With that in mind, physicalism is no more useful than zoroastrianism. — Merkwurdichliebe

True. Same for idealism though.

Materialism is waning. But the pendulum just keeps swinging. — frank

Lol.

I think he meant that physicalism morphed into something its earlier adherents would have rejected. Remember Newton's cohorts wanted to reject gravity on the basis that it was mystical. Newton gave up and retired to his basement in the face of the dogma. — frank

To be fair, I am always talking about all forms of physicalism simultaneously. But to your point, you are correct, physicalism, like all ideologies ages with time, and given it's close relation to scientific advancement, it has aged faster than most.

Do 'we' know that? What does 'produce' mean, here? What is it that is being produced? And how is it being produced? And, is the brain 'a physical thing?' Extract a brain from a human, and it is still the same matter, but it's now an inert object, even though it's stil a physical thing. When situated in a living being, the brain has more neural connections than stars in the sky. It is no longer simply an object, but a central part of cognition and is central to any possible theory, including any theory about 'what is physical'. So in what sense is it a 'physical thing' in that context? — Wayfarer

I've provided all the answers to this a few times already.

What is physical is matter and energy.
There are living brains, which are chemically self-sustainable, active, and produce neuronal activity, and dead brains, which don't.

You're starting to postulate and throw, "but what if..."s out here without anything to back them up. A viable argument needs something to back those "what if"'s up. I can say, "What if unicorns are just really good at hiding?" You need some evidence, or its not a point of discussion.

But the fact of the existence of this school shows that the ground is already shifting towards a more 'mind-like' and top-down causal model of life and mind. — Wayfarer

Unless you show me that their models are divorced from the physical world, then no. And if you have evidence that their models are divorced from the physical world, then provide me such evidence. But as you mention later, that cannot be provided.

But as I've said - the contrary also works, and that is demonstrable by observation and experiment. Humans can perform mental acts which alter the physical configuration of the brain. A physical change to a brain is through injury or a medicine or substance which literally alters the material structure. But if the structure is altered through a volitional act, then that is mental in origin. — Wayfarer

You are repeating an old point again. I feel we're the conversation is starting to swirl, so its probably a good time to close it. I already addressed that by noting that consciousness is a physical act, so it is the physical acting on the physical.

That is 'brain-mind identity theory'. But 'wetness' does not stand in the relationship to hydrogen and oxygen that consciousness does in relation to matter. — Wayfarer

Why not? You need more than just an assertion. The entire point has been whether consciousness is a physical function of the brain. The models were are speaking about for consciousness do not deny this.

Besides, consciousness does not only work within the brain, it is present at some level in the operation of all living organisms. — Wayfarer

I've already mentioned animals and insects. And the origination of their consciousness is through neuronal activity. Again, these are all physical based consciousnesses. You don't see a bee postulating whether consciousness is physical right? That's because it doesn't have the physical brain to actually do it.

So, you're operating within the latter explanatory framework. So any 'theory of consciousness' that I would try and submit, would have to fit within that explanatory framework. But there's a fundamental problem with that, because to do so requires treating 'res cogitans' as an object - which it never is. There is no object anywhere called 'mind'. You can only deal with the question if you can conceive of the subject of the question in objective terms. — Wayfarer

And that is why Idealism is not used in science. I was wondering if you knew of some evidence based model I was unaware of, but it appears not. With that, the entire conversation has lead me to conclude the following from our discussion:

You are arguing with outdated philosophy. Philosophy is only useful if it is rational, and based upon our current understanding of the world. Your current philosophy, which is based on outdated and disproven models, is not rational. When certain philosophies have been disproved, they are fun to study for history, but are useless for practice. Philosophies become outdated all the time, and people can fall prey too them if they are unaware of their flaws.

Phlogiston theory is a good example of a failed philosophy. Phlogiston theory was a competing theory about how things caught on fire with the oxygen theory of chemistry. Lots of fun rationals were made with Phlogiston theory, but in the end, its lack of consistent evidential framework failed, and oxygen theory remained.

