Suppose you see someone acting in a cruel way. Would you try to get them to stop, or not? — Leontiskos

I guess I’ve done so. I’ve taken animals from people who were cruel to them. I’ve thrown men out of bars for harassing women. I’ve broken up unfair fights. I’ve stopped police from hurting people a couple of times; a bit more risky. I've stopped men beating women. I've stopped bullies. Would I intervene if it were a bikie gang picking on a lone person? I’m not sure about that, but I would call the police.

I would say, however, that my interventions have been impulsive and were essentially responses to my emotional reaction to what I experienced. I wouldn’t expect everyone to do the same.

Not sure I fully understand this - are you saying that we all have an inbuilt awareness that needless harm and suffering are bad, and this functions as a basic starting point for morality? And that moral claims are justified when they express obligations that flow from that fact and when they guide us toward reducing needless harm? — Tom Storm

Yes, that's the gist.
.

:up: It is a good formulation and I feel certain we've spoken of this a couple of times before.

I like what you say here. What do you think about relativism with respect to science? There is a kind of morality associated with it, not just in the sense that the proper application of science can be debated, but that the notion of scientific truth rests on valuative criteria. Some argue in the same breath that morals are culturally contingent and relative but that scientific objectivity is not. They can thus claim that some of Hitler’s views can at the same time be judged as morally relative but empirically incorrect. — Joshs

This is a complex topic, and I'm not sure I can give a comprehensive answer here. I've got a degree in sociology, so that's my bias here.

I think there are facts, but also that facts need to be represented somehow so that they become relevant, and that relevance always occurs within a worldview. For example, I think that there are facts about sex, and that a biologist can research them, but the theoretical categories depend on the questions we ask. The result is that to the degree that biological research is a social activity, sexual facts are pre-gendered.

I feel "objectivity" is a distraction technique: for example, different people have different heat tolerance, so whether or not it's too hot in here is a matter of individual judgment. But we can distract ourselves with a thermometer, and we can then structure social conflict around the numbers provided by the device; i.e. you already have a built-in expectation of what counts as cold/warm/hot and you have habituated ways of dealing with this.

As such, objectivity's going to be easier in scienceses that are "remote" in some way from human activity (physics -> biology -> sociology as an example). You can never fully rule out bias, though.

It's probably best treated on a case-by-case basis (and in a lot of cases I don't have enough qualification to make a call).

I guess I’ve done so. I’ve taken animals from people who were cruel to them. I’ve thrown men out of bars for harassing women. I’ve broken up unfair fights. I’ve stopped police from hurting people a couple of times; a bit more risky. I've stopped men beating women. I've stopped bullies. Would I intervene if it were a bikie gang picking on a lone person? I’m not sure about that, but I would call the police. — Tom Storm

Okay, great. And note that when I say "intervene," coercion is not even necessary. To simply reason with someone or ask them to stop or even distract them would also count as intervention.

I would say, however, that my interventions have been impulsive and were essentially responses to my emotional reaction to what I experienced. — Tom Storm

Would you then say that your interventions were irrational? That your morality does not provide any grounds for intervention, and that by intervening you acted irrationally?

Would you then say that your interventions were irrational? That your morality does not provide any grounds for intervention, and that by intervening you acted irrationally? — Leontiskos

I'm not sure I would dignify my interventions as a reasoned moral position. More of a response to an emotional reaction. In some cases, also dangerous. But the broader question as to whether I consider the acts I responded to as wrong is probably yes. The foundation for this is tricky, I suppose I’ve generally drawn from a naturalistic view that the well-being of conscious creatures should guide our actions.

I'm not sure I would dignify my interventions as a reasoned moral position. More of a response to an emotional reaction. — Tom Storm

Okay, but do you see how this is a bit like the insanity defense? When a judge calls someone to account for their actions they might say, "I was insane, I was not in my right mind. I cannot be held to account for my actions." When asked whether one's actions were justifiable this is a bit of a cop-out (unless there was true insanity or loss of control involved).

