Once the image you saw enters into your mind, shouldn't you then consult neurology or brain science in order to find out what is happening with the perceived image in your mind, rather than calling it Indirect Realism? — Corvus

I don’t think that neurologists or brain scientists can currently observe thoughts in the mind.

At the moment it is up to philosophy.

The step you keep taking is from:

"the object perceived must in fact be causally responsible if perception is veridical"

to

"the perceiver must know or believe that the object caused the perception."

That step simply does not follow. Direct Realism requires causal dependence as a metaphysical condition of perception, not causal knowledge as part of perceptual content.

This is precisely why illusions are possible: one can perceive as of the Sun without knowing what actually caused the perception. So the illusion argument does not show that DR is committed to knowing causal initiation; it presupposes the opposite.

On inference: I’m not denying that we can infer from regularities in perception. I’m pointing out that inference to the best explanation presupposes some non-inferential constraint by the world in order for explanations to be better or worse at all. Otherwise, the regularities you cite are equally compatible with indefinitely many hypotheses. The regress is not inference-from-inference, but inference with no account of how perceptual appearances are answerable to the world in the first place.

I don’t think that neurologists or brain scientists can currently observe thoughts in the mind.

At the moment it is up to philosophy. — RussellA

Philosophy is largely about semantics and logic. It doesn't deal with the cells, neurons and brain chemistry how it works with the entered images into it, does it? These are the subject for Neurology and brain science.

I’m not asserting (2). I’m asserting (1) and that the word “hot” in John’s utterance “I feel hot” refers to the sensation he feels. — Michael

I know, and (1) doesn't have the word "mean" in it, and I was trying to figure out what words meant, not what caused certain things.

My private state isn’t invisible to me. I am intimately familiar with the sensations of feeling hot and cold. I can recognize and name which one I am feeling in any given environment — and even if I’m alone. — Michael

And that's the problem. You're talking about your private langauge by reference to things I have no exposure to. I'm not questioning whether you can introspect. I'm saying your introspection can't ground meaning.

I'm not questioning whether you can introspect. I'm saying your introspection can't ground meaning. — Hanover

Nicely stated.

I was trying to figure out what words meant — Hanover

I'm saying your introspection can't ground meaning. — Hanover

I'm talking about reference. The word "headache" refers to the sensation we tend to feel after a heavy night of drinking, the word "cold" refers to the sensation we tend to feel in low temperatures, the word "hot" refers to the sensation we tend to feel in high temperatures, and the word "pain" refers to the sensation we tend to feel if stabbed. This is so obvious that I don't get why there is so much objection. It's really not difficult to understand. You don't need to have access to another person's first-person phenomenal experiences to accept this. It's common sense, and in this case common sense is correct.

Sensations exist, and our words can refer to them — with the word "sensations" being the most obvious.

Philosophy is largely about semantics and logic. It doesn't deal with the cells, neurons and brain chemistry how it works with the entered images into it, does it? These are the subject for Neurology and brain science. — Corvus

Philosophy is also about the brain and how it relates to the mind.

I'm talking about reference. The word "headache" refers to the sensation we tend to feel after a heavy night of drinking, the word "cold" refers to the sensation we tend to feel in low temperatures, the word "hot" refers to the sensation we tend to feel in high temperatures, and the word "pain" refers to the sensation we tend to feel if stabbed. This is so obvious that I don't get why there is so much objection. It's really not difficult to understand. You don't need to have access to another person's first-person phenomenal experiences to accept this. It's common sense, and in this case common sense is correct.

Sensations exist, and our words can refer to them — with the word "sensations" being the most obvious. — Michael

Alright, 25 pages in and there's no question we both know what one another are saying. You are talking about reference.

Do you acknowledge that I can speak with you fully coherently by relying entirely upon the usage of the terms without having any idea what the consitution of the internal referent is? That is, can I understand "red" without reference to the referent, but instead just to usage?

I'm not clear on what your objection is. Is it (1) you don't think "meaning as use" works because if we rely upon use entirely , we'll be hopelessly confused or (2) you acknowledge "meaning as use" fully works, but it is dishonest and incomplete because it fails to consider the underlying nature of reality.

Philosophy is also about the brain and how it relates to the mind. — RussellA

which is all in the realm of inference. There is no conclusive objective details of proof or demonstration how physical brain relates to the mind yet.

I'm not clear on what your objection is. — Hanover

My objection is to your objection to my claim that the words "red", "pain", "cold", etc. refer to the phenomenal character of first-person experiences.

Do you acknowledge that I can speak with you fully coherently by relying entirely upon the usage of the terms without having any idea what the consitution of the internal referent is? — Hanover

You can speak about it, but you might not understand it. A blind person "knows" that strawberries are red, but they don't understand colours in the way that you or I do. A person with CIPA "knows" that being stabbed hurts (other people), but they don't understand pain in the way that you or I do. There is more to the meaning of these words than just their "public use". There is also the sensations they refer to.

You say that hearing this sound means that I am in direct contact with whatever is outside the room.

I do not say that. I have only said that we are in direct contact with the air or atmosphere. That is the medium through which the soundwaves travel. Direct contact entails no distance, so I’m not sure why anyone would assume I am speaking of direct contact between a perceiver and distant objects.