...besides the JTB analysis of "knowledge" challenged by Gettier presupposes (or so it seems) the notion of "belief" as propositional attitude not the other way around. So, unless you have something more convincing to support your claim ("JTB is the basis for belief as propositional attitude"), b/c that is what I asked, then it is fair to say that you are completely wrong. — neomac

Plato is perhaps best attributed with the original conception of JTB. Nonetheless, JTB presupposes belief as propositional attitude, as you yourself have acknowledged. My claim was that JTB was the basis of the rendering.

It's never a good sign when someone simultaneously does both, confirms and denies, something I've written all while denouncing something I'd not. Hence...

:meh:

@creativesoul

> However, after becoming aware of our error, there's nothing at all stopping us from admitting that it was raining outside and we did not believe it, or that we believed a broken clock was working.

Still, I don’t see anything problematic in the claim “that it was raining outside and we did not believe it”, while “that we believed a broken clock was working” still looks problematic. If you tried to put the second claim into the same form of the former, you would obtain: that broken clock was working and I didn’t believe it. Does it make sense? Hell, no.

P.S. you re-edited your post, fine. But my comment still holds

Great job denouncing shit that I've not said.

Plato is perhaps best attributed with the original conception of JTB. Nonetheless, JTB presupposes belief as propositional attitude, as you yourself have acknowledged. My claim was that JTB was the basis of the rendering. — creativesoul

You claimed that JTB was the basis of belief as propositional attitude. I took you to mean either that the notion of belief as propositional attitude is grounded on the notion of knowledge as JTB, and this is false, because it's at best the opposite. Or that the contemporary debate on belief as propositional is originally inspired by the debate between Russell, Moore and Gettier over the notion of knowledge as JTB. But that's not true b/c the contemporary debate about belief as propositional attitude was heavily inspired by Frege "Sense and Reference" which doesn't address the notion and the problems of knowledge as JTB. That is why I asked you to give me something else to support your claim, which it seems you tried to do, but I don't understand what you mean.

What's your view regarding Russell's clock, Gettier's cases, and Moore's paradox?

Interesting how different your account of my position is from what I've argued here.

If we say that Jack believes of that broken clock that it is working, what is the content of Jack's belief and what is Jack's belief about? — creativesoul

It's very simple; the belief is simply that the clock is working. If he was asked whether he thinks 'the clock is working' is true, he might say 'yes' or he might say, as I said before 'give me a minute and I'll tell you'. Or he might say 'I had assumed that, but on reflection I realize that was a baseless assumption'.

Great job denouncing shit that I've not said. — creativesoul

All right, as I wrote in the P.S. you re-edited the text, after I picked it up. I realised it too late. Apologies, sir. Let me repay you by denouncing the shit that you wrote (unless you change it again):

there's nothing at all stopping us from admitting that it was once raining outside and we did not believe it, or that we once believed a broken clock was working, — creativesoul

Now, admitting that it was once raining outside and we did not believe it, makes sense. While admitting that we once believed a broken clock was working, still looks problematic and a way to see it is by rendering it in the same form as the former statement: once a broken clock was working and I did not believe it. Does it make sense? Hell, no.

If we say that Jack believes of that broken clock that it is working, what is the content of Jack's belief and what is Jack's belief about?
— creativesoul

It's very simple; the belief is simply that the clock is working. If he was asked whether he thinks 'the clock is working' is true, he might say 'yes' or he might say, as I said before 'give me a minute and I'll tell you'. Or he might say 'I had assumed that, but on reflection I realize that was a baseless assumption'. — Janus

That does not answer the question I asked. The discussion is all about what counts as the content of some belief or another. So, again...

If we say that Jack believes of that broken clock that it is working, what is the content of Jack's belief, and what is Jack's belief about?

Great job of denouncing shit that I've not written.

The irony of the earlier sophism attribution.

Interesting how different your account of my position is from what I've argued here. — creativesoul

mmmkey

And what does "My claim was that JTB was the basis of the rendering" is supposed to mean?

Great job of denouncing shit that I've not written. — creativesoul

What do you mean? I just quoted verbatim the shit you wrote. Did you change it again?

I write something that you agree with. You change what I write. You disagree with and denounce the change, not what I wrote. Evidently, you cannot see.

What is the content of a proposition? And is it propositional? — bongo fury

What is the colour of a proposition?

What is the colour of a proposition? — Banno

42.

If we say that Jack believes of that broken clock that it is working, what is the content of Jack's belief, and what is Jack's belief about? — creativesoul

The content of the belief (if you want to characterize it as a definite belief, rather than a mere passing assumption) would be "That clock is working".

So then,

Are you saying that Jack believes of a broken clock that it is working, and that the content of Jack's belief is "That clock is working"?

Granted for further evaluations...

And what is Jack's belief about?

Again you introduce the ambiguity. For Jack, he does not believe of a broken clock that it is working, because that would be an absurdity. There is nothing more to be gleaned form this than that Jack does not realize the clock is not working. That is, it has no implications for whether or not beliefs can be expressed in propositional form.

Again you introduce the ambiguity — Janus

No. I repeated what neomac said and you seemed to agree with. Evidently I was wrong, and you do not agree with neo's rendering either.

So, I am asking you to clearly state Jack's belief and then proceed to tell me what Jack's belief is about as well as what the content of that belief is...

So, I am asking you to clearly state Jack's belief and then proceed to tell me what Jack's belief is about and what the content of that belief is... — creativesoul

I already have:

"The content of the belief (if you want to characterize it as a definite belief, rather than a mere passing assumption) would be "That clock is working". "

Jack's belief is obviously about a clock that he doesn't realize is not working. If he did realize it wasn't working his belief would be "That clock is not working".

Jack's belief is...
Jack's belief is about...
The content of Jack's belief is...

Please, to avoid any possible misunderstandings. Fill in the blanks.

So, the charges of ambiguity ring ironic as well...

According to your answers in the last reply...

The content of Jack's belief is "That clock is working".
Jack's belief is about a clock he does not realize is not working.

What is Jack's belief?

Mea culpa!

:blush:

Jack's belief is that the clock is working.

I just saw the answer a few replies back...

Okay, so then we have...


Jack's belief is that the clock is working.
The content of Jack's belief is "that the clock is working".
Jack's belief is about a clock that he does not realize is not working.

Are you still okay with that?

Are you still okay with that? — creativesoul

Yes it's pretty much what I had said.

:up:

So, is it safe to say that - on your view - the content of Jack's belief is equivalent to Jack's belief and that Jack's belief is about something other than it's content?

So, is it safe to say that - on your view - the content of Jack's belief is equivalent to Jack's belief and that Jack's belief is about something other than it's content? — creativesoul

I haven't thought about those specifics. Off the top of my head I'd say that Jack's belief is about a clock and it's condition of working, which begs the question as to whether the clock and its condition of working together form the content of the belief. What else could Jack's belief be about?

Mary's room is based upon the dubious presupposition that we can learn anything about seeing red without seeing red. — creativesoul

In other words, qualia is ineffable. Why else can't Mary learn everything about red without seeing red? That sensation of redness couldn't/ can't be put into words.

Qualia is neither ineffable — creativesoul

:chin: If qualia is effable, why did Mary learn something new when she saw red for the first time?

:chin:

Language is more than scribbles and sounds, ya know. — frank

Really? What does a language that you don't know look like? And when describing what a language you know looks like, are you describing the language or your knowledge of the language?

What is the colour of a proposition? — Banno

Statement, or state of affairs?

The prose is purple, the weather black.