I support the idea of social welfare, free education and medical services and, most importantly, taxing the rich to a much greater degree than is presently happening. But no government seems to have the balls to do it — Janus

Agree.

OK, then we disagree on that. I think their attitude is simplistically self-serving and sociopathic. For me sociopathy is not an "all or nothing" proposition, but is on a spectrum. — Janus

One of the problems for me is that each side in this discourse seems to think the other is sociopathic. Today’s discourse is polarized and antagonistic. I’d like to see more civil conversations between people with different worldviews. I’m reluctant to call individuals sociopathic.

One of the problems for me is that each side in this discourse seems to think the other is sociopathic. Today’s discourse is polarized and antagonistic. I’d like to see more civil conversations between people with different worldviews. I’m reluctant to call individuals sociopathic. — Tom Storm

It's not that I'd say the individuals are necessarily sociopaths, but that their attitude of "let them sink or swim" is sociopathic. I don't believe this attitude is good for the individuals in need or for society as a whole (or even for the individuals holding such attitudes). In my view such attitudes and the policies that reflect them contribute to social ill-being in more ways than just their impact on the individuals in need, and in that sense I would class such attitudes and policies as sociopathic.

Firstly, great post.

The contemporary thinker I personally follow most closely is Peter L. P. Simpson, who defends what he calls "ethical naturalism," but it's hard to specify the contours of such a thing without getting into his book. Also, I don't think that level of detail is necessary in order to avoid the problem I've pointed to with regards to relativism. I think 180's approach does a fine job avoiding the problem I've raised in this thread. — Leontiskos

Cool. I'll have a look. That's helpful.

I think so. I admit that I didn't follow your conversation with Fire Ologist very closely, but I myself think well-being is a perfectly reasonable and defensible moral standard. When people want to argue for a more "transcendent" standard they are usually concerned with specific, rarefied moral truths or norms (e.g. "You should be willing to sacrifice your life for the good of your family if push comes to shove"). — Leontiskos

Nice. I need to refine my understanding of this.

Note, though, that the person who seeks money will have a harder time rationally justifying their position than the person who seeks well-being. This is because—as Aristotle points out—money is a means of exchange without intrinsic worth. If one does not seek money for the sake of the things that money can buy, but rather seeks money and the accumulation of money as an end in itself, then they would seem to be acting in an intrinsically irrational way. Put differently, you should be able to give someone everything money can buy and at that point they should have no real desire for money. If they still desire money at that point then they desire a means without an end, and are therefore irrational. — Leontiskos

That's a great point well put.

I would suggest that no one can opt-out entirely, except perhaps the hermit who abandons all civilization and lives self-sufficiently in the wilderness. Aristotle calls such a person a 'god' given that this is basically impossible to do. If we interact with other human beings then we must also decide how to interact with other humans beings, and anyone who does that already has moral positions, whether they understand them or not. — Leontiskos

Yes, I have often thought this too. For me, as a non-philosopher with finite time and years left, there is an issue around what I can legitimately acquire in terms of knowledge and perhaps more importantly understanding and wisdom. It's clear to me that most of the significant debates in philosophy, including moral philosophy, require some significant reading and study. Most of the recurring questions of philosophy have not been conclusively answered, and some of those answers are more complex than the average person can ever hope to understand. It's hard to know what to do. Sometimes a little bit of knowledge can be a dangerous thing, as we sometimes see on this forum.

What is a person's mandate to figure all this out? It often feels that as public discourse grows increasingly coarse and belligerent, and good philosophy becomes harder to acquire, it is sometimes tempting to just say, "Fuck it, I know what I like and I can’t really do much better than that," or even to opt out entirely.

Firstly, great post. — Tom Storm

Thanks. There is one thing I want to come back to:

My understanding is that [moral naturalism is] the view that moral facts, if they exist, are grounded in natural facts about the world rather than in anything supernatural or non-natural. — Tom Storm

This specific understanding of moral naturalism is also something I am okay with, especially as pertains to the OP. There is a notion in the Anglophone world that moral realism goes hand in hand with divine command theory, and my guess is that this stems from Anscombe. I'd say it is really hard to overestimate how faulty such a thesis is. Divine command theory is a latecomer to the theological scene, especially in Christianity, and it doesn't really solve any meta-ethical questions. Connotatively, moral (or ethical) "naturalism" more often refers to the alternative to the ethical non-naturalism of the 20th century. But that's why I asked what you meant by the term. I am fine with it on either reading, but if you mean something like "non-religious," then it is much easier to agree that it is a reasonable view.

