So a relativist has a conundrum -- how to make an argument against foundationalism without making a universal or truth-based claim? — L'éléphant

A very cogent post. :up:

I think we are just as hard-wired not to care as any out-group or disparaged tribe will demonstrate — Tom Storm

One could say we’re hard-wired to care whether things make sense to us. If we can’t make sense of out-groups, then that care takes the form of threat, the drive for self-protection and the circling of the wagons around our in-group.

Hmm, you think so? It seems to me a threat has to exist for us to note one. Albeit, this could be memorial threat rather than imminent and so sometimes it'll be erroneous.

I think outgroups function fine when they stay apart from yours. I, personally, have absolutely no issue with voluntary social segregation along cultural lines - I'm fairly sure any form of Islam which is anything but mild is fairly incompatible with a free and open society - so too is full religious right-wing Christianity.

I just don't know how to create a central control mechanism like a federal govt without favouring different groups in ways that suck.

Thanks. Yes, there often seems to be a default fear or suspicion of people or things we don’t understand.

So If i were to for instance attempt to stop someone harming my child, it's not because I think its right, its because I, personally, don't want that to happen because it'll make me feel bad. — AmadeusD

That strikes me as a mischaracterization of the situation. If I saw someone about to harm my child, my implicit response would not be "this will make me feel bad, and I prefer not to feel bad, therefore I'll intervene". Rather, feeling bad would be a response to the perceived worth of my child and the destructiveness of the harm. If my only motivation were only to avoid bad feelings then I would have to regard sedating myself as morally equivalent to protecting my child. But I don't because I judge the child's well-being to be objectively worthwhile and the harm to be truly wrong. That's why I might be willing to risk immense suffering or even death in order to protect them. You're taking a complex cognitive assessment and trying to reduce it to pure emotion.

Emotivism can't adjudicate between competing moral positions. No morality rightly can, because it cannot appeal to anything but itself (the theory, that is - and here, ignoring revelation-type morality as there's no mystery there). The only positions, as I see it, that can adjudicate between conflicting moral positions on a given case is are 'from without' positions such as the Law attempts to take. I still don't think there's a better backing than 'most will agree' for a moral proclamation. — AmadeusD

This proposal seems self-defeating. When you claim that no moral adjudication Is possible you are making a judgement, claiming it is more reasonable than alternatives, and implicitly inviting others to accept it. This already presupposes a commitment to the bindingness of certain norms of rationality, such as that we should consider all positions, understand them accurately and weigh the arguments for and against them. If you truly thought that normativity is reducible to emotion there'd be no point in coming to a philosophy forum to engage in complex arguments in support of anything at all.

I think good objections are being made to your positions. I realize I still have to reply to your post <here>, where you elaborate on this idea:

So If i were to for instance attempt to stop someone harming my child, it's not because I think its right, its because I, personally, don't want that to happen because it'll make me feel bad. — AmadeusD

For example:

No, no. It is narcissistic: I care to not feel like i violated my own moral principle. That's it. That's where it ends. — AmadeusD

There is circularity here: "My morality is based on my feelings; and I respect others' rights because I don't want to feel as if I violated my morality." If "violating morality" is just the same as a bad feeling, then it doesn't really make sense to talk about not wanting to feel as if you violated your morality. You could tidy that up, but I think is right. It is a kind of mischaracterization of the situation (and your verbiage betrays this).

Another way to see this is to ask yourself why you respect some putative rights and do not respect others. Is it really just a matter of your feelings? If that were so then you wouldn't be able to give an account of why you respect some rights rather than others (other than a non-rational appeal to your feelings or emotions). But I doubt the situation is as opaque as that. In fact if you give me an example of a putative right that you accept and a putative right you reject, I'll bet I could explain why in a way that is rational and not merely an appeal to emotion.

People experience empathy very differently. — Tom Storm

Nevertheless, they are empathetic.

But for me, morality is a social phenomenon: it concerns how we behave toward one another, so some account of shared value has to enter the picture. — Tom Storm

If it is a social phenomenon then based on what, if not how we dispose ourselves and express our feelings? The shared account is an expression of collective empathy. Someone not concerned about people being punched in the face has probably never seen anyone be punched in the face.

Experience hardens or softens 'feelings'. Reason helps us shape this experience into a more sceptical and open framework when assessing 'right' from 'wrong'.

At root I believe the whoel confusion lies in the conflicting uses of 'ought' in the epistemic, moral and logical senses of the term. These seems to be repeatedly consumed and spat out by each by many people trying to hold to a rigid line of thought.

I can’t get a fix on what point you’re making about empathy and what exactly it tells us about morality.