But the broader question as to whether I consider the acts I responded to as wrong is probably yes. The foundation for this is tricky, I suppose I’ve generally drawn from a naturalistic view that the well-being of conscious creatures should guide our actions. — Tom Storm

Okay, but do you see how you've moved beyond the sort of consent-based moralities we were talking about earlier? You've basically forced someone to do something that they do not want to do, and which is contrary to their "perspective." So earlier when you said, "I understand that not everyone shares such a perspective or sees cruelty or suffering in the same way," you apparently could not have meant by this that you are willing to allow other people to entertain and act upon their own perspectives. In the cases you outlined your perspective trumps theirs, and you coerce them contrary to their perspective. So it seems that you do think there are moral truths that apply to other people whether they want them to or not, given that you literally enforce those truths on others' behavior.

All fair points. I'm not sure what I think. That's partly why I'm here.

Okay, but do you see how this is a bit like the insanity defense? When a judge calls someone to account for their actions they might say, "I was insane, I was not in my right mind. I cannot be held to account for my actions. — Leontiskos

Sure, I have no defence.

So it seems that you do think there are moral truths that apply to other people whether they want them to or not, given that you literally enforce those truths on others' behavior. — Leontiskos

It has always seemed self-evident that one ought not allow the strong to harm the weak. But perhaps I should never have intervened, and in future, perhaps I won’t.

I find the account of moral naturalism fairly convincing, and I suspect that, if they reflected on it, many secular people would intuitively base their morality in a similar way.

If I have time I'll think about it some more but I'm not sure I have much left to say on this. I appreciate your patience and rigour.

It has always seemed self-evident that one ought not allow the strong to harm the weak. But perhaps I should never have intervened, and in future, perhaps I won’t. — Tom Storm

Okay, and as long as you see the point of my objection I am content. If one ought not allow the strong to harm the weak then a consent-based morality is insufficient; and if one were to hold a consent-based morality then they would have to allow the strong to harm the weak (unless the strong somehow consented to being stopped, which they surely would not).

I find the account of moral naturalism fairly convincing, and I suspect that, if they reflected on it, many secular people would intuitively base their morality in a similar way. — Tom Storm

Yes, I have no per se objection to "moral naturalism" or that specific form of negative utilitarianism (although I would tend to go further myself).

If I have time I'll think about it some more but I'm not sure I have much left to say on this. I appreciate your patience and rigour. — Tom Storm

Well I appreciate your seeing the point. In general what I've laid out is what irks me about those who hold to subjectivist or consent-based moralities when these same people engage in forms of moralizing that necessarily go beyond their own positions. The difficulty is that when I make a moral claim that they don't like they will appeal to moral subjectivism in order to oppose my claim; but then when they want to champion some moral cause and fault others for not joining in, they immediately forget all about their moral subjectivism. It's that double standard that is problematic: holding others to a standard that one dispenses with oneself whenever it is convenient to do so.

Well I appreciate your seeing the point. In general what I've laid out is what irks me about those who hold to subjectivist or consent-based moralities when these same people engage in forms of moralizing that necessarily go beyond their own positions — Leontiskos

I can see that.

It's that double standard that is problematic: holding others to a standard that one dispenses with oneself whenever it is convenient to do so. — Leontiskos

A point well made.

Yes, I have no per se objection to "moral naturalism" or that specific form of negative utilitarianism (although I would tend to go further myself). — Leontiskos

And I found this part of the conversation useful. Thanks again.

- Thanks, I thought it was a good conversation as well. :up:

Thanks for the good faith exchange. Well done.

What I am interested in here is whether it is possible to make moral claims from either (relativist or anti-foundationalist) position. I can certainly see how simple relativism makes it a performative contradiction. Hence the relativist fallacy.

