Some would argue that awareness of things is knowledge that there are things. Plato, Russell, that I am familiar with. In juxtaposition to knowledge of things. — Mww

I would say that this probably runs afoul of the Myth of the Given. In order to know that there are things one must have grasped concepts such as "thing" and "existence" and made a judgment on the basis of those concepts. Wilfrid Sellars provides a pretty thorough critique of the notion of immediate knowledge.

Doesn’t Freud’s discovery of the unconscious (if indeed a discovery it was, as it had been anticipated previously) have some bearing on the question of self-knowledge? — Wayfarer

Yeah, I'd say so, but I personally don't think it undermines the possibility of self-knowledge. Unconscious mental processes are not present in experience the way empirical objects are, but their effects are. Thus, I'd say that they can be investigated, understood and known. What are your thoughts?

I am reluctant to directly compare this to Descartes as he published in such a constrained environment.

I am also reluctant to make my quoted passage a generality when I put it forward to show an example of his analysis and manner of discourse rather than put the passage on par with the problems he presented in his Metaphysics.

Experiencing, understanding and reasoning are acts of subjectivity. They are not something over and above the subject but constitutive of the subject itself. So when I engage in these activities I am intrinsically conscious of them as constitutive of me. Or so I would argue... — Esse Quam Videri

Kant made an effort to address this in the Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason. Perhaps you could set your thesis against that since his view is sharply different from yours.

What are your thoughts? — Esse Quam Videri

What I have in mind is something that’s been central to my thinking for a long time. The mind-created world essay (this thread sprouted from that one) grew out of an earlier attempt to articulate how contemporary cognitive science has converged—somewhat unexpectedly—with a broadly Kantian insight.

The basic point is that the world as experienced is not a passive imprint of a mind-independent reality (per John Locke and empiricism more generally). Rather, the mind (or brain) actively synthesises disparate sensory inputs with organising structures—categories, forms, constraints—at a level largely below conscious awareness. This synthetic activity gives rise to what Kant called the subjective unity of perception: the coherent, stable world that shows up for us at all. It is not too far-fetched to compare the h.sapiens forebrain as a remarkably sophisticated VR generator.

There’s good empirical support for this. Neuropsychological disorders— like visual agnosia—show that when this integrative synthesis breaks down, the “world” fragments in very specific ways. This is not a matter of losing access to an external object so much as losing the capacity to bind features into a unified perceptual field (Oliver Sacks books had a lot to say on this.)

It's also the case that neuroscience still lacks a clear account of how this synthesis is implemented. The so-called neural binding problem highlights precisely this gap: there is no agreed-upon neural locus or mechanism that explains how distributed processes are unified into a single phenomenal scene. That absence matters philosophically, because it undercuts the assumption that perceptual unity is simply “read off” from the world (ref).

Andrew Brook argues that this places Kant as almost 'the godfather of cognitive science' because the core Kantian insight, not that the world is unreal, but that objectivity itself is constituted through cognitive synthesis, which has become influential through constructivism in many different disciplines.

That’s the sense in which I say the “mind-independent world,” as commonly understood today, is not a brute given (per the Myth of the Given) but a construct—one grounded in real experience, certainly, but mediated by cognitive conditions and cultural factors we usually overlook, because they've become second nature, and hence, in some basic sense, unconscious, or at least sub-conscious.

In order to know that there are things one must have grasped concepts such as "thing" and "existence" and made a judgment on the basis of those concepts. — Esse Quam Videri

In order to know what things are one must conceptually represent them to himself and judge accordingly. This is knowledge of.

One has no need of conceptual context for mere appearances to sensibility. One can have (the sensation of) a tickle on the back of his neck without the slightest clue as to its cause, antecedent experience not necessarily any help except to inform of what the cause is not, but not what it is.

To know that there is a thing, some as yet undetermined something, is merely the impossibility of its denial that isn’t self-contradictory. It is said to be given for the simple reason the perceiver, insofar as he is affected by it, cannot be its cause.

