I don't believe that the transcendental subject is a being in a sense other than the indexical. We can't single out the transcendental subject and say what it is. I don't think that Kant thought that the transcendental subject was something we could know. — Wayfarer

True, the transcendental subject is not itself an empirical object in Kant's system, but the structure and the function of the transcendental subject is nonetheless knowable via an inference to the conditions for the possibility empirical experience. My interpretation of what Kant is arguing in CPR is that 'something' must exist that has this structure and these functions otherwise empirical experience would be impossible. This is an ontology. Noumena exist. The transcendental subject exists. However, their existence is inferred rather than experienced. If they didn't exist, then empirical experience itself would not be possible.

The “excess” disclosed in inquiry is not an object standing outside cognition, but the open-endedness of meaning itself. And notice I'm not saying there is nothing outside of or apart from the cognized object - that would be to assert its non-existence - but that, whatever we make of the object, is through that process of assimilation, whereby it becomes incorporated into the network that comprises the world of lived meanings (the 'lebenswelt'). Were it totally outside that, then we couldn't even cognize it. — Wayfarer

You are right that the 'excess' is not to be understood in ontological terms.That's the whole point, we can't start by assuming our conclusion. The question of whether any given object exists independently of the mind should be answered at the end of inquiry into the nature of that object, not assumed at the beginning. After we've inquired into the nature of the object and have judged that the object exists independently of the mind, that's it. That is just what it means to make an ontological commitment. Whereas what you are doing is defining 'object' as 'mind-dependent' from the outset, so that no matter what we learn about the object through the process of inquiry this knowledge always only applies to a mind-dependent object by definition. You are deciding the ontological status of the object in advance of the inquiry, which just begs the question.

@Gnomon I'm in agreement with your 'both-and' type of attitude. The 'either-or' dilemma is something stamped firmly into [Rational] consciousness. — Wayfarer

Having an affinity for "modern Aristotleanism" (e.g. hylomorphism), as you have said you do, Wayf, I'm sure, for consistency's sake, you agree with this venerable (pre-modern, non-Western) Aristotlean's bivalence:

Anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be beaten and burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned. — Ibn Sina, d. 1037 CE

:smirk:

What the mind already knows about the object is the object as it is for-consciousness. — Esse Quam Videri

Yes, in that the object in its entirety is the experience. When the perception is already determined as, e.g., basketball, as far as the human intellect is concerned, the totality of conceptions subsumed under the general are included in the experience whether or not consciousness registers them. Such being the case, what is not known about the thing is not in-itself, but can be nonetheless cognized as an inference to a possible experience, insofar as the logical object of those inferences is necessarily contained in the thing experienced.

What the mind doesn't know about the object is the object as it is in-itself. — Esse Quam Videri

Given the above, it is clear this is not the case, under the assumption the object the mind knows of, is the same object the mind may not know all of. It is absurd to suppose the dark side of the moon, at those times in which there was no experience of it, there was only the dark-side-of-the-moon-in-itself.

What the mind doesn’t know about a thing doesn’t necessarily indicate a thing-in-itself. It is entirely possible the mind doesn’t know about a thing because there’s no thing to know about.

THAT the mind doesn’t know OF the object, is just what it means for the object to be as it is in itself.

Therefore, the object as it is in-itself is in excess of the object as it is for-consciousness. — Esse Quam Videri

In a sense, yes. But these merely represent time differentials between the thing in itself and the same thing for-consciousness. Wordplay: in-itself vs in-us; in-itself vs for-consciousness. In-itself as a thing vs thing given to us as appearance vs thing represented in us as phenomenon.

Furthermore, the act of asking a question presupposes that what the mind doesn't yet know about the object (the in-itself) is knowable because, again, otherwise it wouldn't ask the question. — Esse Quam Videri

Agreed, in principle, with the caveat that part of the thing the mind asks about is not any part of the thing in itself. By definition, the mind cannot even ask about the thing-in-itself, but is perfectly within its cognitive purview to ask about things merely possible for-consciousness, to use your term.

Still, there are myriad instances of asking questions even about things the mind thinks, but for which the mind already knows the experience is impossible. One of the more familiar instances being….what is it like to be a bat. Again, in your terms, what is known is a bat; what is asked is what it is like to be a bat-in-itself, from which what is proposed as being knowable, is actually not.

Therefore, the act of asking a question about an object presupposes that the object as it is in-itself is knowable. — Esse Quam Videri

The act of asking a question about an object presupposes the possibility of an answer relative to the object asked about. The object asked about is the object or possible object for-consciousness, not the object as it is in itself.