Anti-foundationalists, by contrast, hold that we can still justify our views through shared practices, shared goals and reasoning, even if there’s no single universal truth to ground them. — Tom Storm

Where does this leave the original question? It seems there remains an inconsistency, or something left incomplete, when asserting there can be “shared practices” and “inbuilt awareness that needless harm and suffering are bad” or “moral naturalism”, while also maintaining aversions to beliefs in a “single universal truth.”

Is it possible to grapple morality away objective truth and universal oughts?

I do not think so. In another thread I pointed out that 180s suggesting that there are in-built moral ground rules is not tenable. That is simply not what we see when we look around the world.

Of course, you can make the argument that religion did this. I think that's reductive and probably not very well supported.

Where does this leave the original question? — Fire Ologist

I think Joshs answered it on page 1. Part of his answer:

What unites these figures is that they reject foundationalism, the idea that morality needs an ahistorical, metaphysically secure ground, while also rejecting the relativist conclusion that norms are therefore merely subjective or interchangeable. The label “relativism” is typically applied by critics who assume that if universal foundations are unavailable, then only relativism remains. But these thinkers reject that forced choice. They are trying to articulate forms of normativity that are historical, situated, and contingent without collapsing into “anything goes.” — Joshs

I remain sympathetic to this view and would like to learn more. But I’m not a philosopher, so morality for me amounts to pragmatically identifying the kinds of behaviour I want to see, or not see, in my culture, based on a view of what promotes wellbeing. I think this is generally how morality operates, except where people follow more rigid, proscriptive belief systems.

Ultimately, if you have the tools, you can construct an argument to ground morality in natural ethics, religious ethics, pragmatic ethics, anti-foundationalism, whatever you like. What others think about these options will largely depend on their worldview.

Where does this leave the original question? It seems there remains an inconsistency, or something left incomplete, when asserting there can be “shared practices” and “inbuilt awareness that needless harm and suffering are bad” or “moral naturalism”, while also maintaining aversions to beliefs in a “single universal truth.” — Fire Ologist

Yeah, I think it's a good observation.

For example, if is constrained to maintain , "one ought not allow the strong to harm the weak," then it would seem that he is committed to the universal (moral) truth, "One ought not allow the strong to harm the weak." This idea of, "My morality does not require universal truths," does not seem to hold up.

180s suggesting that there are in-built moral ground rules is not tenable. — AmadeusD

This is not a position I hold or have ever proposed; I agree that any form of innatism "is not tenable". My response to @Tom Storm's OP is found here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/1029785

Yes, you’ve made that point already. I can definitely see the argument. I’m tempted to pose what if no one really has a foundation for morality, some just think they do and therefore believe their views are grounded?

But part of me also wonders: if Leon is right, does it really change anything? All it means is that I can’t argue meaningfully with certain members on a philosophy forum because they’ll probably claim my position fails a test of reasoning.

What really matters is the world. I can still vote, belong to organizations, and support values and promote alliances based on my view of what constitutes a better way of organizing society. Do I need any more than this?

Our society is a messy clusterfuck of pluralism, competing values, and beliefs. It seems that all we can really do is argue for the positions we find meaningful.

Thoughts?

Our society is a messy clusterfuck of pluralism, competing values, and beliefs. It seems that all we can really do is argue for the positions we find meaningful. — Tom Storm

I don't believe morality is a matter of "positions" at all, but of a compass based on the ability to empathize with others. To harm others is undesirable and hence bad because it feels undesirable and hence bad to many or even most people. The other point is that a community is inherently based on mutual respect and care. The fact that some people lack such empathy-based respect and care means that they are, if they don't conceal their disposition, considered to be sociopaths, and sociopathy is generally considered to be a condition of mental illness or incapacity to function in a way compatible with pragmatically necessary social values.