Further, you seem to be confusing models of understanding consciousness with the idea that these models are claiming consciousness is somehow separate from the mind, and is not physical in origin. All of modern science has concluded that consciousness coming from the mind is the most rational theory that we have. There is no viable model out there that states consciousness is separate from the brain's function. Any that try to are phlogiston theories at this point.

Now if you want to stick with phlogiston philosophy for fun, that's fine. People will believe what they want to believe at the end of the day. I've enjoyed the conversation to see if you had anything new or viable. I did learn a couple of new ideas and models from you, and thank you for your citations. Unfortunately, nothing you've presented counters the evidence based models that science has provided in modern day. So for me? I will stick with the evidence based models of the modern day.

True. Same for idealism though. — frank

Absolutely. But there is a disproportionate amount of physicalists to idealists out there. Especially on TPF. Given that, I have no problem sounding like an idealist when conversing with a physicalist, but I certainly do not want to sound physicalistic when dealing with a hard line idealist.

What is physical is matter and energy.
There are living brains, which are chemically self-sustainable, active, and produce neuronal activity, and dead brains, which don't. — Philosophim

But dead brains are made up of matter and energy too. Shouldn't we be capable of a fairly easy brain transplant if such is the case?

What if unicorns are just really good at hiding?" You need some evidence, or its not a point of discussion. — Philosophim

As a proponent of the existence of unicorns, you would be tasked with finding and showing where they actually hide.

And that is why Idealism is not used in science. — Philosophim

Idealism permeates every relevant scientific discovery. In fact, all scientific speculation (what is know in the scientific method as "hypothesis") would be impossible without appeal to idealism.

What is physical is matter and energy.
There are living brains, which are chemically self-sustainable, active, and produce neuronal activity, and dead brains, which don't. — Philosophim

But the whole point is that intentionality and interpretation can't be accounted for in neuronal terms, if you've been following the argument. That needs nothing to 'back it up' beyond reason itself. Comparing that to argung for unicorns simply shows that you don't grasp the argument, which is logical - it's not based on empirical evidence, but on judgement about the meaning of empirical evidence. It's a philosophical argument, not a scientific one, but the distinction is a philosophical one, so it may not mean anything to you.

I was wondering if you knew of some evidence based model I was unaware of, but it appears not. — Philosophim

I provided a reference to a text book. It has more by way of evidence than I could ever assemble.

Your current philosophy, which is based on outdated and disproven models, is not rational. — Philosophim

Thank you, I shall return the compliment.

The dominant trend does not appear to consider itself as an ideology (despite that is exactly what it is), somehow it regards itself as incontrovertible and self evident. It is very dogmatic, bordering on what I consider religious belief — Merkwurdichliebe

The main problem with our usual understanding of secularity is that it is taken-for-granted, so we are not aware that it is a worldview. It is an ideology that pretends to be the everyday world we live in. Many assume that it is simply the way the world really is, once superstitious beliefs about it have been removed. Yet that is the secular view of secularity, its own self-understanding... The secularity we presuppose must be "de-naturalized" in order to realize how unique and peculiar such a worldview is... — David Loy

Many assume that it is simply the way the world really is, once superstitious beliefs about it have been removed. — David Loy

We can remove every superstition from our belief, but the only superstition that matters is the belief that there is a "way the world really is" ("for everybody" I might add)

:up:

it's always good to hear an expert expunge. — Kenosha Kid

I should then perhaps clarify my expertise is actually in belief, decision-making, uncertainty etc, this stuff about perception is something of a sideline I got into when working with a colleague in cognitive psychology so it's a) second hand, and b) all one preferred interpretation, I'm sure there are others. That said, it'll be interesting to try and flesh out some of the issues.