Sellars is correct as far as empirical knowledge mediated by discursive judgement is concerned, of course. Knowledge that there is a thing, is not that.

Kant made an effort to address this in the Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason. Perhaps you could set your thesis against that since his view is sharply different from yours. — Paine

I don't think I can do this justice in a single post, so I am going to start with some general observations and we can dive deeper if needed.

At a high level, I would say that I don’t necessarily disagree with Kant’s critique of the paralogisms, but rather with the underlying epistemology that he uses to justify his critique. In my opinion, Kant basically reduces knowledge to something like “direct empirical access”. I think we can reasonably argue that, in doing this, Kant is running afoul of the Myth of the Given and concluding from it that genuine knowledge is impossible. The general shape of his reasoning goes something like this: “genuine knowledge is immediate; all human knowledge is mediated; therefore no human knowledge is genuine knowledge”. I would say that this is precisely why he is more-or-less forced to posit the noumena and the transcendental subject (among other things) as strictly unknowable. However, if we reject the claim that all genuine knowledge is immediate (and I would), then we don’t have to follow him down that path.

As for the paralogisms themselves, the common assumption undergirding all of them is that the soul can be known a priori. My general strategy for approaching Kant’s analysis of each paralogism would be to more-or-less accept that these a priori arguments fail while also rejecting the reasons Kant provides for why they fail, which are rooted in his errant epistemological commitments as detailed in the paragraph above. The upshot is that I can accept that the paralogisms are faulty without accepting Kant’s conclusion that genuine knowledge of the self is impossible.

Your points are well-articulated and the parallels you draw between modern cognitive science and Kant are certainly apt (as they were in your original essay). Of course, you could have probably guessed that I would resist taking on too strong a notion of "construction". In my opinion, there is a real difference between saying (1) that cognitive content is underdetermined by sensory input and structured by unconscious operations and (2) saying that the mind-independent world is itself a construct in its entirety.

To put a finer point on it, when you say things like "there's an unconscious synthesis occurring" and "there is no agreed neural mechanism" you are presumably making a claim about the way things really are - not just about the way that they appear to you - and that you've actually grasped and confirmed something true about how the mind actually works. Would you agree with this, or do you see things differently?

One has no need of conceptual context for mere appearances to sensibility. One can have (the sensation of) a tickle on the back of his neck without the slightest clue as to its cause, antecedent experience not necessarily any help except to inform of what the cause is not, but not what it is.To know that there is a thing, some as yet undetermined something, is merely the impossibility of its denial that isn’t self-contradictory. — Mww

Sure, you can have a tickle without knowing its cause, but having a tickle and knowing that you're having a tickle are two different things. The occurrence of the tickle requires no concepts. Your knowing that you're having a tickle does.

The fact that the claim "I'm having a tickle sensation" is, perhaps, impossible to deny does not imply that the claim is not conceptually mediated. The recognition that it can't be denied is itself a reasoned judgment, not an immediate content of sensory experience.

….having a tickle and knowing that you're having a tickle are two different things. — Esse Quam Videri

I don’t need to know there is a sensation beyond having one. The given sensation makes the knowing of it superfluous.

The recognition that it can't be denied is itself a reasoned judgment, not an immediate content of sensory experience. — Esse Quam Videri

Agreed, in principle, for sensation is not the immediate content of sensory experience, but merely the occasion for its possibility.

The proof sensation cannot be denied is determinable from the change in the condition of the affected subject from the time before to the time of each and every such occasion. This is an aesthetic judgement, from which the subject cognizes nothing at all, not a reasoned, re: discursive one, from which a possible cognition always follows.

To put a finer point on it, when you say things like "there's an unconscious synthesis occurring" and "there is no agreed neural mechanism" you are presumably making a claim about the way things really are - not just about the way that they appear to you - and that you've actually grasped and confirmed something true about how the mind actually works. Would you agree with this, or do you see things differently? — Esse Quam Videri

I agree, with an important qualification. I wouldn’t claim that I personally possess privileged insight into “the way things truly are.” But I do think that clarifying what can and cannot meaningfully be meant by that phrase is one of philosophy’s central tasks.