Yes, I have often thought this too. For me, as a non-philosopher with finite time and years left, there is an issue around what I can legitimately acquire in terms of knowledge and perhaps more importantly understanding and wisdom. It's clear to me that most of the significant debates in philosophy, including moral philosophy, require some significant reading and study. Most of the recurring questions of philosophy have not been conclusively answered, and some of those answers are more complex than the average person can ever hope to understand. It's hard to know what to do. Sometimes a little bit of knowledge can be a dangerous thing, as we sometimes see on this forum. — Tom Storm

I understand what you are saying.

What is a person's mandate to figure all this out? It often feels that as public discourse grows increasingly coarse and belligerent, and good philosophy becomes harder to acquire, it is sometimes tempting to just say, "Fuck it, I know what I like and I can’t really do much better than that," or even to opt out entirely. — Tom Storm

I don't think of you as a non-philosopher. I don't think academic philosophy has a monopoly on philosophy. In fact I think academic philosophy is oftentimes positively unhelpful, unphilosophical, and ivory tower-ish. For example, in I argued that my four year-old nephew engages in philosophy, and I did this in response to some TPFers who seem to think that if you're not rearranging existential quantifiers then you must not be doing philosophy. I don't mean that as hyperbolic. That exchange with my nephew was philosophical. It was more philosophical than many of my exchanges on TPF.

So whether or not you are reading through the academic philosophical positions on meta-ethics, I think you are doing philosophy. In all honesty, I think the best moral philosophers are probably not academics (and that some of the worst moral philosophers are academics). Judges, school teachers, counselors, pastors, business managers, sports coaches - these are the people who are actually competent moral philosophers. The best objection to this claim of mine would be, "Well they are morally skillful individuals insofar as they routinely navigate and adjudicate deeply complex human interactions, but they may not be able to explain any of that on a theoretical level." That would be a fair objection, and I might amend my claim by saying, "Okay, but some of them really can explain the theory behind it, and those people tend to understand the theory better than the academics. They engage the theory on a day-to-day basis with real stakes and real consequences."

For example, the person who tries to think through the problem of their estrangement from their adult child is doing moral philosophy in a pre-eminent way.

What is a person's mandate to figure all this out? It often feels that as public discourse grows increasingly coarse and belligerent, and good philosophy becomes harder to acquire, it is sometimes tempting to just say, "Fuck it, I know what I like and I can’t really do much better than that," or even to opt out entirely. — Tom Storm

Yeah, I get that. Aquinas says that we should enter the ocean through small streams, not all at once. So you start where you are, and build out from what you already have. Maybe you think twice about your wife's perspective in the last argument you had. Maybe you step back from an unfortunate decision that your boss made and try to understand the way he sees the world, and then compare it to the way you see the world (and try to deeply understand and even justify why you would not have made the decision he made).

If you're thinking about literature then Plato comes to mind. He is remarkable insofar as he exercises everyone, from beginner to advanced, with the exact same texts. Beyond that, good fiction literature is extremely fruitful in a moral sense, because it provides insight into the complexities of human life and human persons.

If you really want to do the academic thing then you probably want to start with handbooks or overviews.

it is sometimes tempting to just say, "Fuck it, I know what I like and I can’t really do much better than that," or even to opt out entirely. — Tom Storm

The more general question here has to do with the tension between improvement and contentment. "Have I devoted sufficient energy to improvement? Is it okay to be content with where I am? Is my contentment really complacency?" It's always a balance, and it changes with age, duties, the availability of leisure, etc.