It really seems analogous to a cancer cell in the body of an organism. Is anyone seriously going to think that cancer is a good thing?

forms of normativity that are historical, situated, and contingent without collapsing into “anything goes” — Joshs

what promotes wellbeing — Tom Storm

So to my mind, “forms of normativity” and “what promotes wellbeing” serve as placeholders for objective, universal, natural foundations for moral truths. But I think you might agree with this.

I’m tempted to say that no one really has a foundation for morality, some just think they do and therefore believe their views are grounded. — Tom Storm

Yes, so instead of saying morality requires fixed foundations and authority (which is where I am headed), you seem more inclined to admit fixed laws are hard to come by, and maybe impossible to come by, so “no one really has a foundation for morality.”

I think that is right. That is what morality is about. Maybe Nietzsche was right and we need to move “beyond good and evil.” So your question and intuitions are valid.

What really matters is the world. I can still vote, belong to organizations, and support values based on my own view of what constitutes a better way of organizing society. Do I need any more than this?

Our society is a messy clusterfuck of pluralism, competing values, and beliefs. All we can really do is argue for the positions we find meaningful — Tom Storm

I get what you are saying. I just think this is a retreat from the can of worms you opened up.

Morality doesn’t begin, to me, until there are at least two people interacting, and a law or other (objective) source of authority to which both people are subject. Morality is the objective umbrella under which human interactions can be judged. Together, under their law, we enter a moral life. If we lose the objective moral law, or say the law will shift and change (so no real law), I don’t think anyone can really argue positions meaningfully. We each become locked in our own subjective positions with no means to show others why our stance is the only good stance, or the morally better stance. We can convince ourselves if we want that our own position is the better one, but faced with someone else who disagrees and calls us bad, there is no common ground or foundation upon which the two in disagreement can appeal and adjudicate right from wrong. And however we work through such a disagreement (force, utility, avoidance), there is no reason to call this working things out moral. It’s practical at that point, or just will and power, and non-moral.

It’s like this: checkers involves a certain checkerboard, and pieces that distinguish two players (red and black typically) and certain rules. If someone removes entirely one of these things, and suggests some other game, that’s fine, but it’s no longer checkers. I get that morality has way more at stake (to us) than a game of checkers, but I don’t see how we can tell anyone else “that is wrong” or “he is bad” meaningfully, absent something objective they both stand under.

So to me, we can’t avoid playing the morality game, so we are all forced to figure out the rules. But if we don’t admit this, and do not subject ourselves and others to the exact same rules, we are just resisting the game we already play.

It sucks. We are blind, adrift at night in an ocean, groping for something solid and fixed. We can either keep groping for a shared port to remove our blindfolds, or just keep swimming. But if we choose to forget the port, like everything else in the ocean, no one can say they have the fixed, moral, good, true, objective, wellbeing-promoting certain position.

It really seems analogous to a cancer cell in the body of an organism. Is anyone seriously going to think that cancer is a good thing? — Janus

Good points. This is heading towards a position of moral naturalism, isn't it?

I get what you are saying. I just think this is a retreat from the can of worms you opened up. — Fire Ologist

To me most philosophy is a can of worms. :wink:

Yes, so instead of saying morality requires fixed foundations and authority (which is where I am headed), you seem more inclined to admit fixed laws are hard to come by, and maybe impossible to come by, so “no one really has a foundation for morality.”

I think that is right. That is what morality is about. Maybe Nietzsche was right and we need to move “beyond good and evil.” So your question and intuitions are valid. — Fire Ologist

It's one direction I lean towards. But I am unsure what I think.

It’s like this: checkers involves a certain checkerboard, and pieces that distinguish two players (red and black typically) and certain rules. If someone removes entirely one of these things, and suggests some other game, that’s fine, but it’s no longer checkers. I get that morality has way more at stake (to us) than a game of checkers, but I don’t see how we can tell anyone else “that is wrong” or “he is bad” meaningfully, absent something objective they both stand under. — Fire Ologist

That's great - I often make this point except I use chess as the analogue.

