I'm fine with all of this, except I'm not sure that consciousness "accounts for" the higher level properties in the same way that micro properties and chemical properties do. Those seem like genuine bottom-up structures. Or maybe it's just that we're used to this kind of metaphorical image, so it appears clear to us. But consciousness doesn't seem to "account for" rules and math in the sense that these higher-level structures somehow are supported by consciousness. This, perhaps, is where consciousness really reveals itself as unique, and uniquely unlike any physical structures. You just can't draw a 3D map of the structures and say, This is how they connect. If consciousness does support, or account for, higher-level structures, we don't yet know how, or in what mode we ought to think about a term like "support".

This, perhaps, is where consciousness really reveals itself as unique, and uniquely unlike any physical structures. — J

I think this is huge.

Consciousness does account for the rules of baseball. There can't possibly be another explanation for the Infield Fly Rule, the rule about hitting a foul ball when you have a full count, four balls is a walk, nine innings in a game, three outs per side per inning, and endless more.

But, certainly, as you say, the accounting is not the same as physical accounting. It's not the same as the way micro properties account for liquids and solids. Even if we can't, at least can't always, predict what physical things will happen under specific conditions, we can understand it after the fact. And, if we have the same circumstances, we will get the same results.

There's no way anyone could have predicted or calculated what the rules of baseball would be before the game was invented, or even what the rules would settle on after people were already playing it. And there's no looking at the rules now, and seeing how they couldn't have turned out any other way.

Should we expand the way we think of "accounts for"? Should we use a different phrase, since it's a different kind of accounting? "Conscious accounting"? "Variable accounting"?

But, certainly, as you say, the accounting is not the same as physical accounting. It's not the same as the way micro properties account for liquids and solids. — Patterner

Yes, glad you agree that this is crucial.

Should we expand the way we think of "accounts for"? Should we use a different phrase, since it's a different kind of accounting? "Conscious accounting"? "Variable accounting"? — Patterner

Good questions. I think it's partially a matter of terminology, as is often the case when we're dealing with philosophical usages that are either shopworn or unclear. It may go deeper than that, though. I'm not convinced we even have the right concepts yet, to which we could then seek to apply helpful terminology. This is the "way we think of 'accounts for'" that you reference.

It's easier to point out what's wrong with the physical-accounting analogies than to replace them. My only possibly useful suggestion is to stick with simple analogies, such as the baseball game, where we're pretty sure some "conscious accounting" is going on, and try to carefully tease out what happens and why. Are we sure this will reveal anything about consciousness itself? No, but in the absence of a traditional scientific apparatus of inquiry, we need to be open-minded and optimistic about what we can learn.

Meanwhile, I would add (though you probably don't agree) that the scientists should go full steam ahead in their efforts to explain consciousness from a biological perspective. If it keeps failing, that will be informative.

Are we sure this will reveal anything about consciousness itself? No, but in the absence of a traditional scientific apparatus of inquiry, we need to be open-minded and optimistic about what we can learn. — J

That's the attitude we need. If anything exists that cannot be found with our physical sciences, but we refuse to use any tools other than our physical sciences...

Meanwhile, I would add (though you probably don't agree) that the scientists should go full steam ahead in their efforts to explain consciousness from a biological perspective. If it keeps failing, that will be informative. — J

No, I quite agree. Not only because I might be wrong, but also because we will doubtless learn all kinds of other things while looking for this answer. Things that are, in the grand scheme of things, more important than solving this mystery. For me, nothing is more fascinating than this. But if an attempt to solve this that has no hope of succeeding helps with Alzheimer's?

But I do think there's no hope of finding any biological/physicalist answer, so I think more thought should be put into other approaches.