For my part I try to devote more attention to the perspectives and moralities in my immediate vicinity (e.g. family, friends, local community, my own country...). It might be fun to read about Confucian morality from 2500 years ago, but if you're talking about a "mandate" then it's not to the point. For example, I am currently trying to understand Nick Fuentes and the movement that he represents, because he is relevant to my country, to the region where I live, to my conservative political sensibilities, to the young men who I interact with, etc. To illustrate, someone like Fuentes says, "I live in Chicago where there is rampant gang violence committed largely by blacks. Therefore for my own safety and the safety of my family I must be racist towards black people, avoiding the neighborhoods where they live and taking extreme caution when interacting with them." The moral philosopher is the person who takes that perspective seriously and tries to interact with it in a fruitful way instead of just writing it off as malicious and irrational racism. The attempt to respond rationally and effectively to those racist perspectives is currently a topic of interest in the U.S.

This specific understanding of moral naturalism is also something I am okay with, especially as pertains to the OP. There is a notion in the Anglophone world that moral realism goes hand in hand with divine command theory, and my guess is that this stems from Anscombe. I'd say it is really hard to overestimate how faulty such a thesis is. — Leontiskos

Gotya. That's a useful insight to me. Cheers.

I think the best moral philosophers are probably not academics (and that some of the worst moral philosophers are academics). Judges, school teachers, counselors, pastors, business managers, sports coaches - these are the people who are actually competent moral philosophers. — Leontiskos

I wouldn’t have expected this, but I can see the merit in the view, precisely because, as you say, …

They engage the theory on a day-to-day basis with real stakes and real consequences." — Leontiskos

Maybe you step back from an unfortunate decision that your boss made and try to understand the way he sees the world, and then compare it to the way you see the world (and try to deeply understand and even justify why you would not have made the decision he made). — Leontiskos

I think this is important. I’m interested in people who think differently from me (part of the reason I joined) and in understanding why they think that way. I also think we’re in a terrible place, even in Australia, where conservatives and progressives (for want of a better term) talk past each other and tend to regard the other side as insane or deficient. We need to listen. Having said that, I’m not especially fond of activism on either side.

The more general question here has to do with the tension between improvement and contentment. "Have I devoted sufficient energy to improvement? Is it okay to be content with where I am? Is my contentment really complacency?" It's always a balance, and it changes with age, duties, the availability of leisure, etc. — Leontiskos

Yes, I think it does come down to this.

The moral philosopher is the person who takes that perspective seriously and tries to interact with it in a fruitful way instead of just writing it off as malicious and irrational racism. The attempt to respond rationally and effectively to those racist perspectives is currently a topic of interest in the U.S. — Leontiskos

I hear you. I'm probably on the progressive side compared to you but I have conservative intuitions such as wanting to preserve certain institutions and traditions.

For example, I am currently trying to understand Nick Fuentes — Leontiskos

I’d be interested in what you find. He’s a contentious figure.

I’m intrigued by our own anti-immigration and populist politician, Pauline Hanson. A fascinating long essay was written about her party and its membership, which was useful in helping me get my bearings.

I was intrigued for a while by Roger Scruton and his understanding of the conservative tradition. What are your thoughts? I wasn't on board with all I've heard him say but I appreciated his rigour and he had a generosity that is sometimes missing from public intellectuals who focus so clearly on values.

A well-known Australian conservative commentator once described conservatism as a disposition rather than an elaborate philosophy. I wonder whether you think that’s right.

This may not belong here, but since I started this thread, I’ll ask it anyway. It seems to me that we tend to bundle together terms like conservative, right-wing, and reactionary, even though they represent quite different traditions and approaches. If you were to parse the conservative tradition and the right more broadly, how would you go about it?

I apologise that I didn't respond to your very thoughtful contribution. I must have missed it. — Tom Storm

I must admit I've not been reading this thread lately. Work's been very taxing and I couldn't muster the concentration. I've yet to catch up with this thread; I'm fairly sure I will when things have quited down.

As far as I read, though, your discussion with Leontiskos was very interesting to read.

Yes, that’s true. The anti-foundationalist would probably say that things can still count as better or worse relative to shared cultural goals and values, without being grounded in anything transcendent or universal beyond that. We want safe traffic, so we create road rules. Many of these rules are partly arbitrary; we can drive on different sides of the road or adopt different turning conventions, but there are clearly practices that work better or worse for safety. None of this makes road rules objectively true independent of contingent human purposes and conditions. How different is morality to this? — Tom Storm

Pretty much my take.

