Much easier said than done! — Wayfarer

I know. :up:

I don't think there's anything that contradicts the principles of rationality in quantum entanglement but I get what you mean viz. that there are some observable facts about the world that defy reason, in effect giving us a good reason to doubt reason itself. However, notice that this is still a rational thing to do i.e. we're still using reason when we make this judgement. Also, although I'm not a physicist, this whole idea of quantum physics not conforming to rational principles like the law of non-contradiction is merely a misconception, an unfortunate effect of poor analogies. — TheMadFool

Could you define reason/rationality? Saying that it’s reasonable to doubt reason in certain circumstances is circular, especially so if you’re trying to make the point that the reasonable thing to do is trust reason.

Could you define reason/rationality? — Pinprick

Reason is that faculty that discovers, isolates, and prescribes methods/ways of thinking that are either guaranteed to lead you to the truth or, at the very least, take you as close as possible to it.

To tell you the truth, reason seems to be more about steering us away from falsehoods and not exactly lead us to truth as I thought. Reminds me of scientific falsifiability, not sure. Perhaps you can shed some light on it.

Saying that it’s reasonable to doubt reason in certain circumstances is circular, especially so if you’re trying to make the point that the reasonable thing to do is trust reason. — Pinprick

Great point. It must be a paradox then - we placed complete trust in reason and the first thing it does is undermine that trust. You could look at it pessimistically and call it circular or optimistically and applaud reason for its fairness and honesty.

Reason is that faculty that discovers, isolates, and prescribes methods/ways of thinking that are either guaranteed to lead you to the truth or, at the very least, take you as close as possible to it. — TheMadFool

Ok, that would be an idealist conception of reason as a critical faculty. However reason is also the capacity to communicate with other individuals whose orientation may range from antagonistic to co-operative in the pursuit of survival. In that context, truth may very well take a back seat to expediency, propitiation, or any number of other constraints. This is I think a good example of the "ivory tower" criticism often leveled at philosophy.

Perhaps you can shed some light on it. — TheMadFool

Not really, but to me reason is about conforming to ways of thinking that have previously proven to be useful or accurate. To illustrate, a chronic liar likely does so because lying has proven useful, and therefore makes sense (is reasonable) to continue the behavior. Lying obviously has little to do with seeking truth. Reason is associated with logic so often because of logic’s usefulness in finding truth, but we aren’t always interested in finding the truth. The point being that the desired outcome matters. If the means achieve the desired end, then the act would be considered reasonable. So, more to the OP, a skeptic may desire to maintain his skepticism, and therefore doubt reason, which would be considered reasonable, but “truth” may not be his aim.

. It must be a paradox then - we placed complete trust in reason and the first thing it does is undermine that trust. You could look at it pessimistically and call it circular or optimistically and applaud reason for its fairness and honesty. — TheMadFool

There is a factor that has generally been neglected in modern philosophy - in fact it can't even really be named, because there's no name for it. That is the factor which Buddhism calls 'avidya', meaning 'ignorance'.

Now, as I say, there's no real corresponding term in modern philosophy, because avidya has morally normative connotations. The 'enlightened' (i.e. the Buddha) knows things that the untrained mind doesn't know. But this doesn't refer to a scientifically trained mind, except for perhaps by analogy. But in Buddhism, indeed in the 'perennial philosophies' generally, there is the idea that the enlightened sees things as they truly are, because their insight is no longer tarnished by self-interest, greed, passion, grasping, and so on.

Natural science, of course, tries to bring that same kind of rigour to bear on the analysis of objective matters of fact, and often succeeds in that. But what modern science omits is precisely that sense of moral normativity which is found in Buddhism and other forms of the perennial traditions, because it is solely concerned with objective matters of fact. Whereas the perennial philosophies of whatever school have an ethical dimension that is central to their outlook.

So basically only an enlightened person can know objective moral facts because, through their being enlightened, they have eliminated their moral biases? Interesting, but I’m not seeing the connection to reason/doubt. Are you saying that this paradox only exists because we are ignorant, or unenlightened?

