I don't quite understand what (3) means, but it doesn't seem to follow from (1). — Michael

It is a premise. (2) follows from (1) with another tacit premise; (4) follows from (2) and (3). I will add an edit to make this clear.

It looks like your justification for (3) is this argument:

P1. Those who say that trans women are women say that because of this trans women ought be allowed to compete in women's sports
P2. Women's sports is restricted to biological women
C1. Therefore, those who say that trans women are women say that because of this trans women ought be allowed to compete in sports restricted to biological women

If so, this analogy should show the fallacy you're committing:

P1. John says that he wants to date Jane
P2. Jane is a married woman
C1. Therefore, John says that he wants to date a married woman

C1 doesn't follow because it's possible that John doesn't believe that Jane is a married woman (and even if he does it's not what he said). You can't just substitute terms in this way.

With respect to trans women in women's sports, it's not that they favour biological males competing in sports restricted to biological women but that they favour women's sports not being restricted to biological women.

And as for your conclusion that "'transwomen are women' means that biological males who identify as women are biological females", once again nobody who says "trans women are women" is saying "biological males who identify as women have XX chromosomes, a womb, and a vagina". To suggest otherwise is to equivocate.

P1. Those who say that trans women are women say that because of this trans women ought be allowed to compete in women's sports
P2. Only biological women ought be allowed to compete in women's sports
C1. Therefore, those who say that trans women are women are saying that trans women are biological women — Michael

if I may, I'd like to comment on this. I am guessing that "P" stands for proposition, and "C" conclusion"?

Well, it seems P1 includes a conclusion?

I don't agree that people who say trans women are women do so because they ought to be allowed in women's sports. I am not sure that anyone has the reasoning listed?

It is salient if you are sticking strictly to normativity in the logical sense rather than the epistemological sense. You have just continued to corner yourself in the logical sense. — I like sushi

I've no idea wha that means.

The rest of your post has already been dealt with.

Thanks for that. It saved me repeating myself.

Noted a few deleted posts - did I miss anything significant?

C1 doesn't follow because it's possible that John doesn't believe that Jane is a married woman — Michael

It looks as though you are retreating back to a defense you had already (wisely) , namely the defense that says, "Ah, but none of these people knew that men's boxing excluded women on the basis of biology." Again, such a position is so implausible as to appear disingenuous. You are trying to claim that John's not knowing that Jane is married is the same as the trans activist not knowing that women's boxing excluded men on the basis of biology. :yikes:

We could draw out other absurd consequences of your view. You apparently think that, as with John, if you were to explain the situation to the trans activist then their course of action would alter. You apparently think that if you explained to the trans activist that women's boxing excludes men on the basis of biology, then they would change their views; or that if you explained to the trans activist that:

1. "Transwomen are women" means that biological men who identify as women are feminine (or woman-gendered) — Leontiskos

...then they would stop using that phrase in connection with these sports issues or other sex-based issues. The fact of the matter is that the trans activist does not care a whit about your quibbles. Nothing they do is based on some principled difference between sex and gender, where they seek to alter norms based on gender but leave intact norms based on sex. I think you know this.

With respect to trans women in women's sports, it's not that they favour biological males competing in sports restricted to biological women but that they favour women's sports not being restricted to biological women. — Michael

This is yet another quibble, a distinction without a difference. Trans activists want biological men and biological women to compete in the same sports leagues, even when it comes to sports like boxing. They want them to share the same restrooms, the same shelters, the same locker rooms, etc. All of this points to the same issue: your convenient construal of, "Trans men are men," is surely false. As I said in , their claim has little to do with gender. It is a claim about the inclusion of identifying individuals into the sphere with which they identify. Sex divisions in sports is just one impediment to that program of the sovereignty of self-identity. You misrepresent their position when you claim that they are speaking to gender but not sex, as if they were uninterested in changing norms around sex.

Coming back to the original post:

The activist means something like, "This human being who says that he is a man should be viewed by all as a man, both as regards sex and gender." — Leontiskos

Well I certainly don't think that anyone who says "trans men are men" means to say "anyone who self-identifies as a man has XY chromosomes and a penis". — Michael

Lots of people who say "transmen are men" think transmen should be provided with penises by the government, and they probably also think that transmen "deserve" XY chromosomes, even though they realize that such a thing is not (yet) possible. These are the sorts of facts that your skewing of the issue manages to ignore.

I don't agree that people who say trans women are women do so because they ought to be allowed in women's sports. — Questioner

@Michael was engaged in a (mild) strawman. The underlying question has to do with the meaning of a phrase like, "Transmen are men." See on the matter.

You are prioritising the logical normative meaning over the everyday epistemic normative use.

Like here:

If I am talking about apples and how tasty they are you can assume I am talking about apple devices, but that would be pretty silly, unless you are assuming I mean 'tasty' in a metaphorical sense.
— I like sushi

But to carry Philosophim's point what is needed is that one ought not talk about apple devices being sweet.

What is salient is that we can talk about apple devices being sweet, and trans women being women. — Banno

You are taking normative logical priority over normative epistemology.

Maybe now we can get into the nuts and bolts of philosophical discourse! :smile:

1- Logic should not prioritise itself above epistemology in a logical normative sense.

2- Epistemology should prioritise itself over logic in an epistemic normative sense.