If it is the case the perception of a thing is the perception of a whole, it makes sense that the thing-in-itself of which there is no perception includes the whole of that thing-in-itself. From which follows the possibility of knowing all of the one, but the impossibility of knowing anything at all in part or in whole about the other, while at the same time granting necessary existence relative to a perceiver, of both.
—————-

On the other hand…..

There is a kind of in-itself-ness of things for which there is experience. It is not irrational to allow knowledge of the basketball itself to not include knowledge of the air contained inside its spatial boundaries. Or that the knowledge of the exterior spherical surface material does not grant knowledge of the interior spherical surface material. But it is understood a priori, first, that there must be those, and, second, there is no need, and indeed it would be superfluous, to cognize such distinction necessarily, in order for the experience of the thing as a whole to reside in consciousness without self-contradiction.

But it doesn’t serve any useful purpose to suppose the air in the basketball is some thing in itself. Or even the microscopic things of which there isn’t any direct experience at all. Which makes sense, because all that stuff each has its own name, whether directly experienced or not, which presupposes it is some thing already known or inferred logically by the same mind that comprehends the necessity of all the constituency of the thing as a whole experience.
—————-

Noumena exist. The transcendental subject exists. However, their existence is inferred rather than experienced. — Esse Quam Videri

That which is inferred is a strictly logical construct. Existence is a category, and all categories and their subsumed conceptions have reference only to things of experience, and never to merely logical inferences. An existence is empirically given, an inference is only logically valid. Under these conditions, it cannot be said noumena exist, but it can be said it is impossible to know they do not.

Noumena are no more than that which understanding thinks, understanding thinks only in concepts, therefore noumena are no more than concepts. Concepts do not exist, they are no more than valid thoughts, valid meaning they do not contradict anything in the thinking of them. They would certainly contradict experience if it were possible for that which is no more than a mere thought, to be an experience. I mean…if that were the case, everybody could buy a unicorn.

The transcendental subject is not even a concept or a thought of understanding. It belongs to pure reason alone, as an apodeitic principle thus is even further from existence than a mere thought.

In Kantian dualism is the irreducible necessity that if this is this, it cannot ever be that. If existence is this, nothing that does not have this can exist. If inference is that, nothing that does not have that can be an inference. Existence is not inference; inference is not existence. Irreducible necessity meaning one can’t be a dualist for one thing but not another. If he is a dualist he is so in toto and cannot rationally oscillate between being one for this and not one for that.

Of course, if one doesn’t consider himself a proper Kantian dualist, he’s at liberty to mess it up any way he sees fit (grin)

Yours are interesting arguments; I only comment in reference to the claimed source material, your interpretations of it, or conjunction with it, be what they may.

As regards Faggin - I sense that the One resonates with the One of Plotinus' philosophy. He has taken ideas from a variety of sources, and also developed his own using metaphors from quantum physics and computing. But still see him as rather idiosyncratic. He's not going to get noticed much in the 'consciousness studies' ecosystem for that reason. — Wayfarer

Faggin is indeed idiosyncratic compared to eclectic New-Age-type religious philosophy. But his empirical & rational approach may be acceptable to some strands of Consciousness Studies*1. So far, his book is mostly about a scientific worldview, not a religious belief system. The word "god" does not appear in his glossary, but the term "panpsychism" does. Consequently, I get the impression that his worldview is Philosophical & Scientific, not Religious ; intellectual & practical, not emotional.

His chapter 2 is about The Nature of Quantum Reality, and his "creator" is abstract & impersonal. Speaking of universal quantum fields, he says : "These fields have space & time in common and are the fundamental entities that, interacting with each other, create everything that exists physically". The fields themselves may be construed as Metaphysical, but it remains to be seen if Faggin views them as created by some higher power, or are self-existent : i.e. god-like.

In discussing quantum particles, he describes them, not as Lucretius' tiny hard balls of stuff, but as foggy "clouds" of mathematical probability. To me, that sounds more like Platonic Ideality (shadows in he cave) than Aristotle's Physics. Personally, for all pragmatic purposes, I act as-if my world-model is Aristotelian (practical) Reality, but for theoretical exploration I can also imagine a Platonic metaphysical Ideality. Not Either/Or, but BothAnd.

