No such hard problem arises in Hacker's proposal since it doesn't assume subject/object dualim — Andrew M

I don’t accept Hackers elision of the duality of subject and object. I did a bit of reading arounf on Hacker on Wittgenstein. As is well known W was a strong critic of 'scientism' - something which I obviously agree with. But we read:

...scientism is not only overconfidence in science. It is usually, and certainly it was in Wittgenstein's perception, part of a whole world-view that emphasizes growth, progress, and construction, a world-view that, partly following Oswald Spengler, he clearly opposed. One of the main reasons for his aversion to the scientistic world-view was that it deprives human beings of 'wonder', which he considered to be a deep need and feature of human nature. As he stated in 1930, in a remark quoted by many of the contributors, 'Man has to awaken to wonder. . . Science is a way of sending him to sleep again'

https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/wittgenstein-and-scientism/

Wojldn't 'eliminative materialism' be considered, by these criteria, a complete abrogation of the 'sense of wonder'? That the mind itself, reason itself, is simply the expression of the unconscious doings of billions of celliular automata? That it is in fact the most virulent expresssion of 'scientism' in contemprary literatre? I would be hard pressed to find a sharper example.

I'm puzzled by the way you're trying to accomodate Dennett's materialism and reconclise it with philosophies and principles with which it so celarly at odds.

[ Dennett also thinks being a collection mindless robots forming a meme machine does no real harm to free will, consciousness or intentionality.

I don’t accept Hackers elision of the duality of subject and object. — Wayfarer

So I'm pointing out that it's a purely philosophical distinction that has no use in ordinary life or scientific practice.

Arguing against systematically misleading terminology is entirely consistent with Hacker's, Wittgenstein's and Aristotle's approaches. And to argue against dualism doesn't imply agreement with Dennett's materialism. As I noted to you earlier, I reject both materialism and dualism.

Materialism fails because it still accepts half of the dualist's premise, namely Nagel's "view from nowhere". That barren landscape may well abrogate one's sense of wonder, but the solution is not to tack on ghosts. The solution is to reject dualism in its entirety, and understand the human being as a natural and inseparable unity.

So I'm pointing out that it's a purely philosophical distinction that has no use in ordinary life or scientific practice. — Andrew M

the distinction between objective and subjective is clear in plain languge.

1. Object: a material thing that can be seen and touched.
"he was dragging a large object"
2. a person or thing to which a specified action or feeling is directed.
"he became the object of a criminal investigation"

(I'll omit the verb 'to object'.)

The meaning of subject and subjecitve are various, but suffice to note that, in ordinary language, human subjects not referred to by the impersonal pronouns it or that but by he, she or they. Humans have a subjective history, perspectives,and inclinations which cannot at all be ascribed to objects (unless you're panpsychist, which I'm not.)

Incidentally I am reading Nagel's View from Nowhere, which is a slog, but I don't think it says anything like what you appear to think it says. It looks at the way science presumes to arrive at a view from nowhere, that is, one that is not at all under the influence of subjective factors. It goes through a number of paradigmantic philosophical positions in the light ot the contrast between the impersonal, scientific view, and the perspective of living beings - subject!

The solution is to reject dualism in its entirety, and understand the human being as a natural and inseparable unity. — Andrew M

The word 'natural' already containes carries baggage! You're still narrowing the scope of what the human might be, to a definitioin that is satisfactory to naturalism, when that is one of the points at issue. The Greeks, for instance, tried to trace the origin of reason in the mind and in universe through reasoned argument and introspection.

the distinction between objective and subjective is clear in plain languge.

1. Object: a material thing that can be seen and touched.
"he was dragging a large object"
2. a person or thing to which a specified action or feeling is directed.
"he became the object of a criminal investigation" — Wayfarer

The ordinary usages are fine. I'm arguing against the specifically philosophical subject/object distinction which is also stated in that source:

1.1 Philosophy A thing external to the thinking mind or subject.

For reference, see also subject (philosophy) and object (philosophy).

Incidentally I am reading Nagel's View from Nowhere, which is a slog, but I don't think it says anything like what you appear to think it says. It looks at the way science presumes to arrive at a view from nowhere, that is, one that is not at all under the influence of subjective factors. It goes through a number of paradigmantic philosophical positions in the light ot the contrast between the impersonal, scientific view, and the perspective of living beings - subject! — Wayfarer

That's the philosophical subject/object dualism that I'm arguing against. Scientific models are abstractions of human experience, they are not independent of human experience.

The solution is to reject dualism in its entirety, and understand the human being as a natural and inseparable unity.
— Andrew M

The word 'natural' already containes carries baggage! You're still narrowing the scope of what the human might be, to a definitioin that is satisfactory to naturalism, when that is one of the points at issue. The Greeks, for instance, tried to trace the origin of reason in the mind and in universe through reasoned argument and introspection. — Wayfarer

Human nature (which includes human rationality) is a part of nature. Yours and my disagreement here reflects the disagreement between Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle considered form to be immanent in nature (hence hylomorphism), whereas Plato considered form to transcend nature (hence Plato's Forms).

Yours and my disagreement here reflects the disagreement between Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle considered form to be immanent in nature (hence hylomorphism), whereas Plato considered form to transcend nature (hence Plato's Forms). — Andrew M

I think you're right. I read a remark by an Oxford don that every philosopher is one or the other, and I'm definitely the former. At least it gives an amicable ground for disagreement!

I think you're right. I read a remark by an Oxford don that every philosopher is one or the other, and I'm definitely the former. At least it gives an amicable ground for disagreement! — Wayfarer

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