Sounds like the belief of the cat the mouse is behind the stove is as dependent on language as my belief that the milk is in the fridge is dependent on cows (if it's cowmilk) - as a cat-external factor (and one the cat might only dimly understand to begin with). Why, then, are we talking about language and not, say, gravity. The stove's existentially dependent on many, many things, few of which seem part of the present belief. — Dawnstorm

Well, I'm talking about the idea of existential dependency upon language use but not gravity because the former is relevant to our process of understanding and setting out the evolutionary progression of belief whereas the latter is utterly irrelevant for such an endeavor. Existential dependency upon language is a tool(factor) that helps establish the contours of evolutionary progression as it pertains to the emergence and evolution of belief over time, which in turn is relevant to whether or not one belief can cause another.

I didn't see it that way at all. You do not look foolish to me. Becoming aware of our own false belief seems like an accomplishment. I mean, we're all aware of our own fallibility, aren't we?
— creativesoul

I didn't become aware of a false belief in that case... — Dawnstorm

Okay. I assumed that you believed what you wrote, as it was written. Afterwards you agreed that it wasn't true, and that statements using "all" do not typically reflect your beliefs. Understood. It now seems to me to have been a case of being loose with language. You've remarked on precision as well. That's fine. We can move beyond that tangent if you like. No problem here.

Truth, for me, tends to erode meaning — Dawnstorm

That's a statement worthy of a topic in its own right.

What's the difference between using the English language and using the English language like one knows it is a nominative-accusative language?
— creativesoul

There is none. — Dawnstorm

This is a very odd reply, especially given the great detail that followed carefully drawing a distinction between the two uses of "knowing" involved in your claims. It's an equivocation fallacy. It is unacceptable to use two completely different senses of the same term in the same argument. At best, unnecessary confusion ensues.

Is it your claim that all English users know that English is a nominative accusative language before they become aware of that background belief?

I'm still a bit unclear on what the point was, even though you reiterated that it's an important one. Could you set it out clearly as well as the relevance it has to our discussion?

This is what "behavioural implicature" means to me. A perspectival imputation. Basically: linguist:native speaker = human:cat. And since I'm a pretty staunch relativist, I'm fairly sure there's no way around behavioural implicature. — Dawnstorm

Are you saying that when we attempt to set out the cat's beliefs it is a case of imputing our own perspective into the cat, and that the linguist does much the same thing when imputing their own perspective upon native English speakers? To me, that's anthropomorphism in the case of the cat and is to be avoided at all costs. The avoidance of which is a key component/feature of the very methodology I'm working from.

This harks back to the pivotal role that language use has in some thought/belief formation, but not others. If there is some thought or belief that is existentially dependent upon the thinker/believer being capable of using language, then it cannot be the case that a language less creature is capable of having such belief, and hence imputing such belief onto a language less creature is a mistake. The same is true of imputing knowledge that English is a nominative accusative language to a speaker who doesn't know what counts as a nominative accusative language and hence has no clue what those words mean.

...

So, how does this notion of behavioural implicature deal with the fact that behaviour alone is indeterminate regarding that?
— creativesoul

Via an iterative process of situational compatibility. Behavioural implicature is reinforced when our expectations are met. — Dawnstorm

We all know, I presume anyway, that a mouse is incapable of contemplating the consequences of the double slit experiment.
— creativesoul

Under behavioural implicature the question is: what sort of behaviour from a mouse would have you question this piece of "knowledge"? We're not coming at this from a neutral postion. We make working assumptions until they fail us. I mean, I certainly wouldn't assume that a mouse was reading this thread, just because I catch it looking at the screen... — Dawnstorm

But why not? There are unspoken presuppositions at work here. If a mouse was capable of reading this thread, then there would be no trouble with assuming such a thing because you caught them looking at the screen. So what, exactly, is it that stops you from attributing such capabilities to the mouse? What sort of behaviour would the mouse need to display in order to question whether or not they could read this thread?

You see the problem here?

There is an underlying notion of thought/belief at work.

If we are to attribute thought and belief to another creature, we ought to have at least a well-grounded idea and/or standard regarding what sorts of creatures are capable of forming which sorts of beliefs.
— creativesoul

What sort of commonalities do we start off from here, each of us, to begin with? I mean, in this thread I'm not even quite clear yet what counts as a "thought". — Dawnstorm

Indeed. The underlying concept/notion/idea is hard at work in each of our contributions. Setting that out in a way that makes sense regarding of all the times we use the terms is key.

