This is the most fun I've had with a discussion in a long time. — T Clark

Very good discussion!

we just differ on the solution. We don't even disagree much on that. — T Clark

Especially because I see a lot of latitude in interpreting what Sider recommends. To say it again -- his main concern is to draw some kind of distinction (that matters) between a term and its reference. One way of doing that is to use some version of Ontologese, but a curious, flexible willingness to "try on" another's terminology might accomplish much the same thing.

how can we interact with, experience, the Tao without being able to consciously, i.e. verbally, think about it? What is non-verbal consciousness? What is awareness without consciousness? — T Clark

Yes, these are aspects of the consciousness question that are often ignored when Western philosophers talk. You'd think, reading the literature on consciousness, that no one had ever tried to meditate -- much less entire centuries-long traditions of it!

"Surfaces and Essences: Analogy as the Fuel and Fire of Thinking" by Douglas Hofstadter and Emmanuel Sander. — T Clark

Thanks, I'll check it out. I've read a bunch of Hofstadter with pleasure.

Yes, but there is a distinction between technical language and jargon. — T Clark

My concern is what is advocating for is a massive jargonization of philosophy. — hypericin

You're both pointing to the problem -- what's the difference between defining operators and domains in logic, versus a similar operation in ordinary language? Sider is a good writer, but his background is what I'd call technical. I agree, we don't want jargon, and we don't know how far we can push this idea before Ontologese becomes unintentionally comic. Heidegger is an interesting example. I think he was absolutely right to invent some new coinages to talk about his idea of Being, and amazingly enough, at least one (Dasein) has actually stuck. But his way of using those new terms . . . not easy, and often not clear, which was supposed to be the whole point. Sartre too, with pour-soi and en-soi.

it seems a fantasy that a singular set of terms, with universally agreed definitions, could ever be achieved. — hypericin

Yes, but . . . isn't that what happened, more or less, with several logical languages? So it can be done, and done usefully. The problem, once again, is whether ordinary language is flexible enough, and its users willing enough.

I don't really see an alternative to what is sometimes done already: for individual philosophers to rigorously define their terms from the outset, as best they are able. — hypericin

I think that's fine, as long as everyone steers clear of arguing whether they're the right definitions. Maybe that could come later, after the participants have gotten a better look at what sort of structure you can build using those definitions. This presupposes that structure is to a significant degree independent of language, so I'm with Sider there.

Yes, but . . . isn't that what happened, more or less, with several logical languages? So it can be done, and done usefully. — J

Logical languages have basic concepts that are very well agreed upon. Ontologese would not. Everyone would have their options on what should and shouldn't be included. And everyone would have their own definitions. This would lead to either the wrangling we are trying to avoid, or an explosion of terms, designating multiple takes for each term.

amazingly enough, at least one (Dasein) has actually stuck. But his way of using those new terms . . . not easy, and often not clear, which was supposed to be the whole point. — J

Dasein is particularly opaque. But this is the general problem. The idea that all of these terms would be transparent, clear, and agreed upon seems highly optimistic.

I don't believe that this can end terminological debates. The best is that it can keep them mostly substantive.

I really can't disagree with this. An actual adoption of Ontologese is utopian, or possibly dystopian, as you point out. But if, having taking Sider's ideas on board, we can do a better job of keeping debates substantive, that would be significant. The question of substantivity is what motivated Sider in the first place, and it certainly drives us nuts when we get pulled away into terminological wrangles.

I think there are interesting questions remaining about reference magnetism. @T Clark has articulated the issue with fundamentality very well. I find myself pulled both ways on it. I don't want reference magnetism (or joint-carving) to depend on a perception of ontological structure that is completely independent of human conceptualization. Rather, I want it to do what Sider (mainly) asks of it: to help us separate terms from what they refer to. Is there more? It's worth quoting Sider again:

Epistemic value: joint-carving languages and beliefs are better. If structure is subjective, so is this betterness. This would be a disaster. . . If there is no sense in which the physical truths are objectively better than the scrambled ["bizarre"] truths, beyond the fact that they are [true] propositions that we have happened to have expressed, then the postmodernist forces of darkness have won. — Sider, 65.

That last phrase is silly rhetoric, but the rest is provocative. Sider brings in the idea that some languages and beliefs are epistemically better. He doesn't elaborate on what "betterness" is, but we could probably fill in the story using the successes of science, at the very least.

