The question would be "persuasive to whom?". — Janus

Hopefully to the person one is trying to persuade. But relativism does seem impossible to avoid.

Yes, but it is relativism of belief, not of truth. We may indeed intuitively know truths, but just can't rationally or empirically demonstrate that we know, even to ourselves let alone others. For myself, if something seems intuitively true to me, that seems sufficient. I don't expect others to agree, and many of the things I hold true I would not even attempt to argue for.

And how all things in that context seem to me may not be how they seem to you―even though there will likely be commonalities due to the fact that we are both human.

I don’t think this is such a big issue (although it may be a stumbling block empirically), yes it’s true that there is no way of making a direct comparison between minds. But it may be the framing of the question that’s at fault. Rather like what J said.
For me this question is tackled by changing perspective. We know that we are (biologically) a colony. Indeed, we are largely clones (I am aware of sexual variation and heredity). Our constitution is identical, similar to how it is for trees. So it might be worth viewing people as one being (colony) divided into units within a colony. So we are identical, like trees, but with variation in the shape of the tree, or the variety (let’s put speciation to one side for now), some seed might fall on fallow ground some on fertile ground etc.
Now this brings collective consciousness more to the fore. If we treat humanity as one being, the question of what someone else is thinking disappears. If you think about it 99.9% of what we do is identical, with variation, as in trees. Variation in thinking and knowledge, indeed belief might be of little import and as a whole, the colony includes the full spectrum of thought and mental activity and each individual contributes in their own unique way.
Personally I go further and regard the entire biosphere as one colony with each kind of plant, or animal expressing a different aspect of the whole. A lot can be worked out about each from comparison with others. All animals and plants (leaving viruses etc to one side for now), are colonies of identical cells, with very slight variation and where the differences to be found between different kinds encoded in the DNA, not in different cell architecture, (in multi cellular organisms the DNA dictates different roles for cells, which will cause them to adapt to perform different tasks, like people playing different roles in society).
This enables me to view one being (colony) interacting with one material (the world). One being and one neumenon. One soul approaching one (instance of) neumenon producing one being. One undifferentiated soul* approaching one undifferentiated neumenon, resulting in, well the history of the world.

* replace the word soul with your own preference.

Because part of the problem with experience is that it’s so close to us that we don’t even see it. And it’s only in contemplative practice that you really have to deal with it.

It’s a bit like the idea that a fish in a fish bowl doesn’t know that it’s suspended in water. It doesn’t notice the water, the way that we don’t notice air, unless it’s windy. The fish can’t comprehend what water is, perhaps we can’t comprehend something too.

The practitioner of meditative practices knows about this and experiences, at some point, being, being absent our conditioned world.

What I see in your response, and also in @Janus's, is what I was hoping to see, namely an agreement that consciousness is not by definition something utterly apart from the rest of the world we inhabit. How we get a common perspective on it is a matter of differences in degree. So when you say:

We are outside of or apart from the subjects of the natural sciences. As Frank says, 'billiard balls' - and a whole bunch more, up to and including space telescopes - all of these are matters of objective fact. Less so for the social sciences and psychology. — Wayfarer

. . . you (or Frank) are pointing to this continuum, as it moves from hard science to social science to, perhaps, philosophy through phenomenology. The provocative question is, Can you justify drawing a line where you do, at "matters of objective fact"? I'm pretty sure I understand why you want to do this, since scientific realism does seem to have earned the title of "being objective" in some important sense. And yet . . . doesn't this whole discussion remind us that the line may not be that clear? Maybe we need a terminology tweak, some other way to talk about this crucial difference that doesn't invoke "objective fact."

we're thinking about something that can't be treated in an objective manner, because we're not outside or apart from what we're thinking about. — Wayfarer

Yes and no. As I suggested to Janus, we are in one sense outside of consciousness, in that we are self-reflective, and can observe our own minds and subjectivity, and seek agreement from others. Is that "outside enough"? You would say no. This is the infinite regress problem. If I am observing my consciousness, I must be leaving something out, namely the observer's stance. Very well; I take a step back and include the observer; I observe myself observing my consciousness, and I also continue to observe my consciousness. But that leaves out the observer who's observing the observer who's . . . etc. ad infinitum.

