Suppose you see someone acting in a cruel way. Would you try to get them to stop, or not? — Leontiskos

I guess I’ve done so. I’ve taken animals from people who were cruel to them. I’ve thrown men out of bars for harassing women. I’ve broken up unfair fights. I’ve stopped police from hurting people a couple of times; a bit more risky. I've stopped men beating women. I've stopped bullies. Would I intervene if it were a bikie gang picking on a lone person? I’m not sure about that, but I would call the police.

I would say, however, that my interventions have been impulsive and were essentially responses to my emotional reaction to what I experienced. I wouldn’t expect everyone to do the same.

Not sure I fully understand this - are you saying that we all have an inbuilt awareness that needless harm and suffering are bad, and this functions as a basic starting point for morality? And that moral claims are justified when they express obligations that flow from that fact and when they guide us toward reducing needless harm? — Tom Storm

Yes, that's the gist.
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:up: It is a good formulation and I feel certain we've spoken of this a couple of times before.

I like what you say here. What do you think about relativism with respect to science? There is a kind of morality associated with it, not just in the sense that the proper application of science can be debated, but that the notion of scientific truth rests on valuative criteria. Some argue in the same breath that morals are culturally contingent and relative but that scientific objectivity is not. They can thus claim that some of Hitler’s views can at the same time be judged as morally relative but empirically incorrect. — Joshs

This is a complex topic, and I'm not sure I can give a comprehensive answer here. I've got a degree in sociology, so that's my bias here.

I think there are facts, but also that facts need to be represented somehow so that they become relevant, and that relevance always occurs within a worldview. For example, I think that there are facts about sex, and that a biologist can research them, but the theoretical categories depend on the questions we ask. The result is that to the degree that biological research is a social activity, sexual facts are pre-gendered.

I feel "objectivity" is a distraction technique: for example, different people have different heat tolerance, so whether or not it's too hot in here is a matter of individual judgment. But we can distract ourselves with a thermometer, and we can then structure social conflict around the numbers provided by the device; i.e. you already have a built-in expectation of what counts as cold/warm/hot and you have habituated ways of dealing with this.

As such, objectivity's going to be easier in scienceses that are "remote" in some way from human activity (physics -> biology -> sociology as an example). You can never fully rule out bias, though.

It's probably best treated on a case-by-case basis (and in a lot of cases I don't have enough qualification to make a call).

I guess I’ve done so. I’ve taken animals from people who were cruel to them. I’ve thrown men out of bars for harassing women. I’ve broken up unfair fights. I’ve stopped police from hurting people a couple of times; a bit more risky. I've stopped men beating women. I've stopped bullies. Would I intervene if it were a bikie gang picking on a lone person? I’m not sure about that, but I would call the police. — Tom Storm

Okay, great. And note that when I say "intervene," coercion is not even necessary. To simply reason with someone or ask them to stop or even distract them would also count as intervention.

I would say, however, that my interventions have been impulsive and were essentially responses to my emotional reaction to what I experienced. — Tom Storm

Would you then say that your interventions were irrational? That your morality does not provide any grounds for intervention, and that by intervening you acted irrationally?

Would you then say that your interventions were irrational? That your morality does not provide any grounds for intervention, and that by intervening you acted irrationally? — Leontiskos

I'm not sure I would dignify my interventions as a reasoned moral position. More of a response to an emotional reaction. In some cases, also dangerous. But the broader question as to whether I consider the acts I responded to as wrong is probably yes. The foundation for this is tricky, I suppose I’ve generally drawn from a naturalistic view that the well-being of conscious creatures should guide our actions.

I'm not sure I would dignify my interventions as a reasoned moral position. More of a response to an emotional reaction. — Tom Storm

Okay, but do you see how this is a bit like the insanity defense? When a judge calls someone to account for their actions they might say, "I was insane, I was not in my right mind. I cannot be held to account for my actions." When asked whether one's actions were justifiable this is a bit of a cop-out (unless there was true insanity or loss of control involved).

But the broader question as to whether I consider the acts I responded to as wrong is probably yes. The foundation for this is tricky, I suppose I’ve generally drawn from a naturalistic view that the well-being of conscious creatures should guide our actions. — Tom Storm

Okay, but do you see how you've moved beyond the sort of consent-based moralities we were talking about earlier? You've basically forced someone to do something that they do not want to do, and which is contrary to their "perspective." So earlier when you said, "I understand that not everyone shares such a perspective or sees cruelty or suffering in the same way," you apparently could not have meant by this that you are willing to allow other people to entertain and act upon their own perspectives. In the cases you outlined your perspective trumps theirs, and you coerce them contrary to their perspective. So it seems that you do think there are moral truths that apply to other people whether they want them to or not, given that you literally enforce those truths on others' behavior.

All fair points. I'm not sure what I think. That's partly why I'm here.

Okay, but do you see how this is a bit like the insanity defense? When a judge calls someone to account for their actions they might say, "I was insane, I was not in my right mind. I cannot be held to account for my actions. — Leontiskos

Sure, I have no defence.

So it seems that you do think there are moral truths that apply to other people whether they want them to or not, given that you literally enforce those truths on others' behavior. — Leontiskos

It has always seemed self-evident that one ought not allow the strong to harm the weak. But perhaps I should never have intervened, and in future, perhaps I won’t.

I find the account of moral naturalism fairly convincing, and I suspect that, if they reflected on it, many secular people would intuitively base their morality in a similar way.

If I have time I'll think about it some more but I'm not sure I have much left to say on this. I appreciate your patience and rigour.