You are prioritising the logical normative meaning over the everyday epistemic normative use. — I like sushi

No. I am saying they are both valid.

We can, not we ought.

No. I am saying they are both valid.

We can, not we ought. — Banno

Of course, the epistemic and logical use of 'ought' are both valid. We can use either.

You have essentially restated (1):

1- Logic should not prioritise itself above epistemology in a logical normative sense.

2- Epistemology should prioritise itself over logic in an epistemic normative sense. — I like sushi

You are being very slippery here ;)

We use one in one situation and another in another?

A red apple is an apple. Logical ought says true. Epistemic ought says we should think so even though it may not be the kind of apple we are thinking of; therefore, true.

What are your thought about statement (2)?

It looks as though you are retreating back to a defense you had already (wisely) ↪abandoned, namely the defense that says, "Ah, but none of these people knew that men's boxing excluded women on the basis of biology." Again, such a position is so implausible as to appear disingenuous. You are trying to claim that John's not knowing that Jane is married is the same as the trans activist not knowing that women's boxing excluded men on the basis of biology. :yikes:

We could draw out other absurd consequences of your view. You apparently think that, as with John, if you were to explain the situation to the trans activist then their course of action would alter. You apparently think that if you explained to the trans activist that women's boxing excludes men on the basis of biology, then they would change their views; or that if you explained to the trans activist that: — Leontiskos

I haven't abandoned anything. I am explaining that you are misrepresenting your opponents' beliefs.

These are different arguments:

1. a) only those whose sex is female ought be allowed to compete in women's sports, b) trans women ought be allowed to compete in women's sports, therefore c) trans women are biological men whose sex is female.

2. a) all those whose gender is female ought be allowed to compete in women's sports, b) trans women are biological men whose gender is female, therefore c) trans women ought be allowed to compete in women's sports.

You are arguing that because (1a) is true and because these people believe (1b) then these people believe (1c), but this is the intensional fallacy. They don't believe (1a) or (1c); they believe (2a) and (2b) — which is why they believe (2c).

Lots of people who say "transmen are men" think transmen should be provided with penises by the government, and they probably also think that transmen "deserve" XY chromosomes, even though they realize that such a thing is not (yet) possible. These are the sorts of facts that your skewing of the issue manages to ignore. — Leontiskos

These are different claims:

1. Biological women who identify as men have XY chromosomes, testes, a penis, etc.
2. Biological women who identify as men ought be provided with state-funded gender-affirming surgery.

Even if many people believe (2) it does not follow that these people believe (1). Again, you are equivocating. Anyone who says "trans men are men" understands that these trans men have XX chromosomes, a womb, and (except those that have had surgery) female genitalia, hence why they used the term "trans men".

So the phrase "trans men are men" obviously means "the gender of trans men is male", not "the sex of trans men is male".

Anyone who says "trans men are men" understands that these trans men have XX chromosomes, a womb, and (except those that have had surgery) female genitalia, hence why they used the term "trans men". — Michael

So trans men are female is a fair statement? So some men are female.

Which is fine if everyone is happy with using the term men to include female No issue at all (although I disagree with it and think it is ludicrous and misogynist)
The crux is should women's spaces and sports be for female's only. For sport it is incredibly unfair and sometimes dangerous to include males. For exclusive places there are very sound reasons why they should remain female only.
The rest of the issue regarding gender is getting less and less relevant the more roles of women in society changes. There is not a job they are excluded from, there are no clothes they have to wear etc etc etc.

Whatever you are saying here is very unclear to me.

In order to carry the case that "trans women are women" is always false, Phim has show that we ought not say "trans women are women" is true. But it's been shown that there are cases were we can say "trans women are women" is true.

In order to carry his OP, Phim has to show it is false in every case. it isn't. The OP is mistaken.

In order to carry his OP, Phim has to show it is false in every case. it isn't. — Banno

This is not true. You do not need to show something to be false in every case for it to be epistemically true.

Why can you not grasp this simple fact?

:rofl:

Ok.

You do not need to show something to be false in every case for it to be epistemically true. — I like sushi

Are you talking about subjective knowledge and subjective truth?

I am talking about exactly what I said I was talking about repeatedly, over and over.

Epistemic norms are not the same as logical norms in terms of truth value. I have been pointing out , for god knows how long, that Banno is constantly favouring logical normativity over epistemic normatively--which outside the confines of techincal dialogue is basically a faulty approach.

Just like 200 years ago if you said 'doctor' you ought to assume 'male doctor' not 'female doctor' because the epistemic weight backs this up. To say we ought not assume 'doctor' means 'male doctor' is a logical normative approach not an epistemic normative use of 'ought'.

NOTE: This is not my opinion. If Banno think I am making no sense that is something he will have to overcome. Honestly I just think he is trolling now, as I assume the laughing face means 'haha!' you tookt he bait, or 'haha' you're wrong. If it is the later then he can engage is a serious metaphilosophical debate if he wishes.

There actually is something interesting to get into here if you are willing. There is literally no need to use tranwomen as an example if that is too sensitive a subject for you?

So:

1- Logic should not prioritise itself above epistemology in a logical normative sense.

2- Epistemology should prioritise itself over logic in an epistemic normative sense. — I like sushi

Do you understand what I am pointing to here? I am looking at what I guess could be called a meta-normative problem here.