I need you to show me an example of the difference between holding a belief and holding something to be true
— Harry Hindu

Read the opening and second posts in the debate. — creativesoul

There is no part in the entire debate that explains the difference between holding something to be true and holding a belief.

Who decided that it would be a good idea for you and Banno to debate this topic? There is no debate when the debaters constantly talk past each other.

The cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree. <------that's holding a belief.

The cat's owner saw the same events. The owner also believes a mouse is behind the tree, and that "a mouse is behind the tree" is true.<--------------that's holding something to be true. — creativesoul

:roll: Look up the definition of "believe", creative, and you will find that it means to hold something to be true which means that propsitions are not necessary to hold something as true.

What use is holding a belief?

Do we agree that scribbles are images? If you can hold some images to be true, why not other images - like a mouse behind the tree? You're making a special case for certain images as holding truth. Why?

They do not. Cannot. It is humanly impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood. — creativesoul

Which contradicts what you said above. If it is impossible believe in a falshood then believing is always holding something to be true.

— creativesoul

Just to restate my rebuttal concisely:


Jack believes X. (Jack believes a clock is working.)

Your account of Jack's belief suggests Jack believes Y. (Jack believes a stopped clock is working.)

Which account is true?

Is it just any clock, or it is one that stopped?

Which account is true? — creativesoul

The account that most accurately says, implies or suggests what Jack actually believes.



So let's ask Jack what he believes.

Do we say:

"Hey Jack, what do you believe about this clock?"

Or do we say:

"Hey Jack, what do you believe about this stopped clock?"

And what does Jack say?

"I believe that clock is working"?

or

"I believe that stopped clock is working"?

Which version most accurately says, implies or suggests what Jack actually believes?

I'm spending some time trying to understand what a proposition — ZzzoneiroCosm

The philosophical debate about propositions starts (or should start) from some strong intuitions that should be readily acknowledged by all competent speakers. That doesn’t mean that they are rationally justified, it simply means that philosophical accounts are supposed to neither deny nor underestimate the strength of these intuitions, but to take them as a starting point for their analysis and explanations. Here are at least some strong intuitions:
1. All the following statements say “the same” in different languages:
That apple is on the table (in English)
La pomme est sur la table (in French)
Der Apfel ist auf dem Tisch (in German)
2. All the following statements are about “the same” based on name/description coreference (I.e. “that red apple” and “that Fuji apple” co-refere to the same apple):
That red apple is on the table
That Fuji apple is on the table
3. All the following statements report different types of attitude from different subjects toward “the same”:
Jim sees that apple is on the table
Sally states that apple is on the table
Jack believes that apple is on the table
Cindy does not believe that apple is on the table
Billy hopes that apple is on the table

Alice orders that apple should be on the table
4. In any belief ascription (e.g. “Jack believes that apple is on the table”), what the belief is about is “the same” as what the statement (related to the belief ascription’s subordinate clause) is about (e.g. “that apple is on the table”)

What is “the same” in all 4 strong intuitions? “Propositions” some/many/most philosophers say, but this is a theory-laden notion and it depends on the theory of proposition one supports (I would suggest you to read Frege’s “Sense and reference” to have a better grasp on the issue).

I'm spending some time trying to understand what a proposition — ZzzoneiroCosm

Well, I’m not very familiar with his views (which he also revised over time) so I’m not sure how to answer. As far as I’ve understood, Moore initially takes propositions to be mind-independent abstract entities (a view that was probably inspired by Frege’s views) that constitute the objects of our thoughts and the meanings of our statements. My understanding of meaning (in semantics) is highly influenced by Wittgenstein’s views (as reported in his “Philosophical Investigations”), so for me meanings are not mind-independent abstract entities, but rules that present themselves in the course of actual and contextual linguistic practices: this implies that meanings are neither mind-independent, nor practice independent, besides they are not “objects” of thought since they regulate how we think about “objects”, they kind of operate in our thinking when we think more than being things that we consult in order to think.
So “proposition” for me is just a notion that we use for an a-posteriori semantic/logic formalisation of our language, in the same way we use the notion of “name” and “verb” for an a-posteriori grammar formalisation of our language.

Thank you. :smile:

That gives me a nice place to start. I'll have a look at Sense and Reference.

"I believe that clock is working"?

or

"I believe that stopped clock is working"?

Which version most accurately says, implies or suggests what Jack actually believes? — ZzzoneiroCosm

He does not believe the propositional form of the belief that he actually holds about a broken clock. That's the whole point of showing how that practice fails. Hence, the earlier allusion to Moore's paradox...

Okay folks, it's been a fun couple weeks, but I've got more productive things in life to do. Will be spending much much less time around here.

Be well to all...