In the sense that we are viewing morality as simply 'preference' ('boo!' or 'yay!') empathy is what extends the 'boo!' or 'yay!' to others. This sets up the framework for what we commonly call 'morality' but morality is still just preferences not some objective framework. It may appear as objective because these kinds of frameworks have allowed humasn to function more effectively as social units.

Yes, that is close to a view I’ve held. One might say that some forms of empathy, when they are shared, amount to an intersubjective agreement that can look like objectivity if not examined closely.

@AmadeusD please see below for my response to Janus:

It doesn't have to be a universal claim, but merely an observation that no one has been able to present a universal truth, such that the unbiased would be rationally compelled to accept it. The closest we can get, in my view is the empirical observation that things like murder, rape, theft, devious deception and exploitation are despised by most people across cultures. The only caveat being that those things may be not universally disapproved of if they are done to the "enemy" or even anyone who is seen as "other". — Janus

I'm not sure we are on the same page as far as the meaning of universal moral truths. The working definition of 'universal', as I am using it, is that it is objective and timeless and its weight is measured as true or false. They're moral principles that are not restricted by culture, period, or societal values.

That said, I have explained that moral relativists -- which is what you're describing -- cannot then make a claim (someone else mentioned this @Esse Quam Videri) or a judgment (which, in philosophy is actually a proposition or assertion) that "there is no universal moral truth, only disapproval of despicable acts by most people across cultures" because this claim is an assertion, thereby contradicting their own principle.

Essentially you are making an assertion, the value of which is measured by the truth or falsity of your belief. That is why it is self-contradictory.

So, I think that any foundation which is not simply based on the idea that to harm others is bad and to help others is good, per se, is doomed to relativism, since those dispositions are in rational pragmatic alignment with social needs and they also align with common feeling, and also simply because people don't universally, or even generally, accept any other foundation such as God as lawgiver, or Karmic penalties for moral transgressions or whatever else you can think of. — Janus

We can't combine 'foundation' with relativism by virtue of relativism's subjective stance on harm, for example. Relativism denies the objective moral truth.

Foundationalism, on the other hand, is, at its core, an epistemic principle whose theory is based on axioms and justification. (I've already given the philosophical definition of 'universal' above -- not to be confused with 'the general or majority of the population).

Anti-foundationalism isn’t the same as moral relativism. Relativism says what’s right or wrong depends entirely on culture or individual preference. Anti-foundationalism doesn’t make any claim about what is right or wrong; it only questions whether there are absolute, universal moral truths. It’s about how we justify moral claims, not about the content of those claims, so you can be anti-foundationalist without saying “anything goes.” — Tom Storm

Please see my post above in response to Janus as to why I disagree with your post.

In philosophy, the justification for any belief-- moral, scientific, or metaphysical-- is a warranted reason (not emotions or feelings) given in a claim or assertion. It is objective.

You said: Relativism says what’s right or wrong depends entirely on culture or individual preference..
This is a claim (see the epistemic meaning of a claim or assertion), which the relativist cannot make because it is self-contradictory.

You said: Relativism says what’s right or wrong depends entirely on culture or individual preference..
This is a claim (see the epistemic meaning of a claim or assertion), which the relativist cannot make because it is self-contradictory. — L'éléphant

Not sure why we’re talking about relativism or what it can or cannot say. We’ve already discussed the well-established relativist fallacy in this thread and dealt with it, I do not disagree with it.

I’ve been trying to explore anti-foundationalism.

So a relativist has a conundrum -- how to make an argument against foundationalism without making a universal or truth-based claim? — L'éléphant

Not necessarily.
It is often argued that any foundationalism leads inevitably to an infinite regress - what are the foundations of the foundations?
Or it might be simply based on a critique of the foundationalist's argument. (Somewhat as the arguments against the existence of God are often based on a critique of the arguments for God's existence.)

Foundationalism, on the other hand, is, at its core, an epistemic principle whose theory is based on axioms and justification. — L'éléphant

If the epistemic principle is truth-based, it will not justify any moral principles. If it is value-based, it will beg the question.
Axioms are a weak foundation for any assertion. Euclid's axioms allow him to demonstrate geometrical truths, but only if they are true. Different axioms, different "truths". To put it another Euclid's theorems are only true relative to his axioms. Or do you think that there are some self-evidently true moral axioms?

Not sure why we’re talking about relativism or what it can or cannot say. We’ve already discussed the well-established relativist fallacy in this thread and dealt with it, I do not disagree with it. — Tom Storm

A few people on the forum still seem to be defending various forms of relativism, which is why this response keeps resurfacing.