So to me, we can’t avoid playing the morality game, so we are all forced to figure out the rules. But if we don’t admit this, and do not subject ourselves and others to the exact same rules, we are just resisting the game we already play. — Fire Ologist

Yes.

Great post.

But part of me also wonders: if Leon is right, does it really change anything? All it means is that I can’t argue meaningfully with certain members on a philosophy forum because they’ll probably claim my position fails a test of reasoning.

What really matters is the world. I can still vote, belong to organizations, and support values and promote alliances based on my view of what constitutes a better way of organizing society. Do I need any more than this? — Tom Storm

I think what you've already recognized nullifies this sort of argument:

It has always seemed self-evident that one ought not allow the strong to harm the weak. But perhaps I should never have intervened, and in future, perhaps I won’t. — Tom Storm

"Perhaps I need to change my behavior." What I've done is pointed to a kind of inconsistency between your actions and your words. It follows that if you want to be a consistent person and you think what I've said is true, then you must change either your actions or your words. So it seems fairly clear that it does change something.

I’m tempted to pose what if no one really has a foundation for morality, some just think they do and therefore believe their views are grounded? — Tom Storm

Again, we are talking about you (and me). If you don't think you have a foundation for morality, then your behavior will change on that basis. No one says, "I don't have any foundation for my position but I am going to maintain it anyway."

It follows that if you want to be a consistent person and you think what I've said is true, then you must change either your actions or your words. So it seems fairly clear that it does change something. — Leontiskos

I understand your point but (and I'm not trying to be a dick here) I'm under no obligation to be consistent. My views on many things are inconsistent. I do concede that wilful inconsistency may exclude one from most reasoned arguments and discourse.

No one says, "I don't have any foundation for my position but I am going to maintain it anyway." — Leontiskos

Interesting. But it depends on what you mean by a foundation. I’ve met people who do something close to what you describe, and I’ve done it myself. I would put it like this: X is my belief about what is right, and I situate it within a contingent, revisable understanding of what seems to work better for promoting wellbeing. It isn’t grounded in any ultimate moral foundation, but in practices, experiences, and judgments that remain open to challenge and change.

That said, I also like the idea that moral judgments may be grounded in natural facts about people. Humans experience suffering as bad, and conditions that reduce it tend to support wellbeing and social functioning. For that reason, reducing suffering counts as morally better.

One issue I have with this is that some people like suffering and the idea: "no pain, no gain" has some merit for any athlete or high achieving person who has to work hard and sacrifice many things (suffer) to achieve a goal. I guess the moral naturalist would qualify this by identifying unnecessary suffering and that which is not chosen. What are your challenges to moral naturalism?

I apologise that I didn't respond to your very thoughtful contribution. I must have missed it.

Slavery comes up because it was once practised within the arguing culture, and now no longer is. Slavery is brought up by the critic, because they know the relativist to be very likely to consider slavery wrong. And they think that's a gotcha, but by thinking that they demonstrate cultural relativism. The envisioned success of the rhetoric depends on the expected shared values. No?

Moral discourse is predictable to some degree. That is why you can always find some kind of "obviously wrong" thing to throw in the face of a relativist - to shut them up. — Dawnstorm

Yes, that’s true. The anti-foundationalist would probably say that things can still count as better or worse relative to shared cultural goals and values, without being grounded in anything transcendent or universal beyond that. We want safe traffic, so we create road rules. Many of these rules are partly arbitrary; we can drive on different sides of the road or adopt different turning conventions, but there are clearly practices that work better or worse for safety. None of this makes road rules objectively true independent of contingent human purposes and conditions. How different is morality to this?

I understand your point but (and I'm not trying to be a dick here) I'm under no obligation to be consistent. My views on many things are inconsistent. I do concede that wilful inconsistency may exclude one from most reasoned arguments and discourse. — Tom Storm

Right, one could say that there is no problem because they are happy to be inconsistent, or incoherent, or to have double standards, or to be hypocritical. I have only met one person who said such a thing, and they are inevitably on my ignore list (for obviously it isn't possible to talk to a person who flip-flops back and forth constantly without admitting it). Such a person will also end up with a malady like schizophrenia. But I grant that someone could embrace all of this, sure.