I don't find that persuasive. I would need to know what is being left out of an account that stops at the first step. One of the features of consciousness is self-consciousness, and self-consciousness is iterative. End of story. Do we deepen our understanding of this feature by trying to push further and further into it?

Now of course, if you define "objective manner" as "not from my subjective point of view," then it's true that we can never observe consciousness objectively. But why do this? Every single thing a scientist observes is from their subjective point of view. The goal of science is to find ways of negating the idiosyncratic or incorrect observations that may occur, and finding intersubjective agreement. I don't see how observing consciousness is any different. If it's different, it's because of what is observed, not the nature of the observation. The phenomenon of consciousness is subjective, in that it only appears from a point of view. There wouldn't be any consciousnesses if their weren't any conscious beings. That is not true of trees or stars, presumably. But how significant is this difference, in terms of problems or methodology?

whether or not it is conceivable that there could be a completely satisfying explanation as to how the brain produces consciousness (if it does). — Janus

Right, we don't have such a thing, and no one can say for certain whether we ever will. As you know, I'm a cautious optimist in that regard, though I'm pretty sure that "produces" will turn out to be the wrong term.

we say we know how consciousness seems, and give accounts of that, but how can we tell whether language itself is somehow distorting the picture via reification? How would consciousness seem to us if we were prelinguistic beings? That's obviously a rhetorical question. — Janus

A fair point. Maybe this is a good place to remind ourselves that there are other ways of "observing consciousness" than doing phenomenology. Deep meditation is also a type of experience that pares down subjectivity to some sort of essence that is surely prelinguistic. So I don't think your question is merely rhetorical. It's very hard to answer, though! My cat knows the answer, but is unable to tell me.

I don't know how to compare the extent of the differences between people and the commonalities. I don't think we are one "hive mind" at all―look at the great differences between cultures, and the polarizations within particular cultures. I think we do basically understand others (well perhaps some people do that better than others) and I don't think we are locked in our own little solipsistic worlds. I even think it is possible that we share some kind of collective unconscious, as Jung suggested, but the work involved in bringing anything from that to consciousness precludes the vast majority, even if they thought about the possibility, from doing that.

I don't even believe that each cell is identical to all the others. Like the leaves on a particular kind of tree, each has the same metabolic function, but no two are exactly the same. I don't know, of course, but I suspect the same is true of individual cells. I see Nature as endlessly creative and diverse.

Maybe this is a good place to remind ourselves that there are other ways of "observing consciousness" than doing phenomenology. Deep meditation is also a type of experience that pares down subjectivity to some sort of essence that is surely prelinguistic. So I don't think your question is merely rhetorical. It's very hard to answer, though! My cat knows the answer, but is unable to tell me.
8 hours ago — J

Yes, I agree meditation is a way of (potentially) getting free for a time of the discursive, analytical mind and seeing what is there 'beneath' that superficial layer of consciousness. The problem is that we want to translate whatever we find there into the terms of discursive, analytical consciousness, and that doesn't really work very well. Poetry is a better language for that, I think.

. . . you (or Frank) are pointing to this continuum, as it moves from hard science to social science to, perhaps, philosophy through phenomenology. The provocative question is, Can you justify drawing a line where you do, at "matters of objective fact"? — J

I think it's generally recognised that the objective sciences proper begin with Galileo. with mathematical idealisation, the primacy of observation and experiment, and the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. All of these were a crucial step toward defining an objective reality independent of subjective human perception. This was completed with Newton's publicaton of Principia 54 years later. Together these were the bellwethers of the Scientific Revolution. They displaced medieval science, with its reliance on authority and archaic notions of teleology.

Also of note that Auguste Comte's introduction of the idea of the positive sciences, and the application of scientific method to society and culture. He envisaged culture evolving through three stages, the theological (dependent on God or gods), the metaphysical (dependent on abstract causes and essences) and the scientificI (dependent on objective observation, experiment and the discovery of inevitable natural laws.) Though Comte is not often mentioned, his influence is fundamental.

I think the acceptance of the universal nature of objective laws was the hallmark of modernity proper. And that Heisenberg's introduction of the uncertainty principle at the Fifth Solvay Conference in 1927marks the end of m odernity proper and the advent of post-modernity, where the idea of universal objectivity had been undermined by physics itself. The problem that quantum physics threw up was precisely that it threw into question the clear separstion of observer from observed.