The distinction you draw between (1) cognitive content being underdetermined by sensory input and structured by unconscious operations, and (2) the claim that the mind-independent world is wholly constructed, is a real one—and I resist the latter if it is taken in a literalistic sense. Saying that cognition involves unconscious synthesis is not to say that the world is an arbitrary mental fabrication. But then, where is the line drawn between 'world as experienced' and 'world as it is?'

In that sense, I am making claims about how things really are—but not from some point beyond! That is also why I bring in cognitive science, which has, for fairly obvious reasons, devoted a great deal of effort to understanding how the brain synthesises and constructs our experience-of-the-world.

Here is where I’ve found the opening sentence of Schopenhauer's World as Will and Idea instructive:

§ 1. “The world is my idea:”—this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows, though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness. If he really does this, he has attained to philosophical wisdom.

I should also point to one of the footnotes in the Mind- Created World, which is central to the overall argument. It is a quote from one of the Pali Buddhist suttas, to wit:

By and large, Kaccayana, this world is supported by a polarity, that of existence and non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, “non-existence” with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, “existence” with reference to the world does not occur to one.’ — Kaccāyanagotta Sutta

Here, the Buddha warns against reifying either “existence” or “non-existence” as ultimate categories (eternalism and nihilism, respectively). To see the origination and cessation of the world “as it actually is” is precisely to see through that polarity. The “world” in Buddhism is therefore not a metaphysical totality but the experienced world, whose character is structured by conditioned origination and attachment.


--------------

On that note, I’ll be signing out for Christmas. My dear other has made it clear that festive time is not ideally spent arguing with my invisible friends. All the best to everyone here for the festive season :party: :pray: :hearts:

I don’t need to know there is a sensation beyond having one. The given sensation makes the knowing of it superfluous. — Mww

This doesn't sound right to me. A sensation isn't a claim. It can't be true or false. It can't be a premise in an argument, or the result of an inference. A sensation just is.

Best of the season for you and the dear other.

Have a wonderful holiday!

A sensation just is. — Esse Quam Videri

Right, hence my meaning in saying to know of having it is superfluous. In response to your to have it and know you have it are two different things.

The point never was the sensation to begin with, but the thing I know that is necessarily its cause.

It’s so easy to get lost in the minutia.

Yes, perhaps I got lost somewhere along the way. I was originally responding to this:

Some would argue that awareness of things is knowledge that there are things. Plato, Russell, that I am familiar with. In juxtaposition to knowledge of things. — Mww

This seems to stating that awareness is knowledge. Depending on what "awareness" means here would, I think, determine whether the critique applies.

But I am happy to let it go. It sounds like we may be talking past one another.

Right, hence my meaning in saying to know of having it is superfluous. In response to your to have it and know you have it are two different things. — Mww

I can have an itch and scratch it without having being consciously aware of having done so. Or I can have an itch and consciously notice it, and then decide whether to scratch it or not.

Both of those experiences are possible without any self-reflective conceptualization such as "I have an itch".

This seems to stating that awareness is knowledge. Depending on what "awareness" means here would, I think, determine whether the critique applies. — Esse Quam Videri

Awareness can be counted as a kind of knowledge―knowledge by acquaintance or participation, but it is not, on it's own "knowledge that", or propositional knowledge.

Per the example of having an itch above―if I am not consciously aware of having an itch, yet I scratch it then it could be said that my body knew of the itch, even though my mind was not conscious of it.

If I am consciously aware of the itch, it would not seem that the conscious awareness must be of the self-reflective kind.

….without any self-reflective conceptualization such as "I have an itch". — Janus

Pretty much what I’m saying: there’s nothing cognizable in a sensation alone, so nothing to do with its cause or its resolution. Pure reflex of course being irrelevant.