Interesting. But it depends on what you mean by a foundation. — Tom Storm

I mean basis, rationale, justification, grounding, etc. "I have no reason to maintain this position, but I am going to do it anyway."

I would put it like this: X is my belief about what is right, and I situate it within a contingent, revisable understanding of what seems to work better for promoting wellbeing. It isn’t grounded in any ultimate moral foundation... — Tom Storm

The foundation here is well-being, plain and simple. If one didn't have a foundation then they wouldn't be able to appeal to well-being as a reason for their position. Someone who says, "I hold X because it promotes well-being," is someone who grounds morality in well-being.

That said, I also like the idea that moral judgments may be grounded in natural facts about people. Humans experience suffering as bad, and conditions that reduce it tend to support wellbeing and social functioning. For that reason, reducing suffering counts as morally better. — Tom Storm

This is a foundation of "wellbeing and social functioning," which is very close to what you said just before it.

One issue I have with this is that some people like suffering and the idea: "no pain, no gain" has some merit for any athlete or high achieving person who has to work hard and sacrifice many things (suffer) to achieve a goal. I guess the moral naturalist would qualify this by identifying unnecessary suffering and that which is not chosen. — Tom Storm

A utilitarian will just do a short-term vs. long-term contrast and say that some short-term suffering reduces long-term suffering, and is thus preferable on the utilitarian calculus. Someone who champions well-being would say that well-being means more than not-suffering, and that well-being may involve suffering in certain ways.

What are your challenges to moral naturalism? — Tom Storm

First I would need to know your definition of moral naturalism.

Moral discourse is predictable to some degree. That is why you can always find some kind of "obviously wrong" thing to throw in the face of a relativist - to shut them up — Dawnstorm

Unfortunately, I think a required clarification, will defeat this in a significant way:

What relativist are you talking to? If you're talking to a 'standard' Western relativist, yes. It's usually difficult to get answers like in Sam Harris' oft-cited example challenging someone to accept as moral the idea that some foreign culture has a scripture which commands that ever third child is purposefully blinded in service of the faith.
Apparently, his interlocutor said "Then we could never say it was wrong". I am not as incredulous as Harris was, it seems. I understand this to be true, given that those people are not Western. It is wrong to us.

I'm an emotivist so I have to just observe these things - my moral thinking doesn't generally extend beyond my own mind and behaviour (Leon might have something to say here lol). But it seems to me that even being able to ask the question "What kind of relativist?" Or "where from?" defeats hte idea that there's a universal category of wrongs that ca be brought up to one in order to have them eat their hat, so to speak.

First I would need to know your definition of moral naturalism. — Leontiskos

I don’t have one.

My understanding is that it’s the view that moral facts, if they exist, are grounded in natural facts about the world rather than in anything supernatural or non-natural. But I have encountered a range of uses of the term.

I imagine that if you’re going to pick a goal for morality, like wellbeing or flourishing, moral naturalism woudl identify facts that support that choice. But does this start to look like a secular substitute for transcendent grounding?

I'm an emotivist so I have to just observe these things - my moral thinking doesn't generally extend beyond my own mind and behaviour ( — AmadeusD

So how would you go about arguing something is wrong or disagreeing with others about moral assessments?

Part of my interest in the issue is whether or not it’s worth discussing morality, although we can't seem to escape it.

A utilitarian will just do a short-term vs. long-term contrast and say that some short-term suffering reduces long-term suffering, and is thus preferable on the utilitarian calculus. — Leontiskos

That seems tedious.

