No. I go over why here.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15722/the-logic-of-a-universal-origin-and-meaning/p1

Essentially the universe is uncaused. And because of that, nothing that exists, except that the universe exists uncaused, is necessary.

Another way to look at it is is, "What is the definition of necessary?" Necessary implies some law that if this does not exist, then something which relies on that thing cannot exist. But is is necessary that the necessary thing itself exist? No.

Is there anything that exists necessarily? — QuixoticAgnostic

No. Only contingency is necessary (Q. Meillassoux's "Absolute") insofar as, without exception, every existing thing / fact (X) can be conceived of as not existing, or not being the case, (~X) without contradiction (i.e. negating a "necessary thing").

Well, matter needs energy to exist.

I would tentatively answer "yes", and argue that contingency means dependency on conditions. Dependency implies ordered explanatory relations. A structure of ordered explanatory relations ultimately requires an unconditioned (ungrounded) ground.

Contra Meillassoux ( ): the claim "only contingency is necessary" is put forth as a universal and necessary truth about the structure of reality. Thus, the assertion of this claim implies its own denial and reveals an equivocation between logical conceivability and real intelligibility. That X can be conceived as not-X without formal contradiction implies absence of logical necessity not absence of metaphysical necessity. The very act of conceiving ~X presupposes a stable intelligible order (non-contradiction, being, negation, truth) none of which can be coherently negated without self-undermining. Universal contingency therefore parasitically depends on an unacknowledged necessity; the unconditioned ground of intelligibility. In other words, contingency only makes sense against the background of intelligibility and, therefore, cannot be absolutized.

Contra : the argument correctly shows that the universe cannot have a temporal cause (something earlier in time) or a compositional cause (something spatially outside the totality of things) , but it does not address the question of existential contingency per se. Scientific and descriptive causes explain how states of affairs arise within the universe, but they do not explain existence as such. The argument purports to address the question of existence as-such, but treats existence as if it were the last member of an explanatory chain (category error). Explaining existence does not mean finding an external producer in time or composition, but an unconditioned ground. Expanding explanatory “scope” to include the entire universe merely aggregates all contingent entities into a contingent totality, but does not address the question of why there is something (I.e. contingent totality) rather than nothing. Even an eternal or infinite universe remains a collection of contingent beings whose existence is not self-explanatory. This is a question of metaphysical grounding rather than causality and (in my opinion) is left unaddressed.

Universal contingency therefore parasitically depends on an unacknowledged necessity; the unconditioned ground of intelligibility. In other words, contingency only makes sense against the background of intelligibility and, therefore, cannot be absolutized — Esse Quam Videri

What if the ground of intelligibility is itself groundless, as Wittgenstein and Heidegger maintain? And what is a groundless ground? It is performativity itself, becoming before being, difference prior to identity, intra-action before self-presence.

Trouble is, any individual can be made contingent by adding a world where it does not exist.

So to specify, for some individual, that there is no world in which that individual is absent, is to place a quite arbitrary restriction on the allowable domains. There is nothing in S5, modal logic, or rigid designation that forces this restriction.

Let's construct a model in which the individual a exists in every possible world:

w₁ ⊨ {a,b,c}
w₂ ⊨ {a,b}
w₃ ⊨ {a}

Here, a "exists necessarily" - occurs in every possible world.

But we can always add
w₄ ⊨ {b,c}




Requiring an individual to exist in all worlds is a stipulated metaphysical condition, not a logical or semantic necessity.

Pretty much.

...the assertion of this claim implies its own denial — Esse Quam Videri

Nuh. Sure, all you have said is that if we are to be consistent, then we need to not be inconsistent. Well, yes. If you what to be inconsistent, go ahead, but don't expect to be able to do it consistently.

Something must exist necessarily — QuixoticAgnostic

Again, nuh. An empty domain is consistent with possible world semantics and with S5.

Contra ↪Philosophim: the argument correctly shows that the universe cannot have a temporal cause (something earlier in time) or a compositional cause (something spatially outside the totality of things) , but it does not address the question of existential contingency per se. Scientific and descriptive causes explain how states of affairs arise within the universe, but they do not explain existence as such. The argument purports to address the question of existence as-such, but treats existence as if it were the last member of an explanatory chain (category error) — Esse Quam Videri

It is so refreshing to hear someone who read and understand the premises!

Universal contingency therefore parasitically depends on an unacknowledged necessity; the unconditioned ground of intelligibility. In other words, contingency only makes sense against the background of intelligibility and, therefore, cannot be absolutized. — Esse Quam Videri

Correct.

Explaining existence does not mean finding an external producer in time or composition, but an unconditioned ground. Expanding explanatory “scope” to include the entire universe merely aggregates all contingent entities into a contingent totality, but does not address the question of why there is something (I.e. contingent totality) rather than nothing. — Esse Quam Videri

I see what you are saying, but let me counter that slightly. The scope is not the entire universe, the scope is the totality of explanations for that universe. Meaning this includes all of the sub-causalities inside of it. When we trace backwards through these chains we either get a 'start' to the chain, or we see the whole chain in its totality. Either way, there is no cause at these points of reference. It simply is. It just so happens that these points of reference are the limits of causality for the causal explanations of that universe. And in either case, there can be no prior cause which allowed the causation of the universe to be.

That something is necessary for the sake of other things does not automatically mean it is metaphysically necessary in the strict sense.

There's a small notion of necessity as that which must be the case in order for something else to be the case - If you would read this post, it is necessary that you read English. There is a broader notion of necessity as what is true in all possible worlds - that two and two is four. They are not the same.

The advantage of the latter is that it avoids the contentious and irrelevant notion of causation.

There is a broader notion of necessity as what is true in all possible worlds - that two and two is four. — Banno

(2+2)mod3=?

There are theorems in math having hypotheses that are both sufficient and necessary.

Just nit picking.

What if the ground of intelligibility is itself groundless, as Wittgenstein and Heidegger maintain? — Joshs

I consider this is a position worth taking seriously and part of why my "yes" is tentative, but ultimately I find it unsatisfying for the following reasons:

1. It's more of a refusal to ask certain questions than a rebuttal, casting intelligibility as an optional philosophical preference. This strikes me as untrue to the authentic spirit of the human desire to know, which continues to ask "why" until an answer is reached or inquiry is abandoned. Abandonment is a performative choice, rather than an explanatory achievement.

2. Groundless ground is, ultimately, a contradiction in terms. I don't think of this is a mere rhetorical point. A ground is, by definition, that in virtue of which something is intelligible. Terminating explanation in a groundless ground is another way of saying "that which makes everything else intelligible is itself unintelligible", thereby affirming intelligibility everywhere except at the decisive point and exempting the most fundamental reality from the very standard it Is supposed to support.

3. If intelligibility is ultimately groundless, then the claim itself has no intelligible ground and cannot be rationally affirmed as true, only enacted as a stance. Perhaps this is what drove Heidegger into poetics and Wittgenstein into silence, but the moment it is offered as a philosophical claim - especially one meant to correct others - it implicitly submits to normative standards like coherence, explanatory adequacy and rational assent, thereby re-engaging the very operations it tries to overcome.

I'm curious to get your thoughts on this.

And what is a groundless ground? It is performativity itself, becoming before being, difference prior to identity, intra-action before self-presence. — Joshs

I just realized I didn't address this point:

I would say that these (performativity, becoming, difference, intra-action) are descriptions, not grounds. They tell us how discourse or reality behaves, but not why there is such behavior in the first place. For example:

• To say “becoming” is prior to being still presupposes that becoming exists.
  
• To say “difference” is prior to identity still presupposes something that differs.
  
• To say “performativity” grounds intelligibility still presupposes that performativity is intelligible enough to ground anything.

In other words, I would argue that these smuggle intelligibility back in while denying it at the level of principle.

Again, I'd love to get your thoughts on this.