I was agreeing with Sellars’ thesis that empirical knowledge of things is not possible from sensation alone, but still favoring the notion that knowledge THAT there is a thing, is a non-contradictory, hence completely rational idea.

Awareness can be counted as a kind of knowledge―knowledge by acquaintance or participation, but it is not, on it's own "knowledge that", or propositional knowledge. — Janus

You are right to distinguish between awareness and propositional knowledge, and you're right that conscious awareness need not rise to level of self-reflection; consciousness is intrinsically self-present.

That said, I personally would not regard the body's response to an itch as "knowing". If we simply feel the itch and scratch it without advertence, then we haven't really risen above the level of stimulus-response. Intelligently adaptive, sure, but not cognitively engaged.

If the itch becomes focal in the sense that we attend to it and understand it as this kind of sensation in this location, and if we implicitly affirm yes, I have an itch, then I'd be willing to say we've achieved knowledge.

That said, Sellars's critique of the Myth of Given is specifically directed toward those who would conflate sensation with propositional knowledge. Sellars might argue that knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by participation are merely latent or implicit forms of propositional knowledge that have simply not yet been made explicit by being appropriated into understanding and judgement. In that sense they would be more appropriately classified as a type of experience or presence that, while real and important, does not rise to the level of what would normally be admissible as knowledge in a philosophical context.

Personally, I would tend to agree with Sellars, while also acknowledging that the word "knowledge" is used in many ways in both colloquial and philosophical speech. What are your thoughts?

The passage is no starting point for the distinction between immanence and transcendence in the theological sense because nothing is possible if it is not "natural." Aristotle questions the freedom of the "Craftsman" in the Timaeus. A topic that leads to the third paragraph:

412a16. Since it is indeed a body of such a kind (for it is one having life), the soul will not be body; for the body is not something predicated of a subject, but exists rather as subject and matter. The soul must then, be substance qua form of a natural body which has life potentially. Substance is actuality. The soul, therefore, will be the actuality of a body of this kind. — ibid. 412a16 — Paine

Aristotle distinguished between Soul & Body, just as he made a distinction between abstract Form & concrete Matter. The quote doesn't say this specifically, but I interpret the Soul (ousia, essence, form -- subject?, person?) as Transcendent & Potential, and Body (matter, flesh, substance) as Immanent & Actual.

So when Potential is Actualized --- e.g. sperm & egg quicken to become one person --- Soul & Body are united into a living-thinking Hylomorph. Theologians later interpreted the Soul as existing eternally and supernaturally, so at death the Soul separates from the natural concrete material body, and returns to its supernatural abstract potential form. Hence, the imaginative notion of a disembodied ghost lurking in some intermediate realm between Nature and Super-nature.

But, going back to the OP, where does the human Mind & Person come into play? Does the transcendent Soul think like a mind? If so, what does it think about? What is it like to be a disembodied Mind? Does the non-personal Cosmic Potential (Nature) somehow create the actual embodied Mind by joining Form & Flesh (abstract essence & concrete substance) into a natural person? :chin:

what is the relationship between World-at-large & local Brain & personal Mind? — Gnomon

Most of the posts on this thread seem to be various philosophical opinions favoring either traditional Idealism (transcendentalism) or Realism (immanentism). But I just came across a book in my library that offers a scientific version of the Cosmic Mind concept. Music publisher, Howard Bloom's 2000 book, Global Brain, presents his postulation of "collective information processing"*1*2*3 on a universal scale. Which is relevant to my own amateur philosophical thesis of Enformationism. Bloom is also the author of The God Problem : How a Godless Cosmos Creates.

Obviously, Global Brain is a speculative hypothesis, and there is no more empirical evidence for a GB than for a Transcendent Deity. In the Prologue, Bloom says, "we living beings have been modules of something current evolutionary theory fails to see". He goes on to postulate that "we are parts of a greater mind constantly testing fresh hypotheses". Do these statements sound more like religion than science? Note --- the use of "brain" instead of "mind" may be an attempt to avoid spiritual connotations.