In the cultural context of Buddhism - yes, certainly. One of the traits of the Buddha is 'yathabhutam', meaning 'to see things as they truly are'. The ordinary untrained person (putthujana) lacks this ability because their minds are naturally addled by ignorance, self-interest, like-and-dislike, and so on.

But there are certainly parallels in ancient Greek philosophy as well. In stoicism, 'the sage' was likewise a 'personification of wisdom' - think of the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, or the Consolations of Philosophy. The sage 'rises above the passions' and thereby attains to 'true wisdom'. You find analogies for this in virtually all civilised cultures. But where is it in today's culture? What stands for that now? I'm saying that this is now, in our culture, generally associated with science - because science is descended from a philosophical tradition in which that kind of detached understanding was paramount. But science omits something which is fundamental to the pre-modern formulation of wisdom, which is the qualitative aspect of judgement. Modern scientific philosophy omits (for example) the notion of formal and final cause which was intrinsic to Aristotelian philosophy. And that has consequences beyond the scientific.

You can see how this is wildly non-PC, of course. In individualist culture, there is no arbiter of truth other than science, as each man or woman is their own sole judge of moral worth. And it can't be any other way. But still, it has consequences.

Ok, that would be an idealist conception of reason as a critical faculty. However reason is also the capacity to communicate with other individuals whose orientation may range from antagonistic to co-operative in the pursuit of survival. In that context, truth may very well take a back seat to expediency, propitiation, or any number of other constraints. This is I think a good example of the "ivory tower" criticism often leveled at philosophy. — Pantagruel

I suppose you're right but reason is not so easily made to play second fiddle for the very idea that somethings may assume higher priority than it - for expediency or whatever else - is itself a reasonable course of action.

The "ivory tower" abode of philosophers is a different kettle of fish. I believe it's when philosophers remove themselves from reality and isolate themselves in a world of abstractions and thus absorbed give an air of aloofness to those not similarly occupied.

That said, taking into account the notion of zombies, I don't see how people who thinks zombies make sense (that's all of us I think) can ever accuse anyone of being in an "ivory tower" of abstract thought. Zombies aren't persons, right? What do you have to say about that?

Reason is associated with logic so often because of logic’s usefulness in finding truth, but we aren’t always interested in finding the truth. — Pinprick

See above. My description of reason didn't do justice to its full glory.

So, more to the OP, a skeptic may desire to maintain his skepticism, and therefore doubt reason, which would be considered reasonable, but “truth” may not be his aim. — Pinprick

Isn't the skeptic's position that nothing can be known, even if paradoxical, the uncomfortable truth?

Now, as I say, there's no real corresponding term in modern philosophy, because avidya has morally normative connotations. — Wayfarer

No one knowingly does evil — Socrates

What you say here reminds me of the time when I was contemplating the standard definition of god as omniscient, omnibenevolent and omnipotent. Whatever the origin of this definition, that which has a bearing on our discussion is the fact that omnibenevolence had to be mentioned as a separate quality over and above omniscience. As per the Buddhist, morally-tinged concept of avidya and also according to Socrates, having knowledge i.e. overcoming our ignorance should suffice to make us good people. However, the way god is defined suggests that no amount of knowledge, omniscience even, will suffice to make us good, in divine terms - omnibenevolent. What's up with that?

But in Buddhism, indeed in the 'perennial philosophies' generally, there is the idea that the enlightened sees things as they truly are, because their insight is no longer tarnished by self-interest, greed, passion, grasping, and so on. — Wayfarer

Reality As An Illusion

But what modern science omits is precisely that sense of moral normativity which is found in Buddhism and other forms of the perennial traditions, because it is solely concerned with objective matters of fact — Wayfarer

God: Omniscient but not necessarily Omnibenevolent and so the need to mention the latter as a separate divine attribute.