Nuh. Sure, all you have said is that if we are to be consistent, then we need to not be inconsistent. Well, yes. If you what to be inconsistent, go ahead, but don't expect to be able to do it consistently. — Banno

The point is not a trivial reminder that consistency is good, it's that the claim "only contingency is necessary" is being advanced as a true account of reality, not as a shrug or a stylistic preference. Once it's put forward as such, it implicitly claims universal scope, necessity and intelligibility. In other words, it depends on the implicit acceptance of what it outwardly denies. Once inconsistency is embraced at the level of first principles, rational discourse no longer functions as inquiry into reality.

I see what you are saying, but let me counter that slightly. The scope is not the entire universe, the scope is the totality of explanations for that universe. Meaning this includes all of the sub-causalities inside of it. When we trace backwards through these chains we either get a 'start' to the chain, or we see the whole chain in its totality. Either way, there is no cause at these points of reference. It simply is. It just so happens that these points of reference are the limits of causality for the causal explanations of that universe. And in either case, there can be no prior cause which allowed the causation of the universe to be. — Philosophim

Yes, this makes sense, but I don't think it fully evades the original objection. The original objection wasn't that you hadn't traced the causal chain far enough, it was that even if you trace every causal explanation available within the universe, you have still not explained why there is any contingent reality at all. In other words, the objection is distinguishing between causal explanation and metaphysical explanation. Causal explanation can explain one contingent entity by reference to another, but it can't explain contingent existence itself. Calling something "the limit of causality" does not show that it is self-explanatory, it only shows that a certain kind of explanation has run out. The objection is saying that there is still more to be explained even after taking all causal explanations into account.

What do you think?

There's a small notion of necessity as that which must be the case in order for something else to be the case - If you would read this post, it is necessary that you read English. There is a broader notion of necessity as what is true in all possible worlds - that two and two is four. They are not the same. — Banno

That something is necessary for the sake of other things does not automatically mean it is metaphysically necessary in the strict sense.

There's a small notion of necessity as that which must be the case in order for something else to be the case - If you would read this post, it is necessary that you read English. There is a broader notion of necessity as what is true in all possible worlds - that two and two is four. They are not the same.

The advantage of the latter is that it avoids the contentious and irrelevant notion of causation. — Banno

The original argument was not claiming that intelligibility is causally prior, instrumentally required or merely pragmatically unavoidable. It was claiming that the very meaning of contingency presupposes a necessary intelligible order (being, non-contradiction, negation, truth). These are conditions of the possibility of meaningfully asserting anything at all, including claims about contingency.

As such, the appeal to possible worlds semantics doesn't help as it already assumes a stable notion of truth, determinate identity across worlds, modal structure itself and the intelligibility of worlds as such. These cannot themselves be contingent all the way down. Modal logic describes relations between propositions, it doesn't explain why there is an intelligible order in virtue of which modal distinctions are meaningful at all.

The original argument was not about causation, but about explanatory dependence. Contingency implies intelligible dependence relations, intelligible dependence cannot be infinite or self-cancelling, therefore contingency presupposes something non-contingent.

Or so the argument goes...

There is a broader notion of necessity as what is true in all possible worlds - that two and two is four.
— Banno

(2+2)mod3=?

There are theorems in math having hypotheses that are both sufficient and necessary. — jgill

Yep. There is always all sorts of presumed background. In Peno arithmetic, if you like, 2+=2=4. So supposing that something necessarily exists would be presuming just such a situation. What we might reject is the expectation that "Is there anything that exists necessarily?" has only one answer.

So yes, that should read "There is a broader notion of necessity as what is true in all accessible possible worlds", with accessibility conditions setting out the circumstances.

Once inconsistency is embraced at the level of first principles, rational discourse no longer functions as inquiry into reality. — Esse Quam Videri

If your account is inconsistent, you need a better account.

Do we agree on this, at least?

The job given modal logic is to provide a coherent account. If someone is happy with an incoherent account, then yes, they do not need modal logic...

And yes, introducing causality is a furphy.

Yes, this makes sense, but I don't think it fully evades the original objection. The original objection wasn't that you hadn't traced the causal chain far enough, it was that even if you trace every causal explanation available within the universe, you have still not explained why there is any contingent reality at all. — Esse Quam Videri

My intention at that point is to note that there can be no logical reason for contingent reality. In the case where one reaches the end of the causal chain, there is nothing which explains the start. In the case in which one observes the entire causal chain as infinite, there is no reason why the chain exists either. Its not merely that I observed there to be no reason for the existence of a causal universe, it is that logically there can be no reason for a causal universe, and its existence is ultimately uncaused by anything else.