Has anyone else read the book? How do you think it relates to the theme of this thread? Is there a Cosmic Mind, and are human minds the offspring of that mysterious progenitor? Is human culture on Earth just one element of a top-down Universal Intelligence? Or are human agents, inadvertently and unwittingly, in the process of creating a Cosmic Mind --- or a Singularity --- from the ground-up, so to speak? :smile:


*1. The concept of a "global brain" relates to the theory that humanity, together with its technological agents and communication networks like the Internet, is evolving into a single, interconnected, information-processing system, which functions as the nervous system for a social superorganism
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=global+brain+study+group+superorganismic+intelligence

*2. Global Brain : The Evolution of Mass Mind from the Big Bang to the 21st Century by Howard Bloom argues that life on Earth is a single, evolving "global brain," a complex adaptive system where individuals are part of a larger social learning machine, from bacteria to humans. The book traces this evolution from the Big Bang, showing how groups (like bacterial colonies, insect swarms, and human societies) have always functioned as collective intelligences, using mechanisms like conformity and diversity to test ideas and adapt, with the internet being the latest phase of this process.
Group Selection :
Bloom posits that evolution isn't just about individual genes, but about groups competing and learning from each other, with successful group traits being passed on.
Social Learning Machine :
He proposes that all life forms, from microbes to humans, are part of a massive, interconnected system for processing information and learning.
Mechanisms of the Global Brain :
The system relies on elements like "conformity enforcers" (to maintain stability) and "diversity generators" (to innovate), which are seen in everything from bacterial colonies to human cultures.
Historical Examples :
The book uses examples like marching lobsters, bee colonies, and ancient Sparta to illustrate how different species have engaged in collective problem-solving and social learning.
The Internet as a New Phase :
The World Wide Web is presented as the most recent and powerful stage in the evolution of this global brain.
Key Takeaway
The book challenges traditional Darwinian views by suggesting that the purpose of life is not just individual reproduction, but the exploration and survival of the "mass mind" through group-level experimentation and competition.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=howard+bloom+global+brain

*3. A global brain emergent structure is the concept that the interconnected internet, social media, and AI form a planetary-scale, self-organizing information system, analogous to a biological brain, where collective human and machine intelligence arises from countless interactions, creating higher-level cognition for problem-solving, though decentralized and without a single controller, much like neurons forming a brain. This emergent intelligence processes information globally, similar to how neural networks function, allowing for complex, large-scale tasks beyond individual capacity.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=global+brain+emergent+structure

The quote doesn't say this specifically, but I interpret the Soul (ousia, essence, form -- subject?, person?) as Transcendent & Potential, and Body (matter, flesh, substance) as Immanent & Actual. — Gnomon

Your depiction of Actual and Potential reverses their roles given in Aristotle's writing:

For this reason those are right in their view who maintain that the soul cannot exist without the body, but is not itself in any sense a body. It is not a body, it is associated with a body, and therefore resides in a body, and in a body of a particular kind; not at all as our predecessors supposed, who fitted it to any body, without adding any limitations as to what body or what kind of body, although it is unknown for any chance thing to admit any other chance thing. But our view explains the facts quite reasonably for the actuality of each thing is naturally inherent in its potentiality, that is in its own proper matter. From all this it is clear that the soul is a kind of actuality or notion of that which has the capacity of having a soul. — ibid. 414a

The key thing here is that matter is not an utter lack of actuality but reflects an architecture of integration. If we investigate with that model in hand, we can start thinking about nature (physis or what comes-to-be.

When talking about the intellect as possibly eternal, De Anima does not present that in the way it is discussed as a personal survival of death in Plato (a topic for another day). For Aristotle, the actuality of life includes all forms and their functions must include all the simpler types even if the more advanced kinds do things the others cannot. Later Platonists, especially Plotinus, disliked this tension and argued against Aristotle in some places and remodeled his model in others. What you call a "hylomorph" has a job in Plotinus.