By my lights, all thought/belief consists entirely of correlations drawn between different things. The differences involve what those things are. As it pertains to our offshoot here, the thing that's in focus is language use and things that are existentially dependent upon language use.

... Part of the problem here is scope...

If you remove language what remains? — Dawnstorm

Correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable.

What does it mean to say: "the cat believes there's a mouse on the mat"? — Dawnstorm

It's a question that's more about the speaker's terminological use. I've answered it already.

Any question, any answer, any puzzlement around this always comes from a particular perspective... — Dawnstorm

Yes. Understanding any given perspective requires accepting the speaker's definitions, and subsequently seeing how well they hold up to scrutiny, including how well they are able to articulate/explain the evolutionary progression of belief.

This is a very odd reply, especially given the great detail that followed carefully drawing a distinction between the two uses of "knowing" involved in your claims. It's an equivocation fallacy. It is unacceptable to use two completely different senses of the same term in the same argument. At best, unnecessary confusion ensues. — creativesoul

I do apologise for the confusion, but I don't really know how to do better. I'll try, but I'm not confident I'll succeed in being clear here. First, when I said "there is none", what I meant is this:

If you become aware of the linguistic discouse around nominative-accusative languages, you've learned nothing new about using English. You now know that English is one type of language, and there are others. This is not knowledge included in using English. It might help you with learning other languages, such as Basque, but it won't have any impact on your using English.

So:

Is it your claim that all English users know that English is a nominative accusative language before they become aware of that background belief? — creativesoul

Almost. It's not necessarily a background belief, but it's definitely practical knowledge. That's what makes things difficult here. You act as if English is a nominative-accusative language and so do other native speakers, and that's why linguists can come up with the theory. When you learn English as a small child, you internalise the language as a nominative-accusative language. Everyone around you acts as if English is a nominative-accusative language, and so you learn to act like that, too.

As long as you're not aware that things could be different, you have no reason to theorise about what you're doing. Let's say you're Fench, and you have Basque neighbours, and you try to learn Basque. Basque will work in a highly un-intuitive way for you, so this is how you become aware that something you've taken for granted cannot be taken for granted. You now have the impetus to create a theoretical body of knowledge centred around that difference. Your focus is going to be what speakers of Basque are doing, but you'll need to approach this from within what you know about French: from the difference.

You create new practical knowledge about Basque; you don't create new practical knowledge about French. You create new theoretical knowledge that puts the two languages in relation. If you're an autodidact, here, you may never have heard the linguistic terms. Your take may be different from the linguists', so may not even have use for the terms. Who knows?

This is why I kept emphasising: "in the sense that they use it that way."

So:

Are you saying that when we attempt to set out the cat's beliefs it is a case of imputing our own perspective into the cat, and that the linguist does much the same thing when imputing their own perspective upon native English speakers? To me, that's anthropomorphism in the case of the cat and is to be avoided at all costs. The avoidance of which is a key component/feature of the very methodology I'm working from. — creativesoul

I think perspectival bias is inevitable; without it things stop making sense. So, yes, that's what I'm pretty much saying. I, too, would like to avoid anthropomorphism, but my methodology would be strip back what's human about our perspective as much as we can so things still make sense. We need to peel back some of what we know until we go from anthropmorphism to a, maybe, mammal-centred perspective. I recognise this is hard. Me insisting that in a cat-human framework a mat isn't a mat is part of that. We need to stip back as much of the matness as we can and then bring back in as much as we think is warranted, with the bottom-line being what we think we have in common with cats.

This is far from infallible. So see here:

But why not? There are unspoken presuppositions at work here. If a mouse was capable of reading this thread, then there would be no trouble with assuming such a thing because you caught them looking at the screen. So what, exactly, is it that stops you from attributing such capabilities to the mouse? What sort of behaviour would the mouse need to display in order to question whether or not they could read this thread? — creativesoul

That is the very question.