I'm not sure whether you're saying that the recognition of the car is part of the experience I am conscious of, which is also what I'm saying, or whether we consciously recognise the car, which flies in the face of my experience, and also seems to contradict the idea that the brain is adept at filtering out irrelevant sensory data that we are, consequently, unaware of (e.g. the sound of a car engine at night after living a month in Manhatten, versus the sound of a gunshot). — Kenosha Kid

The former. Although it is important to note the cases you alluded to where we're conscious of our processing ("is that a car over there?") because in these cases we're still having an experience - so what is it an experience of? We haven't identified the object yet. Are we experiencing the quale of {some vague grey shape in the distance that we can't quite make out}? Possibly, but 1) that rather detaches quale form the object of experience, and 2) deciding what the thing is is definitely part of the experience, so what happens when we realise it's a car?

Neurologically (according to hierarchy theory) we have a single neuron which will eventually light up (and start it's chain of responses) to the recognition of a particular object. You have a neuron for me (which is delightful) and it initiates a chain of responses every time it recognises me (whether by name, or prose style, or the blue square that is my avatar). Proof of this is quite surprising (summary here). Anyway. The point is that this neuron is triggered after a long chain of neurons all of which have in turn triggered a number of other neurons. (Imagine each neuron in the chain has, say, five exit pathways, only one of which goes on toward the 'car' neuron). The cascade of effects triggered by your interaction with that picture (and the environment you're in at the time, and any other neural processes which were half-way complete when they were interrupted by seeing that picture) will have, by now, had consequences, other than the triggering of your 'car' neuron many of which you could be consciously aware of.

This process is only noticeable when you're not sure if it's a car or not (hence the introduction of cases where you're conscious of that uncertainty), but it's happening, lightening fast, even in cases where your post hoc story is "I saw the car then all these other responses followed". That, provably, is not what really happened.

Now I agree you could say "All of this goings on were associated with what I finally decided was a car", but they weren't really. As I said earlier, some of them were associated with other sensory inputs, but some of then (and I think this is the most important bit) were associated with neurological processes which hadn't yet finished which had nothing to do with the 'scene' at all. It just seems unreflective of what's really going on to say anything about your subjective experience 'of the car'.

The left car is blue. I am conscious of it being blue. I am not conscious of figuring out that it's blue: it's blueness is presented to my consciousness. — Kenosha Kid

Basically, as far as we can tell from the studies that have been done on various forms of achromatopsia, it never is. At no point in time can we trace anything like the 'blueness' of the car being presented as an property to your conscious awareness. In fact all the evidence seems to point to there being nothing but a series of responses to the final object, of which it's colour is only one aspect. So, for example one type of achromatopsia might present with an inability to name colours, another with an inability to distinguish them, another with an inability to respond to them, (Dennet goes through some of these in the Qualia article, but not in much depth) all separate and functioning in other aspects. someone has even been reported to have difficulty with yellow objects of certain shape, but not yellow 2d images. Basically, what seems like a recognition of 'blueness' is actually an object specific tendency to respond. If someone asks, what colour is that car, you'll have a tendency to seek the word 'blue', if someone asks you to pick the blue car, you'll arrange the necessary spatio-motor response, but these are separate systems and can (in lesion studies) be switched off separately. There's no 'awareness of blueness' - at least as far as neuroscience can tell.

I assume you mean that the timescales involved in consciously working stuff out is much slower than the timescales of photons-hitting-retina to conscious-of-image. It can't be too much later. I have present experience for a reason: present problems require present solutions. — Kenosha Kid

That's tight, but the timescales change all the time. When you first see the car you might have one post hoc story which is almost coincident with the process of the retinal signal to the object recognition and sensori-motor responses. But seconds later you'll have a slightly different post hoc story, minutes later another one, until (as will be familiar to us all) years later you have a totally different story of how you felt), again, we could call these stories qualia, but since they are in a constant state of flux, it seems incredibly difficult to get any useful function from doing so - "Which qualia ar you referring to? The one just now...or now...or now..."

I hope I haven't missed the point you're getting at completely here!