So maybe we should concentrate on epistemology rather than ontology. There is no knowing without a knower. If joint-carving terms are better for us in knowing the world, isn't that consistent with agnosticism about Fundamental-with-a-capital-F ontology? Turning the question around: Is "knowing better" a fundamental ontological category? I don't see how, and that's good.

The other question that Sider's thought highlights is the role of truth in epistemology. He's not the first to have noticed that "truth is not enough" -- that we don't want just any truths, but truths that carry a certain perspective or depth. Giving content to that additional "oomph" isn't easy. For Sider, it has to do with the references of the true statements -- whether they're reference magnets and carve at the joints. I think this is a promising line of inquiry. It's always going to be helpful to remind ourselves that what is true and what matters are different issues.

Not having read Sider, I have a different question.

Why is 'ontology' even the concern? This seems kind of naive, as if words really just picked out subsets of ontological reality. When in fact, words are as often dealing with relationships, concepts, relationships and categories of concepts, subjective relationships... It seems impossible to find indisputable, singular 'ontological' versions of such words.

Take the first problematic word you mentioned, 'existence'. Especially when you take concepts, relationships, and subjects into account, the number of 'existences' seems to explode.

Atomic existence: Does the thing have a mind independent, physical existence?
Presentist atomic existance: Does the thing have atomic existence, right now?
Eternalist atomic existance: Did the thing ever have an atomic existence?
"Block universe" atomic existence: Will the thing ever have an atomic existence?
Mind-dependent existence: Does the thing exist at all, even if only in a mind?
Recalled existence: Does the thing exist, if only in living memory?
Historical existence: Does the thing exist, if only in written record?
Local existence: Does the thing exist, and have any causal relationship with any subject?
Relative-local existence: Does the thing exist, and have any causal relationship with a particular subject?

And on and on...

Each of these is debatable. Take mind-dependent existence. Does this require for the mental object to be thought, right now, for it to exist? Or does an active potential to think something count as existence? If the thought was thought in the past, does it require a present impact to count? What if the impact is only marginal, say, it contributed slightly to another thought which contributed slightly to another, which became an enduring belief, does that marginal thought exist? Is this existence intrinsically relative, so that thoughts exist from one subjective frame of reference, and do not exist in another? Or is it the totality of human thought that counts?

Each question is a debate. "Ah, but these are not substantive", Sider might say. "There is no singular reference to this term, we have to clearly delineate what we are talking about!". But this means, for each question, we generate another term: one for the positive response, one for the negative. This exercise can be repeated for every of the variations of "existence" above. So ultimately, we wind up with 100s of "ontologese" terms just covering the natural language "existence". Is this progress?

I think the core problem is that language does not, and cannot, map to ontology in a straightforward way. Language doesn't directly deal in ontology. It deals in concepts. These can multiply endlessly, and they can all "carve to the joints". The joints of ontology, or the joints of other concepts.

I think the primary takeaway I've gathered from this thread is simply that there need not be "correct" words to identify concepts. That is, when I say "existence" is this way, and you have a different way of using "existence", it's perhaps not that one of us has a better understanding of "existence", but that we are simply talking about different concepts and we need to think in terms of their implications.

Referring to my thread on existing vs non-existing things, if I think there can be non-existent things, then I am referring to some "way" (way of reality, way of things, way of being, etc.) which may be disagreeable with another "way", particularly where one would claim there can't be non-existent things. However, perhaps these ways only conflict in their use of the terms, not in the actual referents of the terms from each party. So once again, it is important to understand ideas from the other's perspective rather than trying to conform them to yours. It will yield better understanding overall anyway.

I think the primary takeaway I've gathered from this thread is simply that there need not be "correct" words to identify concepts. That is, when I say "existence" is this way, and you have a different way of using "existence", it's perhaps not that one of us has a better understanding of "existence", but that we are simply talking about different concepts and we need to think in terms of their implications. — QuixoticAgnostic

Yes. I would add that the "different concepts" may be seen as more or less perspicacious, more or less adequate in capturing ontological structure. This is Sider's view, at least. Hence the notion of reference magnets.