. As per the Buddhist, morally-tinged concept of avidya and also according to Socrates, having knowledge i.e. overcoming our ignorance should suffice to make us good people. — TheMadFool

actually I was reading an excerpt from a book recently, about the fact that Plato takes issue with Socrates on this question. 'Acting against your better judgement' is called in the Greek 'akrasia', as I understand it; Socrates held the view that if a rational person knows something is wrong then he or she would never do it. But, we all know what it is to 'act against our better judgement' and I think that was the basis of Plato's criticism. But I haven't really studied that issue in depth. Perhaps Socrates had reached such a stage of intellectual clarity that he literally could not act against reason, but it's fairly plain that almost no-one is like that in reality.

With respect to 'God' - again, in the Indian tradition - more Hindu than Buddhist - the sage knows Brahman - indeed coming to know Brahman, or 'realise Brahman', is the salvific point of the whole religion. But that knowing is much more like 'jnana' than our conception of knowing, it's intimately bound up with renunciation, meditation and illumination - again, practices and modes of understanding that are culturally remote from ours.

I think we tend to anthropomorphise the concept of 'God' - that we see it through the perspective of what is said about it, what it stands for symbollically in social discourse. There is tremendous hostility towards those ideas in 'this secular age'. But the way we see it, I suggest, distorts the issue. Not that there's much that can be done to ameliorate that.

However, the way god is defined suggests that no amount of knowledge, omniscience even, will suffice to make us good, in divine terms - omnibenevolent. What's up with that? — TheMadFool

I think there is a conception of knowledge, jnana, which again is 'salvific' - that there is something that, if known, is inherently salvific. There are endless realms of practical or technical or scientific knowledge which is not like that, of course. But for those on a 'quest', that 'quest' is for the kind of understanding which changes you.

Socrates had reached such a stage of intellectual clarity that he literally could not act against reason, but it's fairly plain that almost no-one is like that in reality — Wayfarer

So you stand by the Buddhist notion of avidya with its moral implications. I don't see the necessary connection between knowledge and morality.

I guess one way to interpret the absence of a link, as implied by the need to mention omnibenevolence separately from omniscience in re God, between knowledge and morality is to ensure free will. There should be no compulsion to do good and there will be one if knowledge is a slippery children's slide with goodness waiting with open arms at the bottom like a loving parent.

Perhaps I've got it backward. Knowledge doesn't lead to morality but morality leads to knowledge. If a person is good, really really good (omnibenevolent) then s/he'll do everything possible to do good and that requires knowledge. The more you know, the more you good you can do. Why not be omniscient? Knowing everything would go a long way in spreading the cheer, right?

Your thoughts?

I don't see the necessary connection between knowledge and morality. — TheMadFool

That’s because in today’s world, the link has been severed. Knowledge is, as the New Left said, mainly instrumental - know-how, knowing how to achieve an outcome, prediction and control. It is techne, not gnosis. We’re excellent at it, but meanwhile the sword of Damocles hangs over our entire world.

You see, the genuine philosophers, of all cultures, tell us that our whole conception of ‘what is real’ is faulty. That’s what you were getting at in the ‘all is illusion’ thread. Consider the allegory of the Cave, which claims that most people - hey, he’s talking about us - are ‘prisoners chained in a cave’. We don’t even know what is real. We think we do, because everyone we know is like us.

Real philosophers actually are prophets, only more subtle.

I rather like the science fiction writing of Philip K Dick. He’s always flirting with the ‘reality as illusion’ idea. Something happens which suddenly pierces the veil - the Truman Show is another example from popular culture - and we realise we’ve been living in an illusory world. It’s like we open a door to a vast world, and realise that we’ve been living in a single room all our lives, telling ourselves there’s nothing outside. Actually philosophy has to do that, otherwise what is it other than chatter?

When Gautama realised supreme enlightenment, his first impulse was not to teach, not to say anything. Legend has it the God Brahma came and implored him to teach ‘for the sake of the many’. Gautama agreed, but only because, he said, there were ‘those with but a little dust in their eyes’. They might understand. But the vast majority never would, because they’re too attached to their misery to want to give it up.

The "ivory tower" abode of philosophers is a different kettle of fish. I believe it's when philosophers remove themselves from reality and isolate themselves in a world of abstractions and thus absorbed give an air of aloofness to those not similarly occupied.