Unfortunately, I think a required clarification, will defeat this in a significant way: — AmadeusD

Sorry for not being clear. I didn't spot the ambiguity when writing my post: "to shut them up" was supposed to indicate intent not effect. I'm a relativist myself, and if that sort of thing shuts me up, it does so in a "not-that-again" way.

I understand this to be true, given that those people are not Western. It is wrong to us. — AmadeusD

Yes, pretty much.

My form of relativism goes outward in concentric circles, with decisions often involving conflict:

- interior conflict (and individual wondering what to do)
- conflict between people
- conflict between groups
- conflict between bigger groups

So:

accept as moral the idea that some foreign culture has a scripture which commands that ever third child is purposefully blinded in service of the faith — AmadeusD

This just focuses on consensus over conflict. If I think that's wrong I can find and support elements in that culture that also thinks this is wrong.

Then: given that I'm an atheist (and so is Harris), faith isn't going to carry legitimising weight with me. But whether I can outright say this depends on who I'm talking to - how much I'll get into trouble saying this.

And that can cause problems, too, if I wish to support people who are against that sort of blinding, but they're against it from a position of minority faith, and thus - by banding together - we need to settle other moral conflicts, or agree to set them aside for the time being as much as possible.

But before that: should I even get involved? Is it any of my business? In how far can I make my moral disgust the problem of unrelated others? Am I going to have the mental and emotional fortitude to pull through? What if I change my mind but can't stop the avalanche I've started?

I consider morality an ongoing iterative process like that.

I don't really want to say much more until I've caught up with the thread, as I don't know what's already been said.

I think this is important. I’m interested in people who think differently from me (part of the reason I joined) and in understanding why they think that way. I also think we’re in a terrible place, even in Australia, where conservatives and progressives (for want of a better term) talk past each other and tend to regard the other side as insane or deficient. We need to listen. Having said that, I’m not especially fond of activism on either side. — Tom Storm

That makes sense to me.

I hear you. I'm probably on the progressive side compared to you but I have conservative intuitions such as wanting to preserve certain institutions and traditions. — Tom Storm

Yeah, I think conservation of at least some things is something most people are interested in.

I’d be interested in what you find. He’s a contentious figure.

I’m intrigued by our own anti-immigration and populist politician, Pauline Hanson. A fascinating long essay was written about her party and its membership, which was useful in helping me get my bearings. — Tom Storm

Interesting. In some ways I think Fuentes is a red-pilled young man with an all-or-nothing attitude. He feels as though if he stops short of 100% he will not have the effect he wants to have. This leads to an iconoclastic attitude towards cultural shibboleths. In some ways it's fairly simple. For example, on race Fuentes has grown up in the midst of an ever-growing problem of black crime in Chicago, and because speaking up about the problem leads to gaslighting in the form of "racist" accusations, Fuentes ends up embracing or at least disregarding the label ("I'd rather be a 'racist' than be murdered"). I had a hard time understanding his anti-Semitism until I watched a video from a British guy (Connor Tomlinson) explaining Fuentes' position in the midst of the recent fallout of a Piers Morgan interview (link). Tomlinson seems to be representing Fuentes' ideas in a much more rational and polite way, and at the same time explaining the phenomenon of Fuentes and his followers. You spoke of the way the two sides, "talk past each other and tend to regard the other side as insane or deficient," and Fuentes is an example of how that approach can blow up in our faces.

The moral question for American conservatives is something like this: is Fuentes an anti-immigrationist who happens to be anti-Semitic? Or is he an anti-Semite who happens to be an anti-immigrationist? Or does it not matter?

The moral principle that few understand is that all immoral acts come down to a form of neglect (i.e. neglecting what one knows they are supposed to observe). Fuentes might say, "When I say 'Hitler is cool,' I am referring to a lot of the things he did apart from genocide, such as raising a nation out of the ashes, or his military prowess, or his style and skill at public speaking." The problem is that if it is impermissible to obliquely affirm genocide, then none of these reasons work as justifications. Or to give a simpler example, if one is not allowed to kill people, then one must also take pains to avoid being neglectful in ways that could cause someone's death. "It wasn't my intention for him to die," is not a sufficient justification if the person was doing something they knew could reasonably cause others to die. But if you back a young man far enough into a corner, he simply won't care about these nuanced moral distinctions, and that's sort of understandable.