This seems kind of naive, as if words really just picked out subsets of ontological reality. When in fact, words are as often dealing with relationships, concepts, relationships and categories of concepts, subjective relationships... — hypericin

I think it would be naive, if ontology was conceived as a 1-to-1 matching of terms with "objects" or items we metaphorically imagine as existing in a visual space. But your list of "relationships, concepts, categories" et al. seems just as much a part of first-order ontology. Also, nothing here is meant to limit what a word can do. We use words in so many different ways; Sider is focusing on a particular philosophical use, and how it can get murky and non-substantive.

It seems impossible to find indisputable, singular 'ontological' versions of such words. — hypericin

But leave aside the words. Is it possible to find indisputable, singular, ontological versions (or concepts) of the references of the words? Sider would call that a substantive question, as opposed to the one about words, which is not about metaphysics but about a particular language.

That said, I'm much less confident than he is that anything "indisputable" would come out of this.

This exercise can be repeated for every of the variations of "existence" above. So ultimately, we wind up with 100s of "ontologese" terms just covering the natural language "existence". Is this progress? — hypericin

It's a good question. Even if "100s" is a exaggeration, there's still a problem with the limits of what natural language can do. I tend to think that logical languages often can better handle longstanding philosophical problems, precisely because terms are removed from their ordinary-language polysemy as much as possible. But, as you helpfully show, carrying out such a program with even a single "big" term is a headache.

One clarification, which relates to my first response. You ask:

Take mind-dependent existence. Does this require for the mental object to be thought, right now, for it to exist? — hypericin

A "Siderian" rephrasing might look like this. We are aware of some reference magnets "in the vicinity" of: what our minds do when we think. Quite often, a mental image appears. And if we stop thinking about that idea, the image will disappear. Now we can be fairly comfortable that this really does describe something in "conceptual space." We know the difference between having the mental image, and no longer having it. (Or maybe not, if you're a hardcore Wittgensteinian . . .) We also know that some of the things we think about are in physical space, and some are not. So . . . rather than talk about what any of this has to do with existence, let's talk about the joint-carving concepts themselves. Maybe, if we get a good grasp on them, we'll go back and decide that "existence" is a good word to use for a present thought, but not for an absent one. Or the opposite. But starting now with a debate about what "existence" means is like looking through the wrong end of the telescope.

I've been thinking about this discussion, wanting to take it further. As I wrote in one of my posts in this thread:

Maybe I'll start a thread with lists of statements I consider metaphysical by my standard and ask people to describe how they fit into their own understanding of the term. — T Clark

I started to try to start on something like that when I remembered I had started a somewhat similar discussion four years ago. Here's the OP from that discussion--"The Metaphysics of Materialism." I've hidden it so it won't clutter up this post.



That discussion ended up being successful from my point of view, but I had to struggle to keep it from devolving into the usual arguments about what metaphysics is and isn't. As I was rereading this I had an epiphany. The primary subject of the thread was not metaphysics, it was the enumeration of the underlying assumptions of pre-quantum mechanics physics. I could have raised that question without ever mentioning metaphysics at all. I've edited my OP to take out stuff that wasn't strictly needed to allow discussing the issues I was interested in. I don't think it's exactly the same thing, but in a sense I've drawn the joints of the discussion in different places.

So... I guess you were right. I've gone back and looked at some of my other comments and discussions on similar subjects. In some cases, I could have made them simpler and less open to confusion by focusing on the specific issue at hand and ignoring the broader metaphysical context.

But your list of "relationships, concepts, categories" et al. seems just as much a part of first-order ontology. — J

I don't think so. These are observer dependent, and limitless, while I would take "first order ontology" to be observer independent and finite. It is clear to me they don't exist on the same order of being.

Think of perspectives, relationships between subjects and objects. For instance, a man looks at a rock. There is one man, one rock, yet even geometrically there are infinite geometric perspectives the man can have of the rock. Then, perceptually :he man can see the rock one way sober, one way drunk, one way on LSD. There is no limit on the number of different psychedelic drugs that can be synthesized, each of which offers a unique perspective. There is no limit to the number of ways all the different sentient species, past, present, future, from earth or other planets, might perceive the rock. And all of this still doesn't begin to exhaust the space of every possible perspective that can be taken on the rock. Crucially, each and every of these perspectives is valid , none are garbage, none are privileged.