Consider that an heuristic principle or rule-of-thumb, rather than a fully elaborated historical theory. But I think it marks the boundary between the acceptance of universal objectivity and its eclipse.

Yes, good precis. So what do you think -- can we speak about "objective facts" in the post-Heisenberg world?

You seem to be identifying the idea of objectivity with naive realism. To think that there is nothing apart from the human seems unsupportable. On the other hand we have perceptual access only to what affects human senses. And we have conceptual access only to what is embodied in our common languages.

We have the concept 'objective' and it generally denotes whatever actually is independent of human perception, thought and judgement. We don't have to know just what it is, but our experience shows us that it is. It also doesn't follow that human perception, thought and judgement have no access to what is. We think that way because we rationally conceptually distinguish human experience from what is and then imagine that they are separate, which leads us to think our experience may be mistaken. But this is just a thought construction, like any other.

So, there are two points here. First, it seems inescapable, given human ignorance and confusion regarding what is really real, to think that there is nonetheless a reality, and that it should count as an objective reality. It is arguably not the objective reality as envisaged by naive realism. It may not be in itself like any system humans have envisaged. That may be because our envisaging is always in terms of our dualistic thinking. Or it may be that our intuitions do show us something of the Real. How can we know which is true?

It seems undeniable that the world presents itself to us, and to other animals, and that there are commonalties between the way animals perceive the world and the way we do. For instance we see trees bearing fruit, and we pick the fruit and eat it. Birds and other animals, including even insects, also perceive and eat the fruit (much to our dismay sometimes). This shows that we and these other species see the fruit and understand it as a source of food.

This suggests the existence of an actual world that is perceived by all and is independent of all in itself. It is also possible that consciousness is in everything, and we and the animals all see the same world due to some kind of entanglement. Or it is all in God's mind. We can imagine many possibilities, but how to tell between them? They might all be wrong, or not so much wrong, as inadequate to the reality.

It seems odd to even have to say that we and the animal share a world as well as each of us inhabiting our own perceptual Umwelts, as obvious as that seems to be. It is perhaps when our discursive, analytical minds start working on this basic perceptual human reality that we can cook up all kinds of weird and wonderful schemes, without realizing that all of those are only artefacts of the discursive mind―our rationality perhaps leading us astray.

Surely we can. Water still boils at 100c at sea level. COVID vaccination is effective. The problem is, though, that objectivity has come to be a stand-in for the idea of truth or veracity in general. There are things that are true for which objectivity is not necessarily the proper description.

Consider mathematics. It is said that mathematics is objectively true, but if 'objective' means 'inherent in the object of cognition', then I wonder if that is the proper word. Not that I can suggest an alternative. Transcendentally true might be one, but then 'transcendental' has a specific meaning in mathematics. But the very absence of alternative terms for 'objective' indicates a gap or absence in modern thought.

We have the concept 'objective' and it generally denotes whatever actually is independent of human perception, thought and judgement — Janus

But is mathematics independent of human perception? Yes, in that mathematical proofs are not dependent on your or my assent or agreement (C S Peirce). But no, because they're only comprehensible to a rational mind capable of grasping mathematical proofs. They're not objective, but are the means we use to determine what is objective, through quantitative analysis. I think the problem here is confusing what the domain of necessary facts with that of empirical observation. Objectivity properly speaking pertains to the latter, mathematical proofs to the former. (It was Kant who identified the connection between the two by way of the synthetic a priori.)

In our post-theistic culture, there is no longer any sense of a transcendent guarantor of the veracity of natural laws ('ideas in the Divine intellect'). So we can only fall back on objectivity as the only criterion of truth - hence the gap, lacuna or absence. One of the main causes of the 'predicament of modernity'.

As a consequence, the modern mindset is deeply committed to the idea that real knowledge must come from outside the self. It must be grounded in an external, shared world (the object). Alternatives like "axiomatic" or "necessary" knowledge are seen as less grounded because they are generated internally by reason and logic, even if their conclusions are unimpeachable (hence indeterminable by empirical means.)