But before that: should I even get involved? Is it any of my business? In how far can I make my moral disgust the problem of unrelated others? Am I going to have the mental and emotional fortitude to pull through? What if I change my mind but can't stop the avalanche I've started?

I consider morality an ongoing iterative process like that. — Dawnstorm

Certainly. These, I think, are just super uncomfortable to most people. Leon seems to not be able to conceptually understand that I do not think my views on morality can apply to other people unless they agree to be bound by it for some reason (my wife and I do this).

So in what sense is your "moral thinking" moral? — 180 Proof

Well, you've got to stop (not saying you do but it's common) making fun of emotivism to get an answer to this :lol: . It has to do with any behaviours of mine which will (intentionally, or at least obviously predictably) affect someone else. That is moral thinking, no? Yes, it is. I just reduce my moral lens to myself, and how things make me feel. So If i were to for instance attempt to stop someone harming my child, it's not because I think its right, its because I, personally, don't want that to happen because it'll make me feel bad.

I’ve sometimes felt that I was an emotivist. One could say that shared cultural responses to right and wrong emerge because, at an intersubjective level, many of us tend to feel similar things and respond to them emotionally in comparable ways.

But how do you handle the familiar objection to emotivism: that when moral disagreement arises between people who do not share the same emotional responses, the theory seems to lack the resources to adjudicate between competing moral positions?

If morality is just about how you feel, why should anyone else care about your feelings at all, and why should you care about theirs?

One of the problems for me is that each side in this discourse seems to think the other is sociopathic. Today’s discourse is polarized and antagonistic. I’d like to see more civil conversations between people with different worldviews. — Tom Storm

The polarization and antagonism can also be simply due to the fact that the two parties are having a conversation at all.

Further, due to the two parties interacting, the polarization can also artificially elevate particular tenets on each side, giving them more prominence than they originally had.

All in all, discourse generally seems overrated. There'd probably be less strife if people talked less.

All in all, discourse generally seems overrated. There'd probably be less strife if people talked less. — baker

This may well have some merit and probably explains the English speaking world’s (no doubt others too) taboo on talking about religion or politics.

What I am interested in here is whether it is possible to make moral claims from either position. I can certainly see how simple relativism makes it a performative contradiction. Hence the relativist fallacy.

Anti-foundationalists, by contrast, hold that we can still justify our views through shared practices, shared goals and reasoning, even if there’s no single universal truth to ground them.

For instance, morality could be seen as something that grows out of human agreements, pragmatic necessities and dialogue rather than absolute rules — Tom Storm

First of all, Tom, your OP makes a very good point.

But to @Janus -- you touched on the heart of the argument between foundationalism and other forms of moral arguments such as relativism.

The one thing that is always missed in discussions like this is that while the foundationalist view claims that there are universal moral truth, anyone who argued against foundationalism is also making -- though maybe not intentionally and without awareness -- a 'universal' claim, mainly that there is no universal truth and morality is based on cultural differences..

So a relativist has a conundrum -- how to make an argument against foundationalism without making a universal or truth-based claim?

Here is an example, as described by Leontiskos:

Then you're committed to the value of human flourishing and you think everyone should recognize your value whether or not they do. In that case you would seem to be a moral realist, someone who sees human flourishing as an intrinsic telos of human beings. — Leontiskos

Moral realism, just like foundationalism, claims that there are moral truths that are not constrained by one's culture, customs, or society.

Relativism is a peculiar position because it is a view one cannot hold without also claiming moral truth which is the very thing it purports to deny.

To juxtapose another moral claim -- moral intuitionists can actually make an argument against moral realism because the former is not denying that there is no objective morality, only that the discovery of moral truths is self-evident.

Thanks for your thoughtful post.