Causal explanation can explain one contingent entity by reference to another, but it can't explain contingent existence itself. Calling something "the limit of causality" does not show that it is self-explanatory, it only shows that a certain kind of explanation has run out. The objection is saying that there is still more to be explained even after taking all causal explanations into account. — Esse Quam Videri

I think I understand what you're saying, but let me repeat it from my viewpoint to make sure. Lets simplify with billiard balls. You're stating that Billiard Ball A can be explained by its current position because Billiard Ball B hit it 1 minute ago. But the existence of Billiard Bard B, independent of Billiard Ball A, cannot be explained by Billiard Ball A. Within that scope, you are correct.

But if we zoom in on Billiard Ball B, its existence is composed of many atoms. But of course, what composes those atoms? We zoom in further and find electrons and protons. So we continue to zoom in on the existence itself, finding that it is comprised of smaller and smaller things until either one of two things happen.

A. We find a 'smallest' thing. There is nothing smaller, no reason for its composition by outside forces or objects, no explanation for its existence besides the fact that it does.
B. We keep going infinitely. It turns out everything is always composed of something smaller.

The result is the same. In both cases, if the full chain or chains of causality are explored we arrive at a point in which there is no cause for the contingencies existence. In A, its because we've found something that provably has no other contingency for why it exists. In B, there is no contingency that explains the existence of the infinite contingencies all the way down. For if there were, it would be part of the infinite chain, and thus something outside of the chain of infinite causality cannot exist.

Thus there is no causal explanation ultimately for why there is existence. It simply is.

I think we're talking past each other. The point isn’t that incoherence is acceptable; I'm not advocating for inconsistency, I'm doing the opposite. The claim “only contingency is necessary,” when asserted as a true description of reality, already presupposes necessity, intelligibility, and universal scope. The criticism is not “your account is messy,” but “your account relies on what it denies in order to be stated as true at all.” Yes, modal logic can ensure formal coherence, but it doesn’t address that deeper dependence.

I think we're talking past each other. — Esse Quam Videri

Doubtless.

“Only contingency is necessary” looks to be saying much the same as that for any individual we we might think necessary, we might posit a world in which that individual does not exist. That is, for any given individual, we might specify a world in which that individual is not in the domain.

I take the OP as asking if there are any necessary individuals - things. Not "are there necessary propositions?" or "Are there necessary truths?".

So set aside "Meillassoux's "Absolute" and look at

every existing thing... can be conceived of as not existing... without contradiction (i.e. negating a "necessary thing"). — 180 Proof

...which can be seen as an informal version of my more formal argument.

‘There are no necessary truths’ is self contradictory, because if it is true then it is necessarily so.

Yes. In standard modal semantics (e.g. S5), whether an individual exists in all possible worlds depends on how we stipulate the domain of worlds. Modal logic allows expanding domains, shrinking domains, and varying domains. Nothing in S5 forces the existence of a necessary individual.

But the argument is not that modal logic forces us to accept a necessarily existing individual. Nor is It that there must be an individual whose existence is logically necessary in all possible worlds. You keep trying to reframe the issue as only about the modal status of individuals across possible worlds, whereas the argument concerns the conditions under which any such modal reasoning about individuals is intelligible at all.

To put it another way:

1. There is no metaphysical necessity whatsoever; reality is absolutely contingent. (Meillasoux)

simply does not follow from:

2. For any individual object, I can construct a world where it does not exist. (Modal Semantics)

The former is a full-blooded metaphysical claim. As such, an appropriate rebuttal was given in equally metaphysical terms.

Ironically, Meillassoux himself explicitly rejects the application of possible world semantics to the problem of absolute contingency as methodologically suspect. I don't think he'd support your translation of his thesis into a trivial point about modal semantics.