As I read chapter 2, a thought occurred to me : Classical Newtonian physics was compatible with the Bible God, who creates a world, like a wind-up toy, and sets it on a straight & narrow path in a specific direction. But non-linear & probabilistic Quantum physics is more like the erratic & random ancient religions based on natural cycles. Their polytheistic gods (e.g. Olympian) were not all-powerful, and argued amongst themselves. Which left their worshipers grappling with mysteries beyond comprehension, wandering guided only by faith. On the other hand, non-religious Philosophy can deal with Quantum Mysticism, not by Faith, but by Reason. :nerd:

*1. Consciousness Studies is an interdisciplinary field exploring the nature of subjective experience, blending neuroscience, philosophy, psychology, physics, and more, to understand how the brain creates self-awareness and reality, focusing on identifying neural correlates, developing theories like Global Workspace Theory or Integrated Information Theory, and investigating altered states like meditation, aiming to bridge the gap between physical brain processes and phenomenal experience.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=consciousness+studies

Whereas what you are doing is defining 'object' as 'mind-dependent' from the outset, so that no matter what we learn about the object through the process of inquiry this knowledge always only applies to a mind-dependent object by definition. You are deciding the ontological status of the object in advance of the inquiry, which just begs the question. — Esse Quam Videri

I don’t think I’m assigning an ontological status to objects. I’m not saying that objects depend for their existence on minds. I’m saying that objecthood — identity, determinacy, intelligibility — is a cognitive status, not an ontological primitive. That’s a claim about the conditions under which inquiry is possible, not a stipulation about what exists prior to inquiry. It is an epistemological rather than ontological argument.

From the mind-created world op:

I will concentrate less on arguments about the nature of the constituents of objective reality, and focus instead on understanding the mental processes that shape our judgment of what they comprise.

... there is no need for me to deny that the Universe is real independently of your mind or mine, or of any specific, individual mind. Put another way, it is empirically true that the Universe exists independently of any particular mind. But what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective. It is not solely constituted by objects and their relations. Reality has an inextricably mental aspect, which itself is never revealed in empirical analysis ¹. Whatever experience we have or knowledge we possess, it always occurs to a subject — a subject which only ever appears as us, as subject, not to us, as object.

So I'm not saying that objects don't exist in the absence of the observer, but that their ontological status is indeterminate.

This is an ontology. Noumena exist. The transcendental subject exists. However, their existence is inferred rather than experienced. If they didn't exist, then empirical experience itself would not be possible. — Esse Quam Videri

But what kind of existence do they have? You can't show them to me, only explain them to me. Anything that has to be explained is conceptual, not phenomenal.

In a previous exchange, I mentioned this passage from a review of a book on Husserl:

We can maintain that mathematical objects are mind-independent, self-subsistent and in every sense real, and we can also explain how we are cognitively related to them: they are invariants in our experience, given fulfillments of mathematical intentions. ...

We can evidently say, for example, that mathematical objects are mind-independent and unchanging, but now we always add that they are constituted in consciousness in this manner, or that they are constituted by consciousness as having this sense … . They are constituted in consciousness, nonarbitrarily, in such a way that it is unnecessary to their existence that there be expressions for them or that there ever be awareness of them.[/i[ (p. 13).
— — Phenomenology, Logic, and the Philosophy of Mathematics (review)

The reason I mention this again, is that it says, on the one hand, that mathematical objects are "mind-independent", but, on the other, that they are "constituted in consciousness, nonarbitrarily."

They are "mind independent" in that mathematical proofs are not dependent on any particular mind. But they are "constituted in consciousness" in that they can only be known by a rational intelligence. So here, I'm advocating a form of logical realism: that numbers, scientific laws, and logical principles are real in this same sense. They're not existent as phenomena, but are inherent in the way consciousness constitutes meaning, through rational inference and the like.

I don’t deny that noumena or transcendental conditions exist, (or rather: are real) but existence is not a single category. What exists phenomenally can be shown; what exists formally or logically can only be explained. Mathematical objects, logical laws, and transcendental conditions are real without being phenomenal — objective without being mind-independent in the sense of existing as items in the empirical world. That is the sense in which reality has an inherently mental aspect, without collapsing into subjectivism.

Classical Newtonian physics was compatible with the Bible God, who creates a world, like a wind-up toy, and sets it on a straight & narrow path in a specific direction. But non-linear & probabilistic Quantum physics is more like the erratic & random ancient religions based on natural cycles. — Gnomon

Well, Tao of Physics (1974) is a cultural landmark, notwithstanding that it is written around many weak analogies. But it is a matter of fact that Neils Bohr, on being awarded Imperial Honors by the Danish Crown for his discoveries, had a familial coat-of-arms designed which had the Taost Ying-Yang symbol at its centre. He regarded the 'complementarity principle' as the most important philosophical discovery of his life.