:flower:

Be well to all... — creativesoul

You too!

I hope you'll continue to consider the possibility that your account of Jack's belief is not what Jack's belief is actually about.

Have a good one. :smile:

That gives me a nice place to start. I'll have a look at Sense and Reference. — ZzzoneiroCosm

creativesoul's ideas about belief ascriptions sound not only preposterous (and justifiably so for me), but also very dangerous: e.g. imagine some christian reported the belief of a high muslim mufti as “he believes that Allah is Jesus” because christians take Jesus to truly co-refere to god. And it doesn't matter if christians' religious beliefs are truly true, because as long they believe they are, they are allowed to make belief ascriptions the way creativesoul is suggesting. Indeed belief ascriptions are second order beliefs, and also description/name coreference is matter of belief, that is why we can't simply overlook de dicto belief ascriptions. De re belief ascriptions, are only apparently so, and when we use them appropriately this becomes more evident.

Jack also believed that that stopped clock was working, but clearly did not believe that "the stopped clock is working" is true. — creativesoul

Jack believes that apple is on the table — neomac

That Fuji apple is on the table — neomac

We cannot conclude Jack believed that the Fuji apple was on the table - he might have thought it a Jonathan. We cannot always substitute into belief statements and preserve their truth value.

...for the belief when put into propositional form, would not be held as true by the believer. — creativesoul

What Creative put into propositional form is not Jack's belief. Jack believed that: the clock was working; Jack believed that: the clock showed 3:00 o'clock. The clock was broken. Because we cannot substitute within the scope of a belief statement salva veritate, it is not implied that Jack believed the broken clock was broken.

The supposed criticism of the propositional structure of belief is muddled.

It's unusual to see my and Banno's considerations dovetail to a similar conclusion. It's significant that they do. Philosophy is about understanding what not to waste time on. :smile:

In other words: even though the clock is stopped, Jack's belief isn't about - a stopped clock. It's about a clock — ZzzoneiroCosm

What Creative put into propositional form is not Jack's belief. — Banno

I took this short course on so-called SuperLearning and it recommends that we translate (key) words into pictures/images. It seems that we remember pictures/images far better than text. Evidence? As a rule we remember faces, but forget names. Link these pictures into a story, a memorable one, and hey presto, perfect recall!

Animals, since they lack human-like languages, may think in pictures/images. Picture theory of meaning?

If so,

1. Are pictures/images propositions?

or

2. Are (some) beliefs nonpropositional?

de re belief ascriptions can be less ambiguously rendered in the following form:
S believes of X that p
E.g. Jack believes of that broken clock that is working
The reason being that in this form, the reference to X is put within the semantic scope of the one who is making the belief ascription instead of the scope of Jack's beliefs themselves.

Other examples to consider:
a1) Jack believes that Alice loves Jim
a2) Jack believes that Jim is loved by Alice
b1) Jack believes that Alice is the sister of Jim
b2) Jack believes that Jim is the brother of Alice

Do a1 and a2 express the same belief?
Do b1 and b2 express the same belief?

creativesoul's reminder of "rigid designators" is misleading. Kripke's theory of rigid designators was supposed to address the logic distinction between proper names and decriptions, and to argue against the Russellian's analysis of proper names in terms of descriptions: now, "broken clock" is a description not a proper name.
Besides we shouldn't take Kripke's theory for granted. And indeed I don't.

Just to restate my rebuttal concisely: — ZzzoneiroCosm

CS is obviously being purposely obtuse regarding your rebuttal (and mine), yet you continue with wasting your time trying to restate it, when there are more pertinent points in this thread to address. :roll:

creativesoul's ideas about belief ascriptions sound not only preposterous (and justifiably so for me), — neomac

As well as Banno's and ZZz's because they've have an emotional attachment to their beliefs about beliefs.

The philosophical debate about propositions starts (or should start) from some strong intuitions that should be readily acknowledged by all competent speakers. — neomac

Agreed. But that is difficult to do when people maintain their grip on their understanding of propositions with their emotions and don't respond to questions about what propositions are when the questions get tough.

1. All the following statements say “the same” in different languages:
That apple is on the table (in English)
La pomme est sur la table (in French)
Der Apfel ist auf dem Tisch (in German) — neomac

Yes, how can three different strings of scribbles mean the same thing?

As far as I’ve understood, Moore initially takes propositions to be mind-independent abstract entities (a view that was probably inspired by Frege’s views) that constitute the objects of our thoughts and the meanings of our statements. — neomac

Mind independent abstract entities seems to be a contradiction. Abstractions are defined as existing as an idea and not as physical or concrete. So how can something that is abstract be mind independent?