The fear is that if we admit that some truth is not "objective," we fall into a philosophical void where all truth is personal or cultural (relativism). By insisting on using "objective" for mathematics, we are creating a linguistic shield to protect it from being dismissed as merely a matter of convention or opinion.

In essence, the difficulty in finding an alternative highlights that we haven't yet settled on a concise, positive term that acknowledges the relational or rational nature of certain truths while retaining the unassailable veracity we associate with the term "objective."

Mathematics may be somehow inherent in nature, to be sure. Or it may be a formal abstraction from the human experience of diversity, or both. Wigner's "unreasonable effectiveness" may only relate to human experience if we assume that human experience tells us nothing about what may be beyond it.

You offer psychological explanations for what is generally believed by materialists in terms of "commitments" and "fears" and you say this constitutes a predicament of modernity. I think this is a projection, and I think the real problem is that our society is polarized. There is still plenty of religion around―in terms of traditional religious cultures and syncretic new age beliefs, and the religious are often opposed to the materialists and vice versa. Why can people not accept that we may have different faiths in the presence of unknowing?

For me, the real problem is the dogma or rational-based insistence on there being "One Truth" for all, rather than a more relaxed pluralistic acceptance of different worldviews, and the understanding that good, sensible ethics is not wedded to any particular system of metaphysical thought.

Mathematics may be somehow inherent in nature, to be sure. — Janus

No, I'm not at all sure. I see mathematics along Husserlian lines as necessary structures of intentional consciousness. So neither 'in' the mind nor 'in' the world. That's the rub.

For me, the real problem is the rational-based insistence on there being "One Truth" for all, — Janus

The 'jealous God' dies hard.

Water still boils at 100c at sea level. COVID vaccination is effective. — Wayfarer

Yes, and this is why we still need a term to use that can refer to such facts, and differentiate them from opinions and mistakes. But how does "objective" square with this?

the idea of universal objectivity had been undermined by physics itself. The problem that quantum physics threw up was precisely that it threw into question the clear separstion of observer from observed. — Wayfarer

The catch, presumably, lies in "universal". Some things remain objective, according to this account, but others are undermined because there is an observer/observed problem. OK -- how does one draw the line? At what point does the involvement of the observer undermine objectivity? And when that line is crossed, what is the "proper description" for truth?

BTW, I substantially agree with the thrust of this, but we need to be really clear on what we're committing to.

No, I'm not at all sure. I see mathematics along Husserlian lines as necessary structures of intentional consciousness. So neither 'in' the mind nor 'in' the world. That's the rub. — Wayfarer

Note, I said "may be, to be sure" not "is, to be sure". I think the notion of "intentional consciousness" is somewhat vague. If mathematics is not an inherent aspect of the mind nor of the world, or of the interactions between mind and world, then from whence does it come? We know number is inherent in the world of experience simply because there is diversity, and there can be no diversity without number.

Potted histories don't really explain anything.

OK -- how does one draw the line? At what point does the involvement of the observer undermine objectivity? And when that line is crossed, what is the "proper description" for truth? — J

I still recommend The Blind Spot. I posted this link on the Forum in 2019, well before you joined, and it was thoroughly bollocksed by everyone, a complete pile-on. Nevertheless, it went on to become a book, and in my view an important one.

If mathematics is not an inherent aspect of the mind nor of the world, or of the interactions between mind and world, then from whence does it come? — Janus

That's a very deep question. I'm studying Husserl's philosophy of mathematics. Husserl sees mathematics as absolutely necessary, ideal truth that is constituted by the universal structures of intentional consciousness, making it the transcendental condition for the possibility of objective science itself. But at the same time, he critiques Galilean science (in his Crisis of the Modern Sciences) for over-valuing the abstract and objective, at the expense of the subject to whom mathematics is meaningful. That is why Husserl and phenomenology forms the basis of many of the arguments in the Blind Spot.

Husserl sees mathematics as absolutely necessary, ideal truth that is constituted by the universal structures of intentional consciousness, — Wayfarer

I am not seeing how that is different than saying mathematics is constituted by mind.

I still recommend The Blind Spot. — Wayfarer

Thanks. I'm reading it now. So far, there are a number of important insights offered, and I can see why you value it. I also see a number of weak arguments and unquestioned assumptions. I'll say more after I finish and reflect.