"Unspoken presuppositions": Yes.
"If a mouse was capable...": My methodology doesn't even assume a mouse is incapbable of reading. Me "certainly not assuming that" is a data-point, too. And uncovering the presuppositions is important. As many as you can discover, and as many as you can handle without losing the grounding that allowys you to think.
"What sort of behaviour...": the sort of movements that would suggest to me that the mouse is following something from top right to bottom left. I have bad spatial perception, so judging the field of vision of a mouse would be hard. But if it would cock the head back and forth in line-break intervals...

A key point here is that we're not communicating with mice via text. If we did (say in animal-language experiments) we might have to expand the semantic field of what it means to "read". We have only the one concept, but it's been developed for inter-human context rather than inter-species contexts.

***

I've gone back and re-read some of your posts about existential dependency on language. I think there's something in there I don't quite understand, but I can't put my finger on what questions to ask.

This is a very odd reply, especially given the great detail that followed carefully drawing a distinction between the two uses of "knowing" involved in your claims. It's an equivocation fallacy. It is unacceptable to use two completely different senses of the same term in the same argument. At best, unnecessary confusion ensues.
— creativesoul

I do apologise for the confusion, but I don't really know how to do better. I'll try, but I'm not confident I'll succeed in being clear here. First, when I said "there is none", what I meant is this:

If you become aware of the linguistic discouse around nominative-accusative languages, you've learned nothing new about using English. You now know that English is one type of language, and there are others. This is not knowledge included in using English. It might help you with learning other languages, such as Basque, but it won't have any impact on your using English. — Dawnstorm

Thank you for that. I appreciate the effort. I think it has been helpful. No need to apologize though. I'm not offended, and do not take this personally. I'm examining claims(arguments/reasoning), not you as an author. As I've mentioned, prior to this conversation, I was completely unaware of the jargon. A small amount of research provided more than adequate enough evidence to warrant my belief that the entire enterprise is very heavily theory laden. A good grasp of it is far beyond my current understanding.

That said, I want to say a few things and see if you agree. I think we agree on them, but I'd like to verify.


1.) Becoming aware of the linguistic discourse around nominative-accusative languages is necessary for knowing that English counts as one.
2.) Becoming aware of the linguistic discourse around nominative-accusative languages is not necessary for learning and/or successfully using English
3.) One need not know that English is a nominative-accusative language in order to use it.

Is it your claim that all English users know that English is a nominative accusative language before they become aware of that background belief?
— creativesoul

Almost. It's not necessarily a background belief, but it's definitely practical knowledge. That's what makes things difficult here. You act as if English is a nominative-accusative language and so do other native speakers, and that's why linguists can come up with the theory. When you learn English as a small child, you internalise the language as a nominative-accusative language. Everyone around you acts as if English is a nominative-accusative language, and so you learn to act like that, too.

As long as you're not aware that things could be different, you have no reason to theorise about what you're doing. Let's say you're Fench, and you have Basque neighbours, and you try to learn Basque. Basque will work in a highly un-intuitive way for you, so this is how you become aware that something you've taken for granted cannot be taken for granted. You now have the impetus to create a theoretical body of knowledge centred around that difference. Your focus is going to be what speakers of Basque are doing, but you'll need to approach this from within what you know about French: from the difference.

You create new practical knowledge about Basque; you don't create new practical knowledge about French. You create new theoretical knowledge that puts the two languages in relation. If you're an autodidact, here, you may never have heard the linguistic terms. Your take may be different from the linguists', so may not even have use for the terms. Who knows?

This is why I kept emphasising: "in the sense that they use it that way." — Dawnstorm

Okay. I think I better understand what you're saying. However, I do not think it adds anything beyond unnecessarily confusing rhetoric to claim that we "act is if English is a nominative accusative language", because there's no other way to act when using English. We also act as if gravity is acting upon us when we navigate the world, because there's no other way to act when navigating the world. If I were to say that everyone acts as if they know that gravity is acting upon them when they navigate the world, I would be doing much the same thing you've done here regarding using English "as if they know"...