Interesting. But it depends on what you mean by a foundation.
— Tom Storm

I mean basis, rationale, justification, grounding, etc. "I have no reason to maintain this position, but I am going to do it anyway." — Leontiskos

Ok. So I always assumed a foundation for morality meant something philosophically important, serious and disciplined or potentially transcendent in source. Can one not say that the foundation of my moral thinking is whatever gets me money? I’m assuming that a foundation need not involve beneficial concessions toward others?

I don't believe morality is a matter of "positions" at all, but of a compass based on the ability to empathize with others. To harm others is undesirable and hence bad because it feels undesirable and hence bad to many or even most people. The other point is that a community is inherently based on mutual respect and care. The fact that some people lack such empathy-based respect and care means that they are, if they don't conceal their disposition, considered to be sociopaths, and sociopathy is generally considered to be a condition of mental illness or incapacity to function in a way compatible with pragmatically necessary social values. — Janus

When I talk about positions, I mean (as one example) how one constructs the notion of human flourishing. I know a number of academics who are conservative. They are often steeped in Greek philosophy and hold the familiar Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia as the goal or telos of a good life. Yet they are also right-wing, Liberal voters who are happy to cut people off welfare and dismantle safety nets.

In my view, their positions would cause considerable harm to the powerless. And yet they and I both ostensibly hold that flourishing is the goal of a moral system. They think that society is enhanced if people's independence is promoted and vital to this is not subsidising sloth and inertia through welfare. I do not think they are sociopathic, they just hold a different worldview. And relative to my worldview they are mostly "wrong" on this.

We live in a pluralist culture where most people think their views are good and right. The best we can do amongst this mess of contradictions is select the views we endorse and try to promote or nurture them. Or opt out entirely, which is also tempting.

My understanding is that it’s the view that moral facts, if they exist, are grounded in natural facts about the world[humans, fauna & flora] rather than in anything supernatural or non-natural. — Tom Storm

:up:

[M]y moral thinking doesn't generally extend beyond my own mind and behaviour — AmadeusD

So in what sense is your "moral thinking" moral?

They are often steeped in Greek philosophy and hold the familiar Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia as the goal or telos of a good life. Yet they are also right-wing, Liberal voters who are happy to cut people off welfare and dismantle safety nets. — Tom Storm

Then they have a narrow view of flourishing as being relevant only to themselves.

In my view, their positions would cause considerable harm to the powerless. And yet they and I both ostensibly hold that flourishing is the goal of a moral system. They think that society is enhanced if people's independence is promoted and vital to this is not subsidising sloth and inertia through welfare. — Tom Storm

I don't believe it is as simple a matter as "not subsidizing sloth and inertia through social welfare". That seems to me like a self-serving rationalization of an essentially selfish attitude.

I do not think they are sociopathic, they just hold a different worldview. And relative to my worldview they are mostly "wrong" on this. — Tom Storm

OK, then we disagree on that. I think their attitude is simplistically self-serving and sociopathic. For me sociopathy is not an "all or nothing" proposition, but is on a spectrum.

We live in a pluralist culture where most people think their views are good and right. The best we can do amongst this mess of contradictions is select the views we endorse and try to promote or nurture them. Or opt out entirely, which is also tempting. — Tom Storm

I see so much wrong with the ways things are that I kind of have "opted out". I mean I don't get personally involved in helping the needy. If I had significant wealth I might, but I'm a lowly pensioner myself, and I have my own suite of interests and pursuits for which there is already not enough time. I do try my best to do no harm, and that's about as far as my concern with others who are not family or friends goes.

I support the idea of social welfare, free education and medical services and, most importantly, taxing the rich to a much greater degree than is presently happening. But no government seems to have the balls to do it. I see there is little I can do about that, other than express my opinion about it. You no doubt are much more directly involved in helping people than I am.

I don’t have one.

My understanding is that it’s the view that moral facts, if they exist, are grounded in natural facts about the world rather than in anything supernatural or non-natural. But I have encountered a range of uses of the term.