The one thing that is always missed in discussions like this is that while the foundationalist view claims that there are universal moral truth, anyone who argued against foundationalism is also making -- though maybe not intentionally and without awareness -- a 'universal' claim, mainly that there is no universal truth and morality is based on cultural differences.. — L'éléphant

What I'm trying to do is articulate what an anti-foundationalist position might look like.

Anti-foundationalism isn’t the same as moral relativism. Relativism says what’s right or wrong depends entirely on culture or individual preference. Anti-foundationalism doesn’t make any claim about what is right or wrong; it only questions whether there are absolute, universal moral truths. It’s about how we justify moral claims, not about the content of those claims, so you can be anti-foundationalist without saying “anything goes.”

But how do you handle the familiar objection to emotivism: that when moral disagreement arises between people who do not share the same emotional responses, the theory seems to lack the resources to adjudicate between competing moral positions?

If morality is just about how you feel, why should anyone else care about your feelings at all, and why should you care about theirs? — Tom Storm

I don't think its an objection to the position. I think its an emotional response to someone else clearly stating the facts of the matter.
Emotivism can't adjudicate between competing moral positions. No morality rightly can, because it cannot appeal to anything but itself (the theory, that is - and here, ignoring revelation-type morality as there's no mystery there). The only positions, as I see it, that can adjudicate between conflicting moral positions on a given case is are 'from without' positions such as the Law attempts to take. I still don't think there's a better backing than 'most will agree' for a moral proclamation.

On the question's face, they shouldn't, and neither should I. But harming others makes me feel shit. It seems to do the same for the majority of people. That's good enough, and the best we can wish for imo.

Relativism is a peculiar position because it is a view one cannot hold without also claiming moral truth which is the very thing it purports to deny. — L'éléphant

I'm unsure it does (but could be wrong -bear with). Banno has made a very good job of discussing with me moral positions that rest of "what people do". In this sense, he claims (if im not making a pigs ear of what he's said to me in the past) there are moral truths which are not objective. But are true.

A relativist can make this claim - but they can make the claim relative to specific sets of value which are contained with specific cultural contexts. I think Banno's tries to avoid the constraints found there and so its not relative.

I still don't think there's a better backing than 'most will agree' for a moral proclamation.

On the question's face, they shouldn't, and neither should I. But harming others makes me feel shit. It seems to do the same for the majority of people. That's good enough, and the best we can wish for imo. — AmadeusD

Got ya. Thanks.

If morality is just about how you feel [@AmadeusD], why should anyone else care about your feelings at all, and why should you care about theirs? — Tom Storm

:up:

[H]arming others makes me feel shit. It seems to do the same for the majority of people. That's good enough, and the best we can wish for imo. — AmadeusD

Your appeal to popularity here seems quite lazy.

Given that everyone is (all sentient creatures are) vulnerable to "harming" (i.e. involuntary pain, dysfunction, loss ... suffering) is a natural fact, this provides a truth maker for the following moral claim: 'It is right to prevent preventable harm or reduce reduceable harm, whenever possible, and wrong not to do so'. IMO, like moral relativism / subjectivism / nihilism, emotivism renders empathy and sociopathy practically indistinguishable.

If morality is just about how you feel, why should anyone else care about your feelings at all, and why should you care about theirs? — Tom Storm

Because it makes practical sense to do so. Empathy exists.

Because it makes practical sense to do so. Empathy exists. — I like sushi

But this doesn’t resolve the problem, since empathy is unevenly distributed across causes and cohorts. How are we to decide whose empathy sets the standard, and which feelings deserve moral weight?

Your appeal to popularity here seems quite lazy. — 180 Proof

I still cannot make any sense of your overuse of formatting. It makes you harder to read than most anyone else here. So If i've misunderstood something, that might be why.

I'm not 'appealing' to authority. I'm saying this is what people in fact, do. And that's fine by me. Lazy? No. It's taken quite some time and quite some difficulty accepting this. Wrong? Could be, but that begs the question :P

this provides a truth maker for the following moral claim: 'It is right to prevent preventable harm or reduce reduceable harm, whenever possible, and wrong not to do so'. — 180 Proof

It doesn't. It just gives us an ability to coherently make that claim - not something to make the claim 'correct' in either direction. It boils down to feelings. I maintain this.