While I totally agree that English use is practical knowledge - quite literally - it makes no sense to me to say that everyone uses English as if they know that it is a nominative-accusative language.

There is a difference between using English as if one knows it is a nominative-accusative language and using English. It is only when one can use the terms "nominative-accusative language" in a sensible manner(consistent with it's formal use) that one can be sensibly said to be using English like they know it is a nominative-accusative language.

I'll address the rest of your last reply next time. I wish I would've skipped the bit above and went straight to the rest. :blush: Thank you for the interesting conversation.

1.) Becoming aware of the linguistic discourse around nominative-accusative languages is necessary for knowing that English counts as one. — creativesoul

Yes.

2.) Becoming aware of the linguistic discourse around nominative-accusative languages is not necessary for learning and/or successfully using English

Yes.

3.) One need not know that English is a nominative-accusative language in order to use it.

Almost. To eliminate any ambiguities (which I should have done much earlier), I'd suggest a minor re-wording: "is a nominative-accusative language" --> "is classified as a nominative-accusative language".

This would rule out practical knowledge and make the wording clearer, I feel.

However, I do not think it adds anything beyond unnecessarily confusing rhetoric to claim that we "act is if English is a nominative accusative language", because there's no other way to act when using English. — creativesoul

But the borders between languages are porous. Non-native speakers might "get it wrong," and still be understood. If you disregard notions of correctness, what language do they speak? You can get a lot wrong and still be understood. A native speaker of Basque might consistently produce "I eat cake," and "Me sleep." (I hasitate to claim "Me eat," because I don't speak Basque and verbs like "eat" that can sometime not take an object might be treated as transitive with object deletion? I never learned a single ergative-absolutive language.) It's actually a fascinating topic, when such usage would cause problems with communication. You can speak some form of English even if you don't fully grasp how a nominative-accusative language works. And a native speaker would likely recognise this as English, but "something's wrong".

I've never been able to quite pin down my point here, but I think it's something like this: There's some kind of vague analogy in how practical knowledge doesn't scale 1:1 onto theoretical knowledge and how the pre-linguistic aspect of thought maps onto propositions. But I'm not sure.

I really do wish I could explain myself better, here. It's familiar terrain for me, but terrain that's difficult to map (if the metaphor makes sense).

Are you saying that when we attempt to set out the cat's beliefs it is a case of imputing our own perspective into the cat, and that the linguist does much the same thing when imputing their own perspective upon native English speakers? To me, that's anthropomorphism in the case of the cat and is to be avoided at all costs. The avoidance of which is a key component/feature of the very methodology I'm working from.
— creativesoul

I think perspectival bias is inevitable; without it things stop making sense. So, yes, that's what I'm pretty much saying. I, too, would like to avoid anthropomorphism... — Dawnstorm

Nice recent additions. I think we're doing just fine. Well, you're doing way better than just fine. I say this in light of a few self-doubts you've expressed thus far regarding your contributions/explanations. We're beginning to understand one another.

Some bias may be inevitable, but not all bias renders us incapable of acquiring knowledge of language less thought/belief. I don't find human perspective to be problematic; at least not in and of itself, as a matter of universal fact. Rather, I find that our human perspective may just be exactly what facilitates our ability to acquire knowledge regarding the thought/belief and/or 'mental ongoings'(scare-quotes intentional) of not only ourselves but of any creature capable of forming, having, holding thought and/or belief.

...my methodology would be strip back what's human about our perspective as much as we can so things still make sense. We need to peel back some of what we know until we go from anthropomorphism to a, maybe, mammal-centred perspective. I recognise this is hard. Me insisting that in a cat-human framework a mat isn't a mat is part of that. We need to strip back as much of the matness as we can and then bring back in as much as we think is warranted, with the bottom-line being what we think we have in common with cats. — Dawnstorm

I think I agree with the general aim here. Commonality is definitely important. Our terminological frameworks of choice differ tremendously. "Matness" is prima facie evidence. That's not what I want to focus on though. Hopefully, it's enough to mention this in passing. I suspect we will be reminded by consequences that result from our respective schemas/frameworks.

How do we know what a mammal-centered perspective is(consists of)?

On my view, that's not up us. A mammal centered perspective, if there is such a thing, is not determined by our language use. To quite the contrary, if it is the case that cats are capable of thought and belief, then it must be the case that the cat's thought and belief existed in its entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices, those meant to take account of the cat's thought/belief notwithstanding.

On my view, a cat can see a mat. Furthermore, when a cat looks at a mat, it cannot see anything else(assuming a non-hallucinatory cat).

Assume for a moment that all humans perish but cats and mats persist. There's no "matness" in this world. It dies with humans. Yet, the mat remains. Now, if there are two juvenile mice engrossed in play - wrestling around while chittering at one another like they often do - and the sounds draw the attention of a cat who begins peering around the corner at the two mice, who just so happened to have paused for a rest on top of a mat, I have no issue at all with claiming that the cat believes that the mice are on the mat.

The mat is meaningful to the cat as a result of being part of the spatiotemporal location of the mice.

There's so much more to cover. No time. Until next time! :smile:

How do we know what a mammal-centered perspective is(consists of)?

On my view, that's not up us. A mammal centered perspective, if there is such a thing, is not determined by our language use. — creativesoul

In my view that's just climbing up and down the abstraction ladder: an anthropocentric view is a version of mammal-centered view. When we go up the abstraction ladder we lose specifity, and when we go down the abstraction ladder we narrow down applicability. We're not only mammals, but neither are cats. Being mammals is one thing we have in common, though.

So:

Assume for a moment that all humans perish but cats and mats persist. There's no "matness" in this world. It dies with humans. Yet, the mat remains. Now, if there are two juvenile mice engrossed in play - wrestling around while chittering at one another like they often do - and the sounds draw the attention of a cat who begins peering around the corner at the two mice, who just so happened to have paused for a rest on top of a mat, I have no issue at all with claiming that the cat believes that the mice are on the mat. — creativesoul

What raises the mat from the background of "over there" such that it is relevant? Are the mice easier to catch while on the mat? Are there territorial considerations (I sleep on this mat, as it's warmer than the bare floor)? We're re-constructing matness from a feline point-of-view here.

Let's say this is my mat, and my cat, and we've been sleeping on it together. That'd have been shared practical behaviour. In how far does that create meaning for the cat? I only have access to my own perspective. When I assume my perspective is "anthropocentric", I assume I have more in common with other humans than with my cat, but that's clearly wrong in the case of "living together". For example, I have more shared habits with my cat than, say, with a member of a secluded tribe in a South American rainforest.

For me, the degree of importance of language is not a settled matter. And my hunch is that I grant language less importance than you do. Instead I priviledge behaviour (well, that's not quite as helpful as I hoped it would be, given that language is behaviour, too....)

1.) Becoming aware of the linguistic discourse around nominative-accusative languages is necessary for knowing that English counts as one.
— creativesoul

Yes.

2.) Becoming aware of the linguistic discourse around nominative-accusative languages is not necessary for learning and/or successfully using English

Yes.

3.) One need not know that English is a nominative-accusative language in order to use it.

Almost. To eliminate any ambiguities (which I should have done much earlier), I'd suggest a minor re-wording: "is a nominative-accusative language" --> "is classified as a nominative-accusative language".

This would rule out practical knowledge and make the wording clearer, I feel. — Dawnstorm

I do not necessarily disagree. Nice.

The suggestion makes 3 follow from 1 and 2(assuming "counts as" and "is classified as" mean the same thing). As it was written, there was a hidden presupposition/premise. Second, it tells me that you may not agree with that hidden premise, which was that knowing English is a nominative-accusative language and knowing English counts as(is classified as) a nominative-accusative is the exact same bit of knowledge.

So, now I'm curious about something. Do you believe we discovered that English is a nominative-accusative language?