I imagine that if you’re going to pick a goal for morality, like wellbeing or flourishing, moral naturalism woudl identify facts that support that choice. But does this start to look like a secular substitute for transcendent grounding? — Tom Storm

The contemporary thinker I personally follow most closely is Peter L. P. Simpson, who defends what he calls "ethical naturalism," but it's hard to specify the contours of such a thing without getting into his book. Also, I don't think that level of detail is necessary in order to avoid the problem I've pointed to with regards to relativism. I think 180's approach does a fine job avoiding the problem I've raised in this thread.

Part of the issue here is that I don't think we ever did get back to your question about the is-ought objection. We could do that, but it would inevitably take us into the weeds a bit. Without getting into those weeds I would just say that most people with common sense are not troubled by the is-ought objection. Arguments like, "It will cause exceptional and avoidable suffering, therefore I should not do it," or, "This will contribute immensely to the wellbeing of me and everyone else, therefore it should be done," do not strike them as invalid inferences. There are some is-ought inferences which seem to be plainly valid.

That seems tedious. — Tom Storm

Maybe, but it's not fruitless. "Stop eating candy or you will ruin your dinner," is one example of prioritizing long-term pleasure over short-term pleasure, or a robust notion of well-being over mere pleasure-seeking. My issue with that utilitarian move isn't that it is incorrect in itself, but rather that it is hard to justify all of the well-accepted moral truths with that idea.

Ok. So I always assumed a foundation for morality meant something philosophically important, serious and disciplined or potentially transcendent in source. Can one not say that the foundation of my moral thinking is whatever gets me money? I’m assuming that a foundation need not involve beneficial concessions toward others? — Tom Storm

I think so. I admit that I didn't follow your conversation with Fire Ologist very closely, but I myself think well-being is a perfectly reasonable and defensible moral standard. When people want to argue for a more "transcendent" standard they are usually concerned with specific, rarefied moral truths or norms (e.g. "You should be willing to sacrifice your life for the good of your family if push comes to shove"). That's an interesting argument, but my objection in this thread is much more mundane and universally applicable.

Can one not say that the foundation of my moral thinking is whatever gets me money? I’m assuming that a foundation need not involve beneficial concessions toward others? — Tom Storm

I'm fine with that. I knew that I was talking to you, and I knew that you held to things like, "One ought not allow the strong to harm the weak." Obviously you need more than a money-aim to justify that sort of moral claim. Also, some might object that the person who acts out of avarice is not moral in the traditional sense of the word. I am happy to concede that, but I am also not as fussy about the word 'moral' as many others are. I think it is a matter of semantics whether we allow ends like avarice to be counted as moral ends.

Note, though, that the person who seeks money will have a harder time rationally justifying their position than the person who seeks well-being. This is because—as Aristotle points out—money is a means of exchange without intrinsic worth. If one does not seek money for the sake of the things that money can buy, but rather seeks money and the accumulation of money as an end in itself, then they would seem to be acting in an intrinsically irrational way. Put differently, you should be able to give someone everything money can buy and at that point they should have no real desire for money. If they still desire money at that point then they desire a means without an end, and are therefore irrational.

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When I talk about positions, I mean (as one example) how one constructs the notion of human flourishing. I know a number of academics who are conservative. They are often steeped in Greek philosophy and hold the familiar Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia as the goal or telos of a good life. Yet they are also right-wing, Liberal voters who are happy to cut people off welfare and dismantle safety nets. — Tom Storm

I think this is a good observation. You are obviously right that there are different moral positions and approaches. :up:

Or opt out entirely, which is also tempting. — Tom Storm

I would suggest that no one can opt-out entirely, except perhaps the hermit who abandons all civilization and lives self-sufficiently in the wilderness. Aristotle calls such a person a 'god' given that this is basically impossible to do. If we interact with other human beings then we must also decide how to interact with other humans beings, and anyone who does that already has moral positions, whether they understand them or not.