I’ve been trying to explore anti-foundationalism. — Tom Storm

To answer the question you raised in the OP, yes, I would say it is possible to make moral claims from an anti-foundationalist position provided that "anti-foundationalist" means rejecting metaphysical or axiomatic starting points, rather than rejecting normativity or objectivity itself. I would argue that a moral claim is simply an affirmation or denial of value that one is prepared to be wrong about, in contrast to other moral utterances that merely express feelings, preferences, loyalties, power moves, identity markers, etc. Given this definition, the making of moral claims does not seem to be incompatible with the rejection of axiomatic moral foundations, and implies fallibilism rather than nihilism with regard to moral truth.

I would argue that a moral claim is simply an affirmation or denial of value that one is prepared to be wrong about, in contrast to other moral utterances that merely express feelings, preferences, loyalties, power moves, identity markers, etc. Given this definition, the making of moral claims does not seem to be incompatible with the rejection of axiomatic moral foundations, and results in fallibilism rather than nihilism with regard to moral truth — Esse Quam Videri

Fallibilism, being prepared to be wrong, does of course require a normative framework within which the criteria of moral correctness are intelligible. Anti-foundationalism doesnt deny such normative foundations for our preferences, values and claims, it denies that there is some meta-foundation for fallibilism beyond contingent normative communities. Fallibilism functions within particular normative communities, not between or beyond them.

Anti-foundationalism doesnt deny such normative foundations for our preferences, values and claims, it denies that there some meta-foundation for fallibilism beyond contingent normative communities. Fallibilism functions within particular normative communities, not between or beyond them. — Joshs

I don't think anti-foundationalism has to deny trans-community fallibilism. Personally, I'd argue that such denial fails to account for the fact that we do judge communities to be morally mistaken and traditions to be ethically distorted, and we do speak meaningfully of moral progress against communal consensus. Fallibilism is socially mediated, but not socially grounded.

we do judge communities to be morally mistaken and traditions to be ethically distorted, and we do speak meaningfully of moral progress against communal consensus. Fallibilism is socially mediated, but not socially grounded. — Esse Quam Videri

Is this ‘we’ actually speaking from some transcultural vantage, a view from nowhere? Or do we merely convince ourselves we are, donning the grab of sovereign authority while demanding conformity to our own particularized perspective on what is ethically right and true?

Not a view from nowhere, just an adherence to the norms that are implicit in the act of judging anything to be correct or incorrect.

I would argue that a moral claim is simply an affirmation or denial of value that one is prepared to be wrong about, — Esse Quam Videri

Prepared to be wrong? But isn't this antithetical to antifoundationalism as it seems to presuppose a foundational standard of correctness.

Personally, I'd argue that such denial fails to account for the fact that we do judge communities to be morally mistaken and traditions to be ethically distorted, and we do speak meaningfully of moral progress against communal consensus. Fallibilism is socially mediated, but not socially grounded. — Esse Quam Videri

I think you’re saying that we may assess other communities from a position of our intersubjective values. One potential problem with this is that there are conservative and religious intersubjective communities that would see the present era (and perhaps our community) as a failure of moral progress. How do you determine which intersubjective community has the better case?

The working definition of 'universal', as I am using it, is that it is objective and timeless and its weight is measured as true or false. — L'éléphant

How could there be any such thing in a temporal world? In relation to moral thought the only universality I can imagine would be that most people cross-culturally hold certain things to be good and others evil.

Most people naturally think it is good to be good to "one's own" (as do other social animals). The difficulty, given the natural incapacity to instinctively or viscerally care for more than some rather small number of people, is to get people to expand there instinctive circle of care into a greater circle of intellectual care. But that is arguably what humanity needs if it is to survive.

That said, I have explained that moral relativists -- which is what you're describing -- cannot then make a claim (someone else mentioned this Esse Quam Videri) or a judgment (which, in philosophy is actually a proposition or assertion) that "there is no universal moral truth, only disapproval of despicable acts by most people across cultures" because this claim is an assertion, thereby contradicting their own principle. — L'éléphant

I am not describing moral relativism, because I think there is good emprical evidence that people generally, and cross-culturally, vale and dis-value the same things in regard to the significnat moral issues like murder, rape and so on.

And I'm not saying there is no universal moral truth, I am reducing the notion of universal moral truth to a more human and less rigid scale. I am making an empirical claim for more or less universal facts concerning what humans everywhere value and dis-value.

The "foundation" is not some god-given principle, but the generality of human moral feeling. It should be taken into account that some people are congenitally deficient in the ability to empathize, and others are unable to empathize or regulate their behaviors due to psychological trauma.

These conditions are not the norm, though, and would make it harder for one to possess a moral compass. It's hard know just what the percentage of the population such empathy-lacking people comprise, but it seems clear that it is not a healthy condition, and I see no reason why we should not think in terms of health since we do that with the body.

Predatory people in society are analogous to cancers in the body.