There's no 'awareness of blueness' — Isaac

And yet we all can agree than certain cars are blue, and others not.

And yet we all can agree than certain cars are blue, and others not. — Olivier5

Indeed. So we have a choice. Discard all neurological evidence and pretend things are the way the seem at first blush to be...or...dive in with curiosity to find out how things might actually be, even if the prevalent theories are counter-intuitive.

What seems to happen with consciousness, perception, free-will..basically anywhere where neuroscience might have some input, is that the response is to vehemently assume our first blush reckoning about it must be right and then filter all the data through that. Can't see much point in that approach myself, but each to their own I suppose.

Yes, seeing someone do something is different to doing it yourself. However yours and my view is not 'a view from nowhere', and neither is Alice's experience radically private or subjective. As human beings, we can use the same language to describe Alice's activity as she can.
— Andrew M

Sorry, but I think you’re missing the point. The basis of the whole debate is whether there is an essential difference, something that can’t be captured objectively, about the first-person perspective. Obviously we can ‘use the same language’ and if you say ‘Alice kicks the ball’ of course I will know what you mean. But that misses the point of the argument. — Wayfarer

The problem is the implicit dualism in the claim. There are no 'first-person' versus 'third-person' perspectives. There is just your perspective, my perspective, and Alice's perspective. Each is a distinctive perspective of the world, but it is a world that we all participate in, and use common language to describe.

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience. — David Chalmers

Experience, in its ordinary sense, is one's practical contact with the world. But note that Chalmers' definition decouples experience from the world, which is dualism, and that is what produces 'the hard problem'. As Peter Hacker puts it, "The philosophical [hard] problem, like all philosophical problems, is a confusion in the conceptual scheme."

There are no 'first-person' versus 'third-person' perspectives. — Andrew M

These categories are from neuroscience. Should scientists not use them?

Plus it's "data", not "perspective."

You touched on this before, so I'll ask you: why do those who disapprove of the idea of qualia quickly become angry and personally insulting? Where the rest are fairly calm?

These categories are from neuroscience. Should scientists not use them? — frank

There's no problem where there is an operational meaning in terms of people's reports (patient and scientist, say). My argument is with dualism.

There's no problem where there is an operational meaning in terms of people's reports (patient and scientist, say). My argument is with dualism. — Andrew M

Substance dualism? Chalmers is famous for suggesting property dualism at least methodologically. But beyond that, he just invites speculation about how to bring phenomenal consciousness into the realm of science. The universe appears to contain elements that possess subjectivity. Let's head toward a theory of consciousness that includes that.

What seems to happen with consciousness, perception, free-will..basically anywhere where neuroscience might have some input, is that the response is to vehemently assume our first blush reckoning about it must be right and then filter all the data through that. — Isaac

I'm just trying to keep us grounded in empirical data here. Kids can learn to name colours, predictably so, and these colours they name seem to correspond well to some objectively measurable wavelengths of electromagnetic waves. There is therefore something objective and operational about colours as we perceive them.

Substance dualism? Chalmers is famous for suggesting property dualism at least methodologically. But beyond that, he just invites speculation about how to bring phenomenal consciousness into the realm of science. The universe appears to contain elements that possess subjectivity. Let's head toward a theory of consciousness that includes that. — frank

I'm arguing against the philosophical subject/object distinction which is the underlying premise of both Descartes' and Chalmers' dualism. My main argument can be found earlier in the thread here.

Consciousness is so hopelessly defined it is hard to know what a person means by it. Dennett is probably talking about consciousness by way of the five senses. But isn't the mind conscious independently of the senses? People need to agree/disagree on this issue even before the discussion begins. Thereafter the discussion is in terms of physical consciousness or the mind's awareness or both. But if people are to make sense they must agree on the terms of the discussion.