Whoever you think more correct, the distinction between transcendental versus immanent is a confusing attribution amongst these ideas. With the different accounts of creation, the consequences were what they were. In Plato's Statesman, there is an interesting account of the Maker reversing time to reboot the system but that is quite different from imagining a power above nature that acts willy nilly and directly interferes with the affairs of men. Spinoza said that all that sort thing was the projection of our limitations upon the Creator.

That said, Sellars's critique of the Myth of Given is specifically directed toward those who would conflate sensation with propositional knowledge. Sellars might argue that knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by participation are merely latent or implicit forms of propositional knowledge that have simply not yet been made explicit by being appropriated into understanding and judgement.

I would say that knowledge by acquaintance and by participation (and to this I would add knowledge by witness), doesn’t need to be appropriated in this way to become propositional knowledge. Perhaps it does do, to become intellectually articulated. But for me it doesn’t need to reach that point of intellectual analysis to become a unit of knowledge which can be squared with other units of knowledge in a way in which it can affect the person in terms of feeling, attitude, or orientation. Or in other words to become an object in intuition, which later might be appropriated into thought, as an after thought.

I agree with you that there are modes of knowing that operate without explicit intellectual articulation and that nonetheless shape us, guide us and constitute genuine cognitive achievements. The infant knows its mother before any proposition could be formed; the person of practical wisdom knows how to act in complex situations without being able to articulate the principles guiding them; perhaps even the mystic knows God in a way that exceeds any theological formulation.

However, at some point we usually require something stronger than this. The issue isn’t so much whether implicit forms of knowing are real, but whether these are endeavoring to make a claim. Consider that people often have conflicting intuitions about the same matter. Their participatory knowing, their acquaintance with the situation yields contradictory orientations. At some point the question arises: who is correct? This is where insight and understanding must be tested by judgment - and not just one’s own judgment, but often the judgment of an entire community.

It seems to me that in the process of making our implicit knowledge more explicit we often learn more than we thought we knew before. That’s because making it explicit forces us to take responsibility for what we are claiming to know. It forces us to think through the strengths and weaknesses of our understanding, to find the gaps and try to fill them. This process doesn’t replace or eliminate implicit understanding. If done right, it iteratively perfects it.

As for Sellars, he was responding to something very specific - namely, the various foundationalist sense-datum theories of his day. He felt that there were several prominent philosophers who were failing to properly disambiguate between the act of sensation and the act of knowing. His use of the word “knowing” aligns with what we have called “judgment” above, the point where you have moved beyond the implicit to the explicit to making a claim, thereby electing to be held responsible by others for justifying that claim.

Your depiction of Actual and Potential reverses their roles given in Aristotle's writing:

"But our view explains the facts quite reasonably for the actuality of each thing is naturally inherent in its potentiality, that is in its own proper matter. From all this it is clear that the soul is a kind of actuality or notion of that which has the capacity of having a soul" — Paine

I'll have to admit that Aristotle's definition of a Soul is not clear to me. But it reminds me of similar definitions of Energy as the capacity or ability or potential for work (i.e. material change). In that case, the capacity is not the same as the actuality. It seems more like the potential for actualization, to become realized. So perhaps his Soul is more like our modern notion of Energy : both potential (abstract) and actual (embodied). Embodied Energy is transformed into Matter [E=MC^2, where E is just a number or value, and M is the property (inertia) that makes matter seem actual & real to us]. Anyway, I'm not an Aristotle scholar, so I won't press the issue. :cool:


The statement "soul is a kind of actuality" comes from Aristotle's philosophy, specifically his work On the Soul (De Anima), where he defines the soul as the "first actuality (entelecheia) of a natural body that has life potentially". This means the soul isn't just a potential (what a body could be) but the very realization or form that makes a body actually living, like the knowledge a person has even when sleeping, making it the principle that brings matter into a living organism.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=soul+is+a+kind+of+actuality+

I think you're hitting on something important here. Aristotle's analysis of the soul can be confusing because it is multi-dimensional, and he's not always consistent in how he utilizes his terminology. My understanding is that his analysis is basically three-tiered, meaning that there are three ways in which the soul can be said to "actualize" the body, and they build on each other.