That said, taking into account the notion of zombies, I don't see how people who thinks zombies make sense (that's all of us I think) can ever accuse anyone of being in an "ivory tower" of abstract thought. Zombies aren't persons, right? What do you have to say about that? — TheMadFool

Yes, when philosophers believe that they can abstract reason from it's practical applications, Ivory tower is applicable.

I'm not sure what your zombies comment means? Can you elaborate?

That’s because in today’s world, the link has been severed. Knowledge is, as the New Left said, mainly instrumental - know-how, knowing how to achieve an outcome, prediction and control. It is techne, not gnosis. We’re excellent at it, but meanwhile the sword of Damocles hangs over our entire world. — Wayfarer

Exactly, knowledge can be used for good and it appears its the most powerful tool that anyone can have at his/her disposal toward that end. Thus, if one is so good to be omnibenevolent one of the first things one wants is omniscience to do the most good.

You see, the genuine philosophers, of all cultures, tell us that our whole conception of ‘what is real’ is faulty. That’s what you were getting at in the ‘all is illusion’ thread. Consider the allegory of the Cave, which claims that most people - hey, he’s talking about us - are ‘prisoners chained in a cave’. We don’t even know what is real. We think we do, because everyone we know is like us.

I believe the illusion is as much self-created as is imposed from outside. Our minds come hardwired with certain inclinations that predispose us to certain worldviews with no regard given to the actual truth.

Real philosophers actually are prophets, only more subtle.

This I doubt. Perhaps true in spirit - essentially both religion and philosophy arise from a sense of awe and wonder, a compulsion to discover what people call the truth. However, religion and philosophy diverge in method - the majority of religions are revelation-based and all invariably require faith but philosophy is a rational enterprise, there being no room for faith, heck, even reason itself is viewed with great suspicion.

I want to ask: could religion and spiritualism be just another shadow on the walls of Plato's cave?

I rather like the science fiction writing of Philip K Dick. He’s always flirting with the ‘reality as illusion’ idea. Something happens which suddenly pierces the veil - the Truman Show is another example from popular culture - and we realise we’ve been living in an illusory world. It’s like we open a door to a vast world, and realise that we’ve been living in a single room all our lives, telling ourselves there’s nothing outside. Actually philosophy has to do that, otherwise what is it other than chatter?

My interest in skepticism arose from the realization that IF nothing can be known, WHY try at all? However, at a certain point in my experience with Pyrrhonian skepticism, it dawned on me that Pyrrhonian skepticism doesn't mean that there's nothing to know but just that 1. it may be unknowable and 2. we can never be certain that what we know is the actual truth. Even if one knows a shop sells knockoffs and not the actual merchandise, I can still explore the shop and maybe even buy something.

When Gautama realised supreme enlightenment, his first impulse was not to teach, not to say anything. Legend has it the God Brahma came and implored him to teach ‘for the sake of the many’. Gautama agreed, but only because, he said, there were ‘those with but a little dust in their eyes’. They might understand. But the vast majority never would, because they’re too attached to their misery to want to give it up.

Heard about that. Interesting story. Reminds me of Lao Tze - those who speak don't know, those who know don't speak.

I'm not sure what your zombies comment means? Can you elaborate? — Pantagruel

I don't know if people realize this or whether it's being forced down our throats by countless media representations but zombies aren't considered persons - you can, in fact you're supposed to, kill them and there are no consequences for doing that.

What's missing in zombies that make them non-persons? They're mindless. It's odd then to accuse someone, say a philosopher, of living in an ivory tower when he's actually being mindful. :chin:

don't know if people realize this or whether it's being forced down our throats by countless media representations but zombies aren't considered persons - you can, in fact you're supposed to, kill them and there are no consequences for doing that.

What's missing in zombies that make them non-persons? They're mindless. It's odd then to accuse someone, say a philosopher, of living in an ivory tower when he's actually being mindful. :chin: — TheMadFool

I do not get it.

I do not get it. — Pantagruel

If what makes a man is a dick, does having a huge dick make you a non-man?