The problem is the implicit dualism in the claim. There are no 'first-person' versus 'third-person' perspectives. There is just your perspective, my perspective, and Alice's perspective. — Andrew M

There is plainly a distinction between the first- and third-person perspectives, as is implied by grammar itself! And furthermore, it is also undeniable that people have different perspective, for the obvious reason that if we did not, then there would no individuation. Persons are subjects of experience, and that dimension of existence is not something that can be fully captured from a third-person perspective. I don't agree at all with Hacker's dismissal of it. I agree with Bennett and Hacker's notion of the mereological fallacy, but I don't think it comes to terms with the problem that Chalmers is articulating. Accordingly, I don't think your response deals with the issue, it just glosses over it.

Dennett is right about some of the things he says*. You give the example of fire as an experience and fire as an actual thing in itself. But Dennett is wrong to extend this to all conscious experience. For example, suppose you listen to a piece of music. The pattern of the music changes, repeats, increases or decreases in tempo and so on. This is what we experience. Is Dennett to argue that there is no corresponding changes, repeats or changes in tempo out there in the objective world? If not, where do these patterns and changes come from? He must be arguing that they are purely internal inventions, which is ridiculous. If there is someone playing a violin and we are listening what is creating the pattern, the violin, or our brain?

Likewise with patterns in language. You are conscious of what I am saying. Are we to argue that the content of this post is purely an invention of your own brain? If it is, communication is impossible, which is clearly not the case.

*But just because some conscious experiences are subjective does not mean all conscious experiences are equally subjective. The degree of subjectivity varies greatly.

Consciousness is so hopelessly defined it is hard to know what a person means by it. — EnPassant

The more general a term is, the harder it is of definition. It is used in different contexts in different ways which also contributes to the difficulties. But in the case of this debate, the cardinal difficulty is that it is not objectively real - that we are what we're seeking to understand.

In the WIKI article you provided the link to, we read:

In contrast with Chalmers, Dennett argues that consciousness is not a fundamental feature of the universe and instead will eventually be fully explained by natural phenomena. Instead of involving the nonphysical, he says, consciousness merely plays tricks on people so that it appears nonphysical—in other words, it simply seems like it requires nonphysical features to account for its powers. In this way, Dennett compares consciousness to stage magic and its capability to create extraordinary illusions out of ordinary things.

Questions: why is it important for Dennett to prove that 'consciousness is not a fundamental feature of the Universe'?

What currently prevents it from being fully explained by natural phenomena?

The universe appears to contain elements that possess subjectivity. Let's head toward a theory of consciousness that includes that. — frank

Mind, I suspect, is not an inexplicable accident or a divine and anomalous gift but a basic aspect of nature that we will not understand until we transcend the built-in limits of contemporary scientific orthodoxy.

Thomas Nagel The Core of Mind and Cosmos

There is no viable model out there that states consciousness is separate from the brain's function. Any that try to are phlogiston theories at this point. — Philosophim

Suppose you go to the doctor and tell him you have a pain in your foot. He might decide to enlighten you and tell you that the pain is not "really" in your foot. It is really a sensation in your brain.

"But" you object "how can I feel it in my foot if it is in my brain?" whereupon he might expound: "You see, the body is so constructed that it locates the pain in your foot. That is, it contextualizes the pain in the foot area. This is because the body is a physical context in which we have experiences. But the pain is really in your brain, you see, son?"

Whereupon you could answer "If the body is a physical context, then can't we extend this reasoning further and argue that the pain is not really in the brain either, but in the mind? And when professionals like you contend that the pain is really in the brain all you are doing is examining a physical context that is not really pain at all. The pain is beyond the brain. Because if the body is merely a physical context and the brain is part of the body can't the brain be part of the contextualization too?"

If we are locating things in the body can't it also be argued that neuroscience is locating/contextualizing experience in a physical context in the brain but the real conscious experience is outside the physical context altogether? Why stop at the brain? Indeed, can physical matter, no matter how complex, have experiences? Because that is what body is really, a physical context in which experiences are framed.