Concepts too are perspectives. They are the cognitive counterparts to perceptual perspectives. They are also limitless. There is no upper bound to the number of ways to think about, compare, categorize the rock. Even for the example of 'existence', if I were patient and creative enough I might be able to cover up with over a hundred variations. Creating concepts is a creative endeavor. Part of the artistry of it is to create concepts that are somehow aligned with the world, that "carve the joints". "Cow plus electron" doesn't cut it. But unlike butchering an animal there is no upper bound to the number of ways that this can be done.

I hope this demonstrates that concepts and perspectives are not ontologically primary, in the same way a heap of atoms is. And that coming up with a fixed, finite set of these everyone agrees on is hopeless endeavor.

Is this a fair criticism of sider? How might he respond?

As I was rereading this I had an epiphany. The primary subject of the thread was not metaphysics, it was the enumeration of the underlying assumptions of pre-quantum mechanics physics. I could have raised that question without ever mentioning metaphysics at all. — T Clark

Great insight.

in a sense I've drawn the joints of the discussion in different places. — T Clark

And the acid test would be: By drawing the joints this way, can you increase the substantivity of the discussion? Can you head off disputes about terminology? Seems so to me. Of course you never know what someone will find terminologically debatable.

So... I guess you were right. — T Clark

Yeah, but . . . "going Siderian" is not a panacea, as you and others have shown. I'd settle for the modest goal outlined above: Keep it substantive.

And speaking of acid tests . . .

perceptually the man can see the rock one way sober, one way drunk, one way on LSD. . . . There is no limit to the number of ways all the different sentient species, past, present, future, from earth or other planets, might perceive the rock. — hypericin

This is true.

Crucially, each and every one of these perspectives is valid , none are garbage, none are privileged. — hypericin

Not quite sure what you mean here. If we stipulate that each one legitimately occurred to the person concerned, then I guess they're all valid in that sense: You can be mistaken about what an illusion represents, but not about the fact that you're experiencing something.

Concepts too are perspectives. They are the cognitive counterparts to perceptual perspectives. They are also limitless. There is no upper bound to the number of ways to think about, compare, categorize the rock. — hypericin

OK, interesting analogy.

Creating concepts is a creative endeavor. Part of the artistry of it is to create concepts that are somehow aligned with the world, that "carve the joints". "Cow plus electron" doesn't cut it. — hypericin

I agree with this, and here's where the analogy with perception is especially helpful. The myriad perceptions (or illusions of perception) that you mention may be valid in the sense I used, but not in the sense that they are "aligned with the world." A mirage is when you see something that isn't there. And Sider's "bred and rue" people are, according to him, thinking something that isn't there. More precisely, they can think an infinite number of true things about the concepts they've invoked but still be missing a crucial piece of ontological structure, a piece which -- and here it gets controversial -- is really there.

So back to the first-order ontology question:

"relationships, concepts, categories" et al. seems just as much a part of first-order ontology.
— J

I don't think so. These are observer dependent, and limitless, while I would take "first order ontology" to be observer independent and finite. It is clear to me they don't exist on the same order of being. — hypericin

concepts and perspectives are not ontologically primary, in the same way a heap of atoms is. — hypericin

I'll take a dose of my own medicine and withdraw the term "first-order ontology"! We're now hyper-alert to what could happen next, if I don't: We'd launch into a debate about how to use the term, or even worse, the term "ontology" itself.

Instead, I'll just say that you're right, concepts and perspectives look to be observer-dependent. In two senses: They differ depending on individual (or intersubjective) perspectives, and there wouldn't be any if there weren't any subjects to have them. Are there are also things that are observer-independent? You're using "a heap of atoms" in much the same way that Sider uses "sub-atomic particles" to represent a "thin ontology" of very basic physical items. I'm not sure what to say about that. Can we even have gluons without concepts, which we've agreed must be observer-dependent? Does "observer-dependent vs. independent" carve at the joints? That's a complicated issue, but at least we can try to keep it substantive by focusing on the different ways in which phenomena may or may not require constitutive construction by consciousness.

coming up with a fixed, finite set of these everyone agrees on is hopeless endeavor. — hypericin

Maybe so, in philosophy. But let's not forget the leopard I brought up a while back. Biological taxonomy is a good example of doing precisely this; we have a fixed set of concepts that everyone (who knows the science) agrees on. Where it's fuzzy at the edges, work needs to be done, but the overall shape of the project is accepted, I think.