However, I do not think it adds anything beyond unnecessarily confusing rhetoric to claim that we "act is if English is a nominative accusative language", because there's no other way to act when using English.
— creativesoul

But the borders between languages are porous. Non-native speakers might "get it wrong," and still be understood. If you disregard notions of correctness, what language do they speak? You can get a lot wrong and still be understood. A native speaker of Basque might consistently produce "I eat cake," and "Me sleep." (I hasitate to claim "Me eat," because I don't speak Basque and verbs like "eat" that can sometime not take an object might be treated as transitive with object deletion? I never learned a single ergative-absolutive language.) It's actually a fascinating topic, when such usage would cause problems with communication. You can speak some form of English even if you don't fully grasp how a nominative-accusative language works. And a native speaker would likely recognise this as English, but "something's wrong". — Dawnstorm

I'm reminded of Davidson's paper "A Nice Derangement Of Epitaphs". If you're not familiar, it may interest you. There's also an older thread on this site by the same name. Interesting thread.

Sure, sometimes nonnative and English speakers alike misuse English, but a native speaker often understands the speaker regardless. I don't see how an example of misusing English addresses the criticism of claiming that using English is to "act as if English is a nominative-accusative language".

If one is using English, then one is using a nominative-accusative language. If using a nominative-accusative language counts as acting like the language one is using is a nominative-accusative language, then there's no other way to act when using English. That's what I was getting at. I just do not see how the bit about "acting as if" helps.

I've never been able to quite pin down my point here, but I think it's something like this: There's some kind of vague analogy in how practical knowledge doesn't scale 1:1 onto theoretical knowledge and how the pre-linguistic aspect of thought maps onto propositions. But I'm not sure.

I really do wish I could explain myself better, here. It's familiar terrain for me, but terrain that's difficult to map (if the metaphor makes sense). — Dawnstorm

I am uneasy with the mapping of propositions onto language less creatures' thought. Propositions are utterly meaningless to language less creatures. Their thought/belief is not. Hence, their thought/belief is not propositions.

Knowing how to use a nominative-accusative language is different than knowing that a language counts as one.

How do we know what a mammal-centered perspective is(consists of)?

On my view, that's not up us. A mammal centered perspective, if there is such a thing, is not determined by our language use.
— creativesoul

In my view that's just climbing up and down the abstraction ladder: an anthropocentric view is a version of mammal-centered view. When we go up the abstraction ladder we lose specifity, and when we go down the abstraction ladder we narrow down applicability. — Dawnstorm

Understood. Abstraction is necessary here. I would say uniquely human as well. I was skirting around something that is better stated outright. Avoiding anthropomorphism requires knowing which sorts of thoughts and/or beliefs only humans are capable of forming, having, and/or holding and which sorts other creatures are capable of.

I think that mammals are capable of having thought and belief. That said, what is the criterion, which when met by some candidate or another, allows us to sensibly call that perspective a mammalian one?

We're in dire need of a criterion.

How does behavioural implication help us here?

knowing which sorts of thoughts and/or beliefs only humans are capable of forming — creativesoul

Well, only humans have a well-developed mental capacity called "theory of mind." it's the ability to make inferences about what is in the mind of others - reading another's mind - being aware that the thoughts of another mind may be different from ours. It was a crucial step in our evolution as a social species.

Assume for a moment that all humans perish but cats and mats persist. There's no "matness" in this world. It dies with humans. Yet, the mat remains. Now, if there are two juvenile mice engrossed in play - wrestling around while chittering at one another like they often do - and the sounds draw the attention of a cat who begins peering around the corner at the two mice, who just so happened to have paused for a rest on top of a mat, I have no issue at all with claiming that the cat believes that the mice are on the mat.
— creativesoul

What raises the mat from the background of "over there" such that it is relevant? Are the mice easier to catch while on the mat? Are there territorial considerations (I sleep on this mat, as it's warmer than the bare floor)? We're re-constructing matness from a feline point-of-view here. — Dawnstorm

Okay. I think what you're calling "matness from a feline point-of-view" is what I talk about in terms of the meaningfulness of the mat to the cat(how and why the mat is and/or becomes meaningful to the cat). In this example, in was just a matter of where the mice were located.