I think the more salient point is the emergence of the 'division of mind and matter' that originates with Descartes and Galileo. The objective world comprising measurable properties (the 'primary qualities') is said to be the ground of reality as far as science is concerned, while how things appear is relegated to the mind of the observer. That is the 'cartesian division' which is still very influential in life and culture. Hence the belief that the Universe is devoid of meaning, as meaning has been subjectivised. So whatever meaning there is, is a matter for the individual. Faggin says in his introduction:

If we start from consciousness, free will, and creativity as irreducible properties of nature, the whole scientific conception of reality is overturned. In this new vision, the emotional and intuitive parts of life—ignored by materialism—return to play a central role. Aristotle said: “To educate the mind without educating the heart means not educating at all.” We cannot let physicalism and reductionism define human nature and leave consciousness out from the description of the universe. The physicalist and reductionist premises are perfect for describing the mechanical and symbolic-informational aspects of reality, but they are inadequate to explain its semantic aspects. If we insist that these assumptions describe all of reality, we eliminate a priori what distinguishes us from our machines and we erase our consciousness, our freedom and, above all, our humanity from the face of the universe. — Faggin, Federico. Irreducible: Consciousness, Life, Computers, and Human Nature (p. 14) Kindle Edition.

But I know from experience, many will respond, 'OK if consciousness is so important, where is it! Show it to me!'

Yājñavalkya says: "You tell me that I have to point out the Self (i.e. 'consciousness') as if it is a cow or a horse. Not possible! It is not an object like a horse or a cow. I cannot say, 'here is the Ātman; here is the Self'. It is not possible because you cannot see the seer of seeing. The seer can see that which is other than the Seer, or the act of seeing. An object outside the seer can be beheld by the seer. How can the seer see himself? How is it possible? You cannot see the seer of seeing. You cannot hear the hearer of hearing. You cannot think the Thinker of thinking. You cannot understand the Understander of understanding. That is Ātman." — Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣad

He regarded the 'complementarity principle' as the most important philosophical discovery of his life. — Wayfarer

Ironically, would troll Neils Bohr as a wishy-washy woo-purveyor, if he had the audacity to post his on this forum. I just realized the significance of the alcohol-purity screenname : A> it may symbolize the ideal of a trump-like "perfect" worldview : Black vs White & True vs False & Immanent vs Transcendent*1 with no watered-down adulterants. Or B> it dumbs-down philosophical complexities to Either/Or dualities that a simple mind can handle.

The "logical fallacy" of a two-value (right/wrong) posturing is the arrogant presumption of absolute knowledge. Which often causes imbalance & disharmony among imperfect humans. I suppose 180's "ideal" of perfect omniscience is admirable in a way, but it's not Plato's way.

For the rest of the story : Rutherford-Bohr's original classical planetary model of an atom was later invalidated by Heisenberg's statistical Uncertainty Principle. But, as you noted, Bohr --- with intellectual modesty --- later came to accept the Yin-and-Yang Complementary Principle illustrated in the Taoism symbol. Note, I also use that Holistic image as a bullet in my blog posts.

For most philosophers and scientists, the search-for-truth is motivated by the lack of omniscience. But 180, on his pure-white perch above us mortals, can despise any signs of ignorance and intellectual modesty. :joke:




*1. "Either/or black vs white" refers to the logical fallacy of a false dilemma (or false dichotomy), where only two extreme options (black or white, good or bad, for or against) are presented, ignoring the vast spectrum of possibilities, nuances, and "shades of gray" that actually exist, often used to oversimplify complex issues or force a choice. It's a way of thinking that reduces complex realities to simple, opposing choices, hindering deeper understanding and compromise.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=either+or+black+vs+white&zx=1765662725371&no_sw_cr=1

*2. In philosophy, the search for truth is the fundamental, ongoing quest to understand reality, knowledge, and existence, using reason, logic, and critical inquiry to answer big questions, even without definitive answers, with various methods like correspondence, coherence, and pragmatism offering different paths to what is real or useful. It's seen as a core activity, even if philosophers often debate what truth is, with some defining it as what works (Pragmatism), what matches reality (Correspondence), or a coherent system of ideas.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=philosophy+search+for+truth

*3. The Yin Yang principle is a foundational concept in Chinese philosophy describing the belief that opposing forces are interconnected, complementary, and interdependent. Represented by the Taijitu symbol, yin (the dark, passive, feminine force) and yang (the light, active, masculine force) are not static but are in a dynamic, ever-changing balance, where each contains a seed of the other. The principle emphasizes that harmony is achieved through the balance of these two forces, not through extremes.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=yin+yang+principle


COMPLEMENTARY YIN-YANG PRINCIPLE OF HOLISM