If what makes a man is a dick, does having a huge dick make you a non-man? — TheMadFool

I think the argument is that the ivory-tower intellectual is not actually being mindful because he or she is neglecting critical components of practical reality. So this form of "heightened rationality" is ipso facto actually irrational.....

I think the argument is that the ivory-tower intellectual is not actually being mindful because he or she is neglecting critical components of practical reality. So this form of "heightened rationality" is ipso facto actually irrational..... — Pantagruel

Thus spoke Reason.

So is the nature of reason predominantly inclusive, or exclusive?

So is the nature of reason predominantly inclusive, or exclusive? — Pantagruel

Firstly, in what sense do you mean inclusive or exclusive?

Secondly, it appears that I'm guilty of loose terminology. There's rationality - a frame of mind - which recommends skepticism/doubt and there's logic - a method to truth which supposedly gets you there without fail. Rationality advises us to be skeptical and logic attempts to reduce error - the difference between what we think is the truth and what the truth actually is.

Firstly, in what sense do you mean inclusive or exclusive?

Secondly, it appears that I'm guilty of loose terminology. There's rationality - a frame of mind - which recommends skepticism/doubt and there's logic - a method to truth which supposedly gets you there without fail. Rationality advises us to be skeptical and logic attempts to reduce error - the difference between what we think is the truth and what the truth actually is. — TheMadFool

Well, it was a question.

To me it is clear that "rationality" is a much larger concept than logic, and one which operates at both the individual and the social level. And there are many kinds of truths. Social truths can be factually inaccurate, yet still functional. As the history of humanity testifies.

Well, it was a question.

To me it is clear that "rationality" is a much larger concept than logic, and one which operates at both the individual and the social level. And there are many kinds of truths. Social truths can be factually inaccurate, yet still functional. As the history of humanity testifies. — Pantagruel

:up:

Isn't the skeptic's position that nothing can be known, even if paradoxical, the uncomfortable truth? — TheMadFool

I suppose. But if the skeptic arrives at this “truth” by using reason, how can he then cast doubt on reason? Regardless, my point was that we are often biased, and can use reason for purposes other than finding truth. That is, if you define reason as being dependent on the goal.

I suppose. But if the skeptic arrives at this “truth” by using reason, how can he then cast doubt on reason? Regardless, my point was that we are often biased, and can use reason for purposes other than finding truth. That is, if you define reason as being dependent on the goal. — Pinprick

Rationality imposes many duties on a person and one of them is to be skeptical in a global sense - everything must be doubted - and that includes rationality itself. There are two things to consider here:

1. The doubt itself: What's the actual truth? How certain are we about a particular claim?

and

2. How can we remove this doubt? How can we discover the actual truth? How can we improve our confidence in a claim?

It's interesting that rationality pays homage to doubt - its point of origin as it were (read the OP) - by making skepticism our duty, an obligation we have to fulfill, if we're ever to get to the truth or as close to it as possible.

Carrying out this duty of skepticism as best as we can, we come to a point where we doubt rationality itself. This attitude of doubt toward rationality reveals an important truth, to wit that it's just one method of removing doubt and there may be other, possibly better, methods out there to tackle the problem of doubt.

Interestingly, it seems rationality is the best among all possible methods of ferreting out truths. Suppose someone claims he discovered another doubt-removing method, call it X. How would we know X is better than rationality? By using rationality, right? We would say things like, "X is better than rationality because..." and that, if nothing else, is being rational. If a court judge finds a better judge, doesn't that mean he himself is the best? :chin: This reminds me of the concept of technological singularity - we kick it off by building the first authentic AI and that AI builds a better AI and that AI builds another AI better than itself, so and so forth. Relate the idea of technological singularity to rationality as a method of discovering truths and it seems possible that a method of arriving at truths different from rationality maybe out there waiting to be discovered. Thus, we must doub rationality/reason.

All the incremental objects of the nature of an AI remain an AI, but the thesis on rationality implies a methodology better than, hence necessarily different from, rationality. The former is a consistent equivalence in itself, the latter is not, therefore they have no equivalence to each other.