My understanding of meaning (in semantics) is highly influenced by Wittgenstein’s views (as reported in his “Philosophical Investigations”), so for me meanings are not mind-independent abstract entities, but rules that present themselves in the course of actual and contextual linguistic practices: this implies that meanings are neither mind-independent, nor practice independent, besides they are not “objects” of thought since they regulate how we think about “objects”, they kind of operate in our thinking when we think more than being things that we consult in order to think. — neomac

This sounds like what I was hinting at here:

What form does a language you don't know take? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds? — Harry Hindu

In what form do the rules present themselves if not the visual and auditory experiences you have when learning how others use language? This is no different than learning the rules of anything else, like object permanence - the realistic notion that entities continue to exist even when they do not exist in the mind - like the mouse that ran behind the tree.

wasting your time — Harry Hindu

I'm not wasting my time. I'm trying to help creative see he's wasting his time. And also enjoying the puzzle. This kind of philosophy is just a popcorn exercise to me. Great exercise, though.

I'm not wasting my time. I'm trying to help creative see he's wasting his time. And also enjoying the puzzle. This kind of philosophy is just a popcorn exercise to me. Great exercise, though. — ZzzoneiroCosm

My point was that it is a waste of your time when it's obvious CS doesn't care about wasting his. That was obvious several pages ago. Yet you avoided the the tough exercises and the tastiest popcorn.

they've have an emotional attachment to their beliefs about beliefs. — Harry Hindu

You're view here is odd to me. I have no attachment or commitment to a single thing that comes out of this branch of philosophy (analytic). I'm just here to make my brain feel good. I'm an existentialist at heart, to whom this sort of wordplay "twaddle" has a ludicrous ring.

When I think about belief, I think about a psychology of belief. That's where my heart is.

Your posts seem highly biased and emotionalized. That's why I don't engage with them fully.

My point was that it is a waste of your time when it's obvious CS doesn't care about wasting his. — Harry Hindu

I would refer you to the recent thread on 'doing good.'

Asking a question is not biased or emotionalized. Avoiding them is.

That's why I don't engage with them fully. — ZzzoneiroCosm

So you'd rather engage them half-assed? Sounds like a waste of time to me.

You're view here is odd to me. — ZzzoneiroCosm

CS was even more odd as you even admitted that he was wasting his time, yet you spent more time addressing his waste of time than my "odd" view. :roll:

I would refer you to the recent thread on 'doing good.' — ZzzoneiroCosm

Why when there is no objective morality or ethics? What good would your notion of good do for me?

So you'd rather engage them half-assed? — Harry Hindu

I engaged them up to a point. Until further engagement seemed futile and there was no fun puzzle to solve.

I didn't see a fun, interesting puzzle in your post. Just your insistence and insistence is no fun.

CS was even more odd as you even admitted that he was wasting his time, yet you spent more time addressing his waste of time than my "odd" view. — Harry Hindu

I had a compassionate feeling for creative, for whatever reason, and thought I might help him sort out his mistake.

Mind independent abstract entities seems to be a contradiction. Abstractions are defined as existing as an idea and not as physical or concrete. So how can something that is abstract be mind independent? — Harry Hindu

Many philosophers take the technical notion “abstract entity” to mean something that is not the result of some mental operation (“abstraction”). According to them “abstract entities” are to be contrasted to “concrete entities”: indeed both of them are real (i.e. mind-independent) entities , the difference (at least according to many) is that abstract entities are not located in space and time, and they are causally inert, while concrete entities are located in space and time (or at least, in time) and are not causally inert. Propositions, numbers, sets are often taken to be some common cases of abstract entities by those who believe in their existence. So for example, while a sentence is a concrete entity, the proposition that the sentence is meant to represent would be an abstract entity of the sort I’ve just described. Frege seems to have proposed this view.

This sounds like what I was hinting at here:

What form does a language you don't know take? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds? — Harry Hindu — Harry Hindu

Yes it does.

I engaged them up to a point. Until further engagement seemed futile and there was no fun puzzle to solve.

I didn't see a fun, interesting puzzle in your post. Just your insistence and insistence is no fun. — ZzzoneiroCosm

:lol: What was CS doing if not insisting? You keep contradicting yourself.

Sure, difficult questions that, when answered, point out your contradictions can't be much fun. That's why you don't answer the question. And not being fun isn't an argument against anything that I've said. It's just a thinly veiled ad hominem.

All this time you've spent with me now could have been more constructive if you just answer the question.

Yes it does. — neomac

Thank you, neomac for answering my question.

Many philosophers take the technical notion “abstract entity” to mean something that is not the result of some mental operation (“abstraction”). According to them “abstract entities” are to be contrasted to “concrete entities”: indeed both of them are real (i.e. mind-independent) entities , the difference (at least according to many) is that abstract entities are not located in space and time, and they are causally inert, while concrete entities are located in space and time (or at least, in time) and are not causally inert. Propositions, numbers, sets are often taken to be some common cases of abstract entities by those who believe in their existence. So for example, while a sentence is a concrete entity, the proposition that the sentence is meant to represent would be an abstract entity of the sort I’ve just described. Frege seems to have proposed this view. — neomac

Thank you for the example.

So in the example, the sentence would be the written scribbles or spoken sounds and the proposition would be the state-of-affairs the scribbles/sounds are meant to represent? To me, the proposition and sentence are one and the same.

A sentence/proposition is a string of scribbles that refers to some state-of-affairs that is not just another string of scribbles. The reference, or the mental act of referencing, scribble with state-of-affairs would be abstract in the sense that we could use any scribble to refer to the same state-of-affairs as you showed when using three different languages to mean the same thing. When translating languages, that is what is translated - the state-of-affairs the scribbles refer to. The scribbles/sounds we use are arbitrary, which is why there must be an agreement to the rules on what scribbles and sounds to use and how to use them.

This is also what it means for some proposition/sentence to be true in that the string of scribbles is true if what it refers to is the case.

Meaning, however, is not arbitrary. It is the relationship between cause and effect. What some scribble means is what caused it to exist on the paper or on the screen. It is caused by a mind that possesses an idea and the will to communicate it, or else the scribbles would not exist. "Hello" refers to the idea and intent of someone to begin a conversation with someone else.

Since propositions are the arbitrary scribbles we use to refer to what is the case and scribbles are experienced visually just like most other things, like houses, hammers, grass and fish, then learning a language is not much different than learning how to use houses, hammers, grass and fish, which is done without language and done simply by observing the behavior of others around such items. This is no different than animals, just a different degree.

So non-language creatures have beliefs in that they learn by making observations and what they learn is what they believe to be the case in other similar states-of-affairs. Their beliefs are not in the form of propositions, but the visual experiences they had. The same goes for scribble-using humans, and is how they learned a language in the first place by believing that scribbles can be used to refer to what is the case or not. You have to believe that before you can begin using scribbles.

What was CS doing if not insisting? You keep contradicting yourself.

Sure, difficult questions that, when answered, point out your contradictions can't be much fun. That's why you don't answer the question. And not being fun isn't an argument against anything that I've said. It's just a thinly veiled ad hominem.

All this time you've spent with me now could have been more constructive if you just answer the question. — Harry Hindu

This is why I don't engage. You have no sense of charity and your posts are unpleasant.

What was CS doing if not insisting? You keep contradicting yourself. — Harry Hindu

It's the tone of your insistence. It's off-putting.

Neomac seems to know a lot about these things so I hope you have better luck there.

I mentioned above I was muddling through and following along, yet you still take that imperious tone... It's off-putting.

1. Are pictures/images propositions? — Agent Smith

Good question. Here is another one: if all propositions can be rendered in linguistic form, then what proposition would correspond to the following image?

What was CS doing if not insisting? You keep contradicting yourself. — Harry Hindu

You're not reading my posts. I think your emotions are mediating.

Until further engagement seemed futile and there was no fun puzzle to solve.

I didn't see a fun, interesting puzzle in your post. Just your insistence and insistence is no fun. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yes, both of you were insisting.

But in your case, there was no fun puzzle to solve.

CS is obviously being purposely obtuse regarding your rebuttal (and mine) — Harry Hindu

That's shallow, knee-jerk psychology.

His heart is in it. He feels he's created or uncovered something devastating or catalytic to the history of philosophy. That foments a profound experience of life-meaning: wakefulness, inspiration, excitement, a superior feeling,* a sense of domination - of philosophical material and of philosophical opponents.

What is happiness? — The feeling that power increases — that a resistance is overcome. — Nietzsche**

To abandon his position is to abandon his happiness. His sense of newfound power and that heady sense of overcoming.

To him that overcometh will I grant to sit with me in my throne, even as I also overcame, and am set down with my Father in his throne. — Some Gunneddown Gunless Johnny**

To my view creative's mindset is a great distance from purposeful obtuseness. He's having an invigorating emotional experience and to abandon his position is to shut down that enjoyment and obliterate that purposefulness. I was doing a bit of coaxing. That's why wisdom is so important in philosophy. Philosophy is an emotional game and our emotions can easily and quickly hoodwink us and walk us...

...down [or was it up] the garden path... — Banno

- to borrow one of Banno's bones.

But it's not nice to gossip so I'll stop.


* See Adler's writings on the ramifications of a universal native experience of inferiority.
** Nietzsche and Saint John of Revelation are - strangely enough - soul-brothers united in the word 'overcome'.