Is this a fair criticism of Sider? How might he respond? — hypericin

He might say, "Well, if we can't enter the metaphysics room and find more precise terms that correspond to the right reference magnets . . . so much the worse for ordinary-language philosophy." But I think he'd be pleased that you see his point about "aligning with the world." This is where I have the most questions, but Sider has sharpened the issue in a very helpful way. And he too admits that "it's highly unclear what exactly the 'right sort' of basis is" for making decisions about what is explanatorily fundamental, i.e., ontologically primary.

As for first-order ontology, if we want to go back to that term, Sider says, "Ontological realism [is the view that] ontological questions are 'deep', 'about the world rather than language'." And he adds, "It is consistent with all positions on first-order ontology." This is a pretty broad understanding. I think he means to include the position that there are no fundamental structures that are observer-independent, though he doesn't agree with it. But it is, after all, a standard position on first-order ontology.

Not quite sure what you mean here. If we stipulate that each one legitimately occurred to the person concerned, then I guess they're all valid in that sense: You can be mistaken about what an illusion represents, but not about the fact that you're experiencing something. — J

You are missing something important here. Perhaps I shouldn't have mentioned LSD, but now that I did, the Hollywood trope that LSD induces hallucinations is wildly inaccurate. Pink elephants are very rare, if they ever truly occur, and would require truly heroic doses. Far more common are alterations in perception, and especially thinking. Not mere illusion. Leaving LSD aside (drugs and philosophy is a huge topic, very worthy of an op), it is clear that the way a bat sees the world is no illusion. It is a way of seeing, coequal with the way we see. And there are infinite valid ways of seeing, as there are infinite potential (and vast actual) neural architectures .

The myriad perceptions (or illusions of perception) that you mention may be valid in the sense I used, but not in the sense that they are "aligned with the world." — J

And so now I hope we can agree, while there are infinite ways of seeing that are misaligned with the world, there are also infinite ways of seeing that are in fact aligned. "One true way" is just naive realism. Once naivhe realism is discarded, one realizes that the way we see the world is a construction, one that is aligned with the world in the relevant ways. But there are boundless ways of building such a construction.

Can we even have gluons without concepts, which we've agreed must be observer-dependent? — J

I think we can. It is fanciful to say that gluons sprang into existence when they were discovered. Of course, we cannot cognitively access gluons without the concept of gluons. And, the concept of gluons can certainly fail to "carve to the joints" of the reality.

I'm beginning to suspect that "thin ontology" is just science. The examples you've shown conform to this. Could Sider be mistaking philosophy for science? I'm thinking of a view where "First order ontology" (not to argue the term, just to suggest the idea) is science: that which can be said independently of any observer. "Second order ontology" is the world of subjectivity, the world we actually inhabit (as @Wayfarer loves to point out): the world of subjective perspectives. This is the world of of inexhaustibly many valid "ways of seeing". The "book of the world" is science. There might be one grand unified theory, one way of describing the objective world that perfectly carves to the joints of the objective world. Whereas, philosophy straddles first and second order ontologies. It is about the real world, but a world that includes subjectivity and perspectives, and itself constructs perspectives upon that subjective-inclusive world. As such, there can never be a single philosophical "book of the world".

Maybe so, in philosophy. But let's not forget the leopard I brought up a while back. Biological taxonomy is a good example of doing precisely this; we have a fixed set of concepts that everyone (who knows the science) agrees on. Where it's fuzzy at the edges, work needs to be done, but the overall shape of the project is accepted, I think. — J

I actually think this is a horrible example, biology is so messy. It completely defines easy categorization. The ones we have are as much convention as anything. They try to carve to the joints, but only as best as they can, the reality is just too complex. What is a species really? Is it a population that can interbreed? Then what about asexual species? Hybridization? Non-transitive breeding? (A <-> B, B <-> C, but not A <-> C). Horizonal gene transfer in bacteria? When you move up from species, it just gets worse and more arbitrary. Even the category of life itself is problematic, and more so than just viruses (prions, mitochondria, artificial life...)

Whereas, philosophy straddles first and second order ontologies. It is about the real world, but a world that includes subjectivity and perspectives, and itself constructs perspectives upon that subjective-inclusive world. As such, there can never be a single philosophical "book of the world". — hypericin

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