People are also, as a natural fact, liable to be taken by an illusion. That doesn't give us a truth maker for "illusions are bad".

The one thing that is always missed in discussions like this is that while the foundationalist view claims that there are universal moral truth, anyone who argued against foundationalism is also making -- though maybe not intentionally and without awareness -- a 'universal' claim, mainly that there is no universal truth and morality is based on cultural differences.. — L'éléphant

It doesn't have to be a universal claim, but merely an observation that no one has been able to present a universal truth, such that the unbiased would be rationally compelled to accept it. The closest we can get, in my view is the empirical observation that things like murder, rape, theft, devious deception and exploitation are despised by most people across cultures. The only caveat being that those things may be not universally disapproved of if they are done to the "enemy" or even anyone who is seen as "other".

So a relativist has a conundrum -- how to make an argument against foundationalism without making a universal or truth-based claim? — L'éléphant

So, I think that any foundation which is not simply based on the idea that to harm others is bad and to help others is good, per se, is doomed to relativism, since those dispositions are in rational pragmatic alignment with social needs and they also align with common feeling, and also simply because people don't universally, or even generally, accept any other foundation such as God as lawgiver, or Karmic penalties for moral transgressions or whatever else you can think of.

The closest we can get, in my view is the empirical observation that things like murder, rape, theft, devious deception and exploitation are despised by most people across cultures — Janus

This is the 'bingo' that I think most thinkers miss.

If you are an emotivist this is not a particularly relevant question. You decide based on what suits your own disposition. People tend to prefer things that benefit them. An entirely selfish or selfless person will soon come to realise that you have to be selfless and selfish to some degree respectively.

If something 'feels' right to you it feels right. You can of course come to change your mind about it with more information. If your feelings do not fit into societal norms you then bend them to your will as best you can or suck it up. The culminative effect has been what we broadly refer to as 'morality' but I see no reason to say 'killing people is wrong' is necessarily a True statement.

What I personally find most intriguing is the interplay between normative values across different domains, and exactly how different such domains really are. If anything I think the most moral act anyone can make is to sacrifice their own sense of morality for the betterment of others because I am someone who values humanity. I 'feel' that human is good.

Every moral position (realist or otherwise) has problems logically. I think this is simply because there is more to life than abstract truths.

The main argument against an emotivist position that adherents of it tend to struggle with is precisely what you outlined. If there is no point from which two people can agree on then it is impossible to figure out a better course.

Here are two problems with this criticism.

(1) Can this be at all possible? Can two people never come to a general agreement about anything deemed 'moral' from which to build a common understanding from.

(2) Even if it is granted that (1) is possible, then does this criticism not also lie at the feet of every moral theory there is? Meaning, just because someone says or believes they are not X or are Y does this mean they actually are. The subjective nature of the kinds of problems involved in ethics means people either stop thinking and resort to a theoretical framework that suits their 'gut feeling' (altruism, some form of consequentialism, or perhaps deontic stance), rather than actually tackle the reasons they feel they way they do as opposed to what they think is 'right' or 'wrong' or how they morally 'ought to' feel about this or that.

I am unsure. I remain unsure. I have experiences that have given me certain insights, but they are wholly subjective so I simply have to do as I do and question as I go.

The labels we use serve a purpose in discourse not as a picture frame for reality. I do see too many adhering to 'emotivism' or 'virtue ethics,' or whatever other niche carved out in the landscape of ethics, as if it is a writ physical law they must abide by.

They are all useful and contrastign perspectives that can allow us to understand others thoughts and actions as well as our own. I still end on the simple thought that people 'feel' this or that way is better suited to them at this or that given moment. If I need a label to sketch my ethical disposition it is as some kind of emotivist, but (big BUT!) it tells you very, very little about how I regard other people's views and values, how I judge them, if I judge them, and what actual moral theories I may feel are better generally, or specifically in certain contexts.

But this doesn’t resolve the problem — Tom Storm

I do not see a problem. Meaning, I do not think it makes sense to view such as problematic. It is a bit like saying 'life is problematic' .. well, yeah! If it was not would we bother doing anything. Problems are good things not bad things; unless you 'feel' otherwise of course ;)

As an explicit example you can ask anyone this simple question:

"What is the biggest problem you have?"