There is plainly a distinction between the first- and third-person perspectives, as is implied by grammar itself! — Wayfarer

I pointed out the grammatical distinctions earlier. "Wayfarer observes the world" versus "The world is observed by Wayfarer". Grammatically, the subject and object are interchangeable.

Distinct from that, there is no "third-person perspective", understood as "a view from nowhere". And there is no "first-person perspective", understood as "radically private and subjective". There are just human beings with their individual human views of the world.

And furthermore, it is also undeniable that people have different perspective, for the obvious reason that if we did not, then there would no individuation. — Wayfarer

Yes, that has been just my point, as I say above. But ...

Persons are subjects of experience, and that dimension of existence is not something that can be fully captured from a third-person perspective. — Wayfarer

... see how you now move to the "view from nowhere", which can't capture "radical privacy and subjectivity"? That is the dualism I'm rejecting. Those philosophical usages are implicitly assumed without argument.

In the WIKI article you provided the link to, we read:

In contrast with Chalmers, Dennett argues that consciousness is not a fundamental feature of the universe and instead will eventually be fully explained by natural phenomena. Instead of involving the nonphysical, he says, consciousness merely plays tricks on people so that it appears nonphysical—in other words, it simply seems like it requires nonphysical features to account for its powers. In this way, Dennett compares consciousness to stage magic and its capability to create extraordinary illusions out of ordinary things.

Questions: why is it important for Dennett to prove that 'consciousness is not a fundamental feature of the Universe'?

What currently prevents it from being fully explained by natural phenomena? — Wayfarer

Presumably Dennett is arguing for what he thinks is true - I don't know his motivations beyond that. However, I do agree with Hacker (as noted here) that what requires explaining is how sentience emerges from the evolution of living organisms, not how consciousness can emerge from matter. Without the dualism, the landscape and the nature of the problems look very different, and not impossible in principle.

The universe appears to contain elements that possess subjectivity. Let's head toward a theory of consciousness that includes that.
— frank

Mind, I suspect, is not an inexplicable accident or a divine and anomalous gift but a basic aspect of nature that we will not understand until we transcend the built-in limits of contemporary scientific orthodoxy.

Thomas Nagel The Core of Mind and Cosmos — Wayfarer

The alternatives are not simply materialism and dualism. As you may know, my own position is hylomorphism.

Without the dualism, the landscape and the nature of the problems look very different, and not impossible in principle. — Andrew M

Especially if you gloss over the principle!

The alternatives are not simply materialism and dualism. As you may know, my own position is hylomorphism. — Andrew M

I'm very open to hylomorphism, but the Aristotelian 'hyle' is nothing like the modern conception of matter.

Secondly, hylomorphic dualism still implies a duality, insofar as 'the rational soul' is the principle within the human which is in principle immortal. That is highly developed in various forms of Thomistic philosophy, and so is still largely accepted by many Catholics, however for very obvious reasons is completely incompatible with Dennett's Darwinian materialism. And it's still dualism!

The philosopher Peter Hacker argues that the hard problem is misguided in that it asks how consciousness can emerge from matter, whereas in fact sentience emerges from the evolution of living organisms. — Wikipedia

It just re-states the problem in other terms, it doesn't solve it.

The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. Further, since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood through the physical sciences alone. Finally, since the long process of biological evolution is responsible for the existence of conscious organisms, and since a purely physical process cannot explain their existence, it follows that biological evolution must be more than just a physical process, and the theory of evolution, if it is to explain the existence of conscious life, must become more than just a physical theory. — Thomas Nagel

Because that is what body is really, a physical context in which experiences are framed. — EnPassant

"Physical" does not really work here. The body and brain are biological. Life is already far more than just "physical". It's about information. Your body is made of information, and that's why it can die.

There is therefore something objective and operational about colours as we perceive them. — Olivier5

I think this conversation is on the wrong thread, but briefly - there's a substantial difference between "something objective and operational about colours as we perceive them" and claiming there's such a thing as the subjective experience of 'blueness'.