“...We are actually in possession of a priori synthetical cognitions, as is proved by the existence of the principles of the understanding, which anticipate experience. If any one cannot comprehend the possibility of these principles, he may have some reason to doubt whether they are really a priori; but he cannot on this account declare them to be impossible, and affirm the nullity of the steps which reason may have taken under their guidance. He can only say: If we perceived their origin and their authenticity, we should be able to determine the extent and limits of reason; but, till we can do this, all propositions regarding the latter are mere random assertions. In this view, the doubt respecting all dogmatical philosophy, which proceeds without the guidance of criticism, is well grounded; but we cannot therefore deny to reason the ability to construct a sound philosophy, when the way has been prepared by a thorough critical investigation.

All the conceptions produced, and all the questions raised, by pure reason, do not lie in the sphere of experience, but in that of reason itself, and hence they must be solved, and shown to be either valid or inadmissible, by that faculty. We have no right to decline the solution of such problems, on the ground that the solution can be discovered only from the nature of things, and under pretence of the limitation of human faculties, for reason is the sole creator of all these ideas, and is therefore bound either to establish their validity or to expose their illusory nature.

The polemic of scepticism is properly directed against the dogmatist, who erects a system of philosophy without having examined the fundamental objective principles on which it is based, for the purpose of evidencing the futility of his designs, and thus bringing him to a knowledge of his own powers. But, in itself, scepticism does not give us any certain information in regard to the bounds of our knowledge. All unsuccessful dogmatical attempts of reason are facia, which it is always useful to submit to the censure of the sceptic. But this cannot help us to any decision regarding the expectations which reason cherishes of better success in future endeavours; the investigations of scepticism cannot, therefore, settle the dispute regarding the rights and powers of human reason....”
(CPR, A763,4/B791,2)

This attitude of doubt toward rationality reveals an important truth, to wit that it's just one method of removing doubt and there may be other, possibly better, methods out there to tackle the problem of doubt. — TheMadFool

It does not follow merely from the skepticism of one rationality, that another replacement methodology for it, is possible. Such methodology may very well be possible, but its possibility is given from a different kind of entity, rather than something so lackadaisical as skeptical analysis of the method already in play, by the possessor of it. Besides, how would a human rationality ever understand a rationality other than the human kind, and because he is necessarily at a complete loss to understand it due to the very limitations of his own, how would he ever claim the betterment of it?

All the incremental objects of the nature of an AI remain an AI, but the thesis on rationality implies a methodology better than, hence necessarily different from, rationality. The former is a consistent equivalence in itself, the latter is not, therefore they have no equivalence to each other. — Mww

:chin: Initially I was inclined to agree but can't the nth AI be as different from the (n+1)th as humans will be from the first genuine AI (capable of building something better than itself)? Exponential growth in intelligence, which is what the technological singularity is, is something we probably can't put on a scale and make predictions on. As an example, look how evolution has taken us from unicellular, presumably non-sentient, lifeforms to us, humans, capable of, supposedly, monumental feats - attaining the technological singularity for instance.

It does not follow merely from the skepticism of one rationality, that another replacement methodology for it, is possible. Such methodology may very well be possible, but its possibility is given from a different kind of entity, rather than something so lackadaisical as skeptical analysis of the method already in play, by the possessor of it. Besides, how would a human rationality ever understand a rationality other than the human kind, and because he is necessarily at a complete loss to understand it due to the very limitations of his own, how would he ever claim the betterment of it? — Mww

You mean to say that we can be absolutely certain (no doubts) that we have the best possible method of acquiring knowledge - currently rationality - and also have a good reason to look for a better method? :chin: That sounds off somehow. Methinks it's exactly when we doubt our method's capabilities that we look for something else. No?

Too, I'm taken aback by how you called doubt "lackadaisical" when in fact we're repeatedly cautioned to be skeptical when faced with claims people make or when we make observations of the world. Perhaps you're more religious than you think you are. :brow:

we're repeatedly cautioned to be skeptical when faced with claims people make — TheMadFool

Skepticism regarding the contents, or the objects, with which the method may be concerned, is hardly the same as the skepticism directed at the method itself.
———-

Methinks it's exactly when we doubt our method's capabilities that we look for something else. No? — TheMadFool

Not in the view from this armchair, no. It’s not so fine a line between doubting a method’s capabilities, and using the method such that its intrinsic capabilities are misguiding. If it is possible the method doesn’t correspond to its conditions, and if from that it is impossible to tell whether it is the method itself or the agent’s use of it that serves as causality for the discord, there is no proper justification for faulting the method alone.

Besides...how would one, as a human rational agent, ever be able to prove some alternative methodology to rationality, that isn’t itself an exposition given from the very unique and innate human condition it was meant to replace? In other words, what profit can there ever be in looking for that which the means for looking immediately makes the ends looked for, impossible to find? Hence the use of lackadaisical, tacitly indicating the absurdity of looking for impossible ends as opposed to correcting extant means.

Nevertheless.....benefit of the doubt: what form do you think an alternative to the human rational method would take?

Skepticism regarding the contents, or the objects, with which the method may be concerned, is hardly the same as the skepticism directed at the method itsel — Mww

Of course they're different in content but not in spirit and in this case it's all about spirit - the questioning spirit.

Not in the view from this armchair, no. It’s not so fine a line between doubting a methods capabilities, and using the method such that its intrinsic capabilities are misguiding. If it is possible the method doesn’t correspond to its conditions, and if from that it is impossible to tell whether it is the method itself or the agent’s use of it that serves as causality for the discord, there is no proper justification for faulting the method alone. — Mww

Agreed but the problem is that there is no proper justification to not to fault the method.

Besides...how would one, as a human rational agent, ever be able to prove some alternative methodology to rationality, that isn’t itself an exposition given from the very unique and innate human condition it was meant to replace? In other words, what profit can there ever be in looking for that which the means for looking immediately makes the ends looked for, impossible to find? Hence the use of lackadaisical, tacitly indicating the absurdity of looking for impossible ends as opposed to correcting extant means. — Mww

Demonstrate the impossibility of the absence of another method, different to rationality that can help us discover truths or guide us in making sense of our world and I promise to give your claims a second look.

Nevertheless.....benefit of the doubt: what form do you think an alternative to the human rational method would take? — Mww

One method exists - faith. It's really just circling back to where we began. Faith led to problems and that led to doubt and that led to reason and to ask us now to have faith is just closing the loop. Do you think there's a good reason to believe on faith and faith alone?

the problem is that there is no proper justification to not to fault the method. — TheMadFool

Oh, I would think there is. It is quite justified to not fault the method, when it is at least possible, if not probable, the use of it is the sole and complete fault. If it’s 50/50, it becomes proper NOT to fault the method alone, in disregard of its use, which is what I said. In order to prove the method at fault, it must be shown that irrationality is impossible, which historical precedent determines not to be the case.
————-

Demonstrate the impossibility of the absence of another method, different to rationality — TheMadFool

The impossibility of the absence of another method presupposes the method necessarily, the validity of which has yet to be established with any apodeictic certainty; such method being only an idea, or at best, a mere notion, the conceptual predicates for it being highly arguable.
————-

Do you think there's a good reason to believe on faith and faith alone? — TheMadFool

What is faith, but rationality without the ground of experience, or, which is the same thing, empirical knowledge? As such, it is not so much a different methodology, but rather, the same methodology operating under different conditions. It follows that it may be all well and good to have faith in that for which experience is merely possible, but it is not all well and good to have faith in that for which experience contradicts. Otherwise, the Earth would still be the center of the universe.

Now the typical rejoinder is: do you have faith in your perceptions, or, do you have faith that reason isn’t fooling you? Or that the fundamental laws of logic and mathematics are universally and necessarily irrefutable? Then it becomes a question of whether not yet having sufficient reason to doubt is the same as having faith. I suppose semantically it is, but still, that doesn’t magically turn faith into an entirely different methodology distinguishable from rationality. Technically, to have faith alone as a determinant quality is nothing more than using rationality without regard for its intrinsic logical legislation, again, in conformity to, and justified by, experience.