Let's say this is my mat, and my cat, and we've been sleeping on it together. That'd have been shared practical behaviour. In how far does that create meaning for the cat? — Dawnstorm

On my view things become meaningful to a creature by virtue of being part of the creatures' thought and/or beliefs(correlations). The cat's behaviour can be included in these correlations(part of the content of the cat's thought/belief), for the cat - that is. The cat can draw correlations between their sleeping on the mat, the mat itself, you, their own sense of contentment, the smell of the mat, of you, the sound of stepping onto the mat, of moving around on the mat, etc. All of those things can be and/or become thought and/or belief content of the cat; as compared/contrasted to propositional content of belief as propositional attitude(belief that some proposition is true).

I only have access to my own perspective.

I disagree. Perhaps if you'll think about that a bit differently, you'll reassess?

The very same means that allows you access to your own perspective allows you access to others'. We are sharing our own perspectives with each other via common language, replete with the ability to talk about our own worldview/perspective as a subject matter in and of itself. Seems to me that our language use is an integral part of all that allows us access to our own and others'. Seems there's a bunch of biological machinery involved too. :wink:

For me, the degree of importance of language is not a settled matter. And my hunch is that I grant language less importance than you do. Instead I priviledge behaviour (well, that's not quite as helpful as I hoped it would be, given that language is behaviour, too....) — Dawnstorm

The degree of the importance of language is not an entirely settled matter for me either. However, it has been extremely helpful for drawing and maintaining the distinctions between thought and/or belief that only humans are capable of and thought and/or belief that other creatures are capable of. Hence, understanding the role that common language plays in thought and belief has been extremely useful in avoiding anthropomorphism.

You sure about that?

There's a fascinating book called Baboon Metaphysics: The Evolution of a Social Mind, by Cheney and Seyfarth, that makes a strong case that baboons have a more-than-rudimentary "theory of mind" which allows them to make predictions based on what they believe other baboons are thinking.

You sure about that? — creativesoul

I'm not sure which part you mean, but yes, our well-developed theory of mind separates us from other primates.

here's a fascinating book called Baboon Metaphysics: The Evolution of a Social Mind, by Cheney and Seyfarth, that makes a strong case that baboons have a more-than-rudimentary "theory of mind" which allows them to make predictions based on what they believe other baboons are thinking. — J

Sounds like a fascinating book, thanks for the recommendation. Yes, I have read that other primates do have at least some capacity to develop theories of mind, but that they are not anywhere near as developed as the human capacity.

For example, only the human capacity for theory of mind led us to apply this ability to supernatural beings (gods) - paving the way for the development of religion.

And even to objects - like Wilson the volleyball in the Tom Hanks movie Cast Away

Yup. It's fairly clear that some pack mammals have some thought about what other members are feeling/thinking.

You sure about that?
— creativesoul

I'm not sure which part you mean, but yes, our well-developed theory of mind separates us from other primates. — Questioner

Yes. The key element being "well-developed". However, some other animals have a theory of mind, just not nearly as well-developed as ours. Ours is one of the things that separates us from other creatures, other primates notwithstanding. I took it that you were denying that any other primate(creature) had the ability to think about other animals' feeling, thought, and/or belief. That's what I was questioning.

...here's a fascinating book called Baboon Metaphysics: The Evolution of a Social Mind, by Cheney and Seyfarth, that makes a strong case that baboons have a more-than-rudimentary "theory of mind" which allows them to make predictions based on what they believe other baboons are thinking.
— J

Sounds like a fascinating book, thanks for the recommendation. Yes, I have read that other primates do have at least some capacity to develop theories of mind, but that they are not anywhere near as developed as the human capacity.

For example, only the human capacity for theory of mind led us to apply this ability to supernatural beings (gods) - paving the way for the development of religion.

And even to objects - like Wilson the volleyball in the Tom Hanks movie Cast Away — Questioner

Yup. We're probably the only creatures capable of (mistakenly)projecting our own thought/belief onto things incapable of it. On my view, anthropomorphism is a mistake to be avoided at all costs.