Yep. So that's perhaps not what is being asked. The OP talks of particular things, and god, and by the last paragraph, the difference between the two.

So there are necessary truths, sentences and such. Are there necessary individuals?

Here's my observation, the contingency of particulars in the actual world; for any individual there is a world in which it does not exist: w₀ ⊨ ∀x◊¬E(x).

But what Meillassoux wants is an application of this for every world, ☐∀x◊¬E(x).

Mine says that all individuals in the world are contingent. Meillassoux's is that all individuals in any world are contingent.

So to answer "Is there anything that exists in the actual world necessarily?" my contention will suffice; but if the question is "Is there anything that exists in any world necessarily? we'd need Meillassoux.

The conclusion is that the claim that some individual a exists necessarily, (□E(a)), is a stipulated constraint on the model, not something forced by the logic itself.

Meillassoux would rule out god as a possibility. My version just says he does not exist in the actual world... :wink:

So there are necessary truths, sentences and such. Are there necessary individuals? — Banno

Individuals - the person, the ego, individual self - are contingent as a matter of necessity. Interesting that the term 'individual' used to denote the person only becomes current in the 17th century. 'In the Middle Ages, you wouldn't call a person an individual. Instead, the term was used to describe things that were units of a whole. For example, the Holy Trinity was described as "individual" because its three parts could not be separated. To be "individual" meant to be unified with others, not separate from them.' The meaning was practically reversed in the Enlightenment.

No, individual items, not people.

So as the title asks: Is there anything that exists necessarily? By this, I don't mean to assume, if something exists necessarily, it must be a particular thing. Maybe something must exist necessarily, but we don't know what it is, or it's merely some "kind" of thing we can say must exist. — QuixoticAgnostic

Isn't "I" a necessary existence? I think, therefore I exist. That statement seems not quite logical.

I exist, therefore I think. This is logically correct. "I" is a necessary existence for my thought. Without "I", I couldn't have thought, or wrote this post. My existence or "I" is the logical necessity for my thought.

Thus there is no causal explanation ultimately for why there is existence. It simply is. — Philosophim

Thanks for the additional clarification. Your additional comments do a great job of hammering in the logic behind your argument. It seems like the question comes down to whether or not one thinks there is still an additional unanswered question lingering at the termination of the causal chain. You argue that once all contingent causal explanations have been exhausted, there's nothing left to explain. The residual worry is that this leaves the contingent totality itself unexplained.

Another way of framing the worry is that explaining each individual item within a contingent series by reference to its predecessor does not explain why there is a contingent series at all. The relations within the series can't be used to explain the existence of the series itself. The response "it just is" seems to arbitrarily terminate inquiry rather than satisfy it. I wouldn't argue that this is incoherent, but I might argue that it is unprincipled. To see what I mean, one might ask "why accept brute contingency at the level of the series but not at lower levels? If we accepted "it just is" earlier in the inquiry, explanation would never get off the ground."

What do you think? Is this a legitimate concern?

Thanks for clarifying.

Since the post I originally responded to specifically referenced Meillasoux I think it is worth noting that Meillasoux would resist framing his argument in terms of modal semantics or (mere) logical conceivability. This deflates his metaphysical/transcendental meta-claim about the nature of modality itself into a question of technical formulation within modal logic. That said, if we’re content to set Meillesoux’s argument aside, then we can move on.

I would say that your claim that modal logic does not, by itself, compel the affirmation of a necessarily existing being is uncontroversial. What would be more controversial is the claim that metaphysical necessity is reducible to logical necessity. While you don’t seem to have explicitly stated this claim anywhere in your argument, I would say that it implicitly relies on that reduction in order to have any metaphysical force.

The hidden premise seems to be something like “all genuine necessities must be expressible as necessities in modal logic”. This collapses a genuine distinction. Logical necessity is about entailment between propositions. Metaphysical necessity is about what reality must be like in order for there to be anything at all. The argument you presented does not address the latter. As such, the argument regarding stipulated constraints doesn’t have any force because metaphysical necessity is not merely stipulated as part of a model-building choice, it is inferred as part of an argument or discovered as the end result of inquiry.

Thoughts?