Then whatever they may say think about whether or nto they have really said anything much other than "I do not like this thing" understanding that underneath it there is a whole invisble world upon which such claims remain oblivious to.

I recommend Bernard Williams' 'Ethics and The Limits of Philosophy' if you wish to dive deeper (note: he is not an emotivist).

:up:

People experience empathy very differently. I overheard a man talking about the mass-murder of Jewish people on a Sydney beach the other day. He said, to some approval, “they started this.” Clearly, the feelings this event generates are not experienced in the same way by everyone. Especially not by people whose values include antisemitism. The same might be said of people’s empathy for trans people or for illegal immigrants. So if all we have to go on are people’s feelings, whose feelings are supposed to matter and how are they a reliable guide?

I’m not sure this can be answered in a satisfying way, except by opting out entirely and saying that it doesn’t matter, that everyone has to decide for themselves how they feel. But for me, morality is a social phenomenon: it concerns how we behave toward one another, so some account of shared value has to enter the picture.

But how do you handle the familiar objection to emotivism: that when moral disagreement arises between people who do not share the same emotional responses, the theory seems to lack the resources to adjudicate between competing moral positions?

If morality is just about how you feel, why should anyone else care about your feelings at all, and why should you care about theirs? — Tom Storm

Being social primates, it is instinctive in us to care about the way others see us, so it isn't a matter of "should care".

People do care, and thus one can easily convey "boo murder" in a rhetorically effective way.

Being social primates, it is instinctive in us to care about the way others see us, so it isn't a matter of "should care". — wonderer1

:up: :up:

It boils down to feelings. I maintain this. — AmadeusD

An emotional – arbitrary – "justification" for e.g. betrayal or cruelty or rape. Lazy. :mask:

An emotional – arbitrary – "justification" for e.g. betrayal or cruelty or rape. Lazy. :mask: — 180 Proof

Feelings are far from arbitrary. They’re appraisals of situations which inform us of our relative preparedness to cope with , anticipate and make sense of them. That is, affect reports the significance and salience of events , why they matter to us. Without them, words like betrayal, cruelty and rape are ethically meaningless.

The main argument against an emotivist position that adherents of it tend to struggle with is precisely what you outlined. If there is no point from which two people can agree on then it is impossible to figure out a better course. — I like sushi

This isn't a struggle for an emotivist. It's just a fact of life. Co-operation operates the way it does and the a majority of people, emotivist or not, seem to understand that. We get on. It is what it is.

I think the struggle comes from others not being able to accept that position (maybe its seen as incomplete? I can't see how).

An emotional – arbitrary – "justification" for e.g. betrayal or cruelty or rape. Lazy. :mask: — 180 Proof

No, 180. What's Lazy is just repeating yourself when you've been addressed. If you're uncomfortable with it boiling down to feelings, make an argument, not an appeal to your discomfort or an ad hominem. It is not my problem if you have trouble accepting that there is no further grounding than your feelings for your moral positions. Do you consistently do things you think are morally right but make you feel bad? No? Interesting.

very well said. I shall add to this that I am not actually required to give anything more than what I've said to support my point. Being called lazy just indicates the bolded above which was entirely anticipated from 180.

Feelings are far from arbitrary. They’re appraisals of situations which inform us of our relative preparedness to cope with , anticipate and make sense of them. That is, affect reports the significance and salience of events , why they matter to us. Without them, words like betrayal, cruelty and rape are ethically meaningless. — Joshs

This seems to me to be an important insight, despite its apparent simplicity.

Being social primates, it is instinctive in us to care about the way others see us, so it isn't a matter of "should care". — wonderer1

To some extent, although you’ve phrased it as “the way others see us” - do you mean that we only do it for show?

I think we are just as hard-wired not to care as any out-group or disparaged tribe will demonstrate. How do we explain the fact that we tend to care about people like us, but not so much about immigrants, the homeless, people with substance-use challenges, or trans people? Huge groups of humans seem to flip into hate, resentment and moral indifference fairly readily and generally find ways to rationalise neglect.