First we have the soul as a set of capacities or latent abilities (dunamis). An example might be that of a human child's capacity to learn a language. Next we have the soul as first-actuality (entelecheia). An example might be that of an adult who has actually learned a language, but is not currently using it. Finally we have the soul as second-actuality (energeia). An example might be that of an adult actually using the language that they have learned.

The connection you made between potentiality and the modern concept of energy is interesting and highlights a key difference between the Aristotelian definitions of matter and energy and the modern definitions. They are practically the inverse of each other. Whereas in modern physics matter (or mass) can be loosely understood as a localized "actualization" of energy in spacetime, for Aristotle energeia was understood to be actualization with respect to a material substrate. In fact, one could argue that the modern concept of energy maps fairly well onto the classical concept of prime matter (pure potentiality) insofar as energy is that which persists under any and all possible change. I don't know how far the analogy can be taken, but it is an interesting parallel to ponder.

(I have to briefly sign back in - shhhh - to mention an article I've found interesting, about how Heisenberg re-purposed Aristotle's 'potentia' in respect to quantum physics Quantum mysteries dissolve if possibilities are realities[/quote]:

In the... paper, three scientists argue that including “potential” things on the list of “real” things can avoid the counterintuitive conundrums that quantum physics poses. It is perhaps less of a full-blown interpretation than a new philosophical framework for contemplating those quantum mysteries. At its root, the new idea holds that the common conception of “reality” is too limited. By expanding the definition of reality, the quantum’s mysteries disappear. In particular, “real” should not be restricted to “actual” objects or events in spacetime. Reality ought also be assigned to certain possibilities, or “potential” realities, that have not yet become “actual.” These potential realities do not exist in spacetime, but nevertheless are “ontological” — that is, real components of existence.

“This new ontological picture requires that we expand our concept of ‘what is real’ to include an extraspatiotemporal domain of quantum possibility,” write Ruth Kastner, Stuart Kauffman and Michael Epperson.

Considering potential things to be real is not exactly a new idea, as it was a central aspect of the philosophy of Aristotle, 24 centuries ago. An acorn has the potential to become a tree; a tree has the potential to become a wooden table. Even applying this idea to quantum physics isn’t new. Werner Heisenberg, the quantum pioneer famous for his uncertainty principle, considered his quantum math to describe potential outcomes of measurements of which one would become the actual result. The quantum concept of a “probability wave,” describing the likelihood of different possible outcomes of a measurement, was a quantitative version of Aristotle’s potential, Heisenberg wrote in his well-known 1958 book Physics and Philosophy. “It introduced something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality.”

I'll have to admit that Aristotle's definition of a Soul is not clear to me. But it reminds me of similar definitions of Energy as the capacity or ability or potential for work (i.e. material change). In that case, the capacity is not the same as the actuality. It seems more like the potential for actualization, to become realized. So perhaps his Soul is more like our modern notion of Energy : both potential (abstract) and actual (embodied). Embodied Energy is transformed into Matter [E=MC^2, where E is just a number or value, and M is the property (inertia) that makes matter seem actual & real to us]. — Gnomon

Energy takes two forms: The first is as light, a self-regenerating excitation moving through the electromagnetic field that is everywhere, it having no rest mass and ever its c-speed; it occurs in all three realms - classical, relativistic, and quantum (photon). The second is as mass as what can persist.

So, keep on with the notion of energy being key to all that is.

Very nice! I hadn't seen that paper, though I think I've run across parts of that quote before.

And don't worry, your secret is safe! :wink: