The world is totally separate from us, existing on its own never saying anything at all. — Corvus

You believe that the world is totally separate to us.

However, this was not the case for Wittgenstein.

According to GEM Anscombe in her paper "The Question of Linguistic Idealism", she considers Wittgenstein to be a partial linguistic idealist.

Partial, in that for Wittgenstein some things don't depend on linguistic practice, such as numbers, horses, wolves, days, etc, whilst some things do depend on linguistic practice, such as rules, rights, promises, etc.

Linguistic idealism is the position that our language does not describe an empirical reality that we are aware of through our sense perceptions, but rather our language determines what kind of contact we have we the reality of the world. Linguistic Idealism undermines the traditional Realist/Idealist debate.

For Wittgenstein, the world is not totally separate to the language that we use to describe it.

For Wittgenstein, the world is not totally separate to the language that we use to describe it. — RussellA

I would rather agree with the world of Heideggerian or MP's, of which the structure or existence is disclosed or revealed by language. The world will happily keep existing without language or humans. Perhaps language and humans cannot exist without the world? It seems the case that the world has existed prior to the existence of life for long time.

And being a hinge proposition is a role taken on in the course of setting up a language game. While playing the game it cannot be doubted. And some games are always being played. — Banno

Hinges are layered. Some hinges, the most basic kind, like "The Earth has existed for more than ten minutes," must be accepted to even have a language or a language game. Here, I'm speaking of the most basic beliefs (such beliefs are the precursors to language) shown only in our actions (although they remain even after language develops), apart from language. The act of sitting on a chair shows my belief in chairs. The act of using my hands shows my belief in hands, etc. This is where hinges start, and they are more fundamental than the hinges that form as part of language. "t is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language game (OC 241). The truth is shown in the actions. This is different from traditional thinking about truth because these truths cannot be doubted or falsified.

OC 206. If someone asked us "but is that true?" we might say "yes" to him; and if he demanded grounds we might say "I can't give you any grounds, but if you learn more you too will think the same"

In other words, if someone asked me "is it true that hinges are beyond doubt", I might say "yes".

If someone asked me "is it true that one feels pain when stung by a wasp", I might say "yes"

The truth is that one feels pain when stung by a wasp. It is not the pain that is true.

The truth is that hinges are beyond doubt. It is not the hinge that is true. — RussellA

You're going a bit too far. My point is that when referring to truth, Wittgenstein is not only thinking in terms of traditional propositions. He applies truth to hinges, too. This is in reference to my discussion with Banno. The truth is built into the actions. The actions show their truth.

You're going a bit too far. My point is that when referring to truth, Wittgenstein is not only thinking in terms of traditional propositions. He applies truth to hinges, too. This is in reference to my discussion with Banno. The truth is built into the actions. The actions show their truth. — Sam26

A historical individual or institution decided that when someone waves one hand the action is to be named "here is one hand", rather than "here are five fishes", for example. Similar to JL Austin's performative utterance.

With the passage of time, that "here is one hand" indicates the action of waving one hand is now beyond doubt, and is therefore a hinge.

Years later, Moore waves one hand and says "here is one hand"

The proposition "here is one hand" is true if and only if Moore waves one hand.

The action of waving one hand shows the truth of the proposition "here is one hand"

But the proposition "here is one hand" is not the hinge that is exempt from doubt.

Therefore, the action of waving one hand doesn't show the truth of the hinge.

The hinge that is exempt from doubt is that the proposition "here is one hand" indicates the action of waving one hand.

The hinge is neither true nor false. The hinge enables truth and falsity in the language game.

I would rather agree with the world of Heideggerian or MP's, of which the structure or existence is disclosed or revealed by language. — Corvus

As Wittgenstein wrote, Moore knows that the earth existed long before his birth, and we all know the same as he (OC 84).

I only know about the earth because of language.

A person without language (suppose they had been born on a desert island and raised by Mona monkeys) could not know about the earth.

The problem is, how can I know about something that is independent of language when I can only know about it within language?

For example, in what sense does "earth" in language capture the reality of the earth, being 12,714 km in diameter and having a mass of 5.9722 × 10^24 kg.

Yep. Note especially

The truth is shown in the actions. — Sam26

Truth is propositional, hence actions are propositional - which is to say no more than that we can talk about what we do.

The problem is, how can I know about something that is independent of language when I can only know about it within language? — RussellA

Why would you supose you only know things within language? No wonder.

I see truth as more than propositional truth. I don't think we'll get passed this disagreement.

I see truth as more than propositional truth. — Sam26

Sure you do. But of course that means you can't say what that more is. And yet you seem to claim to.

The "more" is something like what we do, including what we show. But that can be put into proposition form.

The world is all that is the case. Truth is built in and assertable. Having "hinges" outside of propositions breaches this basic and central tenant, this most central of Wittgenstein's hinge propositions. Here, he is not making a mere observation or assertion but setting up the philosophical game he played throughout his life. He is setting out the extent of the world. Now you want things that are outside the world, that are the case but not true, or true but not the case.

That's inconsistent.

For example, in what sense does "earth" in language capture the reality of the earth, being 12,714 km in diameter and having a mass of 5.9722 × 10^24 kg. — RussellA

Most folks wouldn't need such information in their life on the earth. Especially if you were a Zarathustra in the remote mountain cave living alone, the earth is a place where you are born, find food, cook, lie down for sunshine and enjoy watching the stars in the night sky. All these activities can be performed without knowing language.

It is my position that Wittgenstein is offering a more nuanced view of truth that is embedded in our subjective certainties, practices, and language use. His nuanced view takes into account the relationship between language, practice, and reality. This account is a departure from the traditional notions of correspondence and coherence. He doesn’t offer a theory so much as a way of understanding how truth works in our lives. So, truth is more than a propositional notion, it's deeply tied to our actions, both physical and linguistic. We couldn’t even understand propositional truth without these very basic or bedrock shared convictions. They provide the framework that allows the language of traditional propositions to work. Such convictions (hinges) underlie our entire way of thinking, speaking, and acting in the world.

(Subjectivity here isn’t about individualism but about what is shared by all of us, i.e., it's communal agreement.)

Now you want things that are outside the world, that are the case but not true, or true but not the case. — Banno

I'm not talking about anything outside the world. His hinges are tied to the world, i.e., there would be no hinges without the world. You're tied to the notion of propositions and language, but hinges, at least some hinges, support the very ideas you're proposing. The language game of propositions wouldn't exist without these basic certainties.

I think we can get locked into formal definitions and miss these subtleties.

So, truth is more than a propositional notion, it's deeply tied to our actions, both physical and linguistic. — Sam26

Again, sure. This sort of thing is already in 'meaning as use" motif. I'm not aware of his having addressed Tarski directly, and certainly Davidson's view is after and reliant on Wittgenstein.

Unfortunately I don't have access to the Floyd articles on the topics that concern you. The tension between us might be similar to that between prose and proof that she discusses. It's pretty unlikely that W. did not grasp the formal argument, as some have suggested. But it might be mistaken to supose that the tension between formalism and prose is strictly either-or. Gödel uses a notion of "truth" that is independent of proof, while Wittgenstein looks more to some form of constructionism; another tension that you will need to deal with in your new project.

I'll put my previous argument to you again, since it seems to me that it is central, but perhaps not as obvious as I had thought. Briefly and dogmatically...
1. The world is all that is the case. This I take as a view that W. kept throughout his thinking.
2. In the Tractatus, W. argues that there are important aspects of the world that are shown, but not said.
3. In PI, W. adds that there are also things we do, and that these include what we do with words - that it is what we do with words that is important, not abstract and private "meanings".
4. In OC, W. adds that there are some things that we say which ground what we do, including our use of words. These are effectively not about the world, but rather set up the language we use. This is best understood in the terms Anscombe later set out, as a difference in direction of fit.

Now the difficulty faced by the recent fad of reading Wittgenstein as suggesting that there are non-propositional truths is that it is difficult to give instances of things that are true and yet unstatable. And this is a pretty direct consequence of (1) - that the world is all that is the case - the world is what can be stated to be true.

Truth is more than a propositional notion in that it is how the world is, of course - but that is repeating the difference between "the cat is on the mat" and that the cat is on the mat; between making noises and making assertion, between saying and doing.

I don't see that you have provided a notion of truth that is adequate to these tasks, and i think this is so not becasue you have not done enough with "truth", but that you have tried to do too much.

Point 1:
You seem to agree that truth is more than a propositional notion, tied to our actions, which aligns with Wittgenstein’s meaning as use (PI 43). You point out that this is already present in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and I agree – it’s a cornerstone of my argument. In OC 204, Wittgenstein says, “It is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language game.” I build on this by showing how the truth of hinges is demonstrated in our actions. For example, sitting in a chair shows the truth that chairs exist, a prelinguistic certainty (OC 148), whereas linguistic actions – like saying “I know the Earth exists” in a communal context reflect lived certainties (OC 206). Your acknowledgment doesn’t fully address my layered view of hinges, which makes a distinction between prelinguistic and linguistic certainties. This is crucial to understanding how truth operates at different levels of our practices. I’ll return to this point as I address your other critiques.

Point 2:
There is a tension between Godel’s formal notion of truth and Wittgenstein’s constructivist approach, which suggests the need for further investigation. Godel’s incompleteness theorems (1931) rely on objective truth—unprovable statements are true in a mathematical sense, independent of proof within the system. You argue that Wittgenstein leans toward constructivism, which ties truth to our practices (OC 241). However, my analogy between Godel and Wittgenstein is structural. Godel shows that formal systems require unprovable statements to function, and Wittgenstein shows that epistemological systems require unprovable hinges that enable justification and doubt (OC 115). Both systems rely on unprovable foundations despite being in different domains (formal systems vs lived practices). This supports my argument about the limits of human knowledge without conflating the two notions of truth.

Point 3:
You argue that truth is propositional, rooted in the Tractates’ “the world is all that is the case” (T 1), and that hinges are effectively not about the world” but set up our language (as per Anscombe). You trace this through Wittgenstein’s development—PI’s focus on what we do with words (PI 43), and OC’s hinges grounding our language use. I disagree with your interpretation on two grounds. First, your reliance on the Tractatus overlooks Wittgenstein’s evolution in On Certainty. In OC 241, he says, “It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.” Truth is embedded in our communal practices, not just what can be stated. Hinges aren’t merely linguistic setups—they’re tied to the world we live in (OC 94: “I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness…”). Sitting on a chair shows my belief in chairs, this is an action in the world, not just a language rule.

Second, you claim that hinges can’t be non-propositional truths because truth is statable, which misses my layered view. Prelinguistic hinges, like “Chairs exist,” are shown in actions before language (OC 475: “I want to regard man here as an animal…”). Their truth is in the acting itself—sitting on a chair demonstrates its truth (OC 204). Linguistic hinges, like “I am not a brain in a vat,” are stated, but their truth is still pragmatic—I live as if the world is real. In OC 206, Wittgenstein says we might say ‘yes’ if asked if a hinge is true—we treat it as true because we live it, not because it’s a justified proposition. My view isn’t about unstatable truths; it’s about truths shown in actions, which later we articulate. Your propositional focus overlooks this prelinguistic layer, where truth precedes language.

Point 4:
Finally, you claim I haven’t provided an “adequate” notion of truth, suggesting I’ve tried to do “too much” by extending truth beyond propositions. I believe this is an unfair critique because it doesn’t fully engage with my pragmatic view, which is specific to hinges, not a universal redefinition of truth. I argue that truth for hinges is shown in our actions—physical (sitting on a chair) and linguistic (using words in language games)—and embedded in our forms of life. This isn’t a new theory of truth but a way of understanding how truth functions for hinges, aligning with Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. In OC 204 he emphasizes acting, and in OC 206, he notes we treat hinges as true - as a lived certainty. My layered view ensures this applies to both prelinguistic hinges (truth in acting) and linguistic hinges (truth in language games). Your T-sentence model assumes truth is propositional, but prelinguistic hinges aren’t propositions—their truth is in the acting itself. My notion of truth is adequate for hinges—it captures their lived, communal nature, offering a nuanced perspective on how truth works in our practices, not just in statements.

I build on this by showing how the truth of hinges is demonstrated in our actions. — Sam26

Today, that "here is one hand" means waving one hand is beyond doubt, and is therefore a hinge.

Neither "here is one hand" nor waving one hand is a hinge. "Here is one hand" means waving one hand is the hinge.

But suppose, as you say, that this hinge is true.

Then, this hinge is true because "here is one hand" means waving one hand.

IE, "here is one hand" means waving one hand is true because "here is one hand" means waving one hand.

But this is an example of the Law of Identity. where the notion of truth is redundant. We say A is A. We don't say A is true because A.

Today, that "here is one hand" means waving one hand is beyond doubt, and is therefore a hinge.

Neither "here is one hand" nor waving one hand is a hinge. "Here is one hand" means waving one hand is the hinge. — RussellA

What makes Moorean propositions ("Here is one hand.") a hinge, according to Wittgenstein, is their status as bedrock certainties. This particular bedrock certainty is prelinguistic (not all hinges are prelinguistic, but bedrock certainties are), i.e., it's shown in our actions. Our actions alone demonstrate our certainty that we have hands. (This is not an objective certainty, i.e., it's subjective and communal, not individualistic, meaning they’re shared in our forms of life.) Many such bedrock hinges fall into this prelinguistic category and they're the foundation for language itself. These prelinguistic certainties or beliefs are a necessary precursor for all our talk of justification and truth (i.e., traditional propositional talk). The subjective certainty in these bedrock hinges is lived, prelinguistic beliefs shown in actions—is equivalent to what we hold to be true in a pragmatic lived sense, but not in the traditional, propositional sense. You still seem to want to think of them in the traditional sense. They don't function like that.

We treat certain actions as true in a very practical way. The act of opening a door shows that we treat this hinge as true in a very practical and pragmatic sense. There is no doubt here, there is just action that reflects our subjective communal certainties.

1) What makes Moorean propositions ("Here is one hand.") a hinge, according to Wittgenstein, is their status as bedrock certainties.
2) This particular bedrock certainty is prelinguistic (not all hinges are prelinguistic, but bedrock certainties are), i.e., it's shown in our actions — Sam26

How are you defining "hinge"?

Is the hinge 1) the Moorean proposition "here is one hand", or 2) the prelinguistic bedrock certainty, here is one hand.

Here's a rough definition of hinges.

Hinges are layered, arational (arational because they are not subject to the rational processes of justification, doubt, or proof that characterize traditional epistemological theory), foundational convictions shared by all humans within our forms of life that serve as indubitable certainties grounding our epistemological language, systems of doubt, and justification. They exist both prelinguistically and linguistically, with their truth shown through our actions rather than propositional validation.

Hinges are layered, arational (arational because they are not subject to the rational processes of justification, doubt, or proof that characterize traditional epistemological theory), foundational convictions shared by all humans within our forms of life that serve as indubitable certainties grounding our epistemological language, systems of doubt, and justification. They exist both prelinguistically and linguistically, with their truth shown through our actions rather than propositional validation. — Sam26

:smile: I appreciate your definition.

Prelinguistic

In the world are facts, such as i) here is one hand, ii) the apple is green, iii) the mountain is next to the tree.

These facts exist within human Forms of Life. They exist prelinguistically and are beyond doubt. They are bedrock certainties.

Question 1. Are these prelinguistic facts hinges?

The notion of truth is redundant.
If the apple is green then the apple is green.
Nothing is added - if the apple is green then it is true that the apple is green.

Linguistic meaning

Today, that "here is one hand" means here is one hand is beyond doubt.

The notion of truth is redundant
If "here is one hand" means here is one hand then "here is one hand" means here is one hand
Nothing is added - if "here is one hand" means here is one hand then it is true that "here is one hand" means here is one hand.

Linguistic correspondence

"Here is one hand" is a hinge proposition because its meaning is beyond doubt, as we know that it means here is one hand.

"Here is one hand" is true IFF here is one hand

The truth of the proposition "here is one hand" is contingent on there being here is one hand in the world.

We can talk about prelinguistic truth in terms of facts by understanding facts as states of affairs that are separate from language, similar to the lived truth of prelinguistic hinges. The fact that “The Earth has one moon” exists as a reality (a fact), and a prelinguistic human’s engagement with it (e.g., navigating by moonlight) reflects a lived belief in that fact, similar to how sitting on a chair reflects the lived truth that “Chairs exist.” This isn’t about hinges corresponding to facts in a propositional sense but about their truth being a lived engagement with facts as prelinguistic realities.

This isn’t about hinges corresponding to facts in a propositional sense but about their truth being a lived engagement with facts as prelinguistic realities. — Sam26

Wittgenstein in Tractatus did not describe facts as lived truths

2 What is the case - a fact - is the existence of states of affairs

Do you have any reference that supports you in describing prelinguistic facts as lived truths?

Forget the Tractatus, it has nothing to do with any of this. Some of this is my own extrapolations from OC, but I believe it follows. OC is an unfinished work. We don't know what Witt would have left in or out, or what he would've added.

Here is a more detailed definition of bedrock beliefs or bedrock convictions, aka hinges.

Hinges are layered, arational foundational convictions shared by all humans within our form of life. They serve as indubitable certainties grounding our epistemological language, systems of doubt, and justification. Hinges operate on both the prelinguistic and linguistic levels, with their truth shown in our actions rather than in propositional form.

Prelinguistic Hinges: These are the most foundational convictions, such as “Chairs exist” (shown by sitting) or “I have hands” (shown by using them), which are instinctual, prelinguistic beliefs embedded in our actions before language develops (OC 475: “I want to regard man here as an animal…”; OC 148: “Why do I not satisfy myself that I have two feet…? There is no why. I simply don’t. This is how I act”). They form the primary layer, enabling both language and language games by providing the unarticulated certainties on which linguistic practices are built (OC 115: “The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty”).

Linguistic Hinges: These are articulated convictions that develop within language games, such as “I am not a brain in a vat” (OC 114) or “2+2=4,” which remain indubitable and ground specific epistemic or mathematical practices (PI 23). They build on the prelinguistic layer, extending its certainties into linguistic frameworks while retaining their foundational role.

Arational Nature: Hinges are arational, neither true nor false in the traditional epistemological sense because they are not subject to justification or doubt (OC 205: “If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false”). They are the “hinges on which our questions turn” (OC 341-343), exempt from the true/false evaluation applied to propositional statements (OC 243: “One says ‘I know’ when one is ready to give compelling grounds… However, with hinges, there is no such possibility”).

Foundational Convictions: Hinges are foundational convictions that anchor our epistemological systems, providing the ungrounded basis for language, doubt, and justification. They are the inherited background against which we distinguish true and false (OC 94: “I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness…”). In OC 102, Wittgenstein says, “There are propositions which… are expressions of a conviction,” highlighting their role as the untested certainties we live by.

Shared Within Our Form of Life: Hinges are communal, not individualistic, they are subjective certainties shared by all humans within our form of life. The prelinguistic belief in chairs’ existence, shown by sitting, is a universal certainty across humans, persisting even after language develops.

Truth Shown Through Actions: The truth of hinges is pragmatic and lived, shown in our actions, both physical and linguistic, rather than through propositional confirmation. For prelinguistic hinges, truth is in the acting: sitting on a chair shows the truth of “Chairs exist." For linguistic hinges, truth is shown in lived practices within language games: treating the world as real reflects the truth of “I am not a brain in a vat” (OC 206: “If someone asked us ‘but is that true [referring to a hinge]?’ we might say ‘yes’ to him…”). This truth is a new category, pragmatic, lived truth, quite distinct from propositional truth, as it exists apart from language for prelinguistic hinges and remains action-based for linguistic hinges.

Hinges operate on both the prelinguistic and linguistic levels, with their truth shown in our actions rather than in propositional form. — Sam26

A valuable post. If I may add my thoughts to your conversation.

I am using "here is one hand" to indicate a proposition in language and (here is one hand) to indicate something in the world.

The requirement for action is limited

In the beginning, the meaning of the proposition "here is one hand" can only be shown by an action, such as waving one hand or pointing to the one hand. In other words, in the beginning, how would anyone know that "here is one hand" means (here is one hand) rather than (here is one finger), unless there was some kind of action?

However, once the process has been repeated a sufficient number of times, then it may become a certainty beyond doubt in the minds of the community that "here is one hand" means (here is one hand). This is along the lines of JL Austin's Performative Utterance.

However, in the world, no action is required to know that (here is one hand) is a certainty beyond doubt. If I see (here is one hand), then there is no uncertainty in my mind that (here is one hand). I don't need to see it wave, be pointed at or open a door for me to be certain beyond doubt that (here is one hand). (Here is one hand) may remain static for me to know beyond doubt that (here is one hand).

The truth of (here is one hand) is no different to the truth of (an apple). As we don't say that (an apple) is true, there is no reason that say that (here is one hand) is true. Is (the Moon) true, is (Mount Everest) true? Then why should (here is one hand) be true?

Prelinguistically, action is not required to know (here is one hand